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In a footnote added to the 1764 edition of An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), David Hume (1711–1776) declared in uncharacteristically oracular fashion that ‘CICERO, . . . in a dispute, which is chiefly verbal, must, on account of the author, carry an authority, from which there can be no appeal’.​[1]​ Here, as Isabel Rivers observes, Hume ‘breathtakingly attributes a quasi-scriptural status’ to Cicero’s philosophical writings.​[2]​ Even more breathtaking, however, was the range of questions which Hume denominated as ‘chiefly verbal’ in his works. Hume’s resolution of these issues was fundamental to the ‘total alteration in philosophy’ which he professed to effect from his remarkable first publication, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740), onward.​[3]​ The two most pertinent, ‘chiefly verbal’ disputes concerned morality on the one hand, and religion on the other. In A Treatise, Hume declared that the debate over which qualities in human nature were ‘entitled to the denomination of virtue’ was a question for ‘grammarians’.​[4]​ Understood in context, this claim was remarkable in its implications for the normative pretentions of moral philosophy: ‘virtue’ merely signified that sentiment of approval or reproach which people, in the course of common (and communal) life, experienced when considering the actions and qualities exhibited by others. The second dispute was intimately related to the first and was identified as ‘merely verbal’ in a paragraph added by a dying Hume in 1776 to Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779). This regarded the nature and attributes of God.​[5]​  	  
That Hume found the ancient philosopher’s treatment of religion to be both instructive and stimulating is clearly evidenced by the Dialogues, which—as was readily apparent to his contemporary readers, well-versed in their Cicero—was closely modelled on De Natura Deorum. Yet Hume attached a comparable importance to Cicero’s moral philosophy. In Book III of A Treatise, Hume advanced his ethical theory without making this debt to Cicero clear; but, in defending it from his earliest critic, Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), Hume claimed that he had taken his ‘Catalogue of Virtues from Cicero’s Offices’ and ‘had, indeed, the former Book in my Eye in all my Reasonings’.​[6]​ Hume’s identification of his treatment of ethics and, indeed, of justice with Cicero’s was affirmed quite explicitly, and repeatedly, in the Principles of Morals. As Hume further observed to Hutcheson in 1740, this adoption of (what Hume claimed to be) a Ciceronian approach to morals carried ‘very momentous’ consequences for an understanding of the relationship between religion and ethics.​[7]​ 
One, primary objective of this book is to offer an intellectual context which sheds light on why Hume held Cicero’s authority to be inviolable when attempting to settle a question which, it is argued, occupied the central place in philosophical debate in Britain from the mid-seventeenth to the late-eighteenth century.​[8]​ This concerned the relationship between moral philosophy and moral theology: a subject to which Hume gave more attention, and on which he wrote more extensively, than any other. To what extent, if at all, did the principles that determine the quality of human behaviour need to be understood in the light of God’s will and intentions for His creatures? This question was, in Britain, placed within the context of the historiography of moral philosophy. How far had the heathen philosophers, who had known nothing of Christ, been able satisfactorily to explain morality without recourse to the existence of a divine creator and moral legislator, who would reward or punish men for their conduct on the Day of Judgment? Had the moral teachings of Christianity enlarged upon, contradicted, or merely reaffirmed what the ancient philosophers had been able to discover on the basis of reason alone? What had been the implications of the institutionalisation of Christianity, from the late Roman Empire onwards, as a national religion throughout Europe for the moral and political regulation of communities, and for an accurate philosophical understanding of the true principles of ethics and justice? Hume maintained that Cicero had something uniquely valuable to say on all of these questions. As this study will explain, he was not alone in doing so. By taking this interest in Cicero as a lens through which to understand the development of moral philosophy in this period, this study also seeks to contribute to a number of other areas of current scholarly interest, and to allow us to reconstruct contemporary understandings of the interrelationships between them. This includes the history of scholarship; the contested relationship between sacred and civil history; the emergent interest in the history of manners and mores; the interpretation of the significance of ‘modern’ commercial society; and the development of theories of toleration, and their connection to fears concerning priestly imposture (‘priestcraft’). 
CICERO AND THE ‘SCIENCE OF MAN’
In the pages to follow, it is argued that the writings of John Locke (1632–1704) were profoundly influential both in setting the relationship between moral philosophy and moral theology at the heart of British philosophical debate, and in suggesting that this relationship might legitimately be addressed by turning to the state of moral philosophy in the ancient world (that is, prior to Christ’s ministry). The intellectual relationship between Locke and Hume has, of course, been extensively mined by historians of philosophy; but the focus has largely been placed on their epistemological writings, and on the development of a tradition of British empiricism. Hume’s concerted engagement with issues raised by Locke’s moral philosophy and religious apologetic has received considerably less attention. Indeed, anthologies of British moral philosophy in this period, such as D.D. Raphael’s influential British Moralists, 1650–1800, tend to present Locke as a marginal figure, thereby skipping from Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) to Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713).​[9]​ 
One reason for doing so is that Locke, notwithstanding his very evident interest in the subject, can scarcely be said to have offered a systematic treatment of ethics. Instead his moral thinking has to be pieced together from various (and not necessarily easily-reconcilable) scattered remarks in An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689), Two Treatises of Government (1689), the Epistola de Tolerantia (1689) and its defences, The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), and his extensive unpublished writings.​[10]​ Only one monograph in English has been dedicated exclusively to Locke’s ethical thought, and its author acknowledges at the outset that ‘as a moral philosopher Locke does not belong in the front rank’.​[11]​ As this suggests, another reason for the marginalization of Locke’s influence in the realm of moral philosophy relates to the substantive character of his ethical thought: put crudely, Locke’s thinking on the subject is often held to be as inconsistent as it was piecemeal, and out of step with what historians of philosophy deem to be the trajectory of British moral theory in the eighteenth century. As the example of Hume indicates, this trajectory tended towards a naturalistic, sentimentalist, and broadly secular theory of ethics.​[12]​ The most important British philosophers of the period, as J.L. Mackie observed, agreed in ‘finding a basis for morals in the specific economy of the human soul’, whereas Locke offered a deontological, and theologically-grounded ‘rationalist ethics’.​[13]​ For Locke, neither the content nor the obligatory character of morality could properly be understood if one denied the existence of a divine legislator, who wielded the sanctions of eternal reward and punishment.​[14]​ Locke’s moral thinking has been deemed ‘incoherent’ and ‘broken-backed’ because he ‘failed shatteringly’ in his declared objective to demonstrate these cardinal theological tenets on the basis of natural theology (that is, philosophical reasoning).​[15]​ Ultimately, Locke argued that these fundamental truths had been established by revelation, not reason; as a consequence of this failure, Locke must be considered a deeply ‘tragic thinker’.​[16]​
Given Hume’s interest in developing a purely secular explanation of the origins of society, ethics, and justice, one might assume that greater attention ought to be paid not to Locke, but rather to those great seventeenth-century natural jurists who broadly shared this goal. After all, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) famously claimed in the Prolegomena to De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) that his account of moral and political obligation would hold ‘even if we should grant, . . . that there is no God, or that he takes no Care of human Affairs’.​[17]​ Hobbes’s treatment of ethics and justice, even as it adopted an alternative methodological approach and drew sharply different conclusions, was formulated with much the same objective.​[18]​ Similarly, Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) sought decisively to isolate the disciplines of natural and civil law from moral theology. The former two, he declared in his influential De Officio Hominis et Civis (1673)—a concise summary of the more comprehensive De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1672)—were ‘confined within the orbit of this life’: knowledge of God’s attributes and the existence of a future state was delivered by revelation, not ascertained by reason, and might reinforce men’s sense of obligation to natural law but was not essential to it.​[19]​ This continental natural law tradition appears to offer an even more promising avenue for this study to pursue precisely because, as will be seen in Chapter 1, Cicero occupied a central place within it: whether positively (both Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s foundational principle of man’s natural sociability was clearly indebted to Cicero’s moral philosophy, as was their focus on the intimate relationship between justice and property), or negatively (Hobbes’s entire definition of natural law can be read as a critique of that offered by Cicero).​[20]​ As Jean Barbeyrac declared in the prefatory discourse to his 1706 French edition of Pufendorf’s De Jure, Grotius, building upon the insights of Francis Bacon’s natural philosophy, had ‘raised from the dead’ a ‘Science of Morality’ founded upon the basis of an empirical enquiry into the principles of human nature: that is, on reason.​[21]​ Barbeyrac’s assessment of the significance of this natural law tradition was, furthermore, both well-known and profoundly influential in Hume’s Scotland.​[22]​
In the Introduction to A Treatise, however, Hume offered an alternative narrative of the birth and development of the ‘science’ which he professed to take to its logical conclusion: that is, the ‘science of MAN’. This was an empirical approach to the understanding, passions, and processes of moral judgment which promised to offer insights regarding human life which ‘will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other [science] of human comprehension’. In a similar manner to Barbeyrac, Hume argued that the (empirical) methodology that underpinned this ‘science’ was indebted to the new natural philosophy pioneered by Francis Bacon and the members of the Royal Society of London (est. 1662). Yet Hume maintained that Locke had been the first to introduce into moral subjects Bacon’s methodological strictures regarding the inability of human reason to understand ‘ultimate principles’ in nature, and consequently to privilege careful experience and observation over speculative hypothesis. If, in the ancient world, Socrates had been the first to apply Thales of Miletus’s empirical scientific methodology to the realm of ethics, then Locke was to Bacon as Socrates was to Thales. The intrepid Locke had, Hume continued, been followed by ‘some late philosophers in England’: Shaftesbury, Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733), and, more recently, Hutcheson and Joseph Butler (1692–1752).​[23]​ 
What was so distinctive about Locke’s approach, and why did Hume think that it provided the catalyst for the most significant subsequent philosophical developments in Britain? In contrast to much of the scholarship, James Tully observes that Locke offered ‘the most challenging and audacious moral philosophy in Europe and [that] it continued to set the terms of debate for over a century’.​[24]​ This study bears out both Tully’s claim, and Hume’s insistence that Locke’s writings stimulated a distinctively British conversation in subsequent decades. It does so by foregrounding two aspects of Locke’s treatment of ethics. We have already encountered the first: Locke’s deep scepticism regarding the possibility of a broadly secular explanation of moral obligation. Even as he drew upon many of their insights, Locke was insistently critical of the theories developed by Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf—and, indeed, of the entire western natural law tradition, with one signal exception.​[25]​ This exception was Cicero.​[26]​ This brings us to the second aspect of Locke’s treatment of ethics: his turn to the late Hellenistic world both to critique the methodologies (and substantive conclusions) drawn by others, and to identify a pioneer of his own, which was founded upon a distinctive variant of sceptical philosophy which he identified closely with Cicero, and which drew attention to the strict limits of human reason. 
In seeking a definition of moral obligation without reference to the commands and sanctions issued by a divine legislator and judge, Locke considered the theories offered by his contemporaries to recapitulate the errors of the dogmatic ancient (pagan) sects, whose moral philosophies he held to be irreconcilable with Christian truth—most notably, Stoicism and Epicureanism. Both, in differing ways, denied mankind’s dependence on God, and thereby made man a law unto himself. The Stoics emphasized man’s natural sociability and rational grasp of objective moral truths enshrined in the fabric of the universe: doctrines reformulated by Grotius, rejected unequivocally by Hobbes, and adapted by Pufendorf and Richard Cumberland in the light of Hobbes’s criticisms. The Epicureans, in contrast, were held to reduce virtue to utility, emphasized man’s natural unsociability, and consequently prioritized justice in their genealogical treatment of the origins of ethics and society: an approach taken to its furthest extreme by Hobbes. Locke maintained that the application of a broadly Baconian, empirical methodology to moral subjects necessarily yielded an account of ethics which located the origins of moral obligation and the clearest statement of the content of natural law not in human nature or the commands of Leviathan, but in revealed divine will and command: that is, it yielded a moral theology. As this suggests, Locke’s interpretation of Cicero’s moral philosophy differed markedly from that offered by Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Cumberland, and many others besides. On this reading, Cicero was an academic sceptic, critical of both the Stoic and Epicurean philosophical traditions. It was precisely for this reason that, Locke intimated, Cicero’s writings offered insights which allowed for a distinctive intervention in the debate between the Stoics and Epicureans—and between their modern admirers—regarding the origins of society, morality, and justice.
In what follows it is argued that Locke’s writings led to concerted debate on these two issues. The first—the implications of the adoption of an empirical approach to ethics—was largely the preserve of moral philosophers. The second—the precise character of Cicero’s philosophical commitments, and the concomitant critique of the Stoic and Epicurean traditions as inimical to Christian truth—engaged a much broader constituency of writers, including those concerned either to defend or to assail Christianity in a period in which it came under concerted attack from deists and freethinkers of various stripes.​[27]​ As Chapters 2 and 3 illustrate, the debate between Shaftesbury and Mandeville drew these two issues together. Shaftesbury’s ethical theory sought to defend a capacious Stoic tradition from Locke’s sceptical critique, while nonetheless accepting (and vindicating) its irreconcilability to revealed Christianity. Mandeville’s mature treatment of morality, justice, and religion was, meanwhile, developed in critical response to Shaftesbury’s, and was quite explicitly predicated upon Epicurean philosophical foundations. Both, that is to say, sought to offer non-Christian theories of ethics which responded directly to Locke’s challenge. Chapter 4 explains why the most comprehensive attempt, prior to Hume, to make the case for Cicero as the representative of a distinctive philosophical tradition—academic scepticism—emerged from within the Church of England, in the writings of the avowedly heterodox clergyman Conyers Middleton (1683–1750). This chapter also shows that it was defenders of Anglican orthodoxy who made the most concerted effort to resist any such interpretation of Cicero, usually by reclaiming him for a Stoic tradition which was deemed to offer philosophical support for fundamental Christian doctrines.​[28]​ 
The foregoing chapters provide a context—or a series of contexts—within which to analyse Hume’s quite explicit identification of his sceptical philosophical methodology, and the ethical theory and philosophy of religion to which it gave rise, with a tradition of Ciceronian academic scepticism, as discussed in Chapter 5. Like Locke, Hume drew from Cicero in order to reject the doctrine, which he identified with the ancient Stoics, of man’s natural sociability and to deny that claim that man’s natural benevolence was a sufficient foundation for the creation and maintenance of large-scale societies; yet he similarly declared the reduction of virtue to utility and self-interest to be an illegitimate, Epicurean manoeuvre. Hume nonetheless argued that a Ciceronian theory of morals undercut, rather than bolstered the claims of moral theology; instead, it yielded a truly naturalistic moral philosophy, which nevertheless avoided the speculative hypotheses of the Stoics or Epicureans regarding man’s natural (un)sociability. The broader context offered by this study also helps us to understand why Hume’s critics—both clerical and lay—in England and Scotland turned once more to the late Hellenistic world, and to Cicero in particular, in order to respond to his unequivocal rejection of moral theology.    
LATE HELLENISTIC ETHICS AND EARLY MODERN PHILOSOPHY
As this suggests, the individuals upon whom this study focuses were united in their conviction that the late Hellenistic philosophical traditions were vibrantly ‘alive’ in their own day, shaping contemporary responses to the most important questions under discussion. This perception was, however, not confined to them, or to Britain: it was widely shared by their European contemporaries. As Aaron Garrett observes, the ‘use of the ancient schools as an orienting device with which to describe early modern positions was pervasive, [and] essential to how philosophers understood their own philosophies and those of their opponents’.​[29]​ In a particularly important recent contribution, which focuses on natural philosophy and has little to say about ethics, Dmitri Levitin similarly notes that ‘an interest in, and engagement with, the history of ancient thought’ permeated European intellectual culture throughout the seventeenth century and beyond.​[30]​ Much of the most stimulating recent work on early modern natural science, historiography, political philosophy, and theological controversy has been keenly attentive to this widespread interest in the philosophical bequest of the late Hellenistic world.​[31]​ 
More pertinently for our concerns, the recent literature on the sociability debate after Hobbes—initially explored within the framework of natural law, and subsequently through the new discipline of political economy—has recognized and sought to explain historically the near-universal practice employed by early modern philosophers of ‘picking out certain characteristics of an ancient position and using them to denote a modern one’.​[32]​ The picture that has emerged from this scholarship reinforces Locke’s perception of a dichotomized intellectual landscape, characterized by debates between those whose moral and political philosophies endorsed currents of thinking associated (by themselves, or by their contemporary readers) with either the Stoic or the Epicurean tradition.​[33]​ Pierre Force distinguishes between those who argued that human nature and society could be understood according to one, foundational principle—self-interest, or self-love—and their antagonists, who maintained that other principles such as natural human benevolence had to be taken into account. Force focuses on the former, which he deems to be a neo-Epicurean approach, and explains how Adam Smith attempted to reconcile it with its neo-Stoic opposite.​[34]​ In his complementary analysis of the neo-Stoic tradition, which offers particularly stimulating interpretations of Grotius and Jean-Jacques Rousseau within this context, Christopher Brooke offers a comparably dichotomized picture of early modern philosophy.​[35]​ Similarly, Ian Hunter argues that prior to Kant there were two, ‘rival’ German enlightenments—the metaphysical and neo-Stoic (Christian Wolff, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz), and the civil-jurisprudential and neo-Epicurean (Pufendorf, Christian Thomasius).​[36]​ Much recent literature on the Scottish Enlightenment has placed Hume as the sole representative of the neo-Epicurean tradition in his homeland, where the mainstream of philosophical activity was dedicated to the attempt to forge a synthesis between a moderate Presbyterianism and a broadly Stoic account of ethics and justice.​[37]​
It is certainly true that, in this period, and in the fields of moral and political philosophy in particular, the Stoic and Epicurean traditions were recognized to offer coherent, if mutually-antagonistic responses to the central questions which preoccupied European philosophers. These questions were, to a considerable extent, posed in their starkest form by Hobbes.​[38]​ This is not to say that these questions were completely new. The forces unleashed by the Protestant Reformation had, however, rendered them distinctly more pressing, and further perpetuated and brought into the open tensions inherent within the medieval natural law tradition.​[39]​ The foundational question concerned the origins of law: did it lie in will, as medieval voluntarists such as Gregory of Rimini and William of Ockham maintained, or in right reason (recta ratio) reflecting on the nature of things, as suggested by an intellectualists such as Thomas Aquinas?​[40]​ This question had already been posed in an alternative form by Socrates: ‘is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?’​[41]​ 
Following the ruinous post-Reformation wars of religion, the question of the ultimate origins of law and obligation took on renewed importance, as European philosophers sought to provide moral and political theories which did not rely upon contested theological and metaphysical postulates. It is within this context, indeed, that the ‘modern’ tradition of Protestant natural law took rise, with Grotius; and, as will be seen, in their return to first principles in search of the true foundations of all law, Grotius and his successors all alluded to Cicero’s similar quest for the origins of justice in De Legibus.​[42]​ This represented an attempt to respond to the challenge laid down by the Greek academic sceptic, Carnaedes, who—as described by Cicero—had given a public lecture in Rome in 155 BC defending a broadly Stoic account of justice and natural law on one day, only to subject it to concerted sceptical critique the following morning.​[43]​ The ‘modern’ natural law tradition was, however, at least as internally divided as its scholastic predecessor on the question of the origins of law—a point succinctly illustrated by Grotius’s and Hobbes’s radically differing views of the adequacy of the answer provided to Carnaedes’s provocations by Cicero.​[44]​ 
On the one hand, the anthropological assumptions embedded within Reformed theology chimed with a voluntarist emphasis on the chasm separating sign from signified, human reason from divine wisdom, and nature from grace. Reformed theology stressed the expiatory importance of Christ’s sacrifice, and argued that only faith (sola fides) and God’s free bestowal of unmerited divine grace (election) might save and lend human works any degree of merit. By suggesting that mankind’s faculties, including reason, had been irretrievably corrupted by the Fall, a broadly Augustinian theology of grace cast doubt on the value of the philosophical bequest of the pre-Christian world, the riches of which had been recovered (and celebrated) at the Renaissance. In the absence of salvific knowledge, the attempts of the heathen philosophers to explain, and rhetorically to advocate moral virtue had been both vain and futile: their efforts to live according to a depraved reason had mired them yet further in sin and self-idolatry.​[45]​ Notwithstanding this scepticism regarding ancient philosophy, in the early modern period a seemingly unlikely convergence was effected between Augustinian theology and a broadly Epicurean account of human psychology.​[46]​ Had not the Epicureans stressed the strength of men’s passions, and particularly the overweening motivational force of pleasure and self-interest, in ways which chimed with this Augustinian emphasis on concupiscence? Had they not similarly emphasized the unbridgeable chasm which separated human understanding from divine wisdom? Such a convergence was witnessed in Catholic France, as well as in Reformed countries: the followers of Cornelius Jansen (1585–1638) drew upon Augustine to expose the theologically compromised nature of their Jesuit opponents’ casuistical depreciation of human sinfulness in their quest for social and political authority.​[47]​
By cleaving apart the realms of nature and grace, a ‘hyper-Augustinian’ anthropology encouraged a distinctly un-Aristotelian understanding of society—with all of its imperfections—as the product of fallen man’s squalid attempt to overcome the deficiencies of his nature.​[48]​ The poverty of man’s natural moral powers ensured that the individual’s sense of good and ill were informed by his inevitably self-centred passions and desires, rather than by some semi-autonomous faculty of reason. Consequently, those general rules of justice and morality which made societies possible were conventional and man-made: they represented the imposition of a desacralized order on otherwise asocial, passionate and self-interested subjects, who consented through putative contracts to such systems of law on account of their recognized utility or necessity.​[49]​ If civil society was the result of the interplay between individual wills and the product of consent, then it was also instituted as the only means by which those wills might be disciplined and constrained, thereby preventing the anarchy that would otherwise eventuate in its absence. In a number of respects, Hobbes can be seen to have taken this way of thinking to its furthest limits, not least since his political and moral philosophy was predicated upon a materialist ontology which appeared to his contemporaries to be strikingly Epicurean in provenance.​[50]​ As Hobbes’s writings seemed to attest, a broadly Augustinian-Epicurean understanding of society foregrounded self-love or pride, and the desire for self-preservation, as among the strongest of human impulses; emphasized the importance of undivided sovereign authority for peace and order in human affairs; often advocated a state religion which effectively subordinated the sacred to the civil; and located the ultimate foundations of justice in utility.​[51]​    
Viewed in this light, it is unsurprising that, from their critics’ perspective, theorists working in the Epicurean-Augustinian tradition appeared, like Epicurus, to banish God from the world: even if their intentions in doing so were frequently the result of deeply-held theological conviction.​[52]​ In response, such critics offered an alternative way of thinking about human nature, sociability and the origins of political authority and—as had Grotius—drew upon ancient Stoic sources to do so.​[53]​ This suggested that philosophy (that is, ‘right reason’) might provide the individual with a guide to life to some extent independent of both a fractured and divisive Christian religion and political authority.​[54]​ Ethics necessarily preceded justice; and philosophy could alone furnish men with insights regarding justice and morality upon which the Christian dispensation had enlarged, and which civil magistrates (and, indeed, God himself) were obligated to uphold. As Leibniz emphasized in his critical response to Pufendorf, true virtue was its own reward; the individual lived virtuously because he recognized the inherent rightness of doing so. The individual’s rational identification of an objective standard of goodness was sufficient to direct his will, a claim denied by Pufendorf as by Hobbes, for whom reason was motivationally inert.​[55]​ This purity of intention mattered to Leibniz, as to many of his contemporaries, including Shaftesbury: if it were to have any merit, virtue could not be motivated solely by base and ‘mercenary’ principles such as fear, pleasure, or interest. To use a terminology increasingly deployed in seventeenth-century polemic, the precepts of morality and justice were natural not artificial, universal not local, immutable not contingent. Such a vision was, originally at least, erected upon the theological foundations of the persistence of men’s divinely-created nature after Adam’s Fall. It retained a place for human effort and works in the economy of salvation and, when pushed to extremes (as in Socinian theology), endorsed a Christology which downplayed the propitiatory function of the Passion and portrayed Christ as primarily a moral teacher.​[56]​
To some extent replaying the famous controversy between Augustine and Pelagius, those broadly operating in either of these traditions accused one another of profound theological as well as philosophical error.​[57]​ From the perspective of Dutch Arminians, French Jesuits, and Anglican latitudinarians, a broadly Augustinian-Epicurean vision of human nature appeared to deny the reasonableness of revealed Christianity: it made God so transcendent as to banish Him from the world, suggesting that He took no interest in human affairs (including morality); it denied the essential dignity of man; it stripped Christianity of the support of natural theology; and, as a result, it entirely divorced faith from reason, leaving the inquisitive individual with no stable grounds for belief in the Scriptures aside from fear (‘fideism’). Conversely, the temporizing apologetic approach of those whose writings were perceived, whether accurately or not, to be indebted to classical Stoic moral philosophy was held accountable for the spawning of new heresies, not least Socinianism, which denied the necessity of Christ’s Incarnation and Passion, dissolved revelation into reason, and terminated ultimately in self-idolatry or ‘deism’.​[58]​
As the foregoing suggests, the recent scholarly focus on these two antagonistic traditions—the neo-Stoic and the neo-Epicurean—captures something important about early modern intellectual culture, most especially in the realm of moral philosophy. Even those who expressed contempt for the tendency of contemporary philosophers to adhere dogmatically and uncritically to a particular ‘system’ or ‘school’, and thereby avowed their commitment to an eclectic philosophical approach, unwittingly testify to how profoundly these two traditions were perceived to structure the early modern intellectual world.​[59]​ To take one example: Pufendorf quite self-consciously sought to mediate between a Grotian theory of natural law founded upon man’s natural sociability and recta ratio, and an alternative Hobbesian approach which trenchantly denied these fundamental doctrines. Unsurprisingly, in defending his natural law theory in Scandinavian Polemics (1686), Pufendorf described his objective with reference to the two late Hellenistic traditions. Alluding to the doctrine of sociality upon which his theory was predicated, Pufendorf noted that: ‘the basic premise from which I draw the principles of natural law stands in direct opposition to the theory of Hobbes. For I come very close to the reasonable system of the Stoics, whereas Hobbes serves up a rechauffé of Epicurean theories’.​[60]​ This suggests that the Stoic and Epicurean traditions represented the only viable frameworks within which to address central questions regarding sociability, ethics, and justice—even as it might be possible to forge some kind of synthesis between them. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith set his argument within a similar framework, as had Rousseau in his Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondements de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes (1755). Perhaps as a consequence, the theories of morality and justice—and the descriptions of human nature upon the basis of which they were erected—offered by Pufendorf, Smith, and Rousseau encouraged, and have continued to stimulate, debate as to the ‘real’ nature of their philosophical commitments. This has yielded interpretations of all three as either neo-Stoics or neo-Epicureans, albeit of a self-consciously idiosyncratic kind.​[61]​
In marked contrast, Locke, Middleton, and Hume, in differing ways and to various purposes, explicitly disavowed any attempt to synthesize Stoic with Epicurean insights: these traditions, they suggested, were ultimately irreconcilable. Instead, they identified with an alternative philosophical tradition (academic scepticism) which, they argued, possessed a discrete methodology and yielded highly distinctive insights. It was precisely because they shared the view of modern scholars that their contemporaries were beholden to either the Stoic or Epicurean traditions (or to aspects of both) that this identification with Cicero acquired its heuristic significance and polemical power. It expressed a common ambition to transcend the ‘chiefly verbal’ debates between neo-Stoic and neo-Epicurean theorists over the foundations of (and relations between) ethics, justice, and religious belief, and to offer a more satisfactory—if complex—treatment of these issues. In turn, their critics flatly denied that any such alternative, late Hellenistic tradition of constructive scepticism existed: a verdict broadly endorsed by scholars, who tend to present the ‘revival of scepticism’ as posing a challenge which early modern philosophers sought to overcome, rather than offering conceptual resources which were found to be constructive to their attempts to offer a more satisfactory explanation of human life. As will be seen, both Shaftesbury and Mandeville argued forcefully that only Stoicism and Epicureanism represented discrete philosophical traditions with sufficient conceptual resources to construct an ethical theory worthy of the name; they simply disagreed as to which one was most persuasive. 
The scholarship on Cicero’s reception in early modern Europe has neglected this concerted effort to (re)present him as the pioneer of a discrete tradition of academic scepticism. It has, instead, focused almost exclusively on the interpretations of his philosophy offered by commentators working broadly within the Stoic or Epicurean traditions.​[62]​ Benjamin Straumann and Christopher Brooke, for example, describe a tradition of ‘Ciceronian Stoicism’ (or ‘a Ciceronian brand of Stoicism’), and with good reason: Grotius, as they observe, did indeed portray Cicero (perhaps disingenuously) as representative of the entire Stoic tradition.​[63]​ This interpretation of Cicero suggested that, in his philosophical dialogues, his sympathies broadly lay with his Stoic interlocutors—for example, with Cato in Book III of De Finibus: a claim later advanced against Hume by Hutcheson. Cato succinctly summarized the anthropological doctrines of the Stoics, and critiqued those of the Epicureans.​[64]​ As a result, this reading of Cicero allowed him to be invoked by early modern philosophers, Christian apologists, and deists who rejected an Epicurean (or Hobbesian) vision of human nature by locating the origins of law in human nature and sociability.​[65]​ Conversely, scholars have also noted how polemicists such as the freethinker Anthony Collins identified Cicero with his Epicurean interlocutors, as a means of further vindicating Hobbesian materialism and its implications for religion.​[66]​ 
In their polemically-charged exchanges with their most distinguished critics—Locke with Edward Stillingfleet, Middleton with William Warburton, and Hume with Francis Hutcheson—the question of Cicero’s philosophical commitments was recognized by both parties to carry ‘momentous’ consequences. In all these cases, however, Locke, Middleton, and Hume strenuously denied their antagonists’ identification of Cicero with Cato (or with the Stoic tradition more broadly), whilst nonetheless also denying the charge that by doing so they were appropriating him for the Epicurean cause.​[67]​ Instead, Cicero was presented as a committed academic sceptic: a cautious, constructive variant of sceptical philosophy with which they identified their own approaches, and which was hostile to both Stoicism and Epicureanism. 
Due to the rather under-theorized study of scepticism in this period, the distinction between academic scepticism and other scepticisms (such as the Pyrrhonian, or Cartesian) has received little critical attention.​[68]​ Indeed, ‘modern’ natural law has been influentially interpreted as a response to the challenge of a monolithic (Pyrrhonian) tradition of epistemological scepticism which had been revived by Montaigne and Pierre Charron in particular, and which philosophers from Grotius and Hobbes onwards were apparently anxious to confront and defeat.​[69]​ Similarly, according to Richard Popkin the revival of scepticism in the early modern period was profoundly disruptive of religious faith, problematizing a Reformed emphasis on subjective certainty as a criterion of truth (and indicative of grace).​[70]​ As this study will attempt to show, however, Locke, Middleton, and Hume advertised the fact that they were sceptics of a very particular kind; indeed, they pathologized the all too human aversion to doubt and uncertainty as the cause of the most egregious philosophical and theological errors. Furthermore, for Locke and Middleton at least, far from acting as a solvent to the epistemological foundations of Christian belief, true sceptical philosophy was able to parse the true from the false, and thereby to establish faith on its proper foundations. All three, meanwhile, expressed contempt for Pyrrhonian scepticism, portraying it as a form of negative dogmatism. The Pyrrhonian wise man was totally indifferent on all questions of true and false, right and wrong, and suspended his judgment entirely regarding them; and, by living without belief (adoxastôs), he hoped to secure tranquillity and freedom from anxiety (ataraxia), the goal of all the late Hellenistic philosophical schools. As Cicero observed, however, the Pyrrhonian sceptic could not live his scepticism.​[71]​ In ancient times as in modern, the obvious objection to make was that some such judgments were necessary in order to survive, let alone to live a truly human life. Such a complaint was especially pertinent in an age which could recall civil war, divided loyalties, and the need to make hard choices.​[72]​ 
As the academic sceptic recognized, the real challenge was to live with uncertainty—to borrow a phrase from John Donne, to ‘doubt wisely’—whilst establishing a tolerably reliable standard of probable truth by which one could make decisions which one might reasonably consider to be better than their alternatives.​[73]​ In the Academica, Cicero’s programmatic statement of academic scepticism, the founders of this philosophy, Arcesilaus and Carnaedes, are credited with establishing an alternative, fallibilist epistemology which presents such probabilistic decision-making (informed by custom) as essential to the individual’s conduct in the common affairs of life.​[74]​ The academic sceptic can approve of, and live according to these probabilistic beliefs without assenting to the thing in question as actually true: he could, in other words, live his scepticism.​[75]​ As will be seen, Locke, Middleton, and Hume argued that, for these reasons, academic scepticism, and only academic scepticism, was entirely consistent with the empirical methodology first propounded by Bacon and the experimental natural philosophers: when the evidence was lacking, the academic sceptic recognized this fact, rather than resorting to ungrounded hypotheses. Consequently Cicero, as the leading proponent of a philosophical approach defined by its epistemic open-mindedness and humility, offered a guide as to how far unprejudiced reason could ‘get’, and had ‘got’, in the absence of, or prior to, the delivery of revealed truth by Christ. This begged, and begs, the question: is it far enough, or do we mortals require something more than we can find within ourselves?
A (BRIEF) NOTE ON METHOD
The previous paragraphs raise an obvious methodological issue: to what extent were the interpretations of ancient philosophy offered by early modern commentators faithful or accurate, or even intended to be so given their obvious polemical objectives? It may well be that Cicero is more correctly interpreted as a rather idiosyncratic representative of late Roman Stoic philosophy than as the pioneer of an alternative tradition of thought.​[76]​ Meanwhile the description of Pyrrhonian scepticism offered above—and based loosely on the interpretations of Locke, Middleton, and Hume—might seem from the perspective of classical scholars to bear little resemblance to the writings of Sextus Empiricus, from which it was supposedly derived.​[77]​ Early modern approaches to the textual bequest of the ancient world were, however, mediated by centuries of humanist scholarship, commentary, and critique, and usually framed by Christian apologetic concerns.​[78]​ It is, as a consequence, important not to reify these traditions of neo-Stoicism, neo-Epicureanism or academic scepticism. Considerable methodological caution is required, acknowledging the historicity of these labels and asking what contemporaries were doing, in the particular polemical and institutional contexts in which they wrote, in identifying aspects of their own philosophy—or that of their interlocutors—with these late Hellenistic traditions.​[79]​ It may be a worthwhile exercise to ask, with Jon Miller, whether Spinoza was really the faithful follower of the Stoics which some critics have taken him to be; but a comparison of Spinoza’s philosophy with ‘authentic’ ancient Stoicism (itself an elusive quarry) rather inevitably yields the conclusion that he was not.​[80]​ There were no genuine ‘Epicureans’ or ‘Stoics’ in this period, and it is rather fruitless to search for them. In any case Spinoza seems a curious choice for any such study, precisely because in neither in his published works nor private papers did he indicate a particular interest in, or esteem for ancient Stoicism.​[81]​ Much the same might be said for Hobbes, who actively denied the prevalent accusation that he was a follower of Epicurus—even as he observed that Epicurus did have his disciples in the seventeenth century.​[82]​
The case is quite different when it comes to the individuals on whom this study focuses, all of whom quite explicitly advertised a debt to Stoicism (Shaftesbury), Epicureanism (Mandeville), or Ciceronian academic scepticism (Locke, Middleton, and Hume). In so doing, these individuals sought to appropriate, and to redefine the meaning and significance conventionally attached to, labels which had previously been employed derogatorily in polemical exchanges (Epicurean, Stoic, and sceptic). This not merely justifies, but positively demands, a focus upon them as important and illuminating subjects of analysis. The question in need of answering can only be broached historically, and with a keen attentiveness to the various contexts which informed their writings. Why did these early modern British philosophers ask their readers to recognize the continuity between their own approaches to the issues of which they treated, and that supposedly adopted by an ancient predecessor (or predecessors)? What were the perceived implications of this claim, and how does it help us to understand their objectives?
In seeking to answer these questions, this study draws freely from a variety of source materials, whether published, intended for publication but subsequently suppressed, or private correspondence and manuscripts. The value to the historian of manuscript sources in particular, as Robert Wokler observed, is that they can offer ‘glimpses of the interpenetration of themes that cross their authors’ minds perhaps more clearly than do published works’.​[83]​ This is not to say that unpublished sources necessarily provide unmediated access to the mind of a past thinker in a way that published works do not, nor that they can easily be employed in order to uncover what an individual ‘meant’ to say in any given work but for reasons of either Straussian prudence or a simple lack of clarity did not.​[84]​ It is rather that they can (at times) reveal how particular families of ideas and concepts were connected in the contemporary imagination in ways that appear strange to us, not least as a consequence of the rigid disciplinary divisions that exist in our own intellectual world but were quite foreign to those individuals upon whom this study focuses.​[85]​ 




1	The Place of Cicero in Locke’s Moral Theology
Introduction: Reconstructing Locke’s Cicero
 ‘Scant attention’, Neal Wood observes, ‘has been given by most commentators to the seminal role of Cicero in shaping Locke’s moral, social, and even epistemological attitudes’.​[87]​ Raymond Polin similarly declares that Cicero was ‘always present in the thought of Locke’.​[88]​ John Marshall argues that any coherent reconstruction of Locke’s ‘social vision’ will necessarily foreground his intensive study of De Officiis: an enterprise which Marshall has subsequently carried out in impressive detail.​[89]​ Locke’s admiration for Cicero and his writings is well attested by his private as well as published papers. His library catalogue shows that he owned more works by Cicero than by any other author, with the notable exceptions of himself and Robert Boyle (1627–1691).​[90]​ In his writings on education, Cicero’s De Officiis was the only ‘System of Ethicks’ recommended by Locke, seemingly complementing rather than competing with the New Testament, the ultimate source of moral guidance.​[91]​ This apparently harmonious relationship between Cicero’s moral philosophy and the Christian scriptures was affirmed by Locke on the title-page of the Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689), where the authority of the classical philosopher was (from 1700) reinforced by that of Ecclesiastes. Locke similarly adopted an epigraph drawn from Cicero’s De Natura Deorum in his further exploration, in The Conduct of the Understanding (1706), of some of the epistemological (and ethical) issues which he had mined in the Essay. More strikingly still, Locke’s private papers reveal that he composed chronologies of the lives of just two men: Christ and Cicero.​[92]​
Locke’s esteem for Cicero is at once unsurprising and perplexing. As Mordechai Feingold observes, a central objective of ‘the formal stage of schooling’ in the early modern period was ‘the inculcation of an almost intemperate love of the classics’. As a student at Westminster school and Christ Church, Oxford, Cicero would have occupied a central place in Locke’s education.​[93]​ That Locke, as a tutor, subsequently included Cicero on his students’ reading lists is hardly surprising.​[94]​ Indeed, in his correspondence Locke later repeated the story, popularized by Izaak Walton, that the Anglican bishop, natural law theorist, and one-time Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford, Robert Sanderson, had ‘read over all Tully’s works every year’ in order to cultivate ‘a good latin style’, and could recite De Officiis from memory.​[95]​ In Some Thoughts concerning Education (1693), Locke nonetheless expressed contempt for those who advocated the reading of Cicero merely as a means to ‘learn Latin’ and to hone the arts of rhetoric and eloquence for the purposes of disputation. Locke was as famously hostile to rhetoric, ‘that powerful instrument of Error and Deceit’, as he was to scholastic disputation, which taught students to prioritize triumph over truth (EHU 3.10.34).​[96]​ Here Locke echoed Bacon’s criticism of the tendency of university teaching to ‘deifie Cicero and Demosthenes, and allure all young men that were studious unto that delicate and polished kinde of learning’, thereby encouraging the study of words rather than things.​[97]​ This, however, concerned how and why, and not whether one ought to read Cicero: in his Dialogus Ciceronianus (1528), Erasmus had famously lampooned the humanist cult of ‘Ciceronianism’ in similar terms, whilst nonetheless making clear his reverence for the substantive content of Cicero’s moral teaching.​[98]​ Locke’s claim that young gentlemen ought to read De Officiis not to polish their Latin, but to ‘be informed in the Principles and Precepts of Vertue, for the Conduct of his Life’ was hardly novel.​[99]​  
The intensity of Locke’s admiration for the substantive content of Cicero’s moral philosophy nonetheless appears curious when viewed from another perspective. Locke was resoundingly critical of the ancient moralists, who had failed to establish ethics upon its true foundations. Locke made this point most forcefully in The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), declaring that ‘’[t]is plain in fact, that humane reason unassisted, failed Men in its great and Proper business of Morality. It never from unquestionable Principles, by clear deductions, made out an entire Body of the Law of Nature’. Cicero was no exception (RC, 195–196).​[100]​ Here Locke expanded upon a point made earlier in the Essay: the ancient moralists’ attempts to define the end and purpose of human life had been futile, and led them into myriad errors regarding the origins of moral obligation. ‘The philosophers of old’, Locke declared, ‘did in vain enquire, whether the Summum bonum consisted in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation: And they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best Relish were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nuts’ (EHU 2.21.55). Actions only possessed a genuinely moral quality insofar as they were recognized to represent the will and command of a divine legislator, whose attributes entitled Him to govern His creatures, and who would reward or punish them accordingly: ‘Upon this foundation, and upon this only, Morality stands firm, and may defy all competition’. Yet the ancients had failed to locate the origins of obligation in God’s will, and ‘[t]heir thoughts of another life were at best obscure’ (RC 203–204). If, in the Essay, Locke repeatedly averred that morality might potentially be capable of demonstration, then it was clear that this would be the achievement of modern moral theology, not ancient moral philosophy (EHU 3.11.16–17; 4.3.18–20). Indeed, Locke noted that the various definitions of obligation offered by the ancient philosophical sects—notably the Epicurean’s emphasis on this-worldly utility and pleasure, and the Stoic’s presentation of virtue as its own reward—actively contradicted true moral knowledge by denying mankind’s dependence on their Creator.
Given his oft-repeated claim that the ancients had ‘bottomed their ethics’ on erroneous foundations,  Locke’s esteem for, and repeated recommendation of Cicero’s moral philosophy can be taken to indicate the deeply problematic character of his ethical thought.​[101]​ Locke’s recommendation of the Gospels and De Officiis as the sole sources of moral guidance—the former delivered by revelation, the latter discovered by reason—seemed to indicate the unbridgeable chasm, rather than the harmony, which his philosophical approach had opened up between these two sources of men’s ‘knowledge of their Duty’ (RC 195). It appeared that, in the final analysis, without revelation man was left to grope after knowledge of his duties in the dark, without so much as a ‘dim candle’ to light the way. This seems flatly to contradict Locke’s central claim, made at the outset of the Essay and repeated throughout its pages, that morality is ‘the proper Science, and Business of Mankind in general; (who are both concerned, and fitted to search out their Summum Bonum)’ (EHU 4.12.11). 
Closer analysis of Locke’s presentation of Cicero, however, invites a rather more nuanced interpretation: albeit one which does not detract from the deep ambiguities within Locke’s moral thinking. Locke’s high opinion of Cicero’s moral philosophy, it will be argued in what follows, rested on four broad convictions. 
The first was that Cicero was a pioneer of the empirical approach advocated by the Fellows of the Royal Society: a methodology which Locke’s Essay appropriated and sought to vindicate from its critics, not least in the spheres of ethics and religion.​[102]​ As discussed in the Introduction, Cicero offered a fallibilist epistemology which foregrounded the importance of probable reasoning in human decision-making processes: an approach which, as developed by Locke, appeared to elide any meaningful distinction between opinion or belief (opinio) and knowledge properly so-called (scientia).​[103]​ On this rendering, Cicero was as concerned to draw attention to the limits, as to the legitimate scope of reason. Locke’s Essay similarly offered what one scholar aptly terms an ‘epistemology of limits’.​[104]​ The Ciceronian epigraph chosen for the Essay makes this point eloquently: ‘Quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias, quam ista effutientem nauseare, atque ipsum sibi displicere!’​[105]​ Locke offered a perfectly serviceable translation of this passage—although not intended as such, and rendered consistent with his theory of ideas—when describing his own aims in his Introduction: ‘We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an affectation of an universal knowledge, to raise questions and perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited, and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear and distinct perceptions’ (EHU 1.1.4). From an early stage, Locke conceived of his work as intended ‘to give some account of the weaknesse and shortnesse of humane understanding’, the better to expose the absurdity of men wasting ink—and spilling blood—in defence of opinions and doctrines which were in reality entirely incomprehensible.​[106]​
This leads on to the second aspect of Cicero’s distinctive variant of sceptical philosophy which clearly attracted Locke. Locke was profoundly concerned by sectarianism, in philosophy as in religion; and he pathologized the tendency, deeply embedded in human nature, to avoid doubt at all costs by seeking refuge in an uncritical conformity to the teachings of others. This, as Locke emphasized ad infinitum, had profoundly negative consequences for both the individual and society. It prevented the former from seeking useful knowledge, most notably in morality. Unless they did so, they would fail in their responsibility to their Creator to employ their faculties as He intended (to seek the grounds and content of their moral duties), and so neglect to exercise moral agency by recognizing their accountability for their actions before His law. On a societal level, sectarianism undermined the bonds which held communities together, as men fought over opinions, the truth of which they refused to subject to the impartial and dispassionate examination of reason. It also precluded citizens from exercising their independent judgement on questions which ought to be of greatest concern to them as members of political and religious societies founded theoretically upon their voluntary consent and kept in check solely by their vigilance and capacity for informed critique.​[107]​ Locke found in Cicero a similar concern regarding man’s natural aversion to doubt and desperation for a certainty which, in the most important areas of human life (ethics and religion), might not be attainable. Locke in effect demanded that every individual become his own philosopher, and be guided by the light of his own reason: a claim he advanced in a distinctly Ciceronian register, but rendered consistent with both Christ’s demands and his own theory of ideas.​[108]​ On Locke’s account every individual is required to make use of the ‘active power’ of his mind to ensure that his words (signs) are employed appropriately (that is, consistent with the ideas they represent).​[109]​ Locke’s explanation of how the individual ought to liberate himself from others’ (illegitimate) authority drew heavily from Cicero, who attached an ethical and political, as well as an epistemic value to such intellectual independence. In this respect, Locke effectively suggested that all who would be true moral agents—and, indeed, true followers of Christ—must not merely be philosophers; they had to be academic sceptics.  
This brings us to the third, and perhaps most important element of Cicero’s moral philosophy which evidently appealed to Locke. Cicero, on Locke’s reading, probed the limits of reason. Once those limits had been ascertained, and unlike the dogmatic philosophers by whom he was surrounded, the academic sceptic refused to embrace unverifiable speculative hypotheses in order to profess to understand perfectly what he could and did not. This was true, most importantly, when it came to the question of moral obligation. As we have seen, Locke ridiculed the ancient moralists for having offered mutually-contradictory, and erroneous, definitions of man’s true end and purpose (summum bonum). Locke’s reverence for Cicero’s philosophy, and for De Officiis in particular, was predicated on Cicero’s supposed rejection, as an academic sceptic, of the definitions of moral obligation offered by the various sects, most notably the Stoics and Epicureans. Yet Cicero, on Locke’s interpretation, did not furnish a substitute; instead, the great merit of his scepticism was that it led Cicero to accept that reason, prior to revelation, was incapable definitively of establishing the true foundations of ethics. Consequently, unlike the Stoics and Epicureans he did not embrace a definition of the summum bonum which, making no reference to a divine legislator or future state, actively contradicted the truths revealed by Christ. He may have failed correctly to ‘bottom’ his ethics, but what mattered more was Cicero’s humility in recognizing that reason alone struggled to perform this task. It is nonetheless curious, but important to note that Locke drew his primary philosophical proofs for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in the Essay—the central tenets of his moral theology—directly and explicitly from Cicero’s philosophical writings, as discussed further below. That is, Locke turned to Cicero to reveal the outer limits of moral philosophy and natural theology: what reason alone could establish, and with what degree of certainty. Recognizing these boundaries, the Christian was in a better position to appreciate how, and where, Christ’s revelation had enlarged upon human reason—and where faith necessarily took the place of philosophy.​[110]​ Locke was, from an early stage, concerned more accurately to demarcate the boundaries between knowledge and faith, reason and revelation. Cicero was an important resource in his subsequent attempts to do so.​[111]​   
Locke’s remarkably high valuation of De Officiis, when set against his more general depreciation of heathen moral philosophy, was intimately related to Cicero’s marginalization in the work of the question of how to define true virtue (honestum). Rather than advocate virtue on account of its normative and obligatory character—which, for Locke, the academic sceptic recognized to be an elusive quarry in the absence of revelation—Cicero focused on its utility and agreeableness, to oneself and others. Yet this, for Locke, emphatically did not mean that Cicero reduced virtue to utility and pleasure in an Epicurean (or Hobbesian) manner; instead, he simply put the question of the honestum to one side and focused on an alternative issue. Why, in practice, were most individuals motivated to adhere to moral rules, given that few understood the foundations of their obligation to do so? This is the fourth aspect of Cicero’s moral philosophy which Locke appears to have found particularly stimulating. In his account, Cicero foregrounded the importance of man’s desire for reputation and praise, and aversion to disrepute and contempt; and he emphasized the benefits, for the individual and the community, of this characteristic of human nature. The great merit of De Officiis was, from Locke’s perspective, precisely its appeal to the individual’s desire for reputation as a means of motivating them to live virtuously, leaving it to Christ to explain why all were obligated to do so. This is indicated by Locke’s comments in Some Thoughts:
The Knowledge of Vertue, all along from the beginning, in all the Instances of which he is capable of, being taught him, more by Practice than Rules; and the love of Reputation instead of satisfying his Appetite, being made habitual in him, I know not whether he should read any other Discourses of Morality, but what he finds in the Bible; or have any System of Ethicks put into his Hand, till he can read Tully’s Offices.​[112]​ 
In the Essay, Locke was similarly concerned to explain why, in practice, men tended to adhere to the moral rules which regulated their communities—not merely why, in theory, they ought to do so. As Locke observed, his intention was not so much ‘to treat the grounds of true morality which is necessary to true and perfect happinesse’ as to show ‘whence men had their moral Ideas and what they were’.​[113]​ Those ‘Ideas’ were, to employ an anachronistic term, socially-constructed: defined according to what was found to conduce to the security, order, and prosperity of the community as a whole. Individuals are shaped by their interactions with others in ways which ensure that they adhere to the moral norms which regulate their communities, given their concern for reputation.​[114]​ This allowed Locke to explain why most men, who fail to understand on the basis of reason why they ought to act morally (because it was God’s command), are nonetheless capable of living responsibly as members of societies dependent upon mutual trust and good faith. As we will see, Locke’s placed this concern for reputation within the framework of a divine teleology, which structured his thinking more broadly.​[115]​ A desire for esteem, part of man’s divinely-created nature, ensured that, in society, individuals were habituated in ideas of moral good and ill which, by conducing to well-being of their society, were broadly consistent with the dictates of natural law as laid down by a beneficent God.​[116]​
From an early stage another of Locke’s primary objectives, alongside identifying the boundary between knowledge and faith, was more precisely to delineate the legitimate jurisdiction of both secular (political) and spiritual (ecclesiastical) authority. Here, Cicero’s emphasis on the beneficial consequences of man’s concern for reputation played an important role, by providing insights which allowed for society (societas) to be conceptualized to some extent independently of both the state (civitas) and church (ecclesia). From the mid-1660s onwards Locke was, like many of his contemporaries, anxious to deny Hobbes’s fundamental claim that society was impossible in the absence of undivided political authority; but Locke endeavoured to do so without recourse to doctrines (man’s natural sociability, an innate moral-religious conscience) which Hobbes had, from Locke’s perspective, shown to be groundless. A focus on reputation allowed Locke to explain how men in society acquired shared ideas of good and ill without political instruction, even where ‘true’ moral knowledge—reliant upon an understanding of God’s attributes, will, and sanctions—was lacking. After all, and as he perhaps came to recognize from the 1670s, Locke’s commitment to a hedonic psychology, his empiricist epistemology, and his theory of language (all indebted, to some extent, to Hobbes) made it very hard to explain how men could come by this knowledge without the assistance of revelation. Locke’s focus on reputation, and on the dynamic shaping of the human personality within society, provided a means of addressing this shortfall: the socialized individual might broadly adhere to the dictates of natural law, in the absence of Leviathan, even without understanding why he ought to do so. A common moral language was possible without the need for ‘the state monopolization of the means of semantic production’ advocated by Hobbes.​[117]​
As Section I will show, Hobbes’s scientia civilis was formulated in part as an outright assault on Cicero’s theory of natural law—but Grotius, as much as Cicero, was one of Hobbes’s targets, precisely because the Dutchman’s theory was profoundly indebted to the heathen philosopher. As has long been recognized, and as will be discussed in Sections II-III, Locke accepted a great many of Hobbes’s most fundamental insights, and in some cases extended them further than had Hobbes himself. Yet like many of his English contemporaries, such as Richard Cumberland and Samuel Parker, Locke did so in the confidence that, from these shared premises, Hobbes’s conclusions could be shown to be erroneous.​[118]​ In his attempt to make good on this claim, Locke drew heavily on Cicero. Locke’s was, however, a highly distinctive reading of Cicero as an academic sceptic, critical of Stoic ethics: an interpretation profoundly at odds with that offered by Grotius, Hobbes, and the many philosophers in Britain who similarly turned to the heathen philosopher in the attempt to respond to Hobbes’s supposedly Epicurean theory.​[119]​ As Section IV will suggest, Locke’s religious apologetic, theory of toleration, and understanding of the complex, intertwined histories of moral philosophy and Christian theology were similarly deeply indebted to this highly distinctive reading of Cicero. In short, the attempt more accurately to reconstruct Locke’s interpretation of Cicero offers one means of better understanding the development and character of his thinking across the many subjects of which he treated.
i.	Hobbes, Grotius, and Cicero
Hobbes’s contempt for ancient philosophy bordered on the pathological. The textual bequest of the ancients was not merely worthless, philosophically-speaking. It was positively dangerous: toxic intellectual ‘Venime’ which Hobbes likened to ‘the biting of a mad Dogge’, and which systematically corroded the modern body politic.​[120]​ Hobbes’s remarkable, concerted assault on the universities as seminaries of rebellion focused on the prominence of the ancient languages, and classical philosophical and historical texts, in the scholastic curriculum.​[121]​ As Hobbes argued most forcefully in Behemoth (1679), those responsible for the fragmentation of civil peace and order in England from the 1640s—the Presbyterian clergy, and the Parliamentarians—had imbibed their seditious principles at the universities.​[122]​ The clergy presented their mastery of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew as authorizing them to ‘publish or teach’ their ‘private interpretations’ of the Scriptures, which unfailingly set the Christian’s obligations to God above (and against) their obligations to their sovereign.​[123]​ This represented a fundamental misunderstanding of civil science and Christian sacred history: both of which justified the Constantinian (and Mosaic) union between the ecclesia and the civitas, and gave the sovereign the power of interpretation of Scripture and doctrine.​[124]​ 
Similarly the gentry imbibed an uncritical reverence for the republican ideas of liberty extolled with such eloquence by ‘Aristotle, Plato, Cicero [and] Seneca’, all of whom were unremittingly hostile to monarchical government.​[125]​ This, in turn, led them to believe that they possessed the authority to interpret natural law according to their own lights; whereas on Hobbes’s account, as in the interpretation of Scripture, the deduction of ‘natural right and natural laws from human principles and human contracts’ was rightfully ‘subject to the scrutiny of the civil powers’.​[126]​ If in recent decades the sophistry of the scholastic philosophers and the impostures of the Roman clergy had become intolerable to educated Protestants, then their new-found linguistic skills and promiscuous reading of classical philosophy encouraged them to believe that they were suitably equipped (and authorized) to interpret the dictates of both divine and natural law for themselves:
For men, grown weary at last of the insolence of the priests, and examining the truth of those doctrines that were put upon them, began to search the sense of the Scriptures, as they are in the learned languages; and consequently (studying Greek and Latin) became acquainted with the democratical principles of Aristotle and Cicero, and from the love of their eloquence fell in love with their politics, and that more and more, till it grew into the rebellion we now talk of . . .​[127]​
In his political philosophy Hobbes took particular issue with Cicero’s influential theory of natural law, as outlined most comprehensively in De Legibus and its sequel, the fragmentary De Republica. In the 1647 preface to De Cive (1642), Cicero was identified as a progenitor of the study which Hobbes himself professed to perfect: scientia civilis.​[128]​ Hobbes contended that it was not sufficient to focus on one particular commonwealth; rather the civil scientist searched for ‘the first origin of justice’, which in turn required him ‘to understand correctly what human nature is like’.​[129]​ Here Hobbes deliberately echoed Cicero’s claim, in Book I of De Legibus, to go further than had his compatriots, who focused pragmatically on ‘our own civil law’, which could be justified on the basis of utility and explained historically. Instead, Cicero sought to ‘probe deep, and seek, as you should, the very fountain-head’, in order to offer a universal theory of law and justice, which was founded upon an accurate analysis of human nature and which Aristotle had failed to provide.​[130]​ As Hobbes was clearly aware, Grotius had similarly identified his approach with Cicero’s at the outset of De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), which sought to identify ‘the Fountain of Right [fons iuris], properly so called’.​[131]​ (In his initial attempt in Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis (1660) to intervene in this discussion between Grotius and Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf would unsurprisingly allude to this shared source: his aim was to determine ‘what the law of nature properly is, what is its fountain-head, as it were’.​[132]​) 
In De Legibus, Cicero proceeded to note that the origins of both law and justice ‘must be sought for in the nature of man’. ‘In determining what Justice is’, it was necessary ‘to begin with that Supreme Law which had its origins ages before any written law existed or any State had been established’. This law ‘is the highest reason, implanted in nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite’.​[133]​ Just as reason was a divine gift, so too law, ‘which is right reason applied to command and prohibition’. In this regard both law and virtue arose ‘from Nature’, as ‘all men are bound together by a certain natural feeling of kindliness and good will, but also by a partnership in Justice’.​[134]​ Cicero attacked the Epicureans for depicting justice as conventional and ‘founded on the decrees of people, the edicts of princes, or the decisions of judges’. If moral obligation relied upon men’s fear of punishment rather than arose from ‘Nature’, Cicero asked, ‘what anxiety would there be to trouble the wicked when the danger of punishment was removed? . . . For to what lengths will that man go in the dark who fears nothing but a witness and a judge?’​[135]​ If law originated in human decree, and if morality were determined by it, then it could make ‘Justice out of Injustice’ and ‘good out of bad’. It followed that ‘we can perceive the difference between good laws and bad by referring them to no other standard but Nature’, and ‘only a madman would conclude that these judgments are matters of opinion, and not fixed by Nature’.​[136]​ Human laws, Cicero explained in Book II, were only obligatory insofar as they were in accordance with this fixed standard; and ‘whoever knows not this Law, whether it has been recorded in writing anywhere or not, is without Justice’.​[137]​ Consequently, in his concluding remarks in Book III Cicero noted that De Legibus was intended both to inform magistrates as to ‘the limits of their administrative authority’, and to ‘instruct the citizens as to the extent of their obligation to obey’ the civil laws.​[138]​    
As Straumann observes, ‘Grotius’s largest debt in his doctrine of the sources of law’ in De Jure was to ‘Cicero’s treatment of “nature”’ in De Legibus.​[139]​ Whereas both Cicero and Hobbes formulated their theories of natural law in order to identify a criterion for establishing the (il)legitimacy of a particular political order, however, Grotius was decidedly less interested in this question.​[140]​ Instead, De Jure built upon the theory outlined in Grotius’s earlier De Jure Praedae (1603), which had sought to expose the illegitimacy of Iberian claims to a monopoly of trade in the East Indies. Grotius argued that the high seas remained in a state of nature; yet he maintained that this state was governed by the norms of natural law, which justified the Dutch East India Company’s right, as a private (rather than state) actor, to punish the Portuguese for their conduct by seizing one of their ships. Cicero’s account of natural law, in De Legibus, was amenable to Grotius’s purposes precisely because it suggested that a standard of natural law existed, could be known, and might be enforced by private actors independently of—and theoretically prior to the establishment of—political authority and civil law.​[141]​
As had Cicero, Grotius argued that this higher law was ‘implanted in nature, [and] commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite’.​[142]​ Grotius similarly argued that the commands and prohibitions of this law could be established by ‘right reason’ (recta ratio, or summa ratio), and the inherent ‘rightness’ or ‘justness’ of the content of this law was sufficient to establish its obligatory nature. (This is why, although God was the original source of the law, its obligatory character could be demonstrated even if one should dare [etiamsi daremus] to deny His existence).​[143]​ Meanwhile, and again following Cicero closely, man’s natural desire for society (appetitus societatis) offered a further motivation for men, in the absence (or in matters which lay outside of the jurisdiction) of political authority, to cooperate with one another and to adhere to the dictates of natural law.​[144]​ Natural right was grounded, Grotius maintained, in ‘Sociability . . . , or this Care of maintaining Society in a Manner conformable to the Light of human Understanding’.​[145]​ To be sure, mankind’s natural desire for self-preservation and concern to protect their property played a crucial role in leading them to join together in a civitas regulated by its own laws (that is, laws the origins of which lay in the will of the sovereign). Yet Grotius’s primary interest lay in establishing the existence of an obligatory standard of justice in the pre-political sphere. To this end the Ciceronian-Stoic concepts of recta ratio and appetitus societatis were fundamental to Grotius’s theory: more so, indeed, than an emphasis on self-preservation and self-interest.​[146]​ In advancing his philosophy, Grotius, steeped in humanist learning and rhetorical theory, attributed normative authority to the supposedly universal testimony offered by the wisest philosophers regarding the existence and character of natural law: by whom he meant, primarily, the Stoic philosophers of Greece and Rome, whose wisdom was most comprehensively and succinctly conveyed by Cicero.​[147]​ 
Richard Tuck has influentially interpreted Hobbes’s political philosophy as a ‘Grotian theory’, and the continuities between the two thinkers are undeniable.​[148]​ Both offered a rule-based, rather than a virtue-oriented theory of justice which prioritized what Grotius termed ‘expletive’ over distributive (or ‘attributive’) justice, and in which property occupied a central place. On this view, the just man simply refrains from violating the person and possessions of another: a claim which was itself indebted to Cicero’s distinctive emphasis on private property in his treatment of justice in De Officiis.​[149]​ Little reference was made to the broader obligation under natural law, emphasized by Aristotle in his theory of attributive justice, of those virtues ‘that are beneficial to others, such as Liberality, Mercy, and Prudent Administration of Government’; and Grotius was uninterested in subjecting the existing distribution of wealth and property to critical (and ethical) examination.​[150]​ One implication of this stance was that the question of man’s true end and purpose (the summum bonum) was all but banished from political philosophy, which was concerned primarily with the enforcement of rules governing private property rather than the correct formation of the moral personality of the citizen.​[151]​ Finally, and most importantly, both Grotius and Hobbes shared a commitment to explaining the foundations of moral and political obligation without recourse to God’s will, command, and sanctions. Although God was the ultimate source of law, its obligatory character derived from the inherent characteristics of human nature, and (for Grotius) from the fact that its dictates represented axioms of reason.​[152]​ As Knud Haakonssen observes, Grotius’s conception of moral obligation to all intents and purposes rendered God ‘dispensable’.​[153]​
The divergences between the two thinkers are nonetheless considerable, and were recognized as such by their seventeenth-century readers (not least Pufendorf).​[154]​ Rousseau’s later claim, in Emile (1762), that the two thinkers differed not in their ‘principles’, but solely in their ‘method’ (‘Hobbes relies on sophisms, and Grotius on the poets’) was distinctly idiosyncratic, and reflected Rousseau’s visceral (and polemical) distaste for modern natural jurisprudence tout court.​[155]​ Hobbes took fundamental issue with both Grotius’s methodology and his doctrine. On the former, Hobbes rejected Grotius’s claim that the ancient jurists, with Cicero foremost among them, spoke with one voice with regard to the content and obligatory character of natural law: a priori reasoning, not a reliance on the (mutually-contradictory) testimony of those whom Grotius deemed to be the ‘wisest’ of philosophers, could alone identify the foundations of law and justice.​[156]​ In any case, insofar as ‘Aristotle, Plato, Cicero [and] Seneca’ had offered broadly similar treatments of natural law, their theories were inextricable from a republican tradition of political philosophy which led to conclusions which Grotius himself was eager to disavow. The most important such conclusion, aired and rejected by Grotius, was that ‘the Supreme Power [rests] always, and without Exception, in the People; so that they may restrain or punish their Kings, as often as they abuse their Power’. Grotius, no less than Hobbes, was acutely aware of ‘[w]hat Mischiefs this Opinion has occasioned, and may yet occasion’.​[157]​ Yet Hobbes argued that the anthropological assumptions upon which Grotius’s theory was predicated, indebted as they were to Cicero’s De Legibus, led unavoidably to a separation between natural law and civil law which necessarily cast doubt on the legitimacy of the latter. Cicero’s theory of human nature and natural law, in short, taught citizens that ‘it is up to private men to determine whether the commands of Kings are just or unjust, and that his commands may rightly be discussed before they are carried out, and in fact ought to be discussed’.​[158]​ For this very reason, Hobbes declared in Leviathan (1651) that ‘I cannot imagine, how any thing can be more prejudiciall to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books [as De Legibus] to be publikely read’.​[159]​ In the ‘Review and Conclusion’, indeed, Hobbes offered Leviathan not merely as a corrective to, but as a replacement for classical texts such as De Legibus: ‘I think it may be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities’.​[160]​  
In short, Hobbes’s political and moral philosophy was predicated upon a radically different, even irreconcilable anthropology to Grotius’s. From Hobbes’s perspective, both Cicero and Grotius had misunderstood ‘what human nature is like’, and thereby failed to grasp the true origins and nature of law. Hobbes’s fundamental objective was to deny what Grotius, for very particular purposes, had laboured to establish: that the state of nature is a moral realm, governed by objective norms accessible to reason and to which men are encouraged to adhere by a natural social instinct.
Cicero’s ‘kindliness and good will’, or any notion of natural human sociability, are conspicuous only by their absence from Hobbes’s depiction of man in the state of nature. Grotius was, it followed, quite misguided in his claim that man’s natural appetite for society imposes restrictions and a sense of right and wrong independently of self-interest. ‘The origin of large and lasting societies’, Hobbes declared baldly, ‘lay not in mutual human benevolence but in men’s mutual fear’.​[161]​ Hobbes quite nakedly equated ideas of right in a state of nature with pleasure (or the avoidance of pain) and self-interest: precisely the Epicurean position which Cicero, and Grotius, had sought to undermine.​[162]​ Ideas of right and wrong ‘are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves’.​[163]​ The sovereign was required precisely because the ancient moralists’ conception of recta ratio was grievously mistaken.​[164]​ Reason did not afford man privileged access to a law of nature, which defined his ultimate end, enshrined universally-obligatory, normative moral truths, and provided the basis for social consensus. It followed that consensus and mutual cooperation were impossible in the absence of undivided political authority, and men could not be permitted to interpret natural law by their own lights. ‘Of doctrines that dispose men to sedition’, Hobbes declared in De Cive, ‘the first, without question is: that knowledge of good or evil is a matter for individuals’.​[165]​ Society and civil peace were only possible once men recognized their duty to submit their private judgment to that of ‘the publique Conscience’: that is, once they surrendered their claim to identify moral and religious truths for themselves and submitted to the sovereign. As a consequence Cicero’s two most fundamental claims in De Legibus—that a universally-obligatory law of nature was amenable to individual rational inquiry, and that citizens ought to hold their magistrates accountable to it—eroded the very foundations of the moral and political order. These two claims could not, as Grotius supposed, be dissevered.
Hobbes offered a stridently voluntarist conception of law: it expressed in a clear and comprehensible manner the ‘will’ of a superior possessed of known attributes which entitled him to command others, and of sanctions which enforced those commands. Hobbes argued that mankind, by reason alone, could know only of God’s omnipotence, not of His attributes or will.​[166]​ Reason did not allow man to participate in God’s wisdom, and the ‘light of Nature’ was silent on the question of eternal sanctions. As Hobbes famously declared in Leviathan, ‘God has no Ends’: in a very real sense mankind had been left to its own devices.​[167]​ Given man’s inability to say anything meaningful about God, other than that He exists, any such obligatory law could only derive from the ‘mortal God’ (the sovereign). Consequently natural law, as with all laws, could only be said to have acquired legislative status—that is, it only gained its obligatory force—when promulgated ‘by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will’ by the magistrate and accompanied by the sanctions of the civil law. Here Hobbes directly refuted Cicero’s claim that the magistrate was beholden to a fixed standard of justice, even if this standard did not exist in written form.​[168]​ The laws of nature, for Hobbes as for Grotius, were merely theorems of reason; but reason alone was not, for Hobbes, a source of obligation. Given that, as Grotius had emphasized, a knowledge of God’s will and sanctions played no role in explaining men’s sense of obligation or motivation in this world, only the will and sanctions of the ‘mortal God’ could serve the purpose.​[169]​ The civitas brought societas and the moral consensus upon which it depended into being, rather than the reverse. In the absence of sovereign authority, there was no law; and without law, ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ lost all meaning, and men’s ideas of right and wrong remained irretrievably subjective and mutually-contradictory.​[170]​ 
Hobbes nonetheless parted company from the Epicurean tradition with which he was so frequently aligned by his critics, on one important point above all. The heathen philosophers, including the Epicureans, had in vain professed to offer definitions of man’s true end (the summum bonum), and to provide a philosophical regimen which supposedly allowed for the disciplining of the passions and the attainment of tranquillity (apatheia or ataraxia).​[171]​ Hobbes ridiculed the therapeutic function accorded to philosophy by all of the Hellenistic philosophical sects:
We are to consider, that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finus ultimus (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand.​[172]​
To the extent that any such tranquillity was a realistic goal to be achieved through mental exercise and training, Hobbes suggested, it lay in recognizing the need to submit oneself to a system of discipline (that is, the Leviathan) which could alone provide the preconditions (peace and security) for a truly human life.​[173]​
Meanwhile, there was one issue on which Hobbes was in broad agreement with Cicero. In De Legibus Cicero declared that ‘no one shall have gods to himself, either new gods or alien gods, unless recognized by the state’, an insight Hobbes was very willing to endorse in advancing his rigorously Erastian ecclesiology in Leviathan.​[174]​ The sovereign alone possessed the authority to interpret the Scriptures and to direct those who preached ‘true doctrine’ (the clergy). Only the magistrate could distinguish between ‘RELIGION’ and ‘SUPERSTITION’.​[175]​ Undivided sovereignty was, for Hobbes, essential if seditious clerics were to be constrained from once again pitting ‘Supremacy against the Sovereignty; Canons against Lawes; and a Ghostly Authority against the Civill’.​[176]​ As Rousseau would later famously observe, Hobbes’s civil science aimed to suppress the ‘domineering spirit of Christianity’, and ‘to return everything to political unity, without which no State or Government will ever be well constituted’.​[177]​
ii.	Locke’s early writings, 1659–1669
‘Two Tracts on Government’ (c.1660–1662)
Locke’s claim in 1697 that he had not read Hobbes with any degree of attention, and was unfamiliar with the arguments to be found in Leviathan, must be taken with a large pinch of salt.​[178]​ Locke’s earliest writings, the ‘Two Tracts on Government’ (c.1660–1662) and his lectures on the law of nature (c.1663–1664), evince a familiarity both with Hobbes’s arguments and with those of critics who had recently sought to formulate responses.​[179]​ This is unsurprising. Despite its antiquated Laudian statutes imposing limits on the curriculum, and thereby misleading scholars into presenting it as a moribund outpost of scholasticism, Locke’s time as a student and fellow at Christ Church coincided with a period of remarkable intellectual vitality in Oxford.​[180]​ To be sure, the formal lectures delivered to its students may not have been at the cutting-edge of contemporary scholarship: although those given by the Sedleian Professor of Natural Philosophy, Thomas Willis, in 1661–1662 and attended by Locke represent a notable exception.​[181]​ Yet Oxford in this period offered its residents remarkable opportunities for an extra-curricular education much more stimulating than the statutory one.​[182]​ It is clear that Locke took advantage: most notably when, as a BA, he was liberated from the requirements imposed on undergraduates, and freed to immerse himself in a comprehensive study of medical works as recorded in his notebooks.​[183]​ Locke’s friendship with Boyle, and introduction to the circles in which he moved, dates from 1660; and one, pressing concern of proponents of the new experimental philosophy was to vindicate its legitimacy and merit both from Hobbes’s cavils, and from those who considered it to be rather too close to Hobbes’s own philosophical approach for comfort.​[184]​ Meanwhile, such informal clubs and social groupings also offered opportunities to discuss the most important recent trends in ethics and natural law. This is indicated by Locke’s correspondence from the early 1660s with the physician and ejected fellow of Christ Church, Henry Stubbe, and Gabriel Towerson, Anglican minister and Fellow of All Souls. It is also reflected by his engagement, albeit indirect, with the ethical theory of the botanist, friend of Boyle, and Fellow of New College, Robert Sharrock, who in 1660 managed to publish both a natural history of vegetables and a response to Hobbes’s theory of natural law.​[185]​  
Locke’s earliest works, the ‘Two Tracts’, nonetheless betray relatively little of this intellectual vitality. Instead, they attest to Locke’s profound desire—repeatedly expressed in his correspondence from the late 1650s—for stability in public life after decades of upheaval and bloodshed, and for the private tranquillity for which this might allow.​[186]​ Locke mournfully regretted that ‘there is noe other security against mens passion and reveng but what strength and steell yeelds’.​[187]​ This underpinned Locke’s defence of the restored monarchy and re-established Episcopal Church in the ‘Tracts’, which addressed the most pressing issue of the day. This concerned toleration, and the relationship between religion and politics: did the magistrate have the authority to intervene in religious affairs, even on questions upon which the Scriptures had not explicitly pronounced (adiaphora)? Here Locke’s account of the relationship between the civitas and ecclesia was almost indistinguishable from that offered by Hobbes. This is unsurprising, since Locke’s correspondence reveals a very similar view of human nature. It seemed clear to Locke that ‘’tis our passions, that brutish part, that dispose of our thoughts and actions’; men only entertain ‘truths . . . as they suit with our affections, and as they demean themselves towards our imperious passions’, leaving Locke to ask ‘if there be any remains of reason left among men’. All their professed ‘knowledge’, Locke concluded in Pyrrhonian fashion, was mere ‘opinion moulded up between custom and interest, the two great luminaries of the world, the only lights they walk by’.​[188]​ Locke had ‘long since learnd not to rely on men’: they could not be trusted to behave reasonably.​[189]​
Consequently, Locke defended the royal supremacy on the basis of pragmatism, rather than principle. The magistrate was no less fallible than his subjects on moral or religious questions.​[190]​ Some authoritative standard of good and ill, sacred and profane was nonetheless required for consensus and order. As Hobbes had argued, undivided sovereignty alone might provide and enforce such a standard, and so keep subjects—and, indeed, the clergy, who invariably become ‘troublesome to the magistrate and dangerous to the peace, if not carefully eyed and directed’—broadly on the straight and narrow.​[191]​ In principle Locke agreed with nonconformists​[192]​, such as his Christ Church colleague Edward Bagshawe, that it was desirable for men to be permitted ‘to go to heaven every one his own way’. Yet it was in practice impossible to distinguish between ‘sincere and tender-hearted Christians’ and those ‘crafty men’ who would opportunistically exploit claims to liberty of conscience to undermine the fragile consensus upon which all social order depended.​[193]​ It was all too ‘easy’, as Locke noted in a letter to Stubbe, another opponent of magisterial intervention, in 1659, ‘under pretence of spirituall jurisdiction to hooke in all secular affairs since in a commonwealth wholy Christian it is noe small difficulty to set limits to each and to define exactly where on[e] begins and the other ends’.​[194]​ Locke hardly confronted this difficulty in the ‘Tracts’, which in effect agreed with Hobbes that no such limits could be placed on secular authority.​[195]​ 
It followed that magisterial authority was, as Hobbes had argued, as necessary in moral as in religious affairs, since self-interest invariably led men to identify the good with their own desires: ‘some other rule’ was therefore required ‘to guide us besides every mans private moralls’.​[196]​ Moral consensus was impossible in the absence of political authority. The ‘interests of both public peace and the growth and dignity of religion’, Locke argued in Hobbesian fashion, could only be secured by a prudent, caring, but ultimately unaccountable sovereign and a trusting and obedient citizenship.​[197]​ It was not the place of his subjects to question his decisions or his intentions in making them.​[198]​ In this regard, and in a similar fashion to Hobbes, the law of nature was in effect subordinated to (or made identical with) civil law. Locke’s mention of redemption as having been ‘purchased with [Christ’s] blood’, and his mournful reflection on the ‘corruption of man’ since he ‘first threw himself into the pollution of sin’, suggested an orthodox, Calvinist interpretation of original sin. Post-lapsarian man, Locke noted, ‘sullies whatever he takes into his hand’.​[199]​ 
Locke was nonetheless keenly aware of the tension, foregrounded by nonconformists such as Bagshawe and Stubbe, between the possibly legitimate claims of conscience and the individual’s obligation to political authority. As had political philosophers from Montaigne and Justus Lipsius to Hobbes, however, Locke argued that in the final analysis conscience had to be subordinated to law if public order and peace were to be preserved.​[200]​ ‘Whence is most danger to be rationally feared’, Locke asked rhetorically, ‘from ignorant or knowing heads? From an orderly council or a confused multitude?’​[201]​ Given the bewildering multiplicity of ideas of virtue and sanctity in the world, the wise man submitted quiescently to whatever customs and laws regulated the moral and religious affairs of the society in which he lived, whilst inwardly retiring to his mind to judge freely of things for himself. In Locke’s case, as in Lipsius’s, an uncritical commitment to political authority was fused with an admiration for Stoic moralists such as Seneca: meditation on the Stoics’ ethical precepts might allow for the tranquillity and constancy which Locke so evidently craved.​[202]​ As had Hobbes, Locke distinguished between private judgements (in foro interno) and public assent (in foro externo) in order to deny that an outward conformity to magisterial commands necessarily bound the conscience. External commands only referred to external acts, not internal belief; and Locke accepted that in any case the latter could not be coerced: a point later foregrounded in his defence of religious liberty.​[203]​ Consequently an ‘unfeigned assent and consent’ to the Book of Common Prayer, as mandated by the Act of Uniformity (1662), need not compromise a conscience which was beyond the reach of public authority.​[204]​ 
Lectures on the Law of Nature (c.1663–1664)
The lectures delivered by Locke as Censor of Moral Philosophy at Christ Church in 1663–1664 show a considerably keener, more critical intellect at work.​[205]​ The manuscripts of these lectures nonetheless need to be read with some care. They do not constitute a continuous argument, but rather a set of disputations: propositions, or ‘questions’ are raised and probed, thereby taking students through a variety of familiar jurisprudential problems.​[206]​ That Locke’s lectures nonetheless represent an important stage in his intellectual development is indicated by his concern during his lifetime carefully to preserve these texts: Locke had his amanuensis draw up a fair copy of them in c.1681–1682.​[207]​ Their originality, and indeed their enduring topicality, is further attested by the fact that James Tyrrell was still urging Locke to publish them in 1690, in large part as a means of repudiating Hobbes’s central doctrines. Tyrrell interpreted Locke’s lectures as intended to show ‘Mr: Hobs mistake that the Laws of Nature are not properly Laws nor doe oblige mankind to their observation when out of a civil state, or commonwealth’.​[208]​ Tyrrell was not mistaken: the lectures indeed reveal Locke’s attempt to grapple with issues raised by Hobbes.​[209]​ Yet it seems clear that, from Locke’s perspective, his tentative, initial attempt in the lectures to formulate a response to Hobbes had been superseded by his discussion of natural law and moral knowledge in the Essay. That Tyrrell advocated the publication of the lectures shortly after the appearance of the Essay, however, indicated his anxieties concerning the adequacy of the latter work’s treatment of these issues—for reasons discussed later in this chapter.
Locke’s lectures probed, if inconclusively, thorny questions such as the vexed relationship between conscience and civil law with which he had pragmatically avoided engaging in anything more than a cursory manner in the ‘Tracts’. They reveal Locke’s willingness to accept a number of Hobbes’s most fundamental insights, and a concomitant rejection of central aspects of Grotius’s theory, with which he engaged closely and critically (although not explicitly).​[210]​ Locke, it is clear, was nonetheless determined to challenge Hobbes’s conclusions: but to do so without recourse to broadly neo-Stoic doctrines (natural sociability, recta ratio, universal consent) which Hobbes had, from Locke’s perspective, shown to be inadequate to the task of establishing the existence and obligatory character of natural law. In this regard, Locke’s lectures provide the first indication of his close, highly distinctive, and intellectually fruitful reading of Cicero as an academic sceptic, critical of cardinal tenets of both Stoic and Epicurean theories of ethics and justice.​[211]​
Locke was far from alone in turning to Cicero as a means of responding to Hobbes. Given how frequently Hobbes was tarred with the Epicurean brush—Tyrrell continually urged Locke to respond to ‘the Epicurean Principles of Mr: Hobs’—it is unsurprising that his critics adopted the guise of Epicurus’s ancient critics: the Stoics, and most notably Cicero.​[212]​ Cicero’s strident criticisms of Epicureanism, especially its political and ethical implications, in his philosophical dialogues provided a treasure-trove of arguments that could be employed to undermine the misanthropic vision of man (and capricious picture of God) presented by thinkers such as Hobbes.​[213]​ In a similar manner to Grotius, many of Hobbes’s English critics broadly accepted that self-preservation and self-interest played an essential explanatory role in the construction of the civitas: a point upon which both the ancient Stoics and Epicureans had been able to agree. They nonetheless sought to deny Hobbes’s reduction of ethics to political sociology: moral obligation and justice necessarily exist independently of, and prior to the construction of political authority. In making this case they invoked the authority of Cicero, whose views were, most argued, broadly identical with those voiced by his Stoic interlocutors in his philosophical dialogues.
This was the approach adopted by Sharrock, the title of whose work indicates Cicero’s presiding presence within it: Hypotheses Ēthikē de Finibus & Officiis Secundum Naturae Jus (1660). Sharrock sought to reconcile the useful (utile) with the normatively true (honestum) with recourse to the concept of an innate moral conscience. Man’s conscience, Sharrock argued, imposed natural sanctions (guilt and remorse) sufficient to ensure that they found their interest in virtuous living even in the absence of political authority. Sharrock substantiated his claims by affirming Grotius’s argument from universal consent: the wisest philosophers, prominent among them Cicero and the Stoics, had reached similar conclusions as to the duties of natural law.​[214]​ Sharrock’s basic thesis was supported by Locke’s friend Towerson.​[215]​ A broadly similar approach would subsequently be developed with considerably greater conceptual sophistication by Richard Cumberland, whose choice of title—De Legibus Naturae (1672)—again betrays the author’s identification with Cicero.​[216]​ Cumberland sought to prove, against Hobbes, that good and evil, and the sanctions enforcing morality, were antecedent to civil law with recourse to the natural punishments attending vice (whether the pangs of conscience, the pain of a hangover, or indeed a state of war).​[217]​ As with Sharrock, Cumberland’s primary objective was nonetheless to relate the content of natural law, and the ‘natural’ sanctions enforcing it, to God’s will: sufficient evidence of which, he argued against Hobbes, could be found in nature. Tyrrell’s later Brief Disquisition of the Law of Nature (1692), which was partially intended to rectify the perceived shortcomings of Locke’s treatment of natural law in the Essay, was in turn based on ‘the principles and method laid down’ by Cumberland.​[218]​
Locke’s lectures indicate that he shared this objective to relate natural law more closely to God’s will, command, and sanctions on the basis of natural theology: a task which Hobbes had deemed impossible. From the first, Locke occupied a position which he maintained throughout his life, and which refuted Grotius’s notorious etiamsi daremus claim: ‘even if God and the soul’s immortality are not moral propositions and laws of nature, nevertheless they must necessarily be presupposed if natural law is to exist’ (ELN V: 173; III: 151).​[219]​ Law was obligatory because it represented God’s will, not because, as Grotius maintained, it was equitable or fitted to human nature and the requirements of sociability (although it was, due to God’s beneficent design). Reason was the ‘interpreter’, not ‘the maker of that law’. Here Locke endorsed, as he had in the ‘Tracts’, a voluntarist theory of law akin to Hobbes’s; but he endeavoured to show that God, not the sovereign, was the author of natural law, which was knowable and obligatory even if it remained ‘unwritten’.​[220]​ The question was how men came by this knowledge, and here Locke’s interests were primarily epistemological.​[221]​ Locke was in no doubt that natural law ‘is sufficiently known to men (and this is all that is needed for the purpose) because it can be perceived by the light of nature alone’: revelation was not required (ELN I: 111–112; cf. II: 123). Locke’s lectures nonetheless subjected the conventional arguments deployed by natural law theorists, including Grotius, to concerted critical interrogation. In so doing, Locke broadly endorsed Hobbes’s claim that these arguments were inadequate. If, as Locke evidently believed, the promulgation, propositional content, and obligor character of natural law could be established upon the basis of reason, then an alternative methodological approach was required. 
Locke turned to the new empirical philosophy as a means to this end: unsurprisingly, perhaps, given Locke’s close association with Boyle and his circle, and his interest in a learned medical humanist culture which prioritized experience and observation—the reading of signs or symptoms, and the empirical investigation of their causes—over hypothesis.​[222]​ Locke’s fundamental contention was that ‘the foundation of all knowledge of [the law] is derived from those things which we perceive through our senses’. Through reasoning on this data, we assuredly ‘advance to the notion of the maker of these things’ and, thence, to a grasp of the foundations of moral obligation (God’s will and sanctions). The task facing reason, for the moralist as for the physician or natural philosopher, was thus ‘to find a way from perceptible and obvious things into their hidden nature’, something which required ‘careful reflection, thought and attention by the mind’ (ELN II: 133–135; cf. IV: 155–157). Locke was, by 1663–1664, already a committed empiricist.​[223]​    
This confidence that the empirical method offered the surest means to establish the existence and obligatory character of natural law underpinned Locke’s rejection of conventional doctrines which he broadly summarized in his opening lecture, and subsequently deemed to be merely hypothetical as unsupported by the weight of evidence. This included the argument from natural conscience, as developed by Sharrock and defended by Towerson.​[224]​ It further encompassed the foundational doctrines upon which Grotius’s theory was constructed: right reason (recta ratio), and natural human sociability. On the former, Locke noted that scholastic theorists of an intellectualist bent, such as Aquinas, frequently turned to Stoic philosophy, and most notably to Seneca (although Locke also cited Aristotle).​[225]​ They relied upon a normative concept of recta ratio, by which they meant ‘certain definite principles of action from which spring all virtues and whatever is necessary for the proper moulding of morals’ (ELN I: 111). This conception was subsequently rejected out of hand by Locke, as by Hobbes: reason was merely ‘the discursive faculty of the mind, which advances from things known to things unknown and argues from one thing to another in a definite and fixed order of propositions’ (ELN IV: 149). Meanwhile Locke adduced the evidence of the ‘histories of both the old and the new world’ and ‘the itineraries of travellers’ to cast doubt on man’s natural sociability and attraction to the good and the just (ELN III: 140–141).​[226]​ In so doing, in his fifth lecture Locke denied the legitimacy of Grotius’s claim that the writings of the jurists and moralists of classical antiquity revealed a consensus regarding the origins and content of natural law. Locke’s disparagement of the argument from universal consent was articulated in terms that would have been familiar to readers of Hobbes. In Elements of Law (1650), with Grotius as an obvious target, Hobbes declared:
What it is we call the law of nature, is not agreed upon by those who have hitherto written. For the most part, such writers as have occasion to affirm, that anything is against the law of nature, do allege no more than this, that it is against the consent of all nations, or the wisest and most civil nations. But it is not agreed upon, who shall judge which nations are the wisest.​[227]​
In a similar vein, Locke drew attention to the moral depravity of even the nation deemed most ‘civil’ by Grotius: ‘In what way, in fact, have even the Romans, who are alleged to present to the whole world examples of virtue, procured for themselves honours, triumphs, glory, and the memory of their immortal name, if not by the robbery and brigandage by means of which they devastated the whole earth?’ (ELN V: 169). Meanwhile Locke similarly concurred with Hobbes’s verdict that the ancient writers on the subject had reached no agreement among themselves, and hence could hardly offer a univocal definition of natural law as Grotius had maintained: ‘What use is it to turn to philosophers? For Varro produces more than two hundred of their notions about the highest good, and there can be no fewer opinions about how to reach happiness, that is, about the law of nature’ (ELN V: 175).​[228]​ Locke parted company from Hobbes, however, in relating this universal ignorance regarding the true foundations of ethics and justice to the ancients’ lack of knowledge of God and a future state:
What sort of thing is the opinion of the Greeks, the Romans, and the whole heathen world concerning the gods? For since all these have conceived of many gods and represented them as fighting among themselves, as they did in the Trojan War, as being variously affected towards one another, as cruel, thieves, adulterers, it does not appear surprising if they were unable to derive the ground of their duty from the will of such gods. . . . Is it surprising that such a general consent about gods on the part of men has contributed nothing at all to the proper foundation of morals? For what are these people, pray, if not disguised atheists? (ELN V: 175)
Here Locke made a point which he would later develop in the Essay: heathen polytheism and idolatry in no way attested to the truth of theism but ought rather to be considered as a species of atheism.​[229]​
As this emphasis on the inextricability of religious and moral knowledge attests, Locke was resoundingly sceptical of Hobbes’s attempt to construct an alternative theory of natural law to that offered by Grotius and his predecessors. All obligation derived from one’s obligation to God under natural law; and ‘without this law, the rules can perhaps by force and with the aid of arms compel the multitude to obedience, but put them under an obligation they cannot’. Leviathan could not offer a recipe for stability, peace, and order, as if all pacts originated in utility and human fiat, then they could be broken as and when individuals saw fit. Here Locke echoed De Legibus: ‘unless the obligation to keep promises was derived from nature, and not from human will’, all would fall apart. ‘Without natural law’, Locke continued, ‘there would be neither virtue nor vice’. Instead, ‘everything would have to depend on human will, and since there would be nothing to demand dutiful action, it seems that man would not be bound to do anything but what utility or pleasure might recommend’. In sum, ‘virtue’ and ‘honesty’ would ‘be nothing at all but empty names’ (ELN, I: 117–121; cf. VI: 188–189). Locke’s final lecture, which took aim at the Hobbesian/Carnaedean thesis that ‘every man’s own interest’ provided ‘the basis of the law of nature’, further extended these arguments. Again paraphrasing De Legibus, Locke declared that ‘if the ground of duty were made to rest on gain and if expediency were acknowledged as the standard of rightness, what else would this be than to open the door to every kind of villainy’ (ELN VIII: 211)? The great error of the Epicureans, as Cicero noted repeatedly, was to separate utility (utile) from virtue (honestum), and to argue that all law originated in the former.​[230]​ 
Locke’s turn to De Legibus as a means of undermining Hobbes’s account of obligation was highly conventional, as the examples of Sharrock and, later, Cumberland attest.​[231]​ Yet the manner in which Locke turned to Cicero—even as, in his lectures, he did not make this debt explicit—in order to vindicate his empirical approach and, as a consequence, his rejection of broadly neo-Stoic arguments (such as Sharrock’s own) was considerably more idiosyncratic. In the dialogue Tusculan Disputations, Cicero set off the arguments of the Stoics and Epicureans against one another, whilst identifying errors within both. In a passage in which Cicero spoke in propria persona, he noted ‘how few philosophers are found to be so constituted and to have principles and a rule of life’ that they were actually able to follow in practice: including the dogmatic Stoics and Epicureans. Locke later transcribed this passage in his journal; and Hobbes drew from it in rejecting Grotius’s argument from universal consent.​[232]​ Far from identifying a guide that permitted them to live ‘according to nature’, Cicero suggested that the divergence between their speculative precepts and their moral practice indicated how the dogmatic sects’ philosophical enquiries into the good had led them to attempt to lead profoundly unnatural lives. It was bad enough—a ‘black disgrace’, indeed—that philosophers were guilty of ‘frivolity and vanity’ in their own lives, unable to obey their high-minded ‘dogmas’. The disgrace was enhanced because ‘he stumbles in the duty of which he aims at being the teacher and fails in the conduct of life though professing to give the rule of life’. The ‘wise’ philosopher was not merely guilty of self-delusion: rather, he misled the supposedly irrational multitude over whom he so haughtily professed his superiority.​[233]​
Meanwhile, although Locke suggested that the ancient moralists were of little use in showing how, by ‘careful reflection, thought, and attention by the mind’ it was possible ‘by argument and reasoning’ to uncover the foundations and content of natural law, he nonetheless indicated that there was one exception: Cicero. Locke’s admittedly rather cursory attempt in his fourth lecture to show how his empirical approach could identify the existence and attributes of God drew directly from De Legibus: a debt later acknowledged by Locke when he reproduced these arguments in the Essay (EHU 4.10.6).​[234]​ In De Legibus, Cicero introduced his proofs by noting that ‘Nature has . . . not only equipped man with nimbleness of thought, but has also given him the senses, to be as it were, his attendants and messengers; she has laid bare the obscure and none too obvious meanings of a great many things, to serve as the foundations of knowledge’.​[235]​ Locke adopted a very similar approach, and endorsed the two, primary arguments presented by Cicero. First, by reasoning on the data of sense-experience the individual would discern an order and harmony in the observable universe, thereby acquiring an idea of its purposive nature. Second, by reflecting on his own capacity for abstract thought, the individual would necessarily acquire the idea of an intelligent, powerful, and wise designer by whom, as His created being, he would be held accountable (ELN IV: 157).​[236]​ This is not to say that, on Locke’s reading, Cicero had identified the true origins of moral obligation in God’s will and command (something Locke would later explicitly deny in Some Thoughts); but it did imply that Cicero was a pioneer of an empirical methodology, which ensured that he (unlike Aristotle and the other ancients) did not embrace an erroneous definition of moral obligation. 
This interpretation is strengthened by the implications Locke drew from his rejection of both innate ideas and universal consent as sources of natural law, which left only ‘sense-experience’ (sensus) as a means to true knowledge of one’s duties. The former two doctrines, Locke observed, appeared persuasive to individuals because, if true, they would offer ‘an easy and very convenient way of knowing’ (ELN I: 127).​[237]​ If knowledge of natural law were innate—or if, at least, the wisest of philosophers were all agreed in their accounts of its foundations and propositional content—then there would be no need for the individual to seek out such knowledge for himself. He could simply follow the teachings and commands, and imitate the example, of those ‘wiser’ than himself: a submissive posture broadly endorsed by Locke in his ‘Tracts’ and early correspondence, on account of a less than flattering portrayal of human nature and the capacities of reason.​[238]​ If, conversely, neither ‘inscription’ (innatism) nor ‘tradition’ (the teachings of the philosophers) provided a reliable guide, then the burden on the individual who would live well in this world, and perhaps secure salvation in the world to come, was considerably greater. In attacking the doctrines of innatism and universal consent, Locke sought radically to destabilize the sense of security which they fostered. Men could acquire knowledge of their duties and obligations under natural law by the ‘light of nature’ alone, but this required considerable effort on their part (‘careful reflection, thought, and attention’). In contrast to his resoundingly negative portrayal of human nature in the ‘Tracts’, the lectures express an almost Baconian optimism that the ‘mind’ is ‘capable of everything’; and here it is significant that Locke now banished the question of original sin (the Fall ‘does not particularly concern philosophers’) (ELN IV: 147).​[239]​ One consequence of Locke’s confidence that, by reasoning on the data of sense-experience, men could acquire ‘sufficient’ knowledge of their duties under natural law was that he now imposed an onerous burden on every individual to seek it. Here the influence of Cicero is palpable, even as the debt would be acknowledged explicitly only in Locke’s later (published) writings.
As Hobbes understood only too well, Cicero laboured the point that the law of nature was amenable to rational inquiry by all, and that all were consequently duty-bound to interpret it by their own lights. As Cicero declared in a famous passage of De Republica (3.22), which had been preserved by Lactantius in the Divine Institutes (6.8):
We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment.​[240]​
In De Officiis, Cicero explained that both men and beasts were guided by their desires and acquired all their knowledge by means of the senses. Cicero drew particular attention to the desire for self-preservation, the impulse to unite for the purpose of procreation, and the concern to nourish one’s offspring. Men, unlike beasts, possessed reason, however, ‘by which he comprehends the chain of consequences, perceives the causes of things, understands the relation of cause to effect and of effect to cause, draws analogies, and connects and associates the present and the future’. Reason allowed men to recognize the mutual benefits of uniting together in ‘fellowship’ in pursuit of shared ends, most especially to secure property and to provide more stable and constant ‘comfort and sustenance’ for both oneself and one’s family. Society, in turn, encouraged the cultivation of an ‘impulse’ that beasts lacked, on account of their inability to trace causal connections. ‘The search for truth and its eager pursuit’, Cicero declared, ‘are peculiar to man’; and ‘to this passion for discovering truth is added a hungering, as it were, for independence, so that a mind well-moulded by Nature is unwilling to be subject to anybody’ whose advice, teaching, and commands are not consistent with ‘justice and law’. For this reason the individual had a duty, Cicero declared, ‘to search after truth’, even as this industry might fail to yield certain answers in all areas of life.​[241]​
Cicero nonetheless emphasized that the road to truth was considerably rockier—full of doubt, and requiring greater pains and labour—than the dogmatic Stoics or Epicureans recognized: an aspect of his philosophy subsequently stressed by Locke. This, Cicero argued, was where academic scepticism offered a distinctive philosophical approach which was superior to all others, and which he described most comprehensively in the Academica. Academic scepticism emphasized the severe limits of reason and the frequent need, in even the most important of questions, to content oneself with probability. Demonstrable certainty may not be attainable; yet it did not follow that the individual ought to abandon the search for truth, and meekly follow the opinions of others. ‘Even though many difficulties hinder every branch of knowledge, and both the subjects themselves and our faculties of judgement involve such a lack of certainty’, the academic sceptic refused to ‘abandon in exhaustion our zeal for study’. His aim was, instead, ‘by arguing on both sides [of a question] to draw out and give shape to some result that may be either true or the nearest possible approximation to the truth’.​[242]​ In regard to an eternal law of nature, Cicero argued that all men were equal in two respects. First, in juridical terms the common man, magistrate, and philosopher were treated alike under the law.​[243]​ Second, every individual possessed the requisite faculties potentially to gain sufficient knowledge of their duties under law, and hence to recognize their accountability to it as autonomous moral agents. As Cicero argued in De Officiis, men only became truly human when they embraced their natural ‘desire for seeing truth’; the pursuit, rather than necessarily the acquisition of truth defined ‘a blessed life’.​[244]​ The individual could not blindly follow others, nor profess to lead them: all men were fallible, and accountable for their own errors. This insight underpinned what, Cicero proclaimed, were the fundamental features of academic scepticism:
Nor is there any difference between ourselves and those who think that they have positive knowledge except that they have no doubt that their tenets are true, whereas we hold many doctrines as probable, which we can easily act upon but scarcely advance as certain; yet we are more free and untrammelled in that we possess our power of judgement uncurtailed, and are bound by no compulsion to support all the dogmas laid down for us almost as edicts by certain masters. For all other people in the first place are held in close bondage placed upon them before they were able to judge what doctrine was the best, and secondly they form judgments about matters as to which they know nothing at the most incompetent period of life, either under the guidance of some friend or under the influence of a single harangue from the first lecturer they attended, and cling as to a rock to whatever theory they are carried to by stress of weather.​[245]​
Locke occupied a position which he appears to have considered to be akin to Cicero’s, in denying that the individual could delegate to others his duty to seek moral truth. Yet Locke placed Cicero’s emphasis on individual inquiry within a Christian framework: it was essential not merely for true virtue, but also for salvation, that every individual employ their faculties for the purpose intended by their Creator (to acquire knowledge of Him and His will). ‘By saying that something can be known by the light of nature’, Locke declared, it was insufficient simply to point to those few sages who purported to have secured this knowledge. Instead, echoing De Republica, ‘we mean nothing else but that there is some sort of truth to the knowledge of which a man can attain by himself and without the help of another, if he makes proper use of the faculties he is endowed with by nature’. Locke did not doubt that should he do so, ‘he can attain to the knowledge of this law without any teacher instructing him in his duties, any monitor reminding him of them’ (ELN II: 123; 127: italics added). To be guided by the teachings of others is ‘to be guided by belief and approval, not by the law of nature’, even as the two might potentially coincide (ELN II: 129). As Locke would later put the point in the Essay, ‘the floating of other Mens Opinions in our minds makes us not one jot more knowing, though they happen to be true’ (EHU 1.4.23). The individual who would identify a true guide by which to live needed to investigate into ‘things themselves’ (rebus ipsis): a refrain repeatedly sounded by Bacon and the experimental philosophers, but repurposed by Locke and applied in the spheres of religion and ethics.​[246]​ The task of ‘deriv[ing] the law of nature from its very fountainhead’ (fontibus)—as Hobbes, Grotius, and Pufendorf, drawing on Cicero’s De Legibus (fons), had sought to do—could not be alienated to the philosopher or civil magistrate. Instead this was a duty imposed on all men: ‘it is quite evident that God intends man to do something’, and his ability to identify moral truth made him obliged to seek it (ELN IV: 157). ‘For surely’, Locke declared, ‘each single person has to infer the law of nature from the first principles of nature, not from another person’s belief’ (ELN VI: 177: italics added). 
It is difficult to imagine a more forceful retort to Hobbes’s unequivocal denial, reluctantly endorsed by Locke in the ‘Tracts’, ‘that knowledge of good or evil is a matter for individuals’.​[247]​ For Hobbes and legions of Christian apologists of an Augustinian bent, the desire to know moral things was the source of all ills (and perhaps precipitated the Fall).​[248]​ The challenge, for Hobbes, was to combat man’s compulsive desire to know, thereby encouraging them to submit to the authority of another’s will. For Locke as for Cicero, human nature was recalcitrant in precisely the opposite way: men by nature take the easy road, and willingly conform to others’ opinions as a means of avoiding the anxiety caused by doubt and uncertainty. All too many refuse to ‘open [their] eyes, . . . though possibly the road is unobstructed and his eyesight is sufficiently sharp’ (ELN VII: 203). If the mind was an ‘empty tablet’ at birth, then the earliest inscriptions were made upon it not by ‘observation and reasoning’, but through education in society (ELN III: 137). The force of custom was such that entire peoples ‘recognize no deity at all’, despite the fact that ‘all men everywhere are sufficiently prepared by nature to discover God in His works’ (ELN IV: 156–157). Custom could even lead men to ignore the duty which modern philosophers such as Grotius and Hobbes had claimed was the most basic and fundamental of all: that of self-preservation (ELN V: 171–173). Men’s desire for a sense of security in those areas of greatest concern—morality and religion—explained why they willingly accepted the (illegitimate) authority of those who professed to guide them; and, once they had imbibed their opinions, they were intensely reluctant to submit them to critical scrutiny. As Locke explained in a passage which echoes Cicero’s Academica:
For these opinions about moral rightness and goodness which we embrace so firmly are for the most part such as, in a still tender age, before we can as yet determine anything about them or observe how they insinuate themselves, stream into our unguarded minds and are inculcated by our parents or teachers or others with whom we live. (ELN III: 142)
To call these ‘opinions’ into question was potentially to admit that ‘thus far we have lived badly and without reason’. For the Christian, importantly, this would make everything ‘uncertain’ (incerti) and force him to reconsider both his ‘past life’ and his prospects for a ‘future life’. It would, in other words, compel him to recognize his accountability for his own beliefs, opinions, and actions, to fear for his immortal soul, and thereby to repent (ELN III: 141–143).
To summarize: Locke’s lectures of 1663–1664 indicate his commitment to positions which, to his later contemporary critics as to modern commentators, appear to be in tension, if not mutual contradiction. On the one hand, Locke endorsed an anthropology which was broadly similar to that offered by Hobbes and, indeed, Montaigne, and seemed necessarily to lead to an account of justice and ethics which grounded both in utility and human convention. Men, Locke suggested, are driven by their self-interested passions; reason is to be understood syllogistically, rather than normatively; and human ideas of good and ill are shaped by the tyrannical power of custom, rather than by the rational identification of an immutable and objective standard of truth.​[249]​ Yet Locke maintained not merely that such an immutable standard exists, but that it is amenable to individual rational inquiry; and it follows that true virtue inheres in a conscious recognition of one’s accountability before this law. This conviction was, in turn, predicated on the claim—which Locke did little to substantiate by means of philosophical argument—that the attributes, will, and sanctions of the divine legislator can be established with a tolerable degree of certainty by means of natural theology. 
In short, Locke declared in his concluding lecture, ‘utility is not the basis of the law or the ground of obligation, but the consequence of obedience to it’. Locke’s final sentence paraphrased Cicero’s oft-repeated claim that ‘it is not because it is expedient that [an action] is virtuous, but because it is virtuous it is expedient’.​[250]​ ‘The rightness of an action’, Locke declared, ‘does not depend on its utility; on the contrary, its utility is a result of its rightness’ (ELN VIII: 215). Locke’s confidence that the empirical method pioneered by Boyle and his circle could, when applied in the spheres of ethics and theology, allow for the errors of both Hobbesian (or neo-Epicurean) conventionalism and Grotian (or neo-Stoic) rationalism to be overcome was informed and bolstered by his reading of Cicero as an academic sceptic who had adopted a broadly similar position. This identification with Cicero would be made much more explicit in Locke’s mature, published writings, as will be seen in Section III. First, however, attention to two unpublished manuscripts from the later 1660s serves to illustrate how Locke developed key insights from his lectures in important ways later in the decade.  
‘De Arte Medica’ (1669) and ‘An Essay on Toleration’ (1667)
I will treat of these two manuscripts, for reasons which should become apparent, in reverse chronological order. The first, ‘De Arte Medica’ (1669), grew out of Locke’s interests in physiology and medicine, which ‘absorbed’ him in the period immediately following his term as Censor (from 1664).​[251]​ Locke composed this manuscript whilst working with the physician Thomas Sydenham (1624–1689), after joining Shaftesbury’s household in London in 1667.​[252]​ It has been observed that Locke was ‘unique among the major philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in having received a medical education’.​[253]​ Even as there is no indication that, in the 1660s, Locke drew together his interests in the fields of medicine and natural law, his medical training is relevant when considering his concern to place his philosophical approach to ethics within a historiography of the discipline, and offers support for the claim that Locke found in Cicero a pioneer of his own, empirical methodology. Dmitri Levitin has argued forcefully that the new experimental philosophy was most effectively defended in the first half of the seventeenth century by learned physicians, who sought to place their empirical methodological commitments within the context of a history of their discipline. Advocates of the new natural philosophy, including Boyle and the members of the nascent Royal Society, subsequently adopted a similar approach, offering an historical-contextual explanation for the corruption of their discipline in the hands of the speculative ancients (not least Epicurus).​[254]​ ‘De Arte Medica’ betrays Locke’s similar concern to show how this corruption had occurred in medicine, and to emphasize its deleterious practical consequences. 
Locke endorsed Sydenham’s approach to the treatment of disease, which was radical for its time in suggesting that the causes of illness—no less than the fundamental structure of nature more generally—were hidden from human sight. Sydenham thereby steered clear of aetiology, and the fruitless theoretical disputes between competing medical factions which it supposedly engendered.​[255]​ Accordingly, Locke expressed optimism that real improvement was possible in the treatment of disease, but only if a considerable amount of methodological rubbish were first removed—and, in this connection, he cited Cicero’s De Oratore.​[256]​ Locke pathologized men’s tendency, clearly evidenced by speculative ancient physicians such as Galen (and, by implication, moderns such as van Helmont​[257]​ and Paracelsus) to seek certainty where it could not be had. The ancients, Locke declared,
. . . have very much obleiged posterity, & they are not to be blamed that they did that which is very agreeable to the nature of mans understanding, which not contenting its self to observe the operation of nature & the event of things, is very inquisitive after their cause & very restlesse & unquiet till those things which it is conversant about, it has framed to its self some hypothesis & laid a foundation whereon to establish all its reasonings.​[258]​  
This addiction to ‘systems & hypotheses’ was eminently comprehensible both contextually (‘the fashion of their times and countrys’ ensured that such system-builders acquired ‘fame & reputation’) and psychologically (doing so ‘complied with their most naturall inclinations’, i.e. their desire for certainty). It reflected a malaise which had negatively, and perhaps inevitably given human nature, impacted upon all the arts and sciences:
[T]he beginning & improvemt, of useful arts, & the assistances of human life have all sprung from industry & observation true knowledg grew first in the world, by experience & rationall operations & had this method beene continued & all mens thoughts beene imploid to add their owne tryalls to the observation of others noe question physick as well as many other arts, had been in a better condition than now it is . . . but proud man, not content with that knowledg he was capable of & was useful to him, would needs penetrate into the hidden causes of things [and] lay downe principles & establish maximes to him self about the operations of nature, & then vainely expect, that Nature or in truth god him selfe should proceede according to those laws his maximes had prescribed him.
By failing to recognize the limits of reason in the face of God’s omnipotence, such philosophers had grievously overreached; and this, as Locke’s lectures of 1663–1664 suggested, had also been the case in ethics. When his ‘observation’ could not provide him with the explanatory truths he craved, the philosopher ‘would needs fashion all those out of his own thought & make a world to him self framed & governed by his owne intelligence’.​[259]​ He then applied his ‘maximes’ to the phenomena he studied, thereby precluding ‘unbiased observation’. Philosophical and theological error was an inevitable consequence, as God’s wisdom and design were reduced to the paltry insights of human reason.​[260]​ This addiction to speculation, in turn, hindered ‘the growth of practicall knowledge’. Books had proliferated, but merely engendered fruitless disputes rather than contributing to human learning and happiness. This explained why the ‘dull plowman & unread gardener’ had contributed more to the stock of useful human knowledge than ‘the profound philosopher or acute disputant’, because their understandings of the land they worked had produced material benefits, unlike the philosophers’ commitment to abstract, speculative theories. This comparison between the rustic ploughman (or ‘mechanick’) and the learned disputant, always to the former’s advantage, is commonplace in Locke’s later writings.​[261]​ 
The second, earlier manuscript, Locke’s unpublished ‘Essay on Toleration’ (1667), mined a similar theme, but in order to explain (and to correct) misunderstandings regarding the relationship between morality, religion, and politics. Locke offered a defence of religious liberty which appears flatly to contradict his earlier position in the ‘Tracts’.​[262]​ Locke now declared that ‘the magistrate ought to do or meddle with nothing but barely in order to securing the civil peace and propriety [property] of his subjects’; his sole concern was to preserve ‘the welfare and safety of his people’ by administering justice disinterestedly. The care of men’s souls was no part of his office; and one’s salvation was far ‘too great’ for it to be alienated to a sovereign who was no less fallible than oneself.​[263]​ Locke’s seemingly abrupt about-turn is frequently attributed to two factors: his experience in Cleves in 1665, where denominational diversity appeared actively to support, rather than to undermine civil peace and order; and the influence of Shaftesbury on Locke’s thinking following his arrival at Exeter House.​[264]​ Both of these factors were undoubtedly important; but historians have tended to underplay the extent to which Locke’s position in the ‘Essay’ represents a working through of the implications of some of the broadly Ciceronian insights first explored in his lectures of 1663–1664.
The most obvious of these is Locke’s greater optimism regarding the individual’s capacity, and hence duty, to comprehend the foundations and content of his duties under natural law: something which legitimately could neither be alienated to, nor impeded by anyone else. Another is Locke’s conviction that a similar corruption to that seen in medicine had occurred in the fields of politics, ethics, and religion, in which ungrounded hypothesis had taken the place of experience and observation—and with similarly noxious consequences for human life. Obsessed with their own, subjective hypotheses regarding mankind’s summum bonum, magistrates and philosophers had ceased to be guided by what, on the basis of experience and observation alone, could be shown to contribute to the happiness and well-being of their societies. Both insights explain why Locke justified the magistrate’s intervention to censure those who, ‘out of pride or overweeningness of my own opinion, and a secret conceit of my own infallibility, taking to myself something of a godlike power, force and compel others to be of my mind’.​[265]​ They also allow us to understand why Locke excluded atheists from toleration, a position he would maintain in the Epistola de Tolerantia (1689). The ‘belief of a deity’ was ‘the foundation of all morality’; and the liberty defended by Locke was a liberty to do something, namely to seek the true foundation and content of one’s duties: a search quite obviously discountenanced by the atheist.​[266]​ Meanwhile, Locke advanced an opinion which he recognized to be unconventional. No-one could doubt that virtue brought advantages to government,
Yet give me leave to say, however strange it may seem, that the lawmaker hath nothing to do with moral virtues and vices, nor ought to enjoin the duties of the second table any otherwise than barely as they are subservient to the good and preservation of mankind under government. . . . The magistrate as magistrate hath nothing to do with the good of men’s souls or their concernments in another life, but is ordained and entrusted with his power only for the quiet and comfortable living of men in society, one with another, as hath been already sufficiently proved. And it is yet further evident that the magistrate commands not the practice of virtues, because they are virtuous and oblige the conscience, or are the duties of man to God and the way to his mercy and favour, but because they are the strong ties and bonds of society, which cannot be loosened without shattering the whole frame.​[267]​
In the ‘Essay’, Locke for the first time imposes the categorical distinction between the realms of politics and religion which is so distinctive a feature of his mature writings. The former is concerned exclusively with men’s temporal well-being, the latter with his eternal salvation; and the legitimate jurisdictions of political and ecclesiastical authority—of the civitas and ecclesia—are accordingly discrete. Yet it is Locke’s emergent conceptualisation of a third realm, independent of and antecedent to both the political and the ecclesiastical, which gives his argument such force. This is societas, the realm in which men’s ideas of good and ill, sacred and profane take shape. The magistrate has no legitimate jurisdiction to legislate in the moral realm: he does not possess the authority to impose virtue as virtue, as his office is merely to enforce (or prohibit) those practices which are deemed essential to (or corrosive of) the ‘bonds of society’. Consequently men in society remain at liberty to form their own ideas of the normatively good: that is, to search for the origins and content of natural law. Locke conceived of membership of religious societies as voluntary for a similar reason: the individual must be free to enter, or leave, any such society according to his (evolving) interpretation of the nature of his duties to God (including the duty to worship Him publicly). In marked contrast to Hobbes’s account, no authority could be legitimate which precluded men’s attempts to understand both natural law and the Scriptures by their own lights. Locke’s ‘Essay’ betrays his confidence that, if these three realms remain discrete, there can be no disharmony between them. The natural human desire for certainty, however, had resulted in the elision of any distinction between these realms: a quest for absolute truths which had become yet more pronounced with the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. This claim sits at the heart of Locke’s complex, and to contemporaries deeply problematic, treatment of natural law in the Essay concerning Human Understanding, on which he embarked from c.1670. 
iii.	Hedonism, Social Constraint, and Natural Law, 1669–1690
Locke’s ‘Three Laws’
At the outset of the Essay, Locke identified ‘three Sorts’ of ‘Moral Rules, or Laws’ that had been established by philosophers to explain men’s sense of obligation to adhere to compacts.​[268]​ Each ‘Law’ was accompanied by its own sanctions. The first and, as in the lectures of 1663–1664, for Locke the only true law was that of the Christian: God required it of His created beings, and would hold the individual accountable for his moral actions on the Day of Judgment. The second law was that of the ‘Hobbist’: ‘because the Publick requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you, if you do not’. The third law was provided by ‘the old Heathen philosophers’, most notably the Stoics, who argued that to do so was honest, and suitable to the dignity and perfection of a rational creature (EHU 1.3.5). The first rule was denominated ‘the Divine Law’ and concerned itself with sin and duty; the second ‘the Civil Law’, demarcating crimes and innocence; and the third was originally termed by Locke ‘the philosophical Law’, but from the second edition (1694) was renamed the ‘Law of Opinion or Reputation’ and was preoccupied with virtue and vice (EHU 2.28.7–10). 
The sanctions enforcing the ‘Law of Reputation’, Locke argued, were praise and blame. These were in practice the most powerful of all in shaping men’s conduct. Regrettably few individuals reflected upon God’s laws and the terrible punishments of a future state. Even those who did might ‘entertain Thoughts of future reconciliation, and making their Peace for such Breaches’ of natural law. Meanwhile, as Locke had noted in his lectures of 1663–1664, in some countries men lacked any idea of God, or entertained false (polytheistic) ideas in divinity—so these primitive communities were clearly regulated by an alternative rule. When it came to ‘the Civil Law’ upon which Hobbes placed such weight, Locke stressed its limited reach, and noted that men ‘frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of Impunity’. The reach and power of the ‘Law of Reputation’ was infinitely greater: ‘no Man scapes the Punishment of Censure and Dislike, who offends against the Fashion and Opinion of the Company he keeps, and would recommend himself to’. Few could bear disrepute: it was ‘a Burthen too heavy for humane Sufferance’ to ‘live in Society, under the constant Dislike, and ill Opinion of his Familiars, and those he converses with’. Consequently, ‘he who imagines Commendation and Disgrace, not to be strong Motives on Men, to accommodate themselves to the Opinions and Rules of those, with whom they converse, seems little skill’d in the Nature, or History of Mankind’ (EHU 2.28.12). 
Locke’s concept of a ‘Law of Reputation’ is remarkable in at least three respects, and its importance to our understanding of his moral theory (and its legacy) has been inexplicably overlooked.​[269]​ The first point to note is that, in the Essay, Locke purported to provide ‘a true History of the first beginnings of Humane Knowledge’, based on experience and observation (EHU 1.3.8; 2.11.15). Ethics was no exception. In discussing the ‘Law of Reputation’, Locke later reflected, ‘I was not laying down moral Rules, but shewing the original and nature of moral Ideas, and enumerating the Rules Men make use of in moral Relations, whether those Rules were true or false’ (EHU 2.28.11: italics added).​[270]​ The ‘Law of Reputation’ merely enshrined ‘Rules of Convenience’, rather than true (normative) ‘Rules’—which only the law of nature could offer (EHU 1.3.2). By this means Locke offered a naturalistic account of how men in society form their moral ideas and initially come to be ‘convinced of their Obligation’: not how they ought to do so (i.e. by deducing them from God’s will and sanctions, as communicated to His creatures through both natural reason and revelation). Locke’s distinction between a true (normative) ‘Rule’, and moral norms as they take shape in society clearly echoed Cicero’s statement at the outset of De Officiis, a work so greatly admired by Locke: ‘the rules for moral duties relate, indeed, to the final good [ad finem bonorum]; but it is not so perceptible that they do, because they seem chiefly to refer to the regulation of ordinary life [ad institutionem vitae communis], and of them we are to treat in this book’.​[271]​ 
Second, the importance he attached to this ‘Law’ indicates Locke’s increasing determination, first evidenced in the ‘Essay on Toleration’, to conceptualize society in terms that were independent of (and antecedent to) both government and a rational comprehension of the ‘true Foundations’ of natural law. After all, on Locke’s own voluntaristic definition of the concept, the ‘Law of Reputation’ could not meaningfully be termed a ‘Law’ at all. Law necessarily presupposed ‘a Law-maker’ who was entitled to govern others, and who wielded the sanctions of ‘Reward and Punishment’ (EHU 1.3.13). Yet insofar as the ‘Law of Reputation’ represented the will of a legislator, this was society itself; and the sanctions enforcing it (praise and blame) were similarly communally-enforced. Here it is significant that an important presence in Locke’s journals from the period in which his thinking on the ‘Law of Reputation’ took shape was Richard Hooker (1554-1600). Locke observed that Book I of Hooker’s monumental Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1594), by ‘inlarging’ the conventional ‘sense’ of law, termed ‘any kinde of rule or Canon whereby actions are framed a law’.​[272]​ Here, Locke had in mind a passage in the Laws in which Hooker contrasted the more capacious understanding of law entertained by broadly intellectualist theorists (such as himself) to the narrower conception of the voluntarists: ‘They who are thus accustomed to speak apply the name of Law unto that only rule of working which superior authority imposeth; whereas we, somewhat more enlarging the sense thereof, term any kind of rule or canon, whereby actions are framed, a law’.​[273]​ In all probability, Locke was unaware that here Hooker was paraphrasing, as he so often did, Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, which declared that ‘Law is a rule or measure of an action in virtue of which one is led to perform certain actions and restrained from the performance of others’.​[274]​ This definition of law had, in turn, been criticised by the great neo-Scholastic natural jurist, Francisco Suárez, for being ‘too broad and general’, and for blurring the distinction between ‘command’ and mere ‘counsel’: a verdict subsequently endorsed by Pufendorf in De Jure.​[275]​ It is therefore intriguing that an otherwise thoroughgoing voluntarist such as Locke—for whom law emphatically meant the command of a superior—evidently found it to be of interest, and even of use, in the Essay’s more naturalistic attempt to explain how men in practice acquired their moral ideas and some ‘sense’ of their obligatory character. From the early 1680s, Locke recognized the explanatory power of this alternative definition of law, one seemingly at odds with the voluntarist conception which nonetheless continued to structure his thinking. Even if the ‘Law of Reputation’ was, strictly speaking, no ‘Law’ at all, in practice it acted like one, and (as we will see) was crucial in explaining why men behaved as they did, rather than necessarily as they ought, in society.  
This brings us to a third point. Hooker vindicated Locke’s own subsequent presentation of societal opinion as a ‘law’ because it framed men’s actions in a manner which for the most part conduced to their collective well-being: a definition of law advanced by Hooker in highly distinctive fashion in the Ecclesiastical Polity.​[276]​ For Locke, even as this ‘Law’ was not a source of moral knowledge properly so-called, it played an essential (and broadly positive) role in habituating men to virtuous conduct: hence why Locke emphasized, in his educational writings, the importance of inculcating a love of praise in young gentlemen.​[277]​ As Cicero declared in De Officiis, ‘[i]t is not only arrogant, but it is profligate, for a man to disregard the world’s opinion of himself’, as ‘indifference to public opinion implies not merely self-sufficiency, but even total lack of principle’. The individual’s concern to secure the good opinion of his peers ensured that he became habituated in the moral norms which regulated his community and felt a sense of obligation to behave in ways which rendered him a responsible member of society. This desire to be loved and esteemed by others, on Locke’s account as on Cicero’s, was a far more secure basis than Hobbesian fear and political coercion for the mutual trust upon which society precariously relied.​[278]​ Moreover, the ‘Law of Reputation’ served a particularly beneficial function for Locke because (as Suárez observed) it regulated men’s actions in precisely the sphere in which civil law and civil sanctions, as recognized by ‘modern’ Protestant natural jurists, had no efficacious or legitimate reach: that is, the sphere of the ‘imperfect’ duties (including charity, benevolence, and gratitude) which were precepts of counsel or prudence, rather than the ‘perfect’ commands of justice. In this sense, they were only ‘imperfectly’ obligating and could not be coerced from a man; but, for Locke, they were nonetheless essential to the practical realization of the laws of nature in their fullest extent in the life of a civil society.​[279]​
Locke, Pierre Nicole, and Social Constraint
James Tully argues that Locke’s ‘Law of Reputation’ was a ‘remarkable conceptual innovation’ by means of which he ‘translate[d] humanism, its virtues and vices and motives of honour, praise, glory, and reputation, into his juridical framework’.​[280]​ Yet Locke’s originality here is questionable: the innovative character of his use of the concept lies elsewhere. Locke’s emphasis on the tyrannical reach of the ‘Law of Reputation’ reflected a concerted meditation on the subject from the mid-1670s. During his first tour of France, in 1675–1677, Locke translated three of the French Jansenist Pierre Nicole’s recently-published Essais de Morale (1671). In the third of these essays, ‘A Treatise concerning the Way of Preserving Peace with Men’, Nicole foregrounded the desire for reputation in explaining why men felt obligated to adhere to the moral codes which prevailed in their societies: that is, he similarly placed the humanist virtues and vices within a juridical framework, a point ignored by Tully.​[281]​ As would Locke in the Essay, Nicole distinguished between three types of law. The first was God’s law [lois de justice], which was absolute, inflexible and followed solely by the regenerate few. The second type was civil law [lois expresses], which was strictly limited in its scope and reach. The third type of law was in practice the most important in regulating men’s conduct in society. This was ‘the law of decency [lois de bienséance], which is founded on the common consent of men, who have agreed to condemn those, who offend against it’. This law, firmly of man’s own making, enforced a code of civility (‘les devoirs de civilité’) which encouraged many of the virtues that were enjoined by Christian charity (generosity, humility, temperance).​[282]​ 
Nicole’s Augustinian theological commitments shaped his profoundly negative evaluation of the lois de bienséance.​[283]​ True virtue inhered in moral actions performed from a sincere love of God, which only recipients of divine grace possessed. Yet the ‘law of decency’ was followed for entirely the opposite reason (self-love), rewarding well-bred men (‘les honnêtes gens’) with the praise of their neighbours and punishing those who transgressed with scorn and contempt. Almost all men were motivated to perform their duties by a concern for the good opinion of others (‘the insipid considerations of the creatures’), and this ‘cannot but render his performances lesse acceptable to his creator’. As Augustine suggested, society mired men yet further in sin and self-idolatry.​[284]​ Nicole was nonetheless willing to accept that even as ‘the vertues purely humane are but weaknesses’, these impure motives might be considered within the context of what he termed God’s ‘grâce génèrale’.​[285]​ This was the means employed by God to lead men to act responsibly in their dealings with others, even as they deserved no credit whatsoever for having done so. Ultimately, however, Nicole’s understanding of sin and redemption led him to consider the ‘law of decency’ to lead men away from, rather than towards God and moral truth. Nicole reinforced a rigid (and, in the absence of grace, unbridgeable) distinction between moral action and motive, and between ‘honnêteté humaine’ (acquired, natural virtue) and ‘honnêteté parfait’ (the virtue of the elect).​[286]​
In the Essay, Locke offered a far more positive evaluation of the lois de bienséance: it is here that his analysis of the power of social constraint possesses real claims to originality.​[287]​ For Locke, there was no necessary conflict between the three laws, all of which potentially led men to the performance of their duties under natural law (to oneself, God, and one another). There is no mention by Locke of the need for an infusion of divine grace for men to lead a truly moral life: the Fall remains of no concern to philosophers. Men’s desires no less than their reason constitute a crucial part of their divinely-created nature. Almost all men consider a good reputation to be essential to their happiness in this life; and this is a verdict which Locke, unlike Augustinian moralists, neither denied nor considered to be irreconcilable with Christian soteriology. It was, instead, in a heathen source—De Officiis—that Locke found a treatment of men’s craving for esteem which emphasized its practical social benefits in ensuring a harmony between private and public interest, whilst not reducing virtue (honestum) to utility (utile). Cicero actively exhorted men to perfect the ‘art of winning and retaining the affections of our fellow-men’, because the ability to ‘glide into the affections of the many’ benefitted both the individual and the society of which he was a member. ‘It is chiefly and indispensably necessary’, Cicero declared, ‘that we should possess the faithful affections of those friends who love our persons and admire our qualities’, because ‘we never find real advantage except in good report, honour [and] virtue; therefore we esteem these things first and chief’.​[288]​ It was for his identification of the desire for esteem as a legitimate motive to virtuous action that, in the City of God, Augustine assailed Cicero for advancing the ‘pestilential opinion’ in his ‘philosophical books’ that actions might be praiseworthy which are motivated by a concern for ‘the fickle opinion of men’, rather than ‘pursued for the sake of the true good’ (that is, a love of God).​[289]​ 
Locke’s journal entries from the later 1670s offer us a privileged insight into the development of Locke’s thinking on this head. They show Locke preoccupied with working through the implications for morality of a hedonic psychology, and particularly focused on the strength and consequences of man’s craving for esteem. Locke’s increasing commitment to a hedonic account of human action, of both thought and deed, betrayed his close reading of French authors such as Nicole and Pierre Gassendi, as well as his more long-standing appreciation for the power of Hobbes’s arguments.​[290]​ Locke’s commonplace book from 1679 also reveals his keen interest at this time in the quintessential humanist guidebook to good breeding, Baldassare Castiglione’s Libro del Cortegiano (1528), which similarly foregrounded the individual’s desire to acquire and maintain a good reputation in society. Locke was clearly drawn to the psychological insights it offered, not least that ‘we all love commendations & very hardly defend our selves from flattery’.​[291]​
In an earlier journal entry of 1675, Locke reaffirmed Nicole’s emphasis on the superior efficacy of a concern for reputation over a love of God: ‘The 1st Question, every man ought to aske in all things he doth, or undertakes; is, how is this acceptable to God? But the first Question most men ask, is, how will this render me to my Company, and those, whose esteeme I value? He that asks neither of these Questions is a melancholy Rogue, & allways of the most dangerous, & worst of men.’​[292]​ Locke returned to this point in 1678: ‘The principle spring from which the actions of men take their rise, the rule they conduct them by, & the end to which they direct them seeme to be credit and reputation’. So powerful was this concern that he who ‘wou[l]d governe the world well had need consider rather what fashions he makes then what laws & to bring anything into use he need only give it reputation’.​[293]​ 
Why was Locke so interested in man’s natural desire for esteem? Here it is important to note Locke’s conviction that human nature could, properly examined, reveal information about God’s ‘Ends’ and intentions for mankind. God, Locke repeatedly insisted, did nothing in vain, and to reflect on human nature and man’s natural desires was to gain an understanding of His purposes for His created beings, a point first made in 1663–1664: ‘we can infer the principle and a definite rule of our duty from man’s own constitution and the faculties with which he is equipped’ (ELN IV: 157).​[294]​ Locke returned to this theme in 1676: ‘God has [so] framed the constitutions of our minds and bodies that several things are apt to produce in them pleasure and pain, delight and trouble, by ways that we know not, but for ends suitable to his goodness and wisdom’.​[295]​ Locke’s thought was structured at every level by a divine teleology: this point is essential for an understanding of why Locke’s evaluation of man’s desire for others’ approval was far more positive than Nicole’s (and, as will be seen, Hobbes’s).​[296]​ Cicero and Castiglione recognized the craving for esteem to be among the strongest of human desires; and Locke, in turn, provided an explanation of how it potentially led mankind to serve the ends for which they had been created. 
Locke agreed with Nicole that ideas of virtue and vice denominated ‘nothing else, but that, which has the allowance of publick Esteem’ (EHU 2.28.10–11). Yet the ‘Law of Reputation’ was not arbitrary: it developed according to what a particular society found, on the basis of communal experience, to be beneficial and advantageous in furthering its own ends. In this regard, it tended to contain and enforce moral norms which, like the knowledge of the ‘Mechanick’ or ‘Ploughman’, encapsulated a practical wisdom which was free of the kind of errors into which all too many speculative philosophers fell in their search for abstract hypotheses. It also followed, however, that moral distinctions differed between societies separated in space and time, since practices that were found necessary and advantageous to one might prove disastrous to another. In ‘Of Ethick in General’ (c. 1686–1688), originally composed as a chapter to be included in the Essay, Locke reduced these variations to a ‘generall rule’: ‘Those actions are esteemed virtuous which are thought absolutely necessary to the preservation of societys, & those that disturb or dissolve the Bonds of community are every where esteemed ill & vitious’.​[297]​ At this point in his argument Locke returned to the question of the relationship between utility and truth, and human and divine law, with which he had ended his lectures of 1663–1664. Locke argued that God in his goodness had, ‘by an inseparable connexion, joined Virtue and publick Happiness together; and made the Practice thereof, necessary to the preservation of Society, and visibly beneficial to all, with whom the Virtuous Man has to do’ (EHU 1.3.6). Locke emphasized that there was ‘nothing that so directly, and visibly secures, and advances the general Good of Mankind in this World, as Obedience to the Laws, [God] has set them, and nothing that breeds such Mischiefs and Confusion, as the neglect of them’ (EHU 2.28.11). As a consequence of God’s design, in seeking collectively to improve their lot in this life men in society invariably behave in ways broadly conformable to the laws ‘set’ for them by God. Their natural concern for esteem and reputation plays a crucial role in facilitating a harmony between manmade and natural law, and between private and public interest.
In a journal entry of 1676, Locke noted that men were moved solely by a desire for pleasure and aversion to pain, and that their passions were overwhelmingly self-regarding.​[298]​ Locke broadly accepted Hobbes’s premise: in their natural state men were inherently solipsistic, and considered as ‘good’ whatever advanced their immediate interests. Consequently, ‘Men’s Appetites’ would, Locke agreed, ‘if left to their full swing, . . . carry Men to the over-turning of all Morality’ (EHU 1.3.13). For Hobbes, however, the state of nature was not an historical stage. Hobbes gave little indication that men possessed a capacity to learn in society, in ways which permanently altered their conception of what was pleasurable or painful (and so ‘good’ or ‘evil’). If civil society were dissolved, Hobbes assumed that men would revert to their natural (solipsistic, self-interested) condition. In contrast, Locke explored how men’s ideas of their happiness and interest were altered irreversibly in society: ‘since men in society are in a far different estate than when considered single and alone, the instances and measures of virtue and vice are very different’.​[299]​ 
As Locke had commented in 1663–1664, ‘a great number of virtues, and the best of them, consist only in this: that we do good to others at our own loss’ (ELN IV: 150). Yet what might seem an irrational course of action to the self-centred pre-social individual—acts of charity, for example—no longer appeared so to the socialized man who recognized the pleasure of acting in ways approved of by others. ‘Reputation’, Locke observed, ‘I finde every body is pleased with and the want of it is a constant torment’: for almost all men it constituted an essential part of their happiness.​[300]​ Any ‘loss’ incurred by the virtuous man was more than compensated for by the pleasure derived from the esteem and gratitude of the recipient of his good deed. ‘If then happinesse be our interest end & business’, Locke declared in 1692, ‘’tis evident the way to it is to love our neighbour as our self, for by that means we enlarge & secure our pleasures, since then all the good we doe to them redoubles upon our selves & gives us an undecaying & uninterrupted pleasure’.​[301]​ Cicero similarly emphasized the importance of man’s capacity to learn in society, not least due to their desire for esteem: the ‘community of life’ has ‘taught us to seek the aid of man’ in the quest for happiness and comfort. This led men to gather together in cities, where ‘through a similarity of manners’, customs and language they were increasingly ‘intimately connected together’; and from this ‘followed the gentleness of disposition and consideration for others’ which enriched human life.​[302]​
Locke observed that a good reputation was advantageous to the individual, because it further energized him to endeavour to be worthy of it—a point made strongly by Castiglione as by Cicero (on whose De Officiis and De Oratore the Cortegiano was modelled).​[303]​ In De Officiis, Cicero noted how society ‘arouses men’s spirits, rendering them greater for achieving whatever they attempt’. This, Cicero continued, was because their ‘impulse towards pre-eminence’, which was strengthened in society, led them to consider it to be essential to their happiness to win ‘the good opinion of those with whom and amongst whom we live’. The ‘care’ to preserve their reputation for ‘propriety’ encouraged men ‘to avoid whatever is offensive to the eyes or ears of others’. The ‘virtues’ discussed by Cicero in De Officiis ‘relate to considerateness and to the approbation of our fellow men’.​[304]​ As Locke noted, in this regard Cicero made ‘Vertue’ and praise, as did Locke himself, synonymous (EHU 2.28.11). 
Locke’s emphasis on the individual’s concern for the approval of others thus followed Cicero closely. For Locke as for Cicero, a good reputation furnished the individual with ‘a sort of moral strength, whereby a man is enabled to do, as it were, by an augmented force, that which others, of equal natural parts and natural power, cannot do without it’. The lack of esteem, conversely, ‘makes a man incapable of having the authority, and doing the good, which otherwise he might’.​[305]​ Locke’s emphasis, like Cicero’s, nonetheless lay on the beneficial social function, rather than merely the benefits that accrued to the individual, of this quest for reputation. Here it is important to note that this powerful desire to win the esteem of others (‘glory’) had been foregrounded by Hobbes, but considered eminently dangerous. The concern for ‘Reputation’ was one cause of conflict between men in their natural state and, if not domesticated and channelled by the sovereign, represented a permanent threat to the stability of civil societies.​[306]​ In marked contrast it allowed Locke to explain how society might have been possible prior to, and without the need for, political authority, notwithstanding man’s naturally selfish and asocial tendencies. It rendered the Lockean individual pliable, and ensured that his estimations of what was pleasurable or painful were shaped in socially-beneficial ways through his interaction with others.​[307]​ The ‘Law of Reputation’ could serve effectively, insensibly, and quite naturally to render men’s sense of their own interest broadly conformable to that of the society of which they were a part, so concerned were they to win the approval of others. On this view, men were formed into tolerably sociable and moral creatures through processes of socialization and habituation; and the ‘Law of Reputation’ showed how a shared moral language might be generated endogenously, in the course of their interactions, which owed nothing to a sovereign. A reconciliation between private and public interest was possible without the need for Hobbes’s Leviathan state, and without rehabilitating broadly neo-Stoic doctrines (such as natural sociability or recta ratio) which were rejected by Locke, as by Hobbes.
From ‘Vertue’ to ‘Duty’: Locke on Moral Knowledge 
It is worth reflecting further on the relationship between the ‘Law of Reputation’, guided by temporal utility, and the law of nature, which expressed God’s will and decree: between the local and the transcendent, the contingent and the immutable. It was in large part Locke’s perceived failure more clearly to show the nature of this relation between a conventional moral code—by which, as Locke emphasized, societies were in practice regulated—and the ‘standing and unalterable Rule’ of ‘right and wrong’ enshrined in natural law which led Locke’s critics (such as Tyrrell and Newton) to accuse him of a dangerous (‘Hobbist’) relativism in his treatment of ethics in the Essay.​[308]​ As we will see in Chapter 2, Shaftesbury alighted upon Locke’s ‘Law of Reputation’ to advance a similar charge.
Locke’s theory of ideas and language in the Essay only further complicated his fundamental claim that the law of nature was easily accessible to human reason: the epistemological difficulties, Locke came to recognize, were great indeed. Yet Locke argued that visceral experience was crucial in leading men to perform their duties under natural law: that is, mankind’s collective struggle to overcome the obstacles presented by a less than bounteous Mother Nature, a process within which men’s reasoning faculties themselves developed from a low base. As Cicero had declared, all those things that were useful and beneficial to mankind ‘are for the most part produced by man’s labours; nor should we have them without the application of manual labour and skill’.​[309]​ On Locke’s account, mankind’s collective pursuit of happiness in society taught individuals to behave in ways broadly consistent with the immutable duties of natural law, even if they failed to understand (on the basis of reason) why they ought to do so. 
 ‘It must be allowed’, Locke argued, ‘that several Moral Rules, may receive, from Mankind, a very general Approbation, without either knowing, or admitting the true ground of Morality’ (EHU 1.3.6). In a journal entry of 1693, Locke made this point particularly clearly: ‘There be two parts of Ethicks, the one is the rule which men are generally in the right in (though perhaps they have not deduced them as they should from their true principles). The other is the true motives to practice them and the ways to bring men to observe them, & these are generaly either not well known or not rightly applyd’.​[310]​ Societies might collectively act in ways which were consistent with natural law despite their ignorance of its true foundations and sanctions. 
Locke’s distinction between moral motivation and obligation was highly distinctive, not least when compared with Nicole and Hobbes.​[311]​ The ‘true ground of Morality’ could only be grasped by those who recognized the existence of a divine creator who governed the world, imposed duties on men, and would reward or punish them on the Day of Judgment. Locke expressed doubt in the Essay that these cardinal, but complex ideas could be established on grounds more firm than probability on the basis of reason alone (and drew upon Cicero to make this point). Yet visceral experience might provide what ratiocination, without the assistance of revelation, struggled to offer: sufficiently compelling reasons to live in a manner which was broadly consistent with one’s duties as God’s creature. To be sure, the individual who was motivated to perform his duties under natural law merely from a desire for reputation remained, like the young gentleman who was the subject of Locke’s educational writings, in an infantile state. Men had a duty, as Locke emphasized from 1663–1664, to understand rationally why those duties were morally obligatory at all times and places: that is, to identify and compare his actions to the immutable ‘true Rule’ (natural law). Yet Locke’s position was closer to Cicero’s than to Nicole’s on this point. Cicero criticized the Stoics for confining ‘virtue’ solely to those (i.e. themselves) who supposedly acted morally from a rational comprehension of their summum bonum. In contrast, Cicero argued that to act well out of a concern for reputation was a step on the road to genuine moral knowledge: it habituated men in virtue, the true foundations of which they might subsequently understand through rational inquiry. In any case, as Cicero further observed, ‘it is of more consequence to act properly, than to deliberate justly’, a verdict wholeheartedly endorsed by Locke. ‘The company and community of men’ was more likely than ‘mere speculative knowledge’ to teach men of ‘every duty that tends effectively to maintain and safeguard human society’.​[312]​ 
Locke similarly argued that the ‘Law of Reputation’ served a useful, even indispensable purpose in inculcating the ‘imperfect’ social virtues and laying the foundations for true moral knowledge.​[313]​ Locke’s explanation of the functioning of the ‘Law of Opinion’ was, for want of a better description, ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’. ‘There are’, Locke observed in 1679, ‘several things to be introduced by custom & fashion which are of great use and yet cannot be well established by laws’.​[314]​ This process was an overwhelmingly good thing: ‘if well considered, [it] will give us better boundaries of virtue and vice than curious questions stated with the nicest distinctions’. Those virtues which made life in society pleasurable—such as ‘civility, charity, [and] liberality’, which Locke valued very highly indeed—necessarily existed independently of what Grotius had termed ‘expletive’ justice and consequently could not be dictated or enforced by civil law.​[315]​ In the far from Utopian commonwealth outlined in journal entries entitled ‘Atlantis’, Locke further noted the efficacy and importance of the communal enforcement of moral discipline in a manner which might have chimed with his early modern English readers, who were well-acquainted with the extensive practice of neighbourhood self-government.​[316]​ ‘Every man being a watch upon his neighbour’, Locke argued, ‘faults will be prevented, which is better than that they should be punishd’. ‘More things’, he continued, ‘for the good of the publique are to be introduced by custome & fashion then by law & punishment’.​[317]​ 
Locke’s favourite example was female ‘modesty’. ‘Many things’, Locke argued, ‘naturally become vices in society, which without that would be innocent actions’. Female promiscuity was not clearly proscribed by either ‘nature or reason’. Fortunately, ‘modesty, the great virtue of the weaker sex, has often other rules and bounds set by custom and reputation, than what it has by direct instances of the law of nature or in a solitude or an estate separate from this or that society’. It was solely her concern to avoid ‘any blemish on her reputation’ that led a woman to take pleasure in a monogamous relationship, thereby dedicating herself to ‘the chief end of her being, the propagation of mankind’ (a fundamental duty emphasized in the Treatises). This illustrated how the individual’s sense of her ‘interest’ and ‘happiness’ altered significantly and beneficially through interactions with others in society, and did so in ways which brought it into line with the normative duties enshrined in natural law.​[318]​ 
For Locke, the individual ought nonetheless to move beyond the purely conventional ideas of virtue and vice inculcated in their societies, to understand their immutable and universal obligation. Here the renaming of the ‘philosophical Law’ to the ‘Law of Reputation’ in 1694 is significant. This again betrays Locke’s contempt for Stoic moral philosophy. In the field of ethics as in medicine and natural philosophy, Aristotle, the Stoics and their scholastic successors were guilty of a semiotic failure, confusing the sign for the signified. Dogmatic philosophers were, Locke argued, always inclined to mistake mere ‘names’ (in this instance, ‘Vertue’) for ‘the real Constitution of Things’ (‘Duties’) (EHU 3.7.13). The name ‘Vertue’ was employed ‘every-where’ merely to connote those actions and qualities ‘thought Praise-worthy; and nothing else but that, which has the allowance of public Esteem, is called Vertue’ (EHU 2.28.11). The dogmatic philosophers mistook the contingent and variable ‘Vertues’ of the ‘Law of Reputation’ as true in themselves (honestum) and enshrined in the very order of things, hence why the ‘philosophical Law’ and the ‘Law of Reputation’ were in a sense synonymous: the philosophers simply ossified whatever their community happened to call ‘Vertue’ as immutably true and obligatory.​[319]​ Predictably enough, Cicero was an exception. Locke noted that, in Tusculan Disputations, Cicero had recognized that the ideas of virtue which predominated in any given society varied according to utility and acquired a purchase over men’s minds and conduct primarily on account of their concern for praise (EHU 2.28.11). 
Locke suggested that Cicero had nonetheless employed his reason to the purpose for which, Locke argued, God had bestowed it on men. Rather than following the Stoics in defending the ‘Vertues’ encoded in the ‘Law of Reputation’ as true in themselves, Cicero had employed his ‘Reason to understand those Truths, which have given them reputation’ in the first place, by exploring the connections between the simple ideas by which they were constituted (EHU 1.4.23). Locke argued that ‘actual knowledge’ could only be derived from ‘the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas’ (EHU 4.1.2). It was because moral ideas were of man’s making that a science of morality might be possible, ‘since they are about Ideas in the Mind, which are none false or disproportionate; they having no external Beings for Archetypes which they are referr’d to, and must correspond with’ (EHU 3.11.16).​[320]​ Cicero, unlike the sects by which he was surrounded, had recognized that complex moral ideas had been formed in society and ‘Vulgar Discourse’ on the basis of their evident communal utility.​[321]​ He had nonetheless been able to construct ideal ‘archetypes’ (‘do unto others’) that were useful to all men everywhere, and so objectively true. Cicero’s De Officiis was, in this regard, a work of moral science, insofar as it provided a summary of the propositional content of natural law. ‘The Truth and Certainty of moral Discourses’, Locke declared, ‘abstracts from the Lives of Men, and the Existence of those Vertues in the World, whereof they treat: Nor are Tully’s Offices less true, because there is no Body in the World that exactly practises his Rules, and lives up to that pattern of a vertuous Man, which he has given us, and which existed no where, when he writ, but in Idea’ (EHU 4.4.8).​[322]​ 
As the Reasonableness of Christianity indicated, Cicero had nonetheless not ‘bottomed his ethics’ on their ‘true’ foundation (God’s command and sanctions). This is despite the fact that Cicero had identified the existence of both God and a future state on the strongest arguments which reason could offer. After all, in the Essay Locke drew his proofs for the existence and attributes of God from De Legibus, and for immortality from Tusculan Disputations: a point which has gone unremarked.​[323]​ (More will be said about Locke’s arguments for the probability of a future state below, in the context of his polemical exchanges with Edward Stillingfleet.) Locke similarly quoted from De Legibus to support his contention that it was ‘arrogant and misbecoming’ to suppose that a perfectly good and just deity would, as the exclusivist sects within Christianity claimed, approve of any attempt to limit men’s access to the means of atonement.​[324]​ On all these points, Locke strongly suggested that Cicero showed how far reason could reach in the absence of revelation. Yet nowhere did Locke intimate that Cicero himself had grasped the true foundations of morality: that is, he had not shown how the virtues he advocated in De Officiis related to the natural theological truths he adumbrated, if tentatively, in De Legibus and Tusculan Disputations. As will be seen in the following section, Locke explained Cicero’s failure in historical-contextual terms.
iv.	Locke’s Paradox: The Moral Consequences of Christianity
The ‘Two Provinces of Knowledge’
Locke’s thinking on this head is most succinctly illustrated by a journal entry of 1698 entitled ‘Sacerdos’.​[325]​ This document indicates Locke’s meditation on two citations drawn from Cicero’s philosophical dialogues. The first was the passage from Tusculan Disputations which arguably informed Locke’s hostility to Stoic moral philosophy from 1663–1664: ‘how little [the philosophers’] lives answerd to their own rules whilst they studied ostentation & vanity rather than solid virtue Cicero tells us Tusc. Quest. I.2 c.4’. The second was drawn from Cicero’s academic interlocutor in De Natura Deorum, Cotta’s mockery of the attempts of the Stoics to defend philosophically the truth of the national (pagan) religion. Locke’s immediate source for this citation was Pierre Bayle’s Pensées Diverses sur la Comète (1680): ‘I can hear a Philosopher explain the Reasons of Religion, but I believe our Forefathers without any Reason at all’.​[326]​
These two passages, both critical of the Stoics, were for Locke intimately related. They revealed how in the heathen world the offices of philosopher and priest were entirely discrete. The former claimed to derive his public authority from reason alone. Philosophers ‘professed to instruct those who would applie to them, [in] the knowledge of things and the rules of virtue’, something Tusculan Disputations showed them to be quite incapable of performing in practice. Fortunately, the dogmatic philosophical sects possessed negligible public authority, because their teachings were onerous in seeking to reform men’s moral conduct and to compel them to deny their desires. This was not something that the national religion sought to do. Priests established their public authority on claims to ‘revelation’ (‘the pleasure of the gods, antiquity, and tradition’) that few interrogated on the basis of reason.​[327]​ They professed to act as necessary mediators ‘betwixt the gods and men’, teaching the laity that they could not seek ‘propitiation & atonement’ without their assistance. The favour of the gods, the priests taught, was to be secured entirely through the performance of external rituals. Religion had nothing to say regarding men’s moral duties. Morality and divinity in the heathen world were ‘two parts or provinces of knowledge’ between which there was no overlap. They were the exclusive preserves of ‘two distinct sorts of men’.​[328]​ Since the national religion offered the sole means by which the credulous multitude might allay their fears regarding the gods’ vengeance and secure their favour, its attraction was obvious. As it did not challenge men’s unreflective ideas of good and ill, it was also distinctly undemanding (unlike the hectoring of the philosophical sects). As Locke quipped in the Reasonableness of Christianity, ‘the Priests sold the better Pennyworths, and therefore had all the Custom’ (RC 194).
This separation between morality and divinity ensured that, prior to Christ’s appearance, philosophers had failed to identify the ‘true Foundations’ of morality in God’s will and command. This included ‘Tully’ (RC 196). It was only with Christ that the entire interdependence of the ‘two provinces of knowledge’, morality and divinity, was established. ‘Bringing by revelation from heaven the true Religion to mankind’, Christ had ‘reunited these two again Religion & Morality as the inseparable parts of the worship of God’.​[329]​ As Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity suggested, Christ had ‘lived up to that pattern of a vertuous Man’ presented by Cicero, and was able to explain (as Cicero was not) why all those who would follow him were obligated to attempt to do likewise (as God’s creatures, desirous of righteousness and salvation). It was for this reason that Locke discerned a uniquely complementary relationship between Cicero’s ethical theory in De Officiis and the Christian scriptures. Yet Christ had no interest in ‘the teaching of Men Philosophy’, which ‘was no part of the Design of Divine Revelation’.​[330]​ Christ had left it to men to perform the act of which, Locke conjectured, they were capable, but from which they had been discouraged by the separation of ethics from religion in the heathen world: to examine ‘the connexion and agreement’ between the complex ideas in morality and divinity which, as Cicero illustrated, reason was able to acquire. By this means, and by this means only, philosophers living in a Christian age might vindicate Locke’s claim that morality was potentially capable of demonstration. As Locke noted in 1700, reflecting on the success of the Principia, what was required was a Newton of the moral sciences. Newton had adopted the Lockean method, ‘by finding out intermediate Ideas, that shew’d the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas, as expressed in the Propositions he demonstrated. This is the great Exercise and Improvement of Humane Understanding in the enlarging of Knowledge, and advancing the Sciences’ (EHU 4.7.3).​[331]​ As will be seen in Chapter 5, this was the mantle adopted by David Hume in 1739—but in order to vindicate and to re-establish, rather than to criticize the ancient separation between moral philosophy and divinity.  
The Harmony of the ‘Three Laws’ in Heathen Societies
This separation between morality and divinity in the heathen world precluded any understanding of the true foundations of moral obligation. Yet, on account of Locke’s conceptual separation between moral motivation and obligation, it did not necessarily prevent such societies from developing moral codes which were broadly consistent with the dictates of natural law.​[332]​ ‘Even in the Corruption of Manners,’ Locke declared, ‘the true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice, were pretty well preserved’ (EHU 2.28.11).​[333]​ Given what he goes on to say, it seems clear that here Locke has a distinctly advanced and ‘civilized’ heathen society, ancient Rome, primarily in mind. Rome offered an example of how, in well-regulated heathen societies, those actions that ‘visibly’ contributed to ‘publick Happiness’ were denominated virtues, and those that exercised a contrary effect were denounced as vices. In this regard, Locke’s interpretation of ancient Rome was considerably more positive than had been the case in his lectures of 1663–1664, where he had drawn attention to its systemic violation of natural law.​[334]​ In ‘old Rome’, speculative philosophers had fundamentally misunderstood the ‘true ground of Morality’, concocting erroneous theories of moral obligation (EHU 2.21.55). Yet the dogmatic philosophers were left to bicker on the margins of a civil society to which they contributed nothing. It was not to ‘these learned Disputants’ but rather to ‘Statesmen that the Governments of the World owed their Peace, Defence, and Liberties; and from the illiterate and contemned Mechanick (a Name of Disgrace) that they received the improvements of useful Arts’ (EHU 3.10.9).​[335]​ 
Indeed, and for reasons discussed in what follows, the separation between ethics and religion in ancient Rome had in many respects facilitated an accurate grasp of the purpose and jurisdiction of political authority. The idea that the civil magistrate might be responsible for the eternal souls of his subjects would have made no sense to heathens. The identification and teaching of moral truth was delegated to the philosophers, and religion was left in the hands of the priests. The magistrate therefore understood his commission perfectly. The civil laws were exclusively guided by, and recognized to be legitimate on account of their necessity for, the ‘temporal good and outward prosperity of [the] society’.​[336]​ Politics in the heathen world was informed, as Locke maintained ought to be the case, by an empirical investigation into ‘history and matter of fact’ (i.e. what visibly contributed to social harmony), not abstract speculation.​[337]​ It was for this reason, Locke observed in 1676, that ‘heathen politics’ revealed the true purpose and jurisdiction of civil government: it showed that ‘there can be noe other end assigned’ to government ‘but the preservation of the members of that society in peace & saf[e]ty together’, and this ‘give[s] us the rule of civil obedience’.​[338]​ Ancient Roman politics confirmed Locke’s ‘strange’ doctrine that ‘the magistrate commands not the practice of virtues, because they are virtuous and oblige the conscience, or are the duties of man to God and the way to his mercy and favour, but because they are the strong ties and bonds of society, which cannot be loosened without shattering the whole frame’.​[339]​ It followed that, in Rome, ideas of virtue and vice were permitted to evolve according to what the community found to be in its collective interest, without unnecessary magisterial interference. Consequently, and as Locke argued ought to be the case, the ‘Civil Law’ supplemented the moral codes which had already recommended themselves to the ‘Law of Reputation’. As both laws evolved according to the needs of the community, both remained in a tolerable degree of harmony with the dictates of a natural law which was intended by God for mankind’s benefit as well as His glory. It was, indeed, due to ‘the wonderful Providence of God’ that Christ was made flesh in an age and place where the scope and jurisdiction of human law was properly understood. This allowed Christ to preach his message without illegitimate molestation by the magistrate (RC 120).​[340]​ 
In the Two Treatises, Locke similarly hints at how, even in the absence of true moral knowledge and independent of political authority, society might nonetheless cohere. To be sure, and as scholars have long recognized, this work presents a vision of men in a state of nature as possessing an intuitive grasp of the law of nature and indeed of God. This knowledge was ‘writ in the hearts of all mankind’: a claim which flatly contradicts Locke’s repudiation of innate ideas or a natural moral conscience in the Essay (T II: §11; §56; §67).​[341]​ This has frequently been taken to illustrate the fundamental contradictions within Locke’s thought, and between his works.​[342]​ Yet the Treatises are, as Locke himself implied at various points, not properly speaking works of philosophy. They do not seek to examine ‘the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas’, which alone leads to ‘true’ or ‘actual’ knowledge (EHU 4.1.2).​[343]​ They are, perhaps, better read as translating to the realm of political theory those archetypal truths in religion and morality that Locke elsewhere emphasized could only be developed with great ‘pains and application’. Locke then implied that they were self-evident as consistent with the insights of reason. There was a precedent for this. Cicero had critiqued conventional arguments in favour of natural law (innatism and universal consent) in his moral and religious dialogues. Yet in his political philosophy (De Republica and De Legibus) he had appropriated the concept and distinctly Stoic language of natural law and translated it to the political plane, to defend what he presented as the eternal verities enshrined in an idealized republican constitution that was under immediate threat.​[344]​
One archetypal truth underpinning the Treatises was that the ‘Law of Nature . . . teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions’. There is a distinction between this claim, and the subsequent explanation Locke provided as to why men ought not to do so. They are ‘all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker’, every individual is ‘his Property’, and therefore every man is ‘bound to preserve himself’ as well as ‘the rest of Mankind’ (T II: §6). The latter provides the true (normative) ‘Rule’ that establishes why men ought to perform their duties, and respect one another’s inalienable rights. As Jeremy Waldron and others have noted, however, there is no suggestion that, in practice, it was the rational comprehension of this rule that led men to behave in ways conformable with the law of nature.​[345]​ Instead Locke offers a more naturalistic, anthropological story which is broadly consistent with his hedonic psychology and sceptical epistemology in the Essay. Locke’s emphasis rests on men’s ‘needs’ and ‘wants’, which in society naturally led them to act in accordance with ‘the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration’ (the Scriptures), with ‘God and his Reason’, with ‘the Law of God and his nature’. God ‘directed’ man in his natural state ‘by his Senses and Reason’ to ‘make use of those things, that were necessary or useful to his Being’ (T I: §86). Two elements are combined in the Treatises—the explanatory, and the normative—without any apparent tension. The unity between the two (men’s desires and needs, and God’s commandments through revelation) is ensured by God’s authorship of both.​[346]​ 
As we have seen, in De Officiis Cicero had similarly emphasized the importance of men’s needs and wants in leading them into society. Nature had given ‘to every type of creature the tendency to preserve itself’ and an ‘impulse to unite for the purpose of procreation’, along with (in man’s case) a ‘desire for seeing truth’ and an ‘impulse towards pre-eminence’. Cicero noted that the desire for self-preservation led, with no need for abstract reasoning, to the establishment of political authority as the best means to attain this end.​[347]​ In the Treatises Locke offered a strikingly similar historical account of the origin and development of society, and placed it within a Christian divine teleology lacking in Cicero’s work. By this means Locke was able to reconceptualize men’s particular needs and desires in the specific (pre-political) conditions under which they naturally emerged as duties under natural law. Men following the ‘Dictates of the Law of Reason which God had implanted in him’ were led into society for the sake of ‘Necessity, Convenience, and Inclination’ (T II: §77). Here the individual’s sense of his own interest was beneficially and providentially altered by ‘the mutual Influence, Sympathy, and Connexion’ he experienced with others (T II: §212). Definitions of virtue were shaped by what was found to be advantageous to that society as a whole; and this process allowed that society to further the ends for which it was constituted (‘nothing being necessary to any Society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made’) (T II: §83).​[348]​ The institution of marriage and the family was the means found to sustain the desires to procreate and to care for one’s offspring, which ‘God in his infinite Wisdom’ had implanted in men and were consequently cast by Locke as inalienable duties (T I: §54-6; T II: §77). Similarly, the institution of civil government was itself a means to an end. It secured the ‘general Rule which Nature teaches all things of self Preservation’. Furthermore, it provided the security of property and person required for men to fulfil the biblical injunction to go forth and establish dominion over the earth (T I: §56; T II: §32). Even the invention of money, Locke argued, received authorisation from the biblical command in Genesis. It removed a limitation on the cultivation of the earth, and further incentivized a man to labour, even as he did so from the ambition ‘to enlarge his Possessions’: a self-interested motive considered inherently sinful by the Augustinian moralist (T II: §§48–49). 
Men’s desires were moulded in society in a manner that encouraged them to act in ways broadly conformable to the ‘Law of Nature’ (made synonymous with ‘Divine Law’). The ‘Law’ established in civil society by ‘tacit Agreement’ in the Second Treatise is the ‘Rule of Propriety’, a term used interchangeably with the ‘Law of Reputation’ in the Essay (EHU 3.7.7; T II: §36). All is guided by a concern for ‘the Conveniency of Life’ and the pursuit of temporal happiness. Even as they failed to comprehend the true ‘Rule’ explaining why they ought to do so, men’s divinely-implanted desires naturally led them into society and, once there, the concern for esteem helped to ensure that, collectively, they served the purposes for which they had been created. It was for this reason that Locke rendered utility and virtue synonymous (‘it was useless, as well as dishonest [...]’). In pre-political society, ‘right and conveniency went together’: that is, the honestum and utile were, as Cicero repeatedly claimed, in complete accord (T II: §36; §51).
The identification of the ‘Rule of Propriety’ with the Essay’s ‘Law of Reputation’ offers a means of better understanding another ‘Doctrine’ which Locke thought his reader would find ‘very strange’. This was his foundational claim that, in the state of nature, every man has the ‘right’ to punish those who transgress the law of nature, and hence to assist their neighbours to preserve their lives and possessions (T II: §7–9).​[349]​ The Treatises establish the theoretical grounds of this right, which was nothing but the performance of the individual’s duty under natural law to ‘preserve the rest of Mankind’. In the absence of a firm rational grasp of their normative duties, however, we might ask what could have motivated self-interested men in practice to exercise themselves on others’ behalf? Even as Locke was not required to offer such an explanation in a work of political theory, it is nonetheless arguable that he had the conceptual resources at his disposal to do so had he felt it necessary. Men’s ability to agree on a ‘Rule of Propriety’, and their motivation to adhere to it, was ultimately a consequence of their mutual desire for the good opinion of others. This craving for admiration and esteem, in turn, provides a compelling reason why individuals might actively assist their neighbours to enforce a ‘Rule’ which had been found conducive to their common advantage. John Dunn observes that in the Treatises Locke simply assumes that men had never lived, as Hobbes supposedly suggested, in an ‘ethical vacuum’ out of which political society had to be created. For Dunn, this illustrates that Locke was addressing a quite different ‘problem’ to Hobbes; consequently comparing his work to Hobbes’s ‘is not the way to approach the study of Locke’.​[350]​ Yet Locke’s apparently untroubled assumption in his political theory that an understanding of justice and even the ‘imperfect’ social virtues exists, and is felt to impose obligations on men, in their pre-political state assumes what he had from the mid-1670s worked out and explained, in large part as a means of responding to Hobbes. When read in the context of Locke’s social theory and moral philosophy as a whole, the Second Treatise offers us an individual who is beneficially, providentially, and irreversibly shaped by the society of which he is a part.
The Moral Consequences of Christianity
If the foregoing indicates the constructive, explanatory role accorded to a concern for reputation in Locke’s account of the development of societies, his thinking on this score was nonetheless deeply ambivalent. By way of example: in the Treatises Locke implied that certain primitive, indigenous, heathen societies in the Americas offered real-world instantiations of the relatively harmonious and peaceful state of nature from which all men and civil government supposedly emerged. The ‘Woods and Forests’ were fit to give rules to ‘those that call themselves Civil and Rational’ (T I: §58).​[351]​ Yet the First Treatise is, like the Essay and Locke’s lectures of 1663–1664, crammed with ‘tales of the wandering undead, cannibalistic rituals, and castrating fathers’, illustrating how egregiously entire primitive communities had nonetheless violated the dictates of natural law.​[352]​ Even more startling, however, is Locke’s depiction, in his works of religious apologetic, of the consequences of Christianity for the moral and political regulation of those societies which had embraced the true faith. 
As the foregoing has illustrated, Locke’s moral theology was predicated upon the claim that gospel Christianity had revealed what human reason had attempted, but struggled, to identify: the ‘true ground’ of moral obligation in God’s will and command, enforced by His eternal sanctions. It showed, in other words, why those actions which men nonetheless performed because they found it useful and pleasurable to do so (thereby securing the good opinion of others) possessed a genuinely moral quality, and why all of mankind were duty-bound to perform them. Revealed Christianity, then, did not contradict reason (hence its ‘reasonableness’) even as it enlarged upon its insights to provide what reason alone could not (hence its ‘necessity’) (RC 191–201). The Christian revelation had in theory perfected mankind’s moral knowledge and offered hedonic man the greatest possible incentive to live righteously given its promise of salvation (EHU 2.21.60). 
On Locke’s deeply paradoxical account, however, the adoption of Christianity as a national religion had to a great extent subverted the very motives which had, prior to (or in the absence of) revelation, led men to behave in ways broadly consistent with the moral law. Moral knowledge had, it seemed, undermined moral practice. Locke’s claim that properly-regulated heathen societies, and pre-political society in the Treatises, had developed in ways broadly consistent with ‘the true Boundaries of the Law of Nature’ stood in marked contrast to ‘the schisms, separations, contentions, animosities, quarrels, blood and butchery, and all the train of mischiefs, which have so long harassed and defamed Christianity’.​[353]​ This raised the vexed question of ‘how it comes to pass that the Christian religion hath made more factions, wars, and disturbances in civil society than any other’.​[354]​ In his writings on toleration, Locke made it clear that Christianity as it had been practiced in the world had subverted the natural (providential) harmony that ought to exist between human and divine/natural law. It was for this reason that Locke recognized the superficial plausibility, though not the truth, of the disquieting suggestion that ‘truly the Christian religion is the worst of all religions, and ought neither to be embraced by any particular person, nor tolerated by any commonwealth’.​[355]​ Why had the historical consequences been so catastrophic for those societies that professed to follow Christ and thereby to advance the cause of true religion and morality? Locke was adamant that the fault lay with man, not Christ, whose teachings had been shamelessly and wilfully subverted: ‘Far be it from anyone to think Christ the author of those disorders, or that such fatal mischiefs are the consequence of his doctrine, though they have grown up with it’.​[356]​ 
As we have seen, for Locke it was crucial that the two manmade laws— ‘Civil Law’, and the ‘Law of Reputation’—continued to be guided by temporal utility: in which case, both would encourage men to perform their duties under natural law. Yet Locke recognized the possibility that the ‘Law of Reputation’ might periodically become detached from the criterion of public utility. In the Second Treatise, Locke described this in terms of a separation between ‘Custom’ and ‘Reason’. Customary practices and ideas had their origins in what was found useful to the community, Locke explained. Yet ‘Things of this World are in so constant a Flux, that nothing remains long in the same State’. A practice which may once have been beneficial might now prove harmful. This offers one explanation of why, in the Second Treatise, Locke accords extensive powers of prerogative to the magistrate. ‘Private Interest often keeping up Customs and Privileges, when the reasons of them are ceased’, it might require an act of executive prerogative to override a convention to which common opinion remained irrationally attached: ‘Prerogative being nothing, but a Power in the Prince to provide for the publick good’ (T II: §156–157). This also explains why Locke denied that the civil magistrate was in all cases beholden to the customary, fundamental laws of the realm in the manner argued by many Whig legal theorists (and, indeed, by Grotius), who constructed their arguments against the Crown on the basis of England’s immutable ancient constitution.​[357]​ Manmade laws, for Locke, had to evolve according to the contingent demands of public utility: it was their convenience, rather than their antiquity, which made the laws which regulated political and religious societies consistent with ‘reason’ (T II: §103; I: §57–58). If laws were ‘reasonable’ in this sense of being communally beneficial, they were likely to be in conformity with God’s general will and design, and authoritative as a consequence.​[358]​
An analogous though much greater danger was that the civil magistrate would cease to adopt the common temporal interest of his citizens as his guide: a departure from ‘heathen politics’ which Christ had in no sense countenanced.​[359]​ In the historical account of Christ’s conduct provided in the Reasonableness, Locke laid relatively little emphasis on Christ’s miracles or fulfilment of prophecies, or indeed on his Passion as an expiatory sacrifice.​[360]​ Locke instead focused on his moral actions and teachings as providing the most compelling evidence to attest to the divine nature of his mission. The moral content of Christianity, Locke emphasized, was of far greater importance than those particular rites or ceremonies that had been accorded such weight in Mosaic Israel. The latter were rendered circumstantial or indifferent by Christ. Each church might choose those that seemed to secure ‘just soe much decency & order’ as was ‘requird in actions of publique assemblys’.​[361]​ Christ revealed ‘that Eternal Law of Right, which is Holy, Just, and Good; Of which no one Precept or Rule is abrogated or repealed; nor indeed can be; whilst God is an Holy, Just and Righteous God, and Man a Rational Creature’ (RC 173–174). This ‘Divine Law’, Locke’s definition of which once again paraphrased Cicero’s description of natural law in De Republica (3.22), accorded with and explained the discrete purpose and end of both the ‘Civil Law’ and the ‘Law of Reputation’.
Christianity had not enjoined the magistrate to inculcate ‘true’ moral and religious principles in his subjects. Christ had ‘instituted no commonwealth’, and his law ‘hath not at all meddled’ with the ‘ancient forms of government’ that had been retained by those ‘cities and kingdoms that have embraced the faith of Christ’. There was, in short, ‘no such thing, under the Gospel, as a Christian commonwealth’, and no need for Christianity to interfere with either the ‘Law of Reputation’ or the ‘Civil Law’.​[362]​ Obedience to Christ did not, and could not, demand that men break the compacts they had naturally formed with one another and with the civil magistrate in order to pursue their worldly happiness (and thereby to perform, if unknowingly, their duties under natural law). In the Epistola, Locke reiterated the point made in 1667: ‘the business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth’.​[363]​ Yet this depended upon the sovereign continuing to concern himself solely with the temporal happiness and prosperity of his society. In a Christian age, the birth of the chimerical concept of the ‘Christian commonwealth’ indicated how Christ’s teaching on this point had been systematically disregarded. This in large part explains the central paradox identified by Locke: why the harmony between the three ‘Laws’ had been subverted most egregiously in Christian polities (these ‘disorders’ had ‘grown up with’ Christianity).​[364]​ It also explains why Locke was able to suggest that a heathen (Cicero) had grasped the true relationship between societas, civitas, and ecclesia more accurately than had Christian philosophers.
With Constantine’s endorsement of a specifically doctrinal (Trinitarian) form of Christianity at Nicaea (325 AD), the civil magistrate, misled by philosopher-priests, considered it essential to public happiness that men possess ‘orthodox’ speculative opinions in morals as in religion.​[365]​ Religion and virtue had become ‘a Businesse of State’: truth took the place of utility, and abstract speculation replaced experience and observation.​[366]​ Men’s temporal happiness, the pursuit of which the civil magistrate legitimately sought to facilitate, was conflated with their eternal happiness, which was the concern of the individual alone. This had made it possible for civil magistrates, including Charles II and James II, to be misled into acts that were ‘contrary to the end for which [civil societies] were constituted’ (T II: §227). Supported by ecclesiastics—the other-worldly character of whose motives was questionable—the magistrate had employed the threat of divine and civil sanctions to compel men to conform to particular speculative precepts. Both the ‘Law of Reputation’ and ‘Divine Law’ had been dissolved into civil law: a step most obviously countenanced in the realm of theory by Hobbes. It was because of this disastrous ‘confounding’ of ‘temporall authority’ with ‘ecclesiastical jurisdiction’, in naked defiance of Christ’s teaching, that ‘the Christian religion is accused of so many disorders in the world’.​[367]​ 
The consequences for the moral regulation of communities of this fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose and end of civil authority were profound and deleterious. In a lengthy passage in the Epistola, Locke discussed them with reference to the abject practices of the Spanish in the New World. He could just as well have been referring to the transition between tolerant heathen Rome and that of the Christian emperors (a narrative later offered, in a rather different key, by Edward Gibbon):
An inconsiderable and weak number of Christians, destitute of everything, arrive in a pagan country. These foreigners beseech the inhabitants, by the bowels of humanity, that they would succour them with the necessaries of life. Those necessaries are given them; habitations are granted; and they all join together and grow up into one body of people. The Christian religion by this means takes root in that country, and spreads itself; but does not suddenly grow the strongest. While things are in this condition, peace, friendship, faith, and equal justice are preserved amongst them. At length the magistrate becomes a Christian, and by that means their party becomes the most powerful. Then immediately all compacts are to be broken, all civil rights to be violated, that idolatry may be extirpated. And unless these innocent pagans, strict observers of the rules of equity and of the law of nature, and no ways offending against the laws of the society, I say unless they will forsake their ancient religion, and embrace a new and strange one, they are to be turned out of the lands and possessions of their forefathers, and perhaps deprived of life itself. Then at last it appears what zeal for the Church, joined with the desire of dominion, is capable to produce; and how easily the pretence of religion, and of the care of souls, serves as a cloak to covetousness, rapine, and ambition.​[368]​
This passage contains a number of important assumptions. First, the ‘innocent pagans’ are ‘strict observers of the rules of equity and of the law of nature’: this is a more forceful recapitulation of the claim in the Essay that heathen societies are perfectly capable of developing and enforcing moral norms which were broadly in conformity with natural law (EHU 2.28.11). They broadly adhere to natural law because both of the laws which regulate their society—the ‘Law of Reputation’ and the rudimentary ‘Civil Law’—develop according to the dictates of observable public utility.​[369]​ This is despite the fact that these pagans have no rational grasp of the true grounds of morality (‘Divine Law’) as lying in the will of a God, to whose existence and providential plan for mankind their natural faculties have not yet led them. With the advent of supposedly Christian magistracy (‘the pretence of religion’), in sharp contrast, the temporal well-being of the community has been sacrificed at the altar of eternal bliss (‘the care of souls’) to an extent previously unimaginable. The concern of the Christian magistrate to enforce virtue as virtue, and religious precepts as true, sees heterodoxy presented as a more egregious crime than theft or even murder, which could be justified in the name of extirpating idolatry.​[370]​ 
This, Locke argued, had inevitably resulted in the subversion of the ‘Law of Reputation’. As Locke’s educational writings suggested, men’s desire for praise and aversion to blame rendered them malleable in ways which could habituate them in vicious habits as easily as virtuous ones.​[371]​ In late republican Rome, the ‘pagan country’ in the Epistola, and the early stages of society in the Second Treatise, the desire for praise and aversion to blame had largely led men to conduct themselves in ways which benefited the society of which they were members. This showed how the desire for reputation was, like a respect for one’s parents, an ineffaceable part of man’s divinely-created nature, and served a providential purpose: both, working as they ought, attested to God’s ‘Ends’ and goodness in creating man as He had. With the emergence of commonwealths devoted to the inculcation of ‘true’ religion, however, this had ceased to be the case. Men were encouraged to esteem their neighbours less on account of their contribution to the common good and more on the basis of their professed speculative principles. A desire for esteem encouraged men to conform to social norms: which explained why, in ‘Christian commonwealths’, intolerance and the inhumane acts to which it led could have become so ubiquitous, and men reduced below the level of beasts.​[372]​ 
Here Locke’s account is once again diametrically opposed to Hobbes’s. In Leviathan, Hobbes argued that the sovereign was both rex et sacerdos.​[373]​ In making this case he had recourse to a medical metaphor, in a chapter entitled ‘Of a Christian Commonwealth’—precisely the political entity the legitimacy of which Locke denied: ‘For it is with the mysteries of our Religion, as with wholsome pills for the sick, which swallowed whole, have the vertue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect’.​[374]​ Locke inverted Hobbes’s metaphor, the better to establish the absolute nature of the conceptual distinction between politics and religion which Hobbes had elided. Men in ‘Christian commonwealths’ were forced to ‘swallow down Opinions, as silly People do Empirick Pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and have nothing to do, but believe they will do the Cure: but in this, they are much more miserable than they, in that they are not at liberty to refuse swallowing, what perhaps they had rather let alone’. This disastrous confusion between the civil and the sacred meant men in professedly Christian societies grew up ‘cooped in close, by the Laws’ (EHU 4.20.4).​[375]​ 
The threat of divine sanctions had been employed by professedly Christian magistrates and priests to compel men to conform to ‘orthodox’ speculative precepts, in religion as in morality. This represented the revival of sectarian dogmatism. True philosophers, Locke noted, must ‘find so little reason to be magisterial in their Opinions, that nothing insolent and imperious is to be expected from them’ (EHU 4.16.4). In contrast, sects in philosophy and religion—and Locke treated of the self-styled ‘orthodox’ under this head—sought ‘Triumph’ rather than ‘Truth’. This was true even of the Socinians, who ‘pretend most to freedom’. They once more divorced philosophy from theology by claiming to be able to ‘explain things necessary to salvation more clearly than the Holy Ghost, the eternal and infinite wisdom of God’.​[376]​ The only difference between orthodoxy and dissent is that the former, whether inculcated by the ‘Father or Schoolmaster, the Parson of the Parish, or such a Reverend Doctor’, is imposed with the connivance of the civil magistrate.​[377]​ The forced intrusion of philosophical theology into the public square, armed with the sanctions of both civil and (supposedly) divine law, had positively ‘obscured and perplexed the material Truths of Law and Divinity’ that in a heathen age even the ‘plough man’ had in some sense understood (EHU 3.10.8). This mattered because, as the Reasonableness suggested, Christ and his apostles had built upon men’s acquired knowledge of good and ill. Christ had preached the truths of the Gospel primarily through ‘natural’ rather than ‘supernatural’ means: ‘he does constantly (unless where the confirmation of some Truth requires it otherwise) bring about his Purposes by means operating according to their Natures’ (RC 153). Even as the Gospel message ‘suits the lowest Capacities of Reasonable Creatures, so it reaches and satisfies, Nay, enlightens the highest’ (RC 201). It reinforced, explained and enlarged upon those moral distinctions that developed within societies as men sought to pursue their happiness.​[378]​
Yet the Scriptures were powerless to resist the force of false philosophy. As with all texts, they served ‘like a nose of wax, to be turned and bent, just as may fit the contrary orthodoxies of different societies’.​[379]​ The distinction, and yet entire harmony, between reason and revelation, moral philosophy and moral theology could only be re-established by means of true (sceptical) philosophy. Here Locke’s assertion that ‘many are beholden to Revelation, who do not acknowledge it’ is of the utmost importance (RC 200). This informed the sceptical nature of Locke’s endeavour in his epistemological works. Locke sought to demonstrate to ‘this our knowing Age’ that autonomous reason was incapable of delivering on the promises made by both the heathen schools and scholastic Christian philosophers (EHU: ‘Epistle to the Reader’, 10). One aspect of this endeavour was to show what reason had, in fact, been able to establish prior to revelation, with Cicero standing as the proxy for unprejudiced, empirical enquiry. Locke turned to Cicero to show how far reason could reach, both in identifying the content of natural law (in De Officiis) and in establishing the existence of God (in De Legibus). On the crucial question of the evidence for the immortality of the soul, Locke turned once more to Cicero. By establishing the status quo ante, men might again be encouraged to cultivate their own faculties, recognize how revelation had enlarged upon the knowledge furnished by reason, and thereby place their faith in Christ rather than in those who had usurped his authority.
Locke, Stillingfleet, and Immortality
As Locke maintained from 1663–1664, if God and a future state were absented from the picture, natural law—and with it, the obligatory character of morality—necessarily dissolved into thin air. Scholars have, as a consequence, been puzzled by Locke’s studied agnosticism on the nature of the soul, given how fundamental the existence of a future state was to his moral theory. Having refuted the doctrine of immateriality, Marshall portrays Locke as ‘very lamely’ excusing himself from the task of establishing immortality on alternative philosophical grounds, and presents this as a failure that rendered his entire moral theory broken-backed.​[380]​ Stephen Forde makes a similar point, and concludes that ‘we may never be able to say for certain why he left it unremedied’.​[381]​ The fact that Locke drew almost all of his arguments on immortality directly from Cicero’s philosophical dialogues provides one means of addressing this issue.
In the Essay Locke opined that the question of the immateriality of the soul ‘seems to me to be out of the reach of our Knowledge: And he who would give himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark and intricate part of each Hypothesis, will scarce find his Reason able to determine fixedly’ one way or the other. Locke claimed rather implausibly that he did not intend ‘to lessen the belief of the Soul’s immateriality’. He merely sought to show ‘how far our knowledge does reach’, since ‘the state we are at present in, not being that of Vision, we must, in many Things, content our selves with Faith and Probability’ (EHU 4.3.6). In his treatment of the soul, Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations was Locke’s prime source in establishing ‘how far our knowledge does reach’. The fundamental point Locke sought to make was identical to Cicero’s own in that work: ‘we ought not to be over-confident in any thing, for we are often influenced by some cleverly-drawn conclusion, we waver and change our opinion even in questions that are comparatively clear: much more in this question, for it has an element of obscurity’.​[382]​ Immortality could not seriously be doubted; immateriality, however, demanded precisely such doubt.
In responding publicly to Stillingfleet’s criticisms, and privately to Tyrrell’s admonitions, Locke denounced the tendency of Christians only to believe what could be established by reason. Locke demanded to know if nothing would ‘passe with you in Religion and Morality but what you can demonstrate?’: a rather pious refrain, given the importance Locke himself attached to the possibility of a demonstrable ethic.​[383]​ Yet what is most striking, and insufficiently remarked upon, is the extent to which Locke was willing (as, he felt, his contemporaries were not) to lay such weight on intellectual honesty and humility.​[384]​ This was a consequence of his profound conviction that reason (philosophical enquiry) ought to be pushed as far as it could go, but no further. The combination of De Natura Deorum and Ecclesiastes on the title-page to the Essay suggested as much. Reason and revelation were two means furnished by God to allow His creatures to understand their duties under natural law. To give too much to the former was to detract from the meaning and significance of the latter.​[385]​
There is every reason to suggest that, had he been able, Locke would have provided an account of moral obligation, and a more precise definition of the content of the moral law, that relied more on ‘knowledge’ and less on ‘faith’.​[386]​ Only thus might the new experimental philosophy be vindicated from the charge, repeatedly sounded by its critics, that it undermined the very foundations upon which any ethical theory worthy of the name had to rely. Yet, as we have seen, Cicero’s great merit lay, on Locke’s reading, in his willingness to accept the limits of philosophy when it came to the question of moral obligation. Consequently, Cicero largely restricted himself to moral motivation (the utile and dulce), and to outlining the practical precepts of the moral law. The most disturbing feature of Locke’s moral theory from the perspective of his contemporaries was his refusal to conceal what he identified as being the strict limitations of philosophy. If it could not establish with demonstrable certainty the existence of a future state, this sceptical insight was itself revelatory. It indicated that important truths—which, in his earlier writings, Locke intimated might be demonstrated with some degree of certainty—had only been revealed in full by Christ. In his final works, Locke appealed with increasing frequency (and even more explicitly) to Cicero’s authority, as well as to that of the Gospels, to establish this point.
To Stillingfleet, Locke admitted the Ciceronian origins of his agnosticism on the nature of the soul.​[387]​ Cicero had ‘examined all the arguments his vast reading and great parts could furnish him with’. Yet he remained ‘so far from being certain, so far from any thought he had, or could prove it, that he over and over again professes his ignorance and doubt of it’. Having examined these arguments, Cicero was content only to exclude the two gross elements of earth and water from the soul’s nature: ‘so far he is clear and positive: but beyond this he is uncertain; beyond this he could not get’.​[388]​ Stillingfleet’s subsequent claim that Cicero had broadly endorsed the metaphysical arguments in favour of immateriality furnished by his ‘Master’, Plato, in Phaedo was quite mistaken. ‘Cicero’, Locke replied, ‘was willing to believe the soul immortal, but when he sought in the nature of the soul itself something to establish this his belief into a certainty of it, he found himself at a loss’. Plato’s faith in his ‘all-sufficient reason’, as Cicero noted, led him to assert the pre-existence as well as immortality of the soul. This precluded the possibility of Creation, the Day of Judgment, and a future state.​[389]​ Metaphysical arguments led to true atheism. Physical arguments (an analogy with the natural world) encouraged, as Epicurean materialists showed, a denial of immortality and even of a providential God possessed of moral attributes who governed the world.
It is little wonder, then, that Locke implied that the question of immateriality was, at best, an irrelevance. By casting the debate within a classical historiographical framework, Locke played the part of Cicero to Hobbes’ Epicurus and Stillingfleet’s Plato. The Platonists’ arguments in favour of the doctrine, and the Epicureans’ critical response, simply indicated how an excessive faith in human reason could lead men into the most profound error. The shaky arguments for immateriality, to which Stillingfleet attached such weight, must necessarily push the honest enquirer into an unjustified despondency and scepticism, because of:
An unfair way which some Men take with themselves: who, because of the unconceivableness of something they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary Hypothesis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiased Understanding. This serves, not only to shew the Weakness and the Scantiness of our Knowledge, but the insignificant Triumph of such sorts of Arguments, which, drawn from our own Views, may satisfy us that we can find no certainty on one side of the Question; but do not at all thereby help us to Truth, by running into the opposite Opinion, which, on examination, will be found clogged with equal difficulties. (EHU 4.3.6)
The academic sceptic, conversely, adopted a more moderate and cautious approach, and was consequently able to appreciate where revelation might have enlarged upon mere reason. This is indicated by Locke’s Christianized rendering of the central tenets of academic scepticism as outlined by Cicero in the Academica, which exhorted all individuals to seek moral knowledge even if certainty proved elusive:
[I]n the greatest part of our Concernment, [God] has afforded us only the twilight, as I may so say, of Probability; suitable, I presume, to that State of Mediocrity and Probationership, he has been pleased to place us in here; wherein to check our over-confidence and presumption, we might by every day’s Experience be made sensible of our short-sightedness and liableness to Error; the Sense whereof might be a constant Admonition to us, to spend the days of this our Pilgrimage with Industry and Care, in the search, and following of that way, which might lead us to a State of greater Perfection. It being highly rational to think, even were Revelation silent in the Case, That as Men employ those Talents, God has given them here, they shall accordingly receive their Rewards at the close of the day, when their Sun shall set, and Night shall put an end to their Labours. (EHU 4.14.2)​[390]​
As a result, Cicero’s methodology and moral doctrine, in sharp contrast to that of Plato or Epicurus, was according to Locke in perfect (and unique) harmony with the Gospels. Cicero revealed how far men’s natural faculties could reach. Recognising their limits, he would have comprehended the divine nature of the truths taught by Christ:
So unmoveable is that truth delivered by the spirit of truth, that though the light of nature gave [Cicero] some obscure glimmering, some uncertain hopes of a future state; yet human reason could attain no clearness, no certainty about it, but that it was “JESUS CHRIST alone who brought life and immortality to light through the gospel”. Though we are now told, that to own the inability of natural reason to bring immortality to light, or, which passes for the same, to own principles upon which the immateriality of the soul (and, as it is urged, consequently its immortality) cannot be demonstratively proved; does lessen the belief in this article of revelation, which JESUS CHRIST alone has brought to light, and which consequently the scripture assures us is established and made certain only by revelation.​[391]​
It was the Gospels alone that showed men how they might achieve relief from their incessant desires and attain the tranquillity so craved by the heathen philosophers, by strengthening the one desire that ought to trump all others: the ‘chief end’ of salvation in a world to come.
In the final analysis, by admitting the inability of philosophy conclusively to demonstrate man’s true end, academic scepticism identified a conceptual space that the Christian revelation had filled. It was for this reason that, on Locke’s reading, Cicero would have recognized the divine nature of Christ’s moral and soteriological teachings. The case was quite different with the dogmatic late Hellenistic sects, which claimed to offer definitions of moral obligation on the basis of autonomous reason: an error subsequently repeated by Christian philosophers who remained wedded to scholastic metaphysics and its quest for certainty, like Stillingfleet, and by ‘modern’ natural law theorists such as Grotius and Hobbes. Yet the negligible social influence exercised by the dogmatic sects in heathen society had ensured that most men had not followed them into error. Consequently, had Locke’s idealized common man turned to the Gospels, he would have recognized the extent to which Christ’s moral teachings enlarged upon and explained the ideas of moral good that he had acquired in society. Indeed, Locke remained supremely confident that modern heathens, in the Americas and elsewhere, once led by their faculties to an idea of God and subsequently introduced to the Gospels without coercion or impediment, might recognize the latter to speak of truths which accorded with their moral ideas even as they enlarged upon them (exponentially, in some cases).​[392]​ In ‘Christian commonwealths’ in which ‘Care is taken to propagate Truth’, however, this harmony had been disturbed (EHU 4.20.4). All men now faced a ‘struggle’ to cast off the ‘uneasy and tyrannical yoke’ imposed by false philosophy before they could appreciate the truths delivered by Christ, something not true in heathen societies—even though, paradoxically, they had not enjoyed the light provided by the Gospel.​[393]​
Conclusion
Locke’s little-noted emphasis on how the three ‘Laws’ had only been subverted in a Christian world sheds light on two aspects of his thought. The first is the curious combination in Locke’s epistemological writings of a pedagogical demand that men ‘examine their own Tenets’ with a profound pessimism as to the likelihood of them doing so (EHU 1.3.25).​[394]​ As Locke stressed, custom and the opinions of one’s neighbours shaped men’s ideas of happiness and the good. This encouraged mutual fellowship and a degree of moral consensus prior to the instantiation of political authority. Because moral codes developed naturally according to their public utility, there was no necessary contradiction between the ideas of the good entertained in society and the true precepts of the law of nature. The useful and the true, and the explanatory and the normative, were in tolerable harmony. This had ceased to be the case in a Christian age. There was now a tension between the ideas of the good taught in society, and natural law. There is, consequently, a similar tension between the explanatory and the normative in Locke’s attempt to exhort his reader to follow the advice he offered. This is reflected in Locke’s profoundly Ciceronian programme for reform, which taught the individual how he might recover a degree of cognitive freedom and liberate himself from the false ideas that had been imposed on his mind from infancy. He ought to do so because Christ demanded it of him, and he would be punished if he did not. Yet Locke’s rationale here was decidedly tautological. Only if he did so would he genuinely assent to the truth of the Scriptures in the first place, choose to follow Christ, recognize his duties (including to search for truth), and comprehend the penalty for failing to do so (eternal damnation).
The subversion of the three laws ensured that the individual who desired ‘Truth’ rather than ‘Triumph’ had to be willing to incur, as Locke himself well knew, the opprobrium of his neighbours and the displeasure of political and religious authorities. Few men, as Locke observed, were able to ‘live in Society, under the constant Dislike, and ill Opinion of his Familiars’ (EHU 2.28.12). ‘The world’ as presently constituted, Locke noted, ‘is apt to cast great blame on those who have an indifferency for opinions, especially in religion’: the academic sceptic was a persona non grata in a Christian age.​[395]​ In any case, not many individuals were able to live with the uncertainty and doubt which resulted from true (sceptical) philosophy: few had followed Cicero’s lead. Yet ‘the surest and safest way’ for the individual to pursue truth ‘is to have no opinion at all till he has examined [a question] and that without the least regard to the opinions or Systems of other men about it’. The individual in the modern age was not allowed to ‘see what he himself can, sincerely searching after truth, find out’.​[396]​ There were regrettably few illiterate plough-men in Christian commonwealths. Locke explored this theme in a new chapter added to the fourth edition (1700) of the Essay, entitled ‘Of the Association of Ideas’ (EHU 2.23).​[397]​ Locke also composed Of the Conduct of the Understanding in c.1697, which was similarly intended for inclusion in the Essay but was published posthumously.​[398]​ Both explained how false connections between ideas had been foisted upon men’s minds from infancy, and obstructed their reason and senses working together in harmony. In the Conduct, Locke endeavoured to show individuals how to perform the act that he had himself carried out on a grander scale in the Essay. That is, how to interrogate their opinions and ideas, and remove the ‘Rubbish’ that now lay in their way to knowledge.
Locke’s programme for reform in effect showed men how they might become academic sceptics. In the Academica, Cicero observed how academic sceptics were ‘more free and untrammelled in that we possess our power of judgement uncurtailed, and are bound by no compulsion to support all the dogmas laid down for us almost as edicts by certain masters’.​[399]​ Locke similarly exhorted his reader to cultivate a ‘love of Truth’ and ‘indifferency’ for the opinions of others. ‘This’, Locke warned, ‘I own is no easy thing to do; but I am not inquiring the easy way to opinion, but the right way to truth; which they must follow who will deal fairly with their own understandings and their own souls’.​[400]​ Locke now argued that ‘we are endowed with a power to suspend any particular desire, and keep it from determining the will, and engaging us in action’ (EHU 2.21.50). Locke declared, in terms that were unmistakeably Ciceronian, that this ability to ‘hold our wills undetermined, till we have examin’d the good and evil of what we desire’ allowed for ‘reason unbiased [to] give its judgment’ (EHU 2.21.53). ‘This’, Locke now claimed, ‘seems to be the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that, which is (as I think improperly) call’d Free will’ (EHU 2.21.47).
Only by performing this act, Locke suggested, might men become self-conscious moral agents. Here Locke echoed Cicero’s claim that it was by cultivating the passion for truth that men truly embraced what made them human, and led ‘a blessed life’.​[401]​ Only thus might they arrive at knowledge (however imperfect) of the natural law, the precepts and sanctions of which they would then find explained in the clearest terms in the Gospels. This would lead to a ‘consciousness’ of the conformity or otherwise of their actions in respect of this law and ensure that they govern their conduct as they ought through a recognition of their true end (salvation). It was in this ‘consciousness’ that, Locke now argued, ‘personal identity’ inhered. The individual accepted his accountability for his ‘present and past Actions’ by recognising the existence, precepts, and sanctions of a law to which he was beholden as God’s creature (EHU 2.27.10). This law had, however, ceased to be in perfect harmony with either the ‘Civil Law’ or, more pressingly, the ‘Law of Reputation’. Men’s prevalent concern for the opinions of others, which had once proved so beneficial, now informed Locke’s unmistakeable pessimism regarding his prospects of success in exhorting men in a Christian age to labour for truth.
Even as he sought to liberate his reader from external imposition, Locke’s conception of rights imposed a burdensome duty of accountability and agency. It was a liberty to perform the duties enshrined in a law of nature (including to worship God publicly) as one judged fit and proper. It was a liberty, that is, to embrace self-consciousness, and to take accountability for one’s actions before God. It was not a liberty from those duties, which on Locke’s account the speculative atheist desired. This distinctly Pelagian combination of rights and duties was enshrined in the eirenic paraphrase offered by Locke of Romans 14.23: ‘But he that is in doubt and balanceth is self condemned, if he eat; because he doth it without a full perswasion of the lawfulness of it. For whatever a man doth, which he is not fully perswaded in his own mind to be lawful, is sin.’​[402]​ All men had to be at liberty to recognize their duties under natural law, and to perform them as they saw fit. Those who denied the existence of the divine author of that law, and the duties He imposed, could hardly possess a right to liberty defined in these terms. Locke’s vision of the relationship between morality, justice, and religion was not merely consistent with an exclusion of atheists from toleration. It demanded it.
Locke’s distrust of philosophy, and of public philosophers, was profound.​[403]​ This has been underplayed or ignored by historians rather more eager to present Locke as the apologist for a secular world order and an ethics founded upon reason. At the heart of Locke’s philosophical endeavours was the attempt to re-establish what he presented as the delicate equilibrium between knowledge and faith, and to illustrate the equally delicate harmony between worldly utility and normative truth. Cicero’s philosophical writings were of fundamental importance in Locke’s efforts to articulate and defend this rather precarious position. In response to Molyneux’s repeated requests that he compose a ‘Book of Offices or Moral Philosophy’, Locke replied that there was no need.​[404]​ As Locke’s educational writings suggested, if one desired to know how far reason alone could proceed in moral enquiries, one need look no further than De Officiis. This was precisely the work that Molyneux was exhorting Locke to update.​[405]​ It was this ill-founded dissatisfaction with Cicero’s admittedly inconclusive and limited insights regarding moral obligation, and with the methodology of academic scepticism that informed it, which had led to such ‘rubbish’ being placed in men’s way to knowledge of ethics, justice, and Christ.





2	Shaftesbury’s Science of Happiness
Introduction
Shaftesbury is a complex figure in the intellectual history of eighteenth-century Britain. He can easily appear as an anachronism, contemptuous or ignorant of the advances in learning underway in the age in which he lived. In the original index to the second edition of his Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1714), ‘Metaphysicks’ is followed by ‘necessary Knowledg of nothing knowable or known’. Under ‘Philosophers’ are the entries ‘See CLOWN’, and ‘Moral philosophers of a modern sort, more ignorant and corrupt than the mere Vulgar’.​[406]​ One seeks an entry for ‘Newton, Isaac’ in vain; and whilst Bacon had the honour of being cited by Shaftesbury (once), it was only to establish that he had been fortunate to have ‘escap’d being call’d an ATHEIST’ by his contemporaries, an oversight Shaftesbury was eager to remedy.​[407]​ Rather than trouble himself with the productions of a modern age whose philosophy he considered to be ‘rotten’, Shaftesbury unabashedly proclaimed his preference for the Stoic moralists of classical antiquity. In his General Dictionary (1739), Thomas Birch noted that Shaftesbury ‘carried always with him’ the ‘moral works of Xenophon, Horace, the Commentaries and Enchridion of Epictetus as published by Arrian, and Marcus Antoninus’.​[408]​
Shaftesbury’s classicism has been portrayed in various ways, most of which have been dismissive of his profundity as a philosopher. Ernst Cassirer, for example, argued that it reflected Shaftesbury’s ‘aloofness from his own time’ and lack of interest in ‘the problems affecting his era, or [in] the intellectual and practical decisions’ it sought to formulate.​[409]​ David Raphael portrayed Shaftesbury as the founder of the ‘moral sense’ school, yet argued that he was unable to develop his insights systematically: one finds in Shaftesbury’s writings ‘no coherent view . . . about moral theory in general’. That task was left to abler philosophers such as Francis Hutcheson and Adam Smith.​[410]​ Meanwhile Raphael, following Smith, regarded the Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit (1699) as Shaftesbury’s sole significant contribution to the field.​[411]​ Scholars in other disciplines have, however, increasingly recognized the value of placing Shaftesbury in his proper historical context, presenting (in explicit contrast to Cassirer) a thinker keenly engaged with contemporary political, cultural, and literary currents. Yet in so doing, they have tended to downplay the interpretative importance of Shaftesbury’s profound classicism for an understanding of his philosophical objectives, and to neglect the substantive content of that philosophy itself. Laurence Klein argues that Shaftesbury possessed a ‘self-consciously modern outlook’, and that his classicism was entirely subordinated to his ‘cultural politics’. On this reading, Shaftesbury’s ‘polite’ philosophy is most notable for its highly original ‘deployment of discursive strategies’.​[412]​ Michael Prince has questioned Klein’s interpretation but abandoned the context of antiquity altogether, whilst accepting that in the case of Shaftesbury one cannot speak of a ‘coherent philosophical output’. Prince’s interpretation once again rests on a low estimation of Shaftesbury’s place in the history of philosophy. Shaftesbury’s lack of depth in reasoning was, however, offset by his willingness to play with language and form, and it is here that he is of greatest scholarly interest.​[413]​
This chapter makes a case for taking Shaftesbury seriously as a highly original thinker who sought to explore questions in and about philosophy that were widely considered to be of pressing contemporary relevance. This alone explains why the great and good of the European republic of letters felt compelled to respond to Shaftesbury and even, in the case of Smith, found it necessary to resort to ad hominem attacks.​[414]​ In developing this case, two prevailing (and related) assumptions need to be challenged. The first is that Shaftesbury’s attempt to reformulate and vindicate Stoic moral philosophy was a reactionary enterprize. The second is that Shaftesbury was an inattentive, incapable, or even ‘erroneous reader’ of Locke. William Spellman’s claim that Shaftesbury’s ‘disagreement with Locke was significant, but only in the context of his failure, shared by so many others in the seventeenth century, to understand Locke’s position on the origins of universal morality’ needs revising.​[415]​ Shaftesbury was only too aware of where Locke grounded his ‘universal morality’: in the will, commands, and sanctions of a transcendent Christian deity. Shaftesbury’s classicism finds its most important context, and his vindication of Stoicism its contemporary significance, in Locke’s distinctive treatment of classical moral philosophy. Precisely because scholars have paid scant attention to the latter, they have failed to comprehend the novelty and importance of the former.​[416]​
Locke, Moral Theology, and the Two Traditions
Shaftesbury’s grandfather, the first Earl, had tasked Locke with the supervision of Lord Ashley’s education, and his choice of tutor (Elizabeth Birch) ensured that the youth acquired an early proficiency in Latin and Greek (he was fluent in both by the age of eleven).​[417]​ Moreover from an early age it seems that Locke discussed philosophical questions directly with Ashley, something for which his young pupil remained grateful: ‘you . . . conferr’d with me upon Subjects as though you were really better for not being alone’.​[418]​ One such subject, discussed shortly after the publication of Locke’s Essay in 1689, was the immortality of the soul.​[419]​ From an early stage, Shaftesbury was deeply troubled by Locke’s moral theology. As the previous chapter indicated, Locke emphasized the poverty of classical moral philosophy, and denied the fundamental claim made on its behalf by almost all of the ancient schools: that philosophy could identify the summum bonum and provide a guide to life. Basic human psychology, Locke argued, ensured that ‘uneasiness’ was essential to the human condition: the goal of tranquillity through philosophy was a chimera. Locke expressed this conclusion in a letter written shortly before his death, to his disciple Anthony Collins: ‘this life is a scene of vanity that soon passes away and affords no solid satisfaction but in the consciousness of doeing well and in the hopes of another life’.​[420]​ Shaftesbury was repulsed by such a pious refrain, remarking witheringly, ‘I should never have guessed it to have been of a dying philosopher’. It was more akin to ‘one of those dying speeches which come out under the title of a Christian warning piece’.​[421]​ 
Shaftesbury recognized Locke to offer a moral theology for the classically educated. Shaftesbury’s philosophy, in deliberate contrast to his tutor’s, unequivocally privileged classical over Christian culture, to the extent that he found little of any meaningful value in the latter. The Scriptures had contributed nothing to moral philosophy, and in a number of respects had contradicted the truths it had identified.​[422]​ It was ‘Philosophy, which, by Nature, has the Pre-eminence above all other Science and Knowledge’, and ‘[by] this Science Religion it-self is judged’ (negatively, in the case of Christianity).​[423]​ Shaftesbury agreed with Locke that the ancient Greek and Roman moralists had for the most part offered theories of moral obligation in which a future state of rewards and punishments was notable only by its absence. This, however, was because salvation had no role to play in what Shaftesbury considered to be moral ‘science’, which could establish man’s true end without any need for an external law-giver (whether Hobbes’s Leviathan, or Locke’s transcendent Creator). Shaftesbury’s determination to make this point led him to offer an alternative, and quite original narrative of philosophy’s history. This was a story of progressive degeneracy in which Christianity was centrally implicated: true (Stoic) philosophy had been appropriated by, and corrupted through its subordination to Christian teaching and doctrine. Shaftesbury’s primary objective was to liberate it from this captivity, and to offer a gentlemanly rather than a Christian system of ethics.
Shaftesbury’s private papers make it clear that his understanding of Locke’s moral theology was distinctive, and conditioned by this highly personal interpretation of the history of philosophy. Both men could agree on two points: classical moral philosophy was essentially dualistic, broadly divisible into two dogmatic traditions (the Stoic, and the Epicurean); and the moral and religious insights of each were irreconcilable with the other, and both with Christian belief. Yet where Locke found in Ciceronian academic scepticism an alternative philosophy supposedly capable of reconciling reason with (Christian) revelation, Shaftesbury denied the existence of any such tradition. In a letter of 1706 to Locke’s French translator, Pierre Coste, Shaftesbury claimed to draw from Horace the following insight into classical moral philosophy (and the shift to the present tense in the final sentence is significant):
Nor were there, indeed, any more than two real distinct philosophies, the one derived from Socrates, and passing into the old Academic, the Peripatetic, and Stoic; the other derived in reality from Democritus, and passing into the Cyrenaic and Epicurean. For as that mere sceptic, and new Academic, it had no certain precepts, and so was an exercise or sophistry rather than a philosophy. The first, therefore, of these two philosophies recommended action, concernment in civil affairs, religion. The second derided all, and advised inaction and retreat, and with good reason. For the first maintained that society, right and wrong was founded in Nature, and Nature had a meaning, and was herself, that is to say in her wits, well governed and administered by a simple and perfect intelligence. The second again derided this, and made Providence and Dame Nature not so sensible as a doting woman. The first, therefore, of these philosophies is to be called the civil, social, Theistic; the second, the contrary.​[424]​
On Shaftesbury’s interpretation, Locke had made the error of seeking to construct his moral theory on a monstrous amalgam of the two traditions. This, he suggested, revealed Locke’s ignorance of classical philosophy; but it also owed something to the nature and content of Christianity as revealed in the Scriptures. Christians were compelled (with the Epicureans) to emphasize God’s incomprehensibility and transcendence above His goodness and immanence because the God of Abraham and Isaac (made flesh in Christ) was obnoxious to men’s natural sense of what was morally good. Yet Christian apologists nonetheless recognized that unless God and His law appeared to be morally-evaluable in terms familiar to the Stoics and Platonists—as the height of goodness, wisdom, and justice—then He would inspire only fear (as Hobbes suggested), rather than love and pious reverence. 
Here the relative lack of scholarly interest in the content of Shaftesbury’s philosophical thought has resulted in misunderstanding, encapsulated in Klein’s claim that Shaftesbury ‘talked little of Jesus and assigned him no role except that of moral exemplar’.​[425]​ The fundamental point Shaftesbury developed, one that intentionally struck at the very foundations of Locke’s moral theology, was that Christ could not play this role. To erect Christ as the paragon of moral excellence necessarily subverted the appreciation of truth and harmony in moral actions to which men’s natural faculties led them. In its essential teachings (sin, repentance, salvation), Christianity was fundamentally antithetical to true moral philosophy. To take just one example. Following Aurelius and Epictetus, an essential part of the rigorous self-cultivation and self-discipline which Shaftesbury saw as the only route to happiness and virtue was to learn to live ‘in the moment’: to worry about the past (regret) or the future (anticipation) disturbed one’s tranquillity in profoundly dangerous ways.​[426]​ Quite clearly, a Christian emphasis on repentance as the sine qua non for righteousness combined a regret for past deeds with a concern for future good, all at the expense of the present moment. 
As Locke himself had argued, the only decisive grounds for sound belief in revealed Christianity were moral. The evidence provided by miracles, prophecy, and the historical testimony of the Fathers was of secondary importance, in that it alone could not lead a man to faith. Precisely because Shaftesbury denied the moral reasonableness and necessity of Christianity, this line of reasoning led him to emphasize that the only ground upon which Christianity might be defended was pragmatic. Christianity was, de facto, the established religion; but it was far from clear why any reasonable man would believe sincerely in the doctrines it taught. Even as Shaftesbury was understandably wary of the risks of expressing himself too explicitly on this point, it nonetheless emerges clearly enough from his published writings and, especially, from his extensive and immensely rich private manuscripts.
Shaftesbury turned once more to Horace’s writings to develop the contention that was fundamental to his repudiation of Lockean epistemology and moral theory.​[427]​ Horace, along with all the disciples of the ‘severe philosophy’ (Stoicism), had brought ‘passion . . . under the head of opinion’.​[428]​ It was men’s ‘temper’, ‘fancies’, or ‘affections’ that governed their ‘opinions’ and ‘principles’. Crucially, this was as true in matters of religion as in those of morality. Unless the individual were able to interrogate his ‘fancies’ and subordinate them to the ‘magisterial’ authority of reason—something Locke, like Hobbes, broadly denied—he must lead ‘a life distracted, incoherent, full of irresolution, repentance, and self-disapprobation’.​[429]​ Such an individual would lack any stable sense of ‘self’, unable to acquire the constancy of temper upon which depended ‘that uniformity of opinion which is necessary to hold us to one will and preserve us in the same mind from one day to another’. Philosophy was for Shaftesbury ‘severe’ precisely because it required men ‘to be thus magisterial with ourselves, thus strict over our imaginations and with all the airs of a real pedagogue to be solicitously taken up in the sour care and tutorage of so many boyish fancies, unlucky appetites and desires, which are perpetually playing truant and need correction’.​[430]​ Unless one subordinates one’s recalcitrant ‘fancies’ to reason, one remains always captive to them, and transported to inherently unstable joy or despair by the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. One’s ideas concerning the deity, moreover, would reflect this continual flux. God would at one moment be immanent and the object of the keenest love (enthusiasm), but at the next utterly transcendent and worthy only of fear (superstition). Locke’s willingness to erect an account of moral motivation on the basis of a hedonic psychology denied man’s capacity for rational self-command, and with it any possibility of establishing theistic belief upon stable foundations.
Insofar as Shaftesbury endorsed a concept of the ‘moral sense’ it must be understood in this light, as the universal desire of men for a happiness defined as a stable sense of self that could only result from ‘the order or symmetry of this inward part’.​[431]​ It was, ultimately, on the basis of man’s shared desire for happiness, rather than any cosmological arguments or deductive reasoning, that Shaftesbury constructed his defence of natural human sociability and benevolence. It was also for this reason that he increasingly relied upon what appears to modern philosophers to be a weak analogy between aesthetic taste and morality. Men’s inherent attraction to order and harmony in external representations of mind reflected their profound desire for such order within.​[432]​ Shaftesbury repeatedly encouraged his reader to engage in ‘inward converse’, advocating the ‘art or science’ of soliloquy which, he claimed, had been perfected by the Stoic moralists. This ‘brutal’ exercise in ‘self-dissection’ requires a detachment from rather than involvement in society, since ‘company is an extreme provocative to fancy and, like a hotbed in gardening, is apt to make our imaginations sprout too fast’.​[433]​ As will be seen, Shaftesbury was profoundly troubled by Locke’s emphasis, in his account of how men acquire their moral knowledge, on the importance of social habituation and restraint.
Shaftesbury repeatedly expressed his frustration with those ‘polite’ gentlemen who are incapable of spending ‘two or three hours together, on mere PHILOSOPHY and MORALS’.​[434]​ ‘Who’, Shaftesbury asked rhetorically, ‘is so just to himself as to recall his fancy from the power of fashion and education to that of reason?’​[435]​ Shaftesbury considered himself to swim against the tide of contemporary philosophy in the ‘Refin’d, Polite, and . . . Deliciouse Age’ in which he lived in considering ‘Thought Exercise and a continuall Application to be necessary’ to all who would be virtuous and truly sociable: one had to learn ‘how to be an Honest Man, and a Friend’.​[436]​ It was to appeal to gentlemen in a profoundly unphilosophical age, Shaftesbury repeatedly claimed, that he was forced to resort to a multiplicity of literary forms in Characteristics. The analogy of aesthetic taste, Shaftesbury confessed, was intended to ‘serve instead as an agreeable vehicle for the moral potion, which by itself is become mere physic and loathsome to mankind, so as to require a little sweetening to help it down’.​[437]​ (This claim that beauty was inseparable from ethics, the pulchrum from the moral good, was however a staple of early Stoic thinking.)​[438]​ In his concern for self-actualization and self-mastery, and his emphasis on the arduous ‘pains and application’ that this demanded from the individual, Shaftesbury was entirely at one with Locke. Yet for Shaftesbury it was only philosophy that allowed men to recognize and live according to their chief end, not Christian moral theology and faith. The role of philosophy was to allow the individual to attain a stable sense of self-worth, which ought not to rely merely on the praise and approval of one’s neighbours. Shaftesbury explored this at length in notebooks crammed with citations from Aurelius and Epictetus (the Askēmata): ‘How goes the world? —No matter; but how go I? This is a matter, and the only matter. This is of concern. This mine, and at my peril.—How do I govern? The world? —No. But how do I govern MYSELF?—How do matters stand with me?’​[439]​ In his distinctly Stoic conception of apatheia and contentment as residing in an indifference towards external fortune, including one’s reputation in the eyes of others, Shaftesbury’s account of the path to virtue and happiness was directly opposed to that furnished by Locke.
The ‘two real distinct philosophies’ identified by Horace had sought to provide men with a ‘Vitae Dux’ (guide to life) and a ‘regimen’ that encouraged the suppression of those affections considered to impede the individual’s acquisition of self-mastery and constancy.​[440]​ Here it is important to note, as historians have largely failed to do, that in his writings those considered true disciples of Epicureanism—‘honest Epicurus’ himself, Lucretius, and Bayle—were treated with considerable sympathy by Shaftesbury.​[441]​ Epicurus had not denied that men were naturally possessed of ‘social affections’. On the contrary, it was because men’s love of society and concern for the good of others were so strong that he considered them to be so dangerous. It was only in a Christian world that natural sociability and the ‘social affections’ had been denied altogether, and only with Locke that a moral theory had been constructed upon these foundations. In Locke’s hands, philosophy had been denied its role as queen of the sciences and stripped of its fundamental purpose: ‘to correct manners and regulate lives’.​[442]​ Instead men were reduced to necessitous brutes continually moved by an uneasiness caused by a desire for external objects, from which relief might only be found in the uncertain hope of salvation. The philosopher no longer ‘contemplated the man, as a real man and as a human agent, but as a watch or common machine’.​[443]​ For Shaftesbury, if the new experimental natural philosophy reduced the world to ‘atoms and chance’, Lockean epistemology posited an ‘atomism of the mind’.​[444]​ For Shaftesbury, both Bacon and Locke had sought to combine a distinctly Epicurean (atomistic) account of man and nature with the continued defence of religion, whereas Epicurus himself had recognized that the sole argument for a divine intelligence was to be found in man’s good nature and the providential order of the universe.​[445]​ It was for this reason that Epicurus, a ‘fair reasoner’, had raised ‘his deities aloft in the imaginary spaces and, setting them apart out of the universe and nature of things, makes nothing of them beyond a word’.​[446]​ Here Shaftesbury’s willingness to ‘answer for [Locke’s] Sincerity as a most zealous Christian and Believer’ reads less like a defence of Locke’s character than as an explanation of why he had seen fit to push beyond philosophical ground shared in antiquity by all wise men (Stoics as well as Epicureans).​[447]​
Self-Mastery and the Quest for the Summum Bonum
Shaftesbury’s reluctance in his published writings to make public the profound nature of his philosophical disagreement with one he considered to be his ‘friend and foster-father’ partly explains why commentators have not dwelt on the significance and depth of the division between Shaftesbury and Locke.​[448]​ Shaftesbury’s reticence owed more to their personal ties than to any temperamental aversion to philosophical conflict, as his contemptuous treatment of Bacon suggests. As a consequence of his residual affection for Locke, Shaftesbury ‘ever concealed my differences’ from ‘my old tutor and governor’.​[449]​ The only explicit reference to Locke in his published works is a positive one.​[450]​ Nonetheless it is clear from Shaftesbury’s correspondence that, by 1694 at the latest, he recognized those ‘differences’ to be fundamental.
In the second of two letters, both written in 1694, in which Shaftesbury discussed, in rambling terms, his own philosophical ideas with Locke, he noted that ‘what I count True Learning, and all that wee can profitt by, is to know ourselves’. Unless it showed men how they might be ‘Honester or Better Creatures’ philosophy was both useless and pernicious. All too many modern philosophers, like the ancient sophists denounced by Socrates, were ‘curiose in what signify’d nothing’. Their philosophy ‘gives a Man no help in the persuance of what he has learnt to bee his Duty; Assists him not in the Government of the Irrationall and Brutall Part of himself; which neither makes him more truly satisfy’d with what God does in the World (for that is Loving God) nor more Sociable more Honest or more Just, by removing of those Passions which hee has allways to Struggle with, that he may preserve himself so’.​[451]​ In an entry from 1699 in the Askēmata, later reproduced verbatim in Soliloquy (1710), it is made clear that Shaftesbury considered a philosophy that occupied itself with ‘the formation of ideas, their comparisons, agreement and disagreement’ as a peculiarly modern form of sophistry.​[452]​ No such new-fangled philosophy was required for men to learn of their moral duty, and neither the new experimental philosophy nor modern natural jurisprudence had anything original to offer in this regard: ‘I am so far from thinking that mankind need any new Discoverys, or that they lye in the dark and are unhappy for want of them’. Any man who failed to recognize that he ‘has an End to which he should refer his slightest actions’ certainly lacked ‘knowledge’; but until recently no-one had seriously doubted that such a summum bonum existed and could be identified by reason (‘what is easyer to know?’).​[453]​ Locke’s moral philosophy had rendered the perfectly transparent, opaque. Concerned solely with men’s ‘opinions’ or ‘principles’, Locke’s new way of ideas failed to grasp that these were themselves dictated by men’s ‘TASTE, or Relish in the Concerns of Life’ (in other words, their estimations of where happiness was to be found) and was consequently ‘wasted Labour’.​[454]​ As Shaftesbury observed, ‘it was never known till more late days that to Profess Philosophy, was not to Profess a Life’. Here Shaftesbury cited Cicero’s definition of philosophy, in Tusculan Disputations, as medicine for the mind, thereby indicating how Locke (and others working within the framework of Protestant natural jurisprudence) had misappropriated Cicero to depreciate the therapeutic value of moral philosophy.​[455]​
In the previous letter to Locke of 1694, Shaftesbury alluded to a project on which he was engaged, but which he refused to show Locke or to publish ‘in such a Turn of an Age and Time as this present one’. His thoughts, he felt, would be dismissed as ‘either too ridiculously Absurd, or too odiously true’.​[456]​ He referred to An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit, which was finally published (perhaps against his wishes) in 1699, and later incorporated with largely stylistic revisions into Characteristics (1711).​[457]​ This work can be read not merely as a direct response to Locke’s Essay, but more specifically to the second edition published in 1694.​[458]​ This contention is supported by Shaftesbury’s focus on two specific questions, which were foregrounded by Locke in 1694. The first concerned the central place of ‘uneasiness’ in his hedonic account of human action, of both thought and deed. This was directly contradicted by Shaftesbury: ‘To love and be kind; to have social and natural Affection, Complacency and Good-will, is to feel immediate Satisfaction and genuine Content. ’Tis in it-self original Joy, depending on no preceding Pain or Uneasiness; and producing nothing beside Satisfaction merely’ (I 2.2.3, 96). The second related to the centrality of divine command and a future state in Locke’s moral theory. The fundamental objective of the Inquiry was to expose the chimerical nature of any attempt to establish what Spellman refers to as ‘the origins of universal morality’ in the uncertain ‘hope’ of reward in a future state.​[459]​ ‘There can be nothing more fatal to virtue’, Shaftesbury declared, ‘than the weak and uncertain belief in a future reward and punishment. For the stress being laid wholly here, if this foundation come to fail,’—as Shaftesbury argued it must— ‘there is no further prop or security to men’s morals. And thus virtue is supplanted and betrayed’ (I 1.3.3, 39–40).
By proposing to consider ‘virtue’ and ‘religion’ separately, which were ‘generally presum’d inseparable Companions’, Shaftesbury sought to uncover the fundamental error at the heart of Locke’s moral theory (I 1.1.1, 163). Establishing that men’s ‘opinions’ or ‘principles’ were dependent upon their ‘desires’, Shaftesbury proceeded to argue that only if the latter were to some degree fixed might men be able to entertain a steady belief in both a divine intelligence and perhaps the prospect of a future state.​[460]​ Philosophy, in other words, must necessarily precede theology. It alone could lead men to recognize the capacity of an intelligent mind to establish a harmony and order within themselves and (by analogy) in the universe as a whole. Here Shaftesbury identified two antithetical cosmologies, which gave rise to contrasting estimations of what it was for a man to live according to his nature—the central question of philosophy. ‘In the Whole of Things (or in the Universe)’, Shaftesbury contended, ‘either all is according to a good Order, and the most agreeable to a general Interest: or there is that which is otherwise, and might possibly have been better constituted, more wisely contriv’d, and with more advantage to the general Interests of Beings, or of the Whole’. If one considered the universe to be in any sense ‘defective’, one could hardly sustain the idea of ‘a designing Principle or Mind’ or locate man’s ‘End’ and happiness ‘in Nature’. One would instead be compelled to consider man in lowlier terms, rather than as a ‘Part’ of a coherent larger ‘Whole’ (I 1.1.2, 5–6).​[461]​
Shaftesbury identified the ‘perfect THEIST’ as the individual who ‘at all Seasons, and on all Occasions’ was able to support the ‘Belief of a supreme Wisdom’. The ‘perfect ATHEIST’ was similarly able to ‘think always consistently’ on the question, but reached the opposite conclusion regarding order and design, and consequently dismissed the notion of an intelligent ordering mind altogether. In setting out these diametrically opposed ideal standpoints, Shaftesbury re-established the irreconcilable division between Stoicism and Epicureanism, which he later discussed in his letter to Coste. He provided an ‘Oeconomy of the Passions’ which vindicated both the Stoic and Epicurean sage. Shaftesbury argued that there were two ‘sorts’ of ‘Affections’ natural to man. These were the ‘social’, which led him to exert himself within society; and the ‘selfish’ or ‘private’, which ensured that he did not lose sight of what was required for his self-preservation (understood in broader terms than simply physical survival). These two types of ‘Affection’ could potentially pull in different directions, and a man’s view of happiness and his true interest varied according to the strength of each. As such it was entirely legitimate to ask, with the Stoics and Epicureans, which ought to be preferred, and to seek to suppress those that led him away from what he thereby identified as being his ‘true Scope or End’. As Shaftesbury would later note in Sensus Communis (1709), a work which developed many of the arguments propounded in the Inquiry, ‘’tis the height of Wisdom, no doubt, to be rightly selfish’. The question remained as to where one’s true interest lay, and here the Stoics and Epicureans disagreed:
For in this we shou’d all agree, that Happiness was to be pursu’d, and in fact was always sought after: but whether found in following Nature and giving way to common Affection; or in suppressing it, and turning every Passion towards private Advantage, a narrow Self-end, or the Preservation of mere Life; this wou’d be the matter in debate between us. The Question wou’d not be, “Who lov’d himself, or Who not”; but “Who lov’d and serv’d himself the rightest, and after the truest manner”.​[462]​
Until the individual had identified his true end (the summum bonum), he remained in a liminal state. He experienced ‘the frequent Successions of alternate Hatred and Love, Aversion and Inclination’ which ‘must of necessity create continual Disturbance and Disgust’, repentance and remorse (I 2.2.1, 64). Only the ‘two real distinct philosophies’ that were espoused by the ‘perfect THEIST’ (the Stoic) and the ‘perfect ATHEIST’ (the Epicurean) provided rules by which to establish that constancy of temper which could lead a man to a stable sense of self and to a just conformity between his principles and his conduct. By apparently denying the very existence of the ‘social’ Affections, however, Locke’s philosophy offered no such guidance.
At the outset of the Inquiry, Shaftesbury proposed to examine ‘whether it be a true Saying, That it is impossible for an Atheist to be virtuous, or share any real degree of Honesty or Merit’ (I 1.1.1, 4). This question had been raised in characteristically provocative fashion by Bayle, an acquaintance of Locke and later Shaftesbury, in his Pensées Diverses.​[463]​ Locke had responded forcefully in the negative in his discussion of speculative (as opposed to ignorant) atheism.​[464]​ Shaftesbury occupied a position much closer to Bayle’s, arguing that men’s conduct depended on their affections rather than their professed speculative principles. The ‘perfect ATHEIST’ had a stable sense of self. Even as he was incapable of ‘Virtue’, his constancy of temper ensured that he remained the same man from one moment to the next, an essential prerequisite for friendship and mutual trust. Shaftesbury conceded that he could not be relied upon to the same degree as the ‘perfect THEIST’, however. He would eventually discover that his attempt to suppress his ‘social’ affections was futile and be thrown back into a maelstrom of melancholic bitterness and resentment (I 2.2.1, 74–75).​[465]​ Nonetheless he did not positively advocate principles or practices that were destructive of human society. True Epicurean philosophy advocated ‘a steddy and deliberate Pursuit of the most narrowly confin’d Self-interest’. It necessarily led the individual to withdraw from society, but there was no reason why it would induce him actively to seek to disrupt it (I 2.1.1, 46). As Shaftesbury noted, ‘when Men are easy in themselves, they let others remain so; and can readily comply with what seems plausible, and is thought conducing to the Quiet or good Correspondence of mankind’.​[466]​
Be this as it may, only the ‘perfect THEIST’ (the Stoic sage) was capable of truly virtuous action in Shaftesbury’s austere account. His virtue was clearly not a consequence of his theism, rather the opposite. His recognition that his true ‘End’ and happiness were to be realized in society (interpreted in the broadest terms as ‘mankind’) was not the consequence of ‘dry reasoning’. Shaftesbury made notably little effort to defend his cosmic optimism on the grounds of ‘right reason’ (recta ratio)—a term that scarcely appears in his writings—or his belief in a divine intelligence on the argument from design. Here he departed significantly from his Stoic guides.​[467]​ Instead it was to sentiment that Shaftesbury appealed in an account that was radically subjectivist in intent.​[468]​ Shaftesbury exhorted his reader to ‘Converse with himself’. If he did so, he would recognize that all enjoyment came from a settled temper free of bitterness, and that this could only be acquired if he reconciled himself to providence (meaning external fortune) and learnt to despise those external ‘things’ that were not in his ‘power’.​[469]​ Through this arduous process of self-examination, he would be led to affirm that ‘there is no State of outward Prosperity, or flowing Fortune, where Inclination and Desire are always satisfy’d, Fancy and Humour pleas’d’ (I 2.2.1, 66). Rather than experiencing excessive joy or melancholy due to external circumstances, Shaftesbury argued that the individual would recognize that all that matters is what passes within. He would discover with a degree of ‘Evidence as great as that which is found in Numbers, or Mathematicks’ (here Shaftesbury aped Locke’s terminology) that it is in the pleasures of the mind rather than the senses that the greatest and most constant contentment is to be found (I, ‘Conclusion’, 99). The mind takes pleasure in order, harmony and ease (apatheia); and this can only be achieved through the (temperate) exercise of those social affections which lead a man to ‘love and serve’ (the Shaftesbury family motto). The just philosopher acts virtuously because he recognizes that it is in his nature to do so; because his greatest interest lies in realizing his true nature, in this higher sense virtue and interest are united. In Shaftesbury’s reformulation of core Stoic arguments, it is the arduous attempt to understand one’s true end—a philosophical quest for the summum bonum which Locke, like Hobbes, had in effect discountenanced as futile—that leads one both to acquiesce with what appears to be an unjust external world of men (‘providence’), and to recognize and worship a perfectly wise and benevolent divine being. ‘Perfect THEISM’ is the final and inevitable consequence of this search for contentment. The ‘divine Passion’ to which this gives rise further strengthens the love of order and harmony that the virtuous man has already attained within (I 1.3.3, 43).
Leslie Stephen’s claim that Shaftesbury possessed an ‘easy optimism’ in his theodicy and vision of human nature requires qualification.​[470]​ It was made clear in the Inquiry, and even more so in the Askēmata, that both the ‘perfect THEIST’ and the ‘perfect ATHEIST’ were ideal types. It was quite possible that no such sages had ever lived.​[471]​ ‘Vice and virtue’, Shaftesbury noted, ‘are found variously mix’d and alternately prevalent in the several Characters of Mankind’, and ‘it is as hard to find a Man wholly Ill, as wholly Good’ (I 1.2.4, 22–23). Although all men possess a ‘favourable Inclination’ towards virtue, its realisation depends upon ‘a use of Reason, sufficient to secure a right application of the Affections’ (I 1.2.3, 20). Very few men could be truly virtuous or genuine theists. Almost all would ‘come short of that sound and well-establish’d Reason, which alone can constitute a just Affection, a uniform and steddy Will and Resolution’ (I 1.2.4, 22). The constant flux most men experience between ‘Love and Hatred, Aversion and Inclination’ is reflected in their ideas of a deity (or deities). Most are ‘DAEMONISTS’, possessed of an idea of divinity that is less than perfectly good (I 1.1.2, 5–8). For this reason, in matters of worship, ‘all Moralists, worthy of any Name’ (meaning the Stoics) had ‘prescrib’d Restraint, press’d Moderation, and, to all TYRO’s in Philosophy forbid the forward Use of Admiration, Rapture or Extasy’.​[472]​ Since novices in philosophy lack a stable and constant idea of the good, they might end up admiring a being that was as capricious and arbitrary as the succession of fancies they experience within. The ‘Moderation’ of Stoic moralists discouraged the erection of false models for admiration.
This, for Shaftesbury, was evidently not true in a Christian age. He identified a third ‘sort’ of affections, the ‘unnatural’, which could lead men against both the interest of mankind and rational self-interest. Such ‘unnatural’ affections were artificially inculcated through custom and education in societies where false and pernicious ideas in religion prevailed. ‘Honest Epicurus’, banishing the gods from the moral universe, had in no sense cultivated these. As Shaftesbury continually noted in the Askēmata, drawing from Aurelius: ‘Either atoms or Deity. No medium. That multiplicity or this simplicity. No compromise—anarchy, or monarchy’.​[473]​ The inculcation of a moral theology erected on a ‘medium’ between ‘atoms or Deity’, chaos and uniformity, compelled men to remain in a continual state of unease and self-disapprobation. Shaftesbury drew upon Plutarch’s On Superstition, a favourite text for freethinkers, to make this point:
The Atheist believes there is no Deity; the Religionist, or superstitious Believer, wishes there were none. If he believes, ’tis against his Will: mistrust he dares not, nor call his Thought in question. But cou’d he with Security, at once, through off that oppressive Fear, which like the Rock of TANTALUS impends, and presses over him, he wou’d with equal Joy spurn his inslaving Thought, and embrace the Atheist’s State and Opinion as his happiest Deliverance. Atheists are free of Superstition, but the Superstitious are ever willing Atheists, tho impotent in their Thought, and unable to believe of the Divine Being as they gladly wou’d.​[474]​
This ‘corrupt Religion, or SUPERSTITION’ was alone able to impose ‘many things the most horridly unnatural and inhuman’ as ‘excellent, good, and laudable in themselves’ (I 1.3.2, 27). Shaftesbury’s prime example was ‘misanthropy’, defined as ‘the immediate Opposite to that noble Affection, which, in ancient Language, was term’d Hospitality, viz., extensive Love of Mankind, and Relief of Strangers’ (I 2.2.3, 95). This profoundly ‘unnatural’ affection resulted from the erection and imposition on men’s minds of a model for admiration who exhibited such a quality. Although obnoxious to men’s natural sense of what was good, ‘just and equitable’, through ‘Art and strong Endeavour, with long Practice and Meditation’ a ‘second Nature’ could be created which obliterated the original (I 1.3.1, 25).​[475]​ Men were naturally predisposed to the passion of ‘Admiration’ for that which was greater than themselves. The ‘divine Passion’ of the ‘perfect THEIST’ was so beneficial because it was directed towards a ‘true Model and Example of the most exact Justice, and highest Goodness and Worth’ (I 1.3.2, 29). However:
If there be a Religion which teaches the Adoration and Love of a GOD, whose Character it is to be captious, and of high resentment, subject to Wrath and Anger, furious, revengeful; and revenging himself, when offended, on others than those who gave the Offence: and if there be added to the Character of this GOD, a fraudulent Disposition, encouraging Deceit and Treachery amongst Men; favourable to a few, tho for slight causes, and cruel to the rest: ’tis evident that such a Religion as this being strongly enforc’d, must of necessity raise even an Approbation and Respect towards the Vices of this kind, and breed a suitable Disposition, a capricious, partial, revengeful, and deceitful Temper. (I 1.3.2, 28)
Shaftesbury alluded here to Augustinian theology, the doctrine of the Fall and Adam’s imputed sin, in which ‘one Person were decreed to suffer for another’s fault’ (I 1.3.2, 29).
Smith argued that it was Shaftesbury’s ‘Puritan’ education that gave his philosophy ‘a different turn’, and the Askēmata offers support for this interpretation.​[476]​ In his claim that devotional exercises could ‘be of ill consequence and even fatal’ to virtue, Shaftesbury reflected on his own concerted struggle to expurgate all remnants of his religious education:
Consider the age, vulgar religion, how thou hast been bred, and what impressions yet remaining of that sordid, shameful, nauseous idea of Deity . . . and what a wretched effect this has within . . . . Therefore if thou wouldst praise, worship and adore aright, wait till other habits are confirmed and until other ideas of a certain kind are worn off, as they will be when the whole scope of life is changed; aims, aversions, inclinings and declining reversed, transferred; the whole thought, mind, purpose, will, differently modelled, new. Then it is that thou mayest soundly, unaffectedly and safely sing those hymns to God which the divine man mentions.​[477]​
The ‘divine man’ was Epictetus, and as the Askēmata testify it was to his writings as well as to those of Aurelius that Shaftesbury turned in order to find those exemplars worthy of just admiration and to model himself anew. 
Shaftesbury’s rejection of the strongly Augustinian concept of divine grace as the sine qua non for the virtuous life placed him firmly within the mainstream of latitudinarian Restoration Anglicanism (and alongside Locke).​[478]​ Yet in the Inquiry the thrust of Shaftesbury’s argument carried him considerably further. Shaftesbury argued that the opinions of one’s neighbours, the civil laws, and even the doctrine of a future state (Locke’s three ‘Laws’) might potentially instruct men ‘in a Virtue, which afterwards they practice upon other grounds, and without thinking of a Penalty or Bribe’. The gallows and threat of eternal damnation were, however regrettably, necessary for the unphilosophical ‘Vulgar’ (the great majority of mankind), who were incapable of leading a life according to reason. External sanctions encouraged men to ‘discipline’ their wayward affections, even if this was not a consequence of reasoning on their true happiness; and because ‘it is Example which chiefly influences Mankind, and forms the Character and Disposition of a People’ (I 1.3.3, 37). Yet the question to which this led was where the most perfect examples were ultimately to be found. It is clear that, for Shaftesbury, the answer was unequivocally not the Christian scriptures:
And thus it appears, that where a real Devotion and hearty Worship is paid to a supreme Being, who in his History or Character is represented otherwise than as really and truly just and good; there must ensue a Loss of Rectitude, a Disturbance of Thought, and a Corruption of Temper and Manners in the Believer. (I, 1.3.2, 29: italics added)
In Soliloquy, Shaftesbury made this point even more strongly by noting that ‘such are mere human Hearts; that they can hardly find the least Sympathy with that only one which had the Character of being after the Pattern of the ALMIGHTY’s’.​[479]​ ‘That only one’, clearly enough, was Christ. Here Shaftesbury was undercutting the fundamental contention made by Locke in the Reasonableness of Christianity: that the divinity of Christ was attested by the moral excellence of his ministry and doctrines. Shaftesbury fully accepted that ‘GOODNESS is the only Pledg of Truth’, and that this goodness had to be measured according to men’s ideas of moral excellence as there could be no other standard.​[480]​ Yet, as will be discussed in what follows, Shaftesbury was clear that the Scriptures (including Christ’s ministry and teachings as reported in the Gospels) were quite incapable of providing any such pledge. As a result, ‘there is a certain perverse Humanity in us, which inwardly resists the Divine Commission, tho ever so plainly reveal’d’.​[481]​ The relationship between true moral philosophy and Christian moral theology was antagonistic, rather than harmonious as in Locke’s account. For Shaftesbury, all revealed religions (not least Christianity) were impositions and subverted virtue. Their most ‘corrupt’ professors, such as Hobbes and Locke, merely served to reveal this fact most clearly.
Socratic Philosophy and Christian Theology
In A Letter concerning Enthusiasm (1708), Shaftesbury defended his famous claim that religions ought not to be excluded from the ‘test’ of ridicule on the basis that ‘whatever Humour has got the start, if it be unnatural, it cannot hold; and the Ridicule, if ill-plac’d at first, will certainly fall at last where it deserves’.​[482]​ To substantiate this claim, advanced throughout Characteristics, that ‘Nature will not be mock’d’, Shaftesbury turned to the example of Socrates.​[483]​ When submitted to the base raillery of Aristophanes in The Clouds, ‘the divinest Man who had ever appear’d in the Heathen World’ was content to play along, a sure indication that ‘there was no Imposture either in his Character or Opinions’.​[484]​ The ‘Ridicule’, as a consequence, fell where it deserved: on Aristophanes. This held true for all ‘the well-deserving Antients’. The ‘truth and reason’ of their productions rendered them resistant to mockery. It followed that they ‘will have always a strong Party among the Wise and Learned of every Age’.​[485]​ It was for this reason that the early Church Fathers had eventually met with scorn and contempt in their attempts to discredit them. Their raillery was returned on them with interest, showing the ‘ill Policy as well as Barbarity of this Zealot-Enmity against the Works of the Antients’.​[486]​
For Shaftesbury, ‘a Hand happily form’d on Nature and the Antients’ was thus one and the same thing.​[487]​ He went to considerable lengths to show that the Socratic tradition in philosophy and the Homeric in poetry were entirely indigenous to ‘the politest of all Nations . . . , that is, classical Greece’.​[488]​ ‘Every noble study and science’ in Greece was ‘self-form’d, wrought out of Nature, and drawn from the necessary Operation and Course of things, working, as it were, of their own accord, and proper nature’.​[489]​ The arts and sciences were able to develop ‘naturally’ in Greece due to a combination of political liberty and artistic emulation. They were ‘free communities, made by consent and voluntary association’; and to win an audience, artists were required to charm the ear and appeal to the heart. Emulation was encouraged between communities that were independent but connected by shared trade, language, and culture. Homer was the ‘grand poetick SIRE’, and Socrates the ‘philosophical PATRIARCH’, ‘the greatest of Philosophers, the very Founder of Philosophy it-self’.​[490]​ The ‘vulgar Religion’ of ancient Greece originated from the ‘miraculous Narrations’ of the former. In his fables Homer drew his characters after ‘the Moral Rule’, and they were reflective of ‘the justest Moral Truths, and exhibitive of the best Doctrine and Instruction in Life and Manners’. It was for this (moral) reason that ‘the wise and better Sort’ respected the ‘vulgar Religion’, even if they interpreted its narrations allegorically. It encouraged men to discipline their affections through the fabulous stories it relayed.​[491]​ Unlike in Locke’s account, the pagan religion for Shaftesbury played a moral purpose in reforming men’s sentiments: in this sense, there had been no neat separation between ethics and divinity in the ancient world.​[492]​ Meanwhile it was from Socratic origins that the various branches or formal variations of philosophy were developed, not least the comic (with Antisthenes and Diogenes), the sublime and poetic (culminating with Plato), and the methodical and analytic (with Aristotle).​[493]​
The ‘civil, social, Theistic’ philosophy was entirely ‘natural’ in another sense, a point Shaftesbury developed most fully in his draft of a projected ‘History of Socrates’ (also entitled the ‘Chartae Socraticae’).​[494]​ Shaftesbury began work on this manuscript during his first retreat in Rotterdam in 1698–1699 and returned to it sporadically over the following decade.​[495]​ Shaftesbury recognized his project to be difficult for two, related reasons. The first was due to the nature of the sources upon which any account of Socrates’ life and teachings had to be constructed. As Shaftesbury would later note in Characteristics, Socrates was similar to Christ, the ‘divine philosopher’ and ‘the divine author and founder of our religion’, in that neither were writers.​[496]​ They left it to others to compose a written record of their characters, actions, and words. In the case of Socrates, the most thorough and contemporaneous accounts were provided by Xenophon and Plato; but their reports differed in important respects, and the question arose as to how (or whether) they might be reconciled. Scholars of classical reception consider what has been termed ‘the Socratic Problem’ to have arisen only with Brucker, Lessing, and Mosheim from the mid-eighteenth century, but Shaftesbury intended to confront it directly.​[497]​ The second difficulty concerned the highly controversial nature of the fundamental message Shaftesbury intended to convey in the work. This was that as ‘the Antients excel us in Policy & Government so in the knowledg of this sort (viz. morals) they were not less happily knowing’. Two notes were added in the margin: ‘speak modestly’, and ‘take care of the Objection. viz. the Morall of the Gospell’ (CS 59). Here as elsewhere, and in sharp contrast to Locke, Shaftesbury’s claim was that the moral law revealed in the Gospels had contributed nothing to, indeed it had positively contradicted, the ‘moral science’ established by the Socratic philosophers by means of reason alone. This was the crux of the argument Shaftesbury intended to develop in the ‘Chartae Socraticae’. It was aimed squarely (though not exclusively) at Locke’s attempt to subordinate philosophical ‘virtue’ to Christian ‘duty’, and to present the Gospels as alone providing men with a guide to life.
For Shaftesbury the most important of the many differences between Plato and Xenophon concerned the explanation each offered of the ‘daemonic sign’ (ποτρεπτικός). This was an inner voice Socrates claimed to hear when he was about to make a mistake.​[498]​ Plato’s interpretation, most especially in Phaedo, implied that Socrates’ moral compass owed much to ‘Divine inspiration & [the] infusion of Goodness’ (CS 74-5). It was this Platonic presentation of Socrates upon which Theophilus Gale drew in The Court of the Gentiles (1669–1678), asserting that ‘Socrates had very Metaphysic contemplations of Divine Mysteries’. In accordance with his central thesis, Gale then proceeded to argue that Socrates’ proto-Christian theism, and that of Plato, derived ‘originally from the Jewish Church’ (that is, from the Mosaic revelation).​[499]​ Henry More and Thomas Stanley similarly presented Socrates as a believer in the immortality of the soul on the basis of the account provided by Plato, and later by Plutarch and Lactantius.​[500]​ It was this suggestion that Socrates considered himself to be divinely inspired, and was a sincere believer in a future state, that Shaftesbury was anxious to repudiate. In this regard Shaftesbury’s preference for Xenophon was overwhelming, and his contempt for Plato unmistakeable. ‘Plato receeds from Truth’, Shaftesbury argued, ‘chiefly & allmost wholly in this alone in drawing Socrates into Metaphisicall & Theological Notions’ (CS 40). Yet as his repeated self-cautions illustrate, Shaftesbury recognized the need to tread carefully: ‘Socrates, unmoveably following whatever he thought ποτρεπτικός, which plainly was Reason [speak modestly however] . . . ’ (CS 134).​[501]​ Socrates would have endorsed ‘the Definition of Virtue as a Science’, one deducible only by ‘those Philosophers amongst the rest who know Necessity, the Nature of Evill, Providence particular & General’ (CS 74–75; 52–53). Socrates had accomplished this ‘Science’ on the basis of reason alone, as had Shaftesbury in the Inquiry. There was nothing ‘supernaturall’ about his understanding of morality or religion. Meanwhile:
If we could assert this of Socrates viz: that he thus strenuously maintained the Immortality of the Soul we should be glad as honouring our Hero: but truth will not permitt (as has been at length discours’d above) and we had rather he should suffer than violate truth [take care of appearance of irony]. (CS 48)
For Shaftesbury, it is evident, Socrates was no believer in immortality, let alone immateriality (as Plato suggested in Phaedo). Socrates’ grasp of morality and man’s true purpose and end had no need for an external lawgiver or for the doctrine of a future state. It was in this sense entirely ‘natural’ (rather than ‘supernaturall’): precisely the position Shaftesbury sought to vindicate against Locke. 
This point is related to Shaftesbury’s presentation of the Socratic tradition as entirely ‘self-formed’ in two distinct senses. First, it owed nothing to other traditions, and here Shaftesbury was especially concerned to emphasize its autonomy from learning as it had developed in the ‘motherland of superstition’, Egypt.​[502]​ In his ‘Metaphysicall & Theological Notions’, conversely, Plato ‘drew from Chaldea Egypt Pythagoras &c.’, and it was for this reason that his account of Socrates was largely to be considered a ‘fiction’ (CS 66). Only in these nations was the doctrine of a future state incorporated into their distinctly metaphysical moral philosophizing, not in Greece.​[503]​ In a series of long footnotes in the Miscellanies that constituted the third volume of Characteristics, Shaftesbury drew from the antiquarian scholarship of Sir John Marsham and John Spencer to establish the origins of Hebraic learning and the Judaeo-Christian tradition in Egyptian superstition. In this regard, he sought to reverse the thesis developed (in very different ways) by Gale, Locke’s antagonist Stillingfleet, Cudworth, Pierre-Daniel Huet and Newton that heathen polytheism represented the corruption of purer Hebraic ideas concerning God’s unity and providence.​[504]​ The Judaeo-Christian tradition, born of Eastern mysticism and superstition, had corrupted a pure Hellenistic moral philosophical tradition: not the other way around.
Where John Toland’s hermetic interests saw him similarly assert the historical primacy of Egypt in order to lionize the tolerant civil religion he found in the prisca sapienta, Shaftesbury’s purpose was quite different.​[505]​ For Shaftesbury, a tolerant ethical theism could only be established on Socratic (and Homeric) foundations that were entirely separate from, and in conflict with, the mystical ‘wisdom’ of Syria, Egypt, and Mosaic Israel. This leads to the second sense in which the Socratic tradition was ‘self-formed’. It literally grew out of reflections on the self, and on the true source of happiness as lying within in constancy and order of mind. This was enshrined in the citation from Persius’ Satires that appeared on the title-page of Soliloquy: ‘No need to inquire outside yourself’.​[506]​ For Shaftesbury this endorsed his claim that the individual had no need for infused grace or external guidance, and would find no moral assistance in the Scriptures and ought not to seek it there. In this sense the ‘Chartae Socraticae’ reinforced the absolute division between moral philosophy and Christian moral theology drawn in the Inquiry.
In the ‘Chartae Socraticae’, Shaftesbury appealed to ‘those that are neither Enthusiasts nor Atheisticall’. ‘Enthusiasts’ drew upon Plato to emphasize the need for ‘inspiration’ and an ‘infusion of goodness’ for the perfection of virtue. They found in the notions of the ‘sublime philosopher’ a means of establishing the truth of Christianity upon the metaphysical foundations provided by heathen learning (CS 74).​[507]​ Ultimately, such ‘enthusiasts’ developed an Aristotelian-Thomist account of grace: it super-added the theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity) to those cardinal virtues that man was able to identify and cultivate through his own efforts. As the example of hospitality showed, for Shaftesbury it was the purveyors of Socratic philosophy who had understood the true foundations of an extensive (universal) love of mankind. Christianity had by contrast introduced an ‘unnatural’ affection of ‘misanthropy’ quite unknown to the heathen philosophers. In this regard, far from enlarging upon or completing the natural law, the Christian revelation had actively subverted it. Shaftesbury was also at pains to deny the claims of neo-Epicurean ‘Atheists’ such as Bacon that Socrates was a sceptic ‘of an ostentatious Nature’, who was content to leave ‘all Things in Doubt and Uncertainty’.​[508]​ Such an interpretation suggested that men were indelibly sinful and as incapable of certainty in moral matters as in religious. This conformed to a voluntaristic theology and account of grace that owed much to Augustine: an apologetic approach that frequently disparaged the unreasonable desire for moral knowledge and autonomy as the consequence of fallen man’s pride and concupiscence. In contrast, Shaftesbury emphasized that Socrates was really a dogmatist in his moral philosophy, even as he shunned the ‘Dogmatick style’ in sharing his wisdom with those of lesser capacity than himself (CS 52).​[509]​ 
In passages scattered throughout Characteristics, and especially in the Miscellanies, Shaftesbury provided a history of Christianity that sought to explain why its professors invariably veered between ‘Enthusiasm’ and ‘Atheism’. Shaftesbury provocatively emphasized that, had it not been either injudiciously persecuted or (conversely) imposed by the civil magistrate, Christianity could not have established itself so widely. Julian, a ‘generous and mild Emperor’, received his education from both heathen and Christian teachers and, as Shaftesbury noted with heavy irony, ‘very unfortunately’ chose to adhere ‘to the ancient Religion of his Country and Forefathers’. All he found in Christianity was an invitation to inhumanity through the subversion of men’s natural affections; it had ‘so little regard . . . to true Piety, so little Obedience to our Laws and Constitutions; however humane and tolerating’.​[510]​ On the one hand, this reflected the particular species of Christianity preached by self-interested clerics. Here Shaftesbury’s historical account of the malignant effects of ‘priestcraft’ as a ‘trade’ that had developed in Syria, Egypt, Israel, and subsequently Christian Rome was almost identical to the narratives provided by James Harrington and more recent freethinkers such as Walter Moyle and Charles Blount.​[511]​ On the other hand, in Shaftesbury’s account those convinced of the truth of revealed Christianity were to some degree forced to emphasize God’s power over His goodness precisely because the Scriptures, including the Gospels, did not conform to the ‘divine and moral Truths’ established by Socratic philosophy.
In this regard, from its very inception Christianity was of necessity a ‘political’ religion. Unlike Grecian polytheism, it won men over by appealing to their base appetites rather than by alluding to higher moral truths. Whereas the Grecian mythological religion encouraged men to discipline their wayward ‘fancies’ and was in this respect entirely consistent with the pedagogical dictates of true moral philosophy, with Christianity the opposite was the case. For Locke, with Christ moral philosophy and divinity were finally united. For Shaftesbury, Christianity was ‘unnatural’: the necessary enemy of true philosophy (and philosophical theism), which it sought systematically to obliterate. Here Shaftesbury diverged both from the ‘latitudinarian’ ethical Christianity of those neo-Platonic divines with whom he is often associated, and from contemporary freethinkers who (often citing Locke) argued that gospel Christianity was entirely consistent with (and therefore reducible to) the moral insights of true philosophy (right reason).​[512]​ Shaftesbury would in no sense have accepted Matthew Tindal’s later claim that revealed Christianity was merely the republication of the religion of nature.​[513]​ 
This is indicated by Shaftesbury’s mockery of sola scriptura Protestantism, and his pointed expressions of admiration for the ‘political model’ of Christianity developed by the Papacy. The Roman Church, Shaftesbury argued, sought to provide a religion that satisfied both ‘Enthusiasts’ and ‘Atheists’. Rome simultaneously emphasized God’s goodness and His power. It tolerated the mysticism of mendicant orders that established faith on the (neo-Platonic) basis of ‘contemplation and divine love’. Yet its own authority and hierarchical ecclesiology relied upon the (Augustinian) claim to mediate between irretrievably sinful men and their jealous and capricious God. The ‘ROMAN-Christian, and once Catholick Church’, Shaftesbury noted, ‘knew how to make advantage from both the high Speculations of Philosophy, and the grossest Ideas of vulgar Ignorance’. It found much to value in the philosophy of Plato, Sextus and Epicurus but, given the cause it sought to defend, nothing at all in the moral teachings of the Socratics.​[514]​
Sola scriptura Protestantism, however, claimed to find in the moral teachings of the Scriptures all the evidence required to establish the divine origins of Christianity. Here Shaftesbury again contrasted the Scriptures to the miraculous fables of ancient Greece. The latter were (rightfully) considered to be in some sense sacred on account of their entire conformity with nature and ‘all divine and moral Truth’. Only ‘Enthusiasts’ would make this claim for the Scriptures. They were ‘multifarious, voluminous and of the most difficult interpretation’ and, more importantly, they contradicted men’s natural moral sentiments. Only by abandoning the objective standard of moral goodness and deformity found within one’s breast and most fully articulated by the Socratic philosophers might the Scriptures be considered to express ‘the justest Moral Truths’. It was for this reason that Shaftesbury argued that ‘mere human Hearts’ would, if uncorrupted, resist ‘the Divine Commission’. Only ‘Enthusiasts and Fanatics’ would ignore this internal guide in favour of such an arbitrary and obnoxious standard of moral excellence. Given that the Scriptures lent themselves to an infinity of interpretations, to follow them was effectively to abandon moral rules and to embrace those notions of the good suggested by one’s own ‘aerial Fancy, or heated Imagination’, or those inculcated by self-interested clerics.​[515]​ At its very core revealed Christianity itself—and not merely the corrupted form of it peddled by power-hungry priests—was as ‘unnatural’ as it was ‘monstrous’. 
The disastrous effects of such enthusiasm, and its ability to portray the most unnatural practices and affections as the height of goodness and piety, had been revealed ‘during the Times of the late great Troubles’ (the Civil War).​[516]​ Hobbes’ Leviathan, Shaftesbury noted sardonically, ought to be read as the work of a ‘mere political writer’. Hobbes attempted to introduce a ‘general scepticism’ to wean men away from placing trust in antinomian enthusiasts propagating specious notions of liberty and popular government.​[517]​ Hobbes might be considered as ‘a martyr for our deliverance’; a ‘good sociable man’ himself, he nonetheless painted the most execrable picture of human nature.​[518]​ In his system of ‘Political Christianity’, Hobbes had attempted to re-establish the balance lost at the Reformation between the Christian God’s goodness and immanence, and His power and transcendence. Responding to the excessive claims for the former, Hobbes had uniformly emphasized the latter.​[519]​
Shaftesbury remarked that the various Protestant churches now rested their authority on what he termed a ‘more generous Foundation’ than that of the moral excellence of the Scriptures. They had turned once more to the historical testimony of the Fathers and the early Councils.​[520]​ Shaftesbury made it clear that a ‘nicely critical historical faith’ was in practice untenable, and provided insufficient grounds for Christian belief. As Middleton would later argue, the weight of evidence spoke strongly against the credibility of such ‘ancient facts or persons’.​[521]​ This, however, was no bad thing. For Shaftesbury this movement towards regarding the sacred sources as merely historical documents—and unreliable ones, at that—was an indication of the gradual improvement that had taken place in Protestant nations, and especially in England, ‘the latest barbarous, the last civiliz’d or polish’d People of EUROPE’.​[522]​ 
The model of true barbarism was, for Shaftesbury, provided by ‘Eastern Religionists’ and the Islamic clergy. They established their religion, as misguided sola scriptura Protestants had all too recently sought to do in England, solely on ‘a Book’ (the Koran) which they claimed was ‘not only perfect, but inimitable’. A ‘real Man of Letters, and a just Critick’ would have little trouble exposing this claim as specious. To defend such a contention, they had extinguished ‘all true Learning, Science and the politer Arts’ and, most notably, banished ‘the ancient Authors and Languages’. It was the ‘moral science’ to be found in the poetry and philosophy of the ancients that most exposed the Koran, as it did the Christian scriptures and patristic writings, as profoundly deficient both in style and (moral) doctrine. A similarly ‘barbaric’ enmity against ancient learning had been indulged by the early Christians. This illustrated that ‘they had no very high Idea of the holy Scriptures, when they supposed them such Losers by a Comparison’.​[523]​ Shaftesbury himself invited precisely such a comparison: the better to advance his underlying point that the early Fathers had been quite correct in their judgement.
Shaftesbury expressed an optimism that ‘there is a mighty light which spreads over the world’, and with the establishment of peace in Europe ‘it is impossible but letters and knowledge must advance in greater proportion than ever’.​[524]​ For Shaftesbury, this advance in learning was enshrined in, and dependent upon, the revitalization of classical moral philosophy at the expense of Christian moral theology. This was causally related to the increasing tendency to look to the Scriptures solely to attest to ‘the principle Facts concerning the Authority of Revelation’, rather than as the foundation of all moral truth.​[525]​ The greatest impediment to this second Renaissance was Lockean philosophy. Here the distinction Shaftesbury drew between Hobbes and Locke was significant. Hobbes was a pragmatist, a ‘mere political Writer’. Faced with ‘Fanatics and Enthusiasts’ preaching a perverted form of divine love and a specious notion of political liberty, he had composed an account of morality and religion that was intended as a necessary antidote. He was neither a divine nor a moralist. Given that antinomians found in their superficial reading of classical philosophy a means of defending their ruinous political and religious tenets, Hobbes had found it expedient to advocate ‘the Extirpation of antient Literature’ altogether ‘in favour of his Leviathan-Hypothesis, and new Philosophy’.​[526]​ This was, from Shaftesbury’s perspective, a necessary step for Hobbes to take in developing his argument. The philosophy of neither the Stoics nor Epicureans could sanction Hobbes’s base depiction of human nature, or the justification of political authority that followed from it: his primary objective. Nor could it support a defence of religion, however pragmatic and insincere, upon the grounds of fear and disorder rather than love and providence. At least Hobbes, like Epicurus, had been ‘honest’, and recognized the implications of the position he adopted for God (banished from the world) and moral truth (equated with the whim and command of the civil magistrate).
It was Locke, whose moral theology Shaftesbury understood (correctly) to have developed in part as a response to Hobbes, who represented by far the greater danger. ‘I have learnt’, Shaftesbury declared in Sensus Communis, ‘that Virtue is never such a Sufferer, by being contested, as by being betray’d. My Fear is not so much from its witty Antagonists, who give it Exercise, and put it on its Defense, as from its tender Nurses, who are apt to over-lay it, and kill it, with Excess of Care and Cherishing’.​[527]​ Hobbes had already been referred to as ‘an able and witty Philosopher of our Nation’.​[528]​ It was Locke who had claimed the title of philosopher, and professed to defend the sacred causes of virtue and religion from Hobbes’s superficial barbs. Yet, for Shaftesbury, Locke’s primary concern as a ‘zealous Christian and Believer’ had been to justify the moral teachings of the Scriptures as ‘not only perfect, but inimitable’. Had Locke ‘known but ever so little of antiquity, or been tolerably learned in the state of philosophy with the ancients’, he could never have sustained this claim.​[529]​ Here it is significant that Shaftesbury scarcely mentions Cicero in his writings, and largely excludes him from his genealogy of an otherwise capacious Socratic tradition.​[530]​ There is every indication that Shaftesbury considered Cicero to have been a mere doxographer who had crudely summarized, but scarcely understood, the two philosophical traditions he described, and between which he professed to mediate for purely rhetorical purposes. This was strongly implied in Shaftesbury’s denunciation, in his letter to Coste in 1706, of the ‘mere sceptic, and New Academic’ philosophy to which Cicero professed his allegiance. Had Locke turned to the true (Stoic) sources of classical wisdom, he would have been compelled to distinguish clearly between philosophy and natural law, and revealed (Christian) moral theology. This was a separation which, for Shaftesbury, represented the sine qua non for the advancement of ‘letters’ and (moral) ‘knowledge’. Instead Locke sought, by any means possible, to render them inseparable, and it followed that he ‘made great alterations on these points where, though a divine may waver, a philosopher, I think, never can’. The ‘great points’ to which Shaftesbury referred were ‘liberty and necessity’, which he regarded as ‘the test and touchstone of a genius in philosophy’.​[531]​
Only the ‘two real distinct philosophies’ had provided durable definitions of these. Man’s ‘liberty’ lay in striving to live according to his nature and ‘true Scope and End’, thereby attaining respite from the continual ‘unease’ caused by his mutinous ‘fancies’. For the Stoic, this demanded that he acquiesce with the workings of an orderly providential universe, and love mankind. For the Epicurean it required that he abandon all ideas of design and order in the universe, and with it any notion of God or objective moral truth. The ‘credulous Mr. LOCKE’ sought to synthesize elements of the two by combining a hedonic psychology with a defence of morality and religion. For Shaftesbury, he sought to reconcile ‘Atoms’ with ‘God’. It followed that men ‘have scarce heard of what it is to combat with their Appetites and Senses . . . ; they rather raise and advance them by all possible Means, without Fear of adding Fuel to their inflam’d Desires, in a Heart, which can never burn towards GOD, till those other Fires are extinct’.​[532]​ Establishing the origins of universal morality in an external law and sanctions (most fully revealed by Christ), Locke signally failed to ‘examine himself and consider his natural passions’. The ‘unnatural’ affection of ‘misanthropy’, commended by the capricious God of Abraham and Isaac, was instead made ‘natural’ to all men.​[533]​
On this basis Locke proclaimed that ‘Experience and our Catechism teaches us all’. To substantiate such a base portrayal of human nature, it was to the depictions of degenerate and barbarous nations provided by ‘Modern Wonder-Writers’ that he turned. In so doing, Locke ‘gave up an Argument for the Deity, which CICERO (tho’ a profess’d Sceptick) would not explode’.​[534]​ Even Cicero had recognized that a belief in the existence of a providential order and an acknowledgment of man’s natural ‘SENSE of inward Proportion and Regularity of Affection’ provided the sole grounds for theistic faith. Yet on Shaftesbury’s interpretation, as Bacon and his followers had destroyed the former, so Locke had obliterated the latter.​[535]​ In looking to Christianity and a future state to explain man’s true end, Locke had denied what both the Stoics and Epicureans had recognized to be the sole argument for theism and universal morality. Locke’s moral theology represented, for Shaftesbury, a profoundly misled attempt to establish his ‘daemonism’ (Christian belief) on philosophical foundations:
’Tis this must render Revelation probable, and secure that first step to it, the Belief of a Deity and Providence. A Providence must be prov’d from what we see in the Order in things present. We must contend for Order; and in this part chiefly, where Virtue is concern’d. All must not be refer’d to a Hereafter. For a disorder’d State, in which all present Care of Things is given up, Vice uncontroul’d, and Virtue neglected, represents the very Chaos, and reduces us to the belov’d Atoms, Chance, and Confusion of the Atheists.​[536]​
Conclusion
The interpretation of his philosophy, and the reading of his classicism, provided in this chapter raises serious questions of Klein’s presentation of Shaftesbury as an apologist for the ideal of an easy, gentlemanly coffee-house sociability suitable to a commercial, urbanized, and defiantly ‘Whig’ modernity. Shaftesbury’s definition of virtue was austere, and in many respects an engagement in society and polite company (in such a degenerate age, at least) threatened to derail, rather than to assist in its pursuit. Such social interactions encouraged men to take their ideas of good and ill from external authorities, including the contingent and variable opinions of one’s neighbours, rather than seeking for the objective, ‘fix’d Standard’ of virtue enshrined in the very order of the universe. Locke’s three ‘Laws’ were perfectly adapted to such a debased modern age: on Locke’s account, Shaftesbury claimed, ‘all Actions are naturally indifferent’, having ‘no Note or Character of Good, or Ill, in themselves; but are distinguish’d by mere FASHION, LAW, or arbitrary DECREE’ (revelation).​[537]​ The particular explanatory importance Locke attached to his ‘Law of Reputation’, which Shaftesbury clearly recognized, ultimately suggested that ‘Virtue and Vice had, after all, no other Laws or Measure, than mere Fashion and Vogue’. It was precisely because of the tension in Locke’s moral theory between the true origins and sanctions of the moral law (God’s will and eternal rewards or punishments), and the inability of mere human reason to establish these cardinal truths without the assistance of revelation, that Locke was compelled to turn to social constraint and the desire for reputation in explaining why in practice men usually governed their conduct as natural law demanded. In this regard, Locke’s moral philosophy illustrated Shaftesbury’s fundamental contention that ‘there is nothing so foolish and deluding as a partial Scepticism’. Ciceronian academic scepticism, substituting probability and hope for truth and assurance, could not provide the foundations for an ethical theory worthy of the name. It could yield only a theory of politeness which made certain actions prudent and others imprudent in specific socio-historical contexts, rather than a theory equipped to identify the normative character and the immutable and universal precepts of the moral law.​[538]​ 
In the modern world no less than the ancient, virtue was confined to those few who were able and willing to recognize that their true happiness as rational beings resides in disinterested virtue, and to refer all moral actions to this ultimate end. Shaftesbury’s unambiguously aristocratic moral theory appealed to the individual who was able to ‘recall his fancy from the power of fashion and education to that of reason’.​[539]​ This demanded rigorous self-discipline: the ‘self’ was under continual siege from myriad worldly temptations, and to succumb to them was, for Shaftesbury, fatal. This is not to say that Shaftesbury discouraged an active engagement in society and public life tout court: true ‘theistic’ philosophy, indeed, demanded it. Yet the tension between the two commandments of the Shaftesbury family motto—‘love and serve’—was profound: after a short spell in Parliament, Shaftesbury retired to Naples partly because of the threat such active engagement posed to his quest for tranquillity.​[540]​ 





3	Mandeville and the Construction of Morality
Introduction: Mandeville’s Intellectual Development, 1714–1732
Unlike this book’s other main protagonists, Bernard Mandeville appears to have left no personal archive—correspondence, private papers, or early drafts of his publications—to which the historian can turn in order to reconstruct his intellectual development. Any such account must depend entirely on his published writings.​[543]​ From these, it seems that Mandeville encountered Shaftesbury’s philosophy at some point between 1714 and 1720. There is no allusion to Characteristics in The Fable of the Bees (1714), whereas Mandeville’s works from Free Thoughts on Religion (1720) onwards are littered with references to it. Indeed, his two most important works, the Fable Part II (1729) and Origin of Honour (1732), virtually resurrect and engage Shaftesbury in debate: both texts take the form of a dialogue between an ardent defender of Shaftesbury’s ‘Social System’ (Horatio), and an advocate of Mandeville’s ‘System of Deformity’ (Cleomenes). Mandeville repeatedly informed his reader that ‘you never saw two Authors who seem to have wrote with more different Views’; his own philosophy was erected upon principles that were ‘diametrically opposite’ to Shaftesbury’s.​[544]​ From 1720, Mandeville repeatedly and forcefully indicated that his own philosophical achievement could only properly be appreciated if his writings were read alongside Characteristics.  
That Mandeville came to recognize the striking contrast between his philosophical approach and that adopted by Shaftesbury is unsurprising. Mandeville was a Dutch émigré and physician. In his youth he attended the Erasmian school in Rotterdam, where he may have been tutored by Pierre Bayle. As his earliest English writings make clear, Mandeville was well-acquainted with the psychological insights offered by French Augustinians such as Bayle, Nicole, François de la Rochefoucauld, Jacques Esprit, and Jacques Abbadie, and well-read in the polemical exchanges between the Jansenists and their Jesuit antagonists. These authors emphasized the extent of post-lapsarian human depravity and were virulently hostile to a broadly Stoic moral philosophy.​[545]​ Predictably, these were authors whom Shaftesbury held in contempt. Indeed, Mandeville’s earliest works appeared (to little acclaim) at precisely the time that Shaftesbury was mining ancient Stoic sources in order to respond to Hobbes, Locke, and these satirical French moralists of a ‘yet inferior kind’ whom he presented as perverting Epicurus’ teachings. ‘The revivers of this philosophy in latter days’, Shaftesbury argued, used the ‘play of words’ to reduce crudely all the springs of human action to self-interest and self-love.​[546]​ A prime target of Shaftesbury’s ‘Chartae Socraticae’ was ‘the Modern French: who have abandon’d vertue, and set themselves against all these Good men as Socrates Cato & c’ (CS 100). In Characteristics, La Rochefoucauld was placed at their head.​[547]​ Mandeville’s Grumbling Hive (1705), a 423-line verse fable and the kernel out of which the Fable grew, owed a considerable debt to La Rochefoucauld.​[548]​ The full extent of Mandeville’s engagement with these French writers was made even clearer in the Fable. Its notorious subtitle, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, merely echoed the epigraph to La Rochefoucauld’s Moral Maxims, which proclaimed that ‘our Vertues are oftentimes in Reality no better than Vices in disguise’.​[549]​ Warburton’s characteristically vindictive verdict in 1727 that ‘the Fable of the Bees is but the Tap-droppings of Hobbes and Rochefoucault’s unnatural Beverage’ carries some truth.​[550]​
Mandeville has recently received considerable scholarly attention, on account of the burgeoning interest in the development and transmission of the Augustinian-Epicurean tradition. Once dismissed by historians of philosophy primarily as a satirist, the importance of what John Robertson calls Mandeville’s ‘deeper philosophical commitments’ has been recovered. These scholars nonetheless broadly accept Warburton’s verdict: even as the Fable might in an Anglophone context be considered ‘the most provocative work of moral theorising since Hobbes’s Leviathan’, it appears highly derivative when placed within a broader European setting.​[551]​ Taken in isolation, the Fable supports the claim that Mandeville’s primary achievement was to act as a ‘cultural middleman’, conveying to an Anglophone readership the insights regarding moral psychology that had been developed by Jansenists in France and within the Huguenot émigré community in the Low Countries.​[552]​ Shaftesbury would have found little in the Fable that was novel: not least given his friendship with Bayle and familiarity with his writings, to which Mandeville’s work was heavily indebted.​[553]​ Mandeville played on a theme common to the writings of Augustinian controversialists, including English nonconformists: the tension between the realms of nature and grace.​[554]​ An overriding objective of the Fable was to satirize any and all moral theories which professed to show that higher principles than fallen man’s craven self-love played any meaningful role in explaining the moral universe. 
Mandeville’s writings from the later 1720s—the Fable Part II, and Origin of Honour—betray a greater seriousness of purpose. In them, Mandeville is now widely recognized to have provided ‘a highly articulated, conceptually challenging, science of man’, which informed much eighteenth-century thinking about the origins and implications of modern, commercial society.​[555]​ Once again, this scholarly verdict chimes with that of Warburton, who accepted that Mandeville’s mature works posed a considerably tougher challenge, one that could not so easily be ignored.​[556]​ Adam Smith was similarly attentive to the greater theoretical sophistication and explanatory force of these later writings. Smith referred in 1755 to ‘the second volume of the Fable of the Bees’ as an important contribution to the ‘science of man’, and correctly identified Rousseau’s debt to it in his Discours sur L’Origine et les Fondements de L’Inégalité Parmi les Hommes (1754).​[557]​
The current scholarship does not draw a link between Mandeville’s greater seriousness of purpose in his later writings, and his new, and very explicit, determination in them to confront Shaftesbury’s moral theory.​[558]​ This reflects a misapprehension as to the nature of Shaftesbury’s philosophical project. Broadly speaking, in 1714 Mandeville’s satirical barbs were directed at three targets, all of whom sought to forge a synthesis between Stoic ethical thought and Christianity. The first such target was the French archbishop, theologian, and tutor to Louis XIV’s grandson, François Fénelon (1651-1715), whose remarkably successful novel Telemachus, Son of Ulysses (1699) decried the morally-corrosive effects of commercial society and the interdependence to which it gave rise.​[559]​ The second target was the pious societies for the reformation of manners, which had proliferated in England following the Revolution of 1688–1689. The third was the urbane coffee-house periodicals edited by Joseph Addison and Richard Steele (the Tatler, Guardian, and Spectator).​[560]​ All sought to establish a harmony between the right-thinking man’s temporal interests—to be an upstanding, trustworthy, and convivial member of polite society, concerned for the public good—and his Christian obligations. Neither the duties of polite morality nor those of true religion, they suggested, were particularly taxing. This was a claim which chimed with the theology of Anglican casuists such as Isaac Barrow, who spoke of the (this-worldly) profitableness and advantage to the individual and society of practicing Christianity.​[561]​ 
Precisely because scholars have tended to portray Shaftesbury as offering a similarly undemanding and ‘polite’ moral theory, broadly amenable to ‘latitudinarian’ practical divinity, any distinction between his philosophy and Spectatorial politeness has been elided.​[562]​ As a consequence the significance of Mandeville’s increasing concern from 1720 to respond to Shaftesbury appears negligible.​[563]​ It is clear, however, that Mandeville did not read Shaftesbury’s philosophy in this way. Mandeville recognized Shaftesbury to offer, as Fénelon, Addison, Steele, and liberal Anglican theologians had not, a fully-articulated ethical theory founded upon non-Christian (indeed, anti-Christian) premises. Mandeville, in short, took the ‘Three large Volumes’ of Characteristics seriously as a work of philosophy, as he indicated in his response shortly before his death to George Berkeley, who had attacked both Mandeville and Shaftesbury in Alciphron (1732). Shaftesbury’s philosophy—and, by implication, his own—could not be dismissed so lightly:
I differ from My Lord Shaftesbury entirely, as to the Certainty of the Pulchrum & Honestum, abstract from Mode and Custom: I do the same about the Origins of Society, and many other Things, especially the Reasons why Man is a Sociable Creature, beyond other Animals. I am fully persuaded, His Lordship was in the Wrong in these Things; but this does not blind my Understanding so far, as not to see, that he is a very fine Author, and a much better Writer than my self, or you either.​[564]​
In Origin of Honour, Mandeville offered two reasons why he found Shaftesbury’s philosophy uniquely stimulating, if erroneous. First, the author of Characteristics ‘endeavoured to sap the Foundation of all reveal’d Religion, with Design of establishing Heathen Virtue on the Ruins of Christianity’: not a charge that could easily be levelled at Whichcote, Addison, or Fénelon. Second, Shaftesbury’s ethical theory was unapologetically aristocratic, expressing a profound contempt for ‘the Generality of Mankind’. Mandeville considered it a gross injustice that critics of the Fable, such as Hutcheson, accused him of being a ‘Man-Hater’, and thought it paradoxical that they offered Shaftesbury’s Characteristics as an antidote.​[565]​ It was Shaftesbury, the supposed ‘Painter’ of human nature, who in fact entertained a ‘worse Opinion of his Species, than ever the Author of the Fable of the Bees appears to have had yet’. Mandeville needed just one example to clinch his case. Had Shaftesbury not argued, despite his profound hostility to Christian moral theology, that ‘if it was not for the Fear of an After-Reckoning, some Men would be so wicked, that there would be no living with them’?​[566]​ Shaftesbury had endeavoured to redeem the philosophical few, rather than mankind from Hobbes’s and Locke’s base portrayal of human nature. His man of virtue was no plebeian: he was a highly educated classicist and man of leisure. Similarly, it was misleading to see Shaftesbury as the theorist of ‘natural’ human sociability and benevolence. Mandeville recognized that, in Characteristics, the universal love of mankind was in no sense innate. Virtue and true (self-preserving) sociability are the end-products of intense and arduous philosophical reflection, undertaken in a retirement from the business of the world which most people simply could not afford. Shaftesbury’s ‘heathen’ moral theory, like that of his Stoic heroes, was nakedly aristocratic and profoundly demanding. It offered a definition of virtue to which only the few could ever aspire. Having vindicated the philosophical elite, he merrily accepted that the rest of mankind needed herding, like cattle, by the manipulation of their fear of a tyrannous God in whom the wise few were not stupid enough to believe. As the previous chapter suggests, Mandeville’s interpretation of Shaftesbury may have been uncharitable (though no more so than Shaftesbury’s critique of Locke), but it was not manifestly unjust.​[567]​ These were essential features of Shaftesbury’s philosophy, Mandeville argued plausibly, which ‘that curious Metaphysician’ Hutcheson had evidently failed to understand. By turning to Shaftesbury’s philosophy as a means of vindicating the causes of Christianity and natural human benevolence from the Fable’s satirical barbs, Hutcheson’s case was deeply compromised from the outset.​[568]​
Mandeville’s identification of the limitations of Shaftesbury’s moral philosophy was more than idle points-scoring. His mature works represented a serious attempt to provide what Shaftesbury had not: a system of ethics which could explain why almost all men, rather than merely the philosophical few, felt an obligation to behave morally, without invoking religious belief or a concern for eternal sanctions. Mandeville’s intimate engagement with Shaftesbury also brought him into dialogue with Locke: the more systematic and intellectually compelling nature of Mandeville’s later works reflects his determination to intervene in this English debate. For Mandeville, neither Locke’s moral theology nor Shaftesbury’s aristocratic, Stoic moral philosophy could explain why most men in modern commercial society either felt, or ought to feel, obligated to adhere to moral rules. This attempt to address issues raised in distinctive fashion in England by Locke and Shaftesbury provides a context—as an exclusive focus on the Epicurean-Augustinian tradition cannot—in which to understand Mandeville’s intellectual development from the 1720s. In particular, it casts light on why the ‘Augustinian’ and satirical elements of Mandeville’s thinking almost entirely fell away.​[569]​ 
For Augustinian moralists such as Bayle or Nicole, the human condition was genuinely tragic, and irreparable: human depravity stained everything, and the societies men had (necessarily) created simply engulfed them ever-deeper in their own depravity and self-love. It followed that there was little to be gained from attempting seriously to understand the origins and purpose of human society, with the ultimate objective of showing how it might more efficiently attain the ends for which it had been instituted. Those ends were as squalid as they were futile. Christian duty, and human ideas of the good and the just were almost entirely irreconcilable: a perception so anxiety-inducing that even its most ardent proponents could not help occasionally backing away from its full implications. As we saw in Chapter 1, Nicole intimated that some degree of reconciliation might just be possible between ‘honnêteté humaine’ and ‘honnêteté parfait’, only to conclude that this was wishful thinking.​[570]​ Bayle sought partially to isolate morality from his sceptical insights: true ideas of God were indeed obliterated by the Fall, but those regarding moral good and ill were not.​[571]​ La Rochefoucauld similarly retained the distinctly Aristotelian-Stoic concept of a true species of natural virtue that might be, and ought to be, loved for its own sake and was consistent with Christianity.​[572]​ In Mandeville’s philosophy, in contrast, even the faintest possibility of any such reconciliation between virtue as it existed in the world, and Christian duty as revealed in the Scriptures, was dismissed out of hand as deluded casuistry. 
Instead, Mandeville argued that the codes of morality and justice by which societies were regulated were artificial, and unequivocally discountenanced by the sole, immutable standard of truth: the Christian scriptures, which he interpreted through a ‘hyper-Augustinian’ lens. If Esprit was correct to claim that ‘one who is Mild, Peaceable, Indulgent, Good and Officious, is not truely Virtuous, if he be so to get Men’s Love, and not to obey God’s Commands’, then ‘true’ virtue simply had no place in moral or political philosophy.​[573]​ Mandeville pushed the inherently problematic relationship between Reformed theology—and the anthropological assumptions embedded within it—and natural law theory to its limits. To put the point differently: there could be no reconciliation between Locke’s ‘Law of Reputation’, the power of which depended upon men’s self-love and craven desire for recognition, and the ‘Divine Law’ revealed in the Scriptures. 
In making this case, Mandeville scarcely attempted to conceal his conviction that society was mankind’s greatest achievement, and the source of all the happiness of which they were capable. Society was, in short, a feat to be celebrated. Here Mandeville’s outlook was strikingly different to that of the Augustinian thinkers upon whom he nonetheless drew so heavily. Any concern with post-lapsarian human depravity and the futility of mankind’s search for temporal contentment, so prominent in Augustinian moralizing, simply dropped out of the equation. Mandeville argued that morality and justice as they existed in the world were only to be explained by the transformation of the human personality within society. This was, as Fénelon had recognized but regretted, a process that saw men become increasingly interdependent; and here men’s desire for esteem from others—highlighted by Locke and regretted by Shaftesbury—played a central role.​[574]​ Religious belief, and most especially Christian moral theology and its sanctions of a future state, had no explanatory role to play: a point Mandeville made even more strongly than had Shaftesbury. Only the Epicurean sage, viewing human nature with ironic detachment, could appreciate how men in modern, commercial societies had by their ‘Indefatigable Desire of Meliorating [their] Condition’ entirely transformed themselves into actors on a social stage.​[575]​ The fundamental message underpinning Mandeville’s account of mankind’s passage from rudeness to refinement was ‘fabricando fabri fimus’ (by making we become makers).​[576]​ Mandeville’s moral theory was built squarely upon the ‘ruins’ of both Stoic and Christian virtue, and consequently offered as superseding the accounts provided by Shaftesbury and Locke.
The Story of Sociability: from the Fable (1714) to Part II (1729)
In the Fable of 1714, Mandeville declared that it was essential to be ‘able well to distinguish between good Qualities and Virtues’. This was a distinction identical to that drawn by Locke (and Nicole) between ‘virtue and vice’ and ‘sin and duty’. Mandeville further agreed with Locke that men’s ideas of the good were contingent and varied according to what was found to be socially useful: ‘When we pronounce Actions good or evil, we only regard the Hurt or Benefit the Society receives from them’.​[577]​ The ‘Virtues’, in contrast, represented God’s will, and were immutable and absolute. For Mandeville, however, Locke’s attempt to reconcile the ideas of good and ill entertained by men in society with God’s will and command was futile. To be virtuous an action had to be disinterested, which demanded the individual’s ‘Conquest of his own Passions out of a Rational Ambition of being good’. On this point, Mandeville agreed with Shaftesbury. Both argued that ‘Passions may do Good by chance, but there can be no Merit but in the Conquest of them’.​[578]​ Yet a hedonic understanding of human psychology, such as that offered by Locke himself, showed the absurdity of Stoic moral theory. Virtue could not be its own motive or reward. With the exception of the regenerate, who were moved by the Holy Spirit, all men were motivated to act by their desires, not by disinterested benevolence or by an autonomous faculty of reason. To the ‘anatomist’ who peeled back ‘the smooth white skin that so beautifully covers’ the social no less than the physical body, it was evident that in the absence of efficacious grace—of which there was almost no trace in the world—‘Men’s Inclinations can only be subdued by Passions of greater Violence’.​[579]​
There could be no reconciliation between the ‘good Qualities’ and ‘Virtues’. The former, which originated on account of their temporal public utility, ‘have nothing to do with Virtue or Religion’ because ‘instead of extinguishing, they rather inflame the Passions’.​[580]​ As Mandeville’s Grumbling Hive first made clear, men’s passions alone stimulated their endeavour. Consequently, the most successful and productive of human societies were those which managed to indulge (rather than attempted to suppress) men’s passions in socially-beneficial ways. In this regard human moral codes presupposed the absurdity of both Stoic and Christian morality: rational self-restraint was an inadequate foundation for society. Meanwhile, Mandeville asserted that by their own natural lights men were no more capable of discerning an immutable standard of moral than of aesthetic truth, an analogy he drew as a consequence of reading Shaftesbury’s ethical theory. ‘It is manifest then’, Mandeville declared, ‘that the hunting after this Pulchrum & Honestum is not much better than a Wild-Goose-Chace’.​[581]​ If Locke had reluctantly concluded that those theological tenets which he held to be essential to an understanding of morality—God’s attributes, commands, and sanctions—had largely been revealed rather than discovered, Mandeville went further, denying entirely the significance of natural religion: ‘all true Religion must be reveal’d, and could not have come into the World without Miracle’.​[582]​ The divine law revealed by Christ, meanwhile, was antithetical to the pursuit of happiness and prosperity in this life: the essential paradox at the heart of Augustinian-Epicurean thought.​[583]​ 
In 1714 Mandeville argued that human moral codes had been pragmatically devised ex nihilo in the classical world by the politician and haughty Stoic philosopher: an indication, perhaps, of Hobbes’s influence on Mandeville’s early intellectual formation.​[584]​ They worked together in the self-interested attempt to make the unruly masses governable, and amenable to their will. In their untaught state, as Hobbes had shown, ‘fear’ was ‘the only useful Passion that Man is possess’d of towards the Peace and Quiet of Society’. It led men to accept the authority of an arbiter who might secure them from the violence of others.​[585]​ Yet Mandeville recognized that fear no more than ‘Force alone’ could render men sociable or encourage them to labour in the public rather than their private interest. A society in which a concern for individual self-preservation prevailed would be impoverished, impolite, and incapable of defending itself from external aggressors.​[586]​ 
It was for this reason that pride or self-love was so crucial. Self-love was defined by Mandeville as the ‘vast Esteem we have for ourselves’, a self-estimation that far exceeded one’s actual worth.​[587]​ No pleasure was greater, and none more tangible, than ‘the Raptures we enjoy in the Thoughts of being liked’ and finding that our self-estimation was supported by others. No pain was more acute than that caused by pride’s antonym, shame. It was ‘in these two Passions’, Mandeville argued, ‘in which the Seeds of most Virtues are contained’.​[588]​ It was, as Locke intimated, the concern for esteem which led men to exert themselves on others’ behalf, and to practice the social virtues. This explained why the sanctions of praise and blame, as Nicole had emphasized, and Locke had taken in a rather different direction, were such powerful inducements. A man in whom self-love was strong would do almost anything to avoid the pain caused by shame, even at the cost of his physical security. This, potentially, made man a uniquely malleable and suggestible creature, so long as governors and philosophers could find a way to stimulate (and then manipulate) men’s pride.
The Hive had emphasized how in a thriving commercial society such as England most men were possessed of exorbitant pride and the enlarged desires to which it gave rise. In the explanation he offered as to how this had come about in the Fable, most notably in the ‘Origin of Moral Virtue’ (1714), Mandeville again intimated that the key role had been played by the ‘Ambitious’ few in the ancient world—would-be political leaders and philosophers—in whom pride had already conquered fear. It was in political society, then, that the passion of pride was awoken in the multitude by the skilful manipulation of their passions by the politician and moralist.​[589]​ This made men ‘tractable’ (a favourite term of Mandeville’s) as, when strengthened, pride could trump fear and the narrow self-interest it expressed. The politician and moralist denominated as ‘virtuous’ those qualities that suited their personal interest as the leaders of society: given the external threats posed to their nation by its neighbours, martial courage and heroism were high on their list. For men willingly to risk their life on the battlefield, they had to believe that there was a good (finus) greater than life itself. For the man of pride, this was one’s reputation. 
In Mandeville’s ingenious but reductive account, the heathen magistrate and moralist had attempted to pique the pride of the hoi polloi by dividing society into ‘two Classes’: the few (themselves) and the multitude. Here Mandeville may have had Plato’s Republic in mind.​[590]​ The leaders of society claimed to be ‘lofty high-spirited Creatures’ who were ‘free from sordid Selfishness’ and, living according to reason, able to suppress their selfish passions. This was, of course, untrue: it was their exorbitant and unrestrained pride which distinguished them, rather than their philosophical self-denial. The common people were, in turn, shamed by their representation as odious animals held captive by their base appetites. It was by this means that shame was stimulated in a greater number of men, who were motivated to act in ways which drew the applause of their betters, thereby offsetting the pain caused by contempt. Mandeville argued that ‘this was (or at least might have been) the manner after which Savage Man was broke’. ‘The Moral Virtues’, he concluded in a memorable turn of phrase, ‘are the Political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride’.​[591]​
Mandeville made no attempt in 1714 to explore, as had Locke, how moral codes had developed naturally and consensually, as men gathered together in pursuit of shared ends. In Part II (1729), however, Mandeville adopted a more nuanced approach. The literary form adopted by Mandeville in this work, the dialogue, itself indicates this greater seriousness of purpose, insofar as it reflected his concern in his later writings to challenge directly the moral theory provided by Shaftesbury. In reviving this classical philosophical form in The Moralists, Shaftesbury had used it as a vehicle to advance the Stoic definition of happiness as only to be found in the rational, virtuous life against broadly Epicurean objections. Mandeville relocated the scene of the discussion from the rural Arcadian groves of classical literary convention to a defiantly modern, commercial, and urban setting. He also reversed the outcome of the dialogue. In explaining how polite commercial sociability had come about, something Shaftesbury had failed to do, it was the Epicurean arguments of Mandeville’s interlocutor (Cleomenes), rather than those of the admirer of Shaftesbury (Horatio), that were presented as furnishing men with the Socratic ideal of self-knowledge. 
By shifting the scene of the discussion to an avowedly commercial, urban setting, Mandeville raised the pressing question which, he claimed, Shaftesbury had steadfastly ignored. In modern, polite society, almost all men seemingly practised the ‘good Qualities’ (officium) voluntarily, without any apparent external coercion. What reason, then, was there to think, with Shaftesbury, that the ‘wise’ did so on different principles (rational self-restraint) to the ‘vulgar’ (fear, self-love)? The Epicurean Cleomenes, no less than the Stoic Horatio, derived pleasure from social intercourse, polite exchange, and the performance of the social virtues. Both were contented members of the ‘Beau Monde’.​[592]​ Cleomenes was able to show, as Horatio was not, that they both acted upon the same principles, which had nothing whatsoever to do with philosophical self-denial. Mandeville’s declared objective from 1729 was instead to demonstrate that:
There are no good Offices or Duties, either to others or ourselves, that Cicero has spoke of, nor any Instances of Benevolence, Humanity, or other Social Virtue, that Lord Shaftesbury has hinted at, but a Man of good Sense and Knowledge may learn to practise them from no better Principle than Vain-glory, if it be strong enough to subdue and keep under all other Passions, that may thwart and interfere with his Design.​[593]​
The two interlocutors in the dialogue raised important criticisms of the explanations offered of moral motivation and obligation in Characteristics and the Fable respectively. This led Mandeville in Part II onto new ground, and to conjecture how his Stoic antagonist might have responded.​[594]​ The most pressing weakness identified by Horatio concerned the deliberately provocative and undeniably reductive account offered by Mandeville in the Fable regarding the origins of moral virtue. ‘I can’t help observing’, Horatio noted, ‘that when human Understanding serves your Purpose to solve any thing, it is always ready and full-grown; but at other times, Knowledge and Reasoning are the Work of Time, and Men are not capable of thinking justly, ’till after many Generations’.​[595]​ At times in the Fable human reason appeared instrumental, as in the presentation of the ‘skilful Politician’ and moralist as possessed of quite remarkable foresight. At others it was purely procedural, and the development of society driven by men’s pre-rational impulse to improve their natural condition.​[596]​
In addressing this shortcoming, Mandeville deconstructed the analogy he had drawn between men and bees. Even though a thriving commercial society and the beehive appeared alike, to the extent that all individuals were willing to work for the public good, the former had a history and the latter did not. The honey produced by the first bees was no less perfect than that furnished by the most recent. In the case of bees, ‘the Laws of Nature are fix’d and unalterable: In all her Orders and Regulations there is a Stability no where to be met with in Things of human Contrivance and Approbation’. The behaviour of bees was entirely ‘natural’. ‘Man’, however, ‘naturally will not do, as he would be done by’, and all men are ‘bad, that are not taught to be good’. The golden rule (do unto others) was the consequence of education in society, rather than in any sense natural to man or the product of Christian belief. Mandeville conceded that, given the radically anti-teleological thrust of his account, a better analogy to draw was between man in the state of nature and the grape. It could not meaningfully be said that within grapes there was wine, any more than that within man there was sociability, or that the realisation of these qualities represented the attainment of their true natures. Both society and fermentation were the far from inevitable consequences of mankind’s inexhaustible industry and inventiveness in finding the means to improve their condition. The extent of mankind’s achievement was entirely ignored by Shaftesbury, since ‘what you call Natural, is evidently Artificial, and belongs to Education’.​[597]​
In explaining in Part II how ‘Men become sociable, by living together in Society’, Mandeville’s revision of his treatment of pride and shame was significant. In 1714 Mandeville had argued that these were discrete passions. He now claimed that they were two manifestations of one ‘frailty’ natural to man, that of ‘self-liking’, which led him to entertain the ‘superlative Wish’ to have others reinforce his inflated self-estimation. All sentient creatures were possessed of self-love, which ensured that they secured what was required for their preservation (and that of their young). It was self-liking that distinguished men from animals. Self-liking militated against self-knowledge, thereby encouraging hypocrisy: this explained why the increasingly socialized individual ‘should be ignorant of his own Heart, and the Motives he acts from’. Mandeville repeatedly emphasized that, if a man in the state of nature were to witness the conduct of individuals in developed commercial societies, he would assuredly consider them to have been bewitched by an evil power. How else might he explain why they so willingly and unthinkingly sacrificed their greatest interest—the preservation of life and limb, and their ‘Ease and Security’—in the quest for the imaginary rewards of flattery and inessential material possessions? This was all the more perplexing, Mandeville argued, given that the Christian God’s revealed will enjoined men to remain in his natural state, and not to seek relief from the earthly torture to which their Creator had seen fit (for His own unimpeachable purposes) to condemn them. Self-liking, then, was truly ‘the Sorcerer, that is able to divert all other Passions from their natural Objects, and make a rational Creature ashamed of what is most agreeable to his Inclination as well as his Duty’.​[598]​ It was also the sole source of happiness for mankind, furnishing them with their wishes and hopes and inuring them to despair. ‘No Man’, Mandeville argued, ‘can resolve upon Suicide, whilst Self-liking lasts’, whereas in its absence death might well seem preferable to the abject struggle for self-preservation.​[599]​ 
As should be clear, the reality of natural as well as moral evil was fundamental to this depiction of man’s struggles in his natural state. This, as Mandeville noted at length in the ‘Search into the Origins of Society’ in the second edition of the Fable (1723), was something Shaftesbury’s Stoicism had led him to deny. Man in nature was surrounded by ‘a thousand Mischiefs’, and ‘every thing is Evil, which Art and Experience have not taught us to turn into a Blessing’.​[600]​ Rather than ‘skilful Politicians’ and moralists playing the leading role in man’s ‘Victory’ over the natural world and his own untaught nature, in Part II this was achieved by ‘human Industry and Application, by the uninterrupted Labour, and joint Experience of many Ages’. It was a collective accomplishment. In his natural state, men’s ‘Thoughts’ were never ‘at Liberty to rove beyond the first Necessities of Life’. Self-liking was piqued only once men came to recognize, through hunting, their superiority over the beasts which initially they feared (as reflected in heathen fables recounting the slaying of terrifying mythical creatures), but later learnt how to kill or tame.​[601]​ Once aroused, and only at this point, self-liking and the desire to have others submit to one’s sense of superiority led to the war of all against all described by Hobbes.​[602]​
This state was devastating to every man, who had already acquired a sense of property by associating his ‘Self’ with what he considered to be the fruits of his labour: whether the land he had worked, or the children he had produced. The only escape from such a state was found ‘when human Creatures once submit to Government’.​[603]​ In seeking to offer a more naturalistic explanation of the origins and development of society, Part II reveals a much greater debt to Locke. Its account of the origins of property followed Locke explicitly, and Mandeville’s debt to Lockean epistemology—which Shaftesbury had condemned as mere sophistry—was also considerable. The mind, Mandeville argued, was initially a ‘Charte Blanche’, entirely dependent upon the data of sense-experience. The action of thinking consisted, as Locke had shown, in the ‘hunting after, joyning, separating, changing, and compounding of ideas’, and the facility with which men did so increased exponentially within society. The rightful use of the faculty of thought lay in its capacity to assist men to procure most efficiently what had already been identified as desirable by their passions. ‘Reason’ consisted primarily in ‘the Management of Self-liking’, because this was socialized man’s strongest passion: the supposedly ‘rational’ man (such as the Stoic sage) was simply an individual in whom the passion of self-liking was sovereign.​[604]​ Free will was a chimera, invented by Stoic and Christian moralists to inculcate a sense of shame in men. Here as elsewhere, Mandeville drew heavily from the naturalistic elements within Locke’s philosophy whilst discarding the framework of a divine teleology into which they had been placed by Locke.​[605]​ Man’s will was governed by his desires. The proud man found genuine pleasure, and took pride, in securing the objects he desired; and this furnished him with the illusion that he was a self-directing rational agent, which represented ‘a violent Principle of innate Folly’.​[606]​
All the improvements made by men in their emergence from their timorous natural state could only be accounted for upon the principle of self-liking. This informed Mandeville’s account of the origins and development of language. The cultivation of this faculty occurred as men sought to express their inflated self-esteem, and to persuade others to ‘give Credit to what the speaking Persons would have them believe’.​[607]​ Language was a tool of manipulation, not the means to communicate truth.​[608]​ One area in which men would seek to express their superiority was in their claims to have knowledge of an invisible power in the universe, which all their fellow men both acknowledged and feared. Mandeville’s explanation of the origins of religion was explicitly Epicurean.​[609]​ Precisely because men in their natural state were surrounded by very real evils, so ‘Fear is the Passion, that first gives them an Opportunity of entertaining some glimmering Notions of an invisible Power’.​[610]​ Whatever caused pain to man could become the object of reverence, including inanimate objects such as stones. It was for this reason, Mandeville argued, that ‘there is nothing so high or remote in the Firmament, nor so low, or abject upon Earth; but some Men have worship’d it, or made it one way or other the Object of their Superstition’. Seeking to win the admiration of others, men would regale them with ‘willful Lies’, claiming to have seen or heard this power and to know how it might be placated.​[611]​
The maxim that ‘Fear made a God’ was nevertheless reductive and misleading, for two reasons.​[612]​ First, as ‘Mr Lock’ had shown, the idea of one, theistic ‘God’ was complex. It could only have emerged once men’s ‘Faculty of Thinking’ had developed. This took place in society over time with the acquisition of language and the accumulation and ordering of the data of observation and experience. Second, this maxim implied, as Locke himself argued, that a curiosity regarding the nature of invisible power would terminate in theism (‘a God’)—whereas Lucretius had been speaking of the link between fear and polytheism.​[613]​ Here Mandeville once more employed Locke’s own reasoning against him. Mandeville denied any necessary correlation between men’s attempts to understand (and control) the natural world, and ‘true’ theistic ideas of God that were affirmed subsequently by the Christian dispensations.​[614]​ There were many things, as Locke had shown, ‘which are commonly esteem’d to be eternal Truths’ and assumed to be the consequence of reasoning and philosophy, but which had in fact remained concealed to mankind without divine assistance. Reasoning on invisible power, in the absence of revelation, could lead men to myriad ideas of god(s), and to any number of theories as to how it/they ought to be worshipped. All had roughly equal (that is, equally weak) claims to be considered ‘reasonable’.​[615]​
Mandeville nonetheless gestured towards a naturalistic explanation of how theistic religion, which envisaged God as a perfectly good and wise being who took an especial interest in mankind, had come into being. Here Mandeville again foregrounded self-liking and marginalized ratiocination: theism was really a form of self-worship. The manner in which Mandeville constructed his argument on this point indicates that a primary target here was Shaftesbury’s Stoic providential theism (as ventriloquized by Horatio). If the ancient Epicureans were superstitious, then the Stoics and Platonists had been genuine atheists. Throughout Mandeville’s writings, the Stoic philosophers—notably Seneca and Cato, but later Shaftesbury himself—are used to illustrate just how completely self-liking can eviscerate self-knowledge. The Stoics’ pride led them to view human nature (i.e. their own), the natural and moral worlds, and divine power through a grossly distorted and flattering lens. This, not disinterested empirical reasoning, underpinned their theism. The divine being of the philosophers was, as a consequence, utterly antithetical to the God of the Judaeo-Christian tradition: a claim which Shaftesbury had been only too willing to endorse. Stoic theism directly contradicted the Second Commandment (‘You shall not make for yourself an idol’), precisely because it was a form of self-idolatry. For Mandeville, there was nothing to choose between the Stoics’ ‘Atheism’ and the polytheistic ‘Superstition’ of the Epicurean poet (Lucretius): both were ‘of the same Origin’—an ‘Ignorance of the Divine Essence’.​[616]​ One expressed the sovereignty of pride, the other the tyranny of fear. Neither provided the foundations for a natural religion which was reconcilable to revealed Christianity. Mandeville rehearsed Shaftesbury’s attempt to establish the existence of providence and a perfectly good deity on the basis of philosophical arguments regarding a harmonious natural and moral order. Such a vision of the natural world, and of human nature, was itself the consequence of self-liking. It expressed the proud man’s ‘superlative Wish’ to find his estimation of himself as a rational, sociable being superior to all other creatures reinforced. God was afforded these desirable attributes and made the beneficent father of a world, and of a species (mankind), which was devoid of evil. Shaftesbury’s theism represented the height of self-liking: self-idolatry. 
In equating philosophical theism with self-worship, Mandeville was at one with Jansenist moralists such as Esprit. ‘It is owing to the Principle of Pride we are born with’, Mandeville declared, ‘and the high Value we all, for the Sake of one, have for our Species, that Men imagine the whole Universe to be principally made for their use; and this Errour makes them commit a thousand Extravagancies, and have pitiful and most unworthy Notions of God and his Works’.​[617]​ It was inevitable that this idea that men were uniquely favoured by one omniscient and perfectly good deity would gather currency as societies developed, precisely because this process saw self-liking strengthened. Much the same was true, Mandeville noted, for the doctrine of immortality taught by the Stoics and Platonists. Immortality was ‘a Truth broach’d long before Christianity’, and could not have ‘found such a general Reception in human Capacities as it has, had it not been a pleasing one, that extoll’d and was a Compliment to the whole Species’. The idea that human beings were uniquely impervious to the death and decay seen throughout the animal and vegetable worlds was as flattering as it was lacking in empirical evidence.​[618]​ Christian soteriology, which emphasized the unique depravity of man and hence the need for Christ’s unmerited gift of grace, was however considerably less flattering to human nature. The apparent similarities between Stoic philosophical theism and revealed Christianity were entirely superficial: a claim with which both Locke and Shaftesbury would have agreed, if for quite different reasons. 
Mandeville similarly took issue with Shaftesbury’s claim that Stoic philosophy might serve a therapeutic function, offering medicine for the mind. Far from leading men to reconcile themselves to providence, Shaftesbury’s depiction of human nature and the natural world forced them to chafe against it. Here Mandeville cited Lucretius’ exclamation: ‘Oh minds of man so weak! Oh hearts so blind!’​[619]​ The great advantage of Epicurus’ atomistic account of the creation, Mandeville argued, was that it complemented his fundamental insight that ‘all Actions in Nature, abstractly consider’d, are equally indifferent’, and that ‘every thing is easy to the Deity’.​[620]​ Horatio was forced to concede that he wished that human nature and the origins of society were other than they actually were: it was for this reason that Stoic, rather than Epicurean philosophers were genuine ‘man-haters’. Natural affection, Horatio argued, would surely have provided a more stable foundation for both society and morality than self-liking. Reformulating the fundamental moral of the Hive, Cleomenes explored what the consequences of this would have been. Had God privileged man above all other creatures, there would have been no wars, disease, or untimely deaths. The result would have been overpopulation and famine. This would have forced a perfectly good, but evidently far from omniscient deity to intervene repeatedly in earthly affairs, thereby suggesting that the laws He had established at the Creation were inadequate. Shaftesbury’s ‘Social System’ reduced the infinite and incomprehensible wisdom of God to the paltry and contingent insights into His design dimly glimpsed by depraved man through experience and observation.​[621]​
That God had a particular plan for mankind, and that the existence of evil in the world in no sense called His justice or power into question, could never have been established on the basis of philosophy, which suggested something quite different. Here Mandeville repeated many points he had made in the Free Thoughts, a work heavily indebted to Bayle. In the absence of revelation, the problem of reconciling the existence of evil with that of a perfectly good deity was intractable. Only the Manichean heresy of two, co-eternal principles in the universe (one good, the other evil) could answer the Epicurean theory that God took no interest in human affairs. In so doing, however, it challenged God’s omnipotence in a way that Epicureanism did not.​[622]​ From Mandeville’s perspective in Part II, the crucial feature of Epicurus’ account of the creation of the universe (which he nonetheless dismissed as ‘monstrous and extravagant’) was that it allowed for man to be seen as he actually was in nature (powerless and blind), not as he wished to be (autonomous and rational).​[623]​ Mandeville defended a literal interpretation of the story of Creation found in Genesis because, he claimed, it was more plausible than Epicurus’ ‘fortuitous Jumble of Atoms’. Yet it was similarly consistent with the portrayal of human nature provided by Mandeville himself on the basis of a posteriori observation of men’s conduct in the practical affairs of life. Cleomenes argues that the biblical account of the confusion of tongues at Babel, the preternatural state of innocence, and Adam’s predestined sin are all to be taken literally. They touch upon questions that philosophy cannot address. The answers they provide are nevertheless entirely consistent with just reasoning on the depraved nature of man, and on the origins of society (craven self-liking). In this regard, revealed Christianity is eminently credible.​[624]​
Mandeville similarly appropriated and inverted Shaftesbury’s axiomatic claim that Stoic philosophy alone might identify the beautiful. Theocles’ ‘philosophical enthusiasm’ in The Moralists was entirely legitimate, but misdirected. Neither the natural world nor human nature was harmonious or beautiful. What was resplendent and glorious was the artificial world created by men as a consequence of their unceasing endeavour to triumph over the inherent disorder and evils found in both. This point was emphasized continually by Mandeville and accentuates the degree to which he departs from Bayle’s profound contempt for societies erected upon vice. Cleomenes reveals to Horatio how ‘a most beautiful Superstructure may be rais’d upon a rotten and despicable Foundation’, and ‘such a clear and beautiful Stream could flow from so mean and muddy a Spring as an excessive Thirst after Praise’.​[625]​ Nothing is more astonishing than how men have learnt, through art and education, to conceal their self-liking and to flatter that of others, and how they receive ever greater pleasure in proportion to their success in doing so. This has led to a ‘polite’ modern society in which all ‘labour for one Interest’: the pursuit of temporal happiness, which for men in whom self-liking is sovereign is entirely dependent upon securing the admiration of others. At the outset of Part II, Cleomenes the ‘anatomist’ is contrasted with Horatio the ‘painter’, with the latter extolling ‘the Dignity of the Subject’ and ‘the Excellency of our Species’.​[626]​ Over the course of the work, this distinction is entirely collapsed. Horatio is forced to concede to Cleomenes that ‘you are a good Painter’, who has truly uncovered the beautiful in man’s, rather than God’s handiwork.​[627]​
In Part II the role of the ‘skilful Politician’ and perspicacious moralist is, in comparison to the Fable, downplayed. It was the ‘Work of Ages’ to understand human nature and ‘the true Use of the Passions’. The most important of them, shame, was ‘so general, and so early discover’d in all human Creatures, that no Nation can be so stupid, as to be long without observing and making use of it accordingly’.​[628]​ As with all human arts, that of government proceeded in fits and starts, with revolutions and rebuilding, before stability was acquired and men’s passions indulged in a manner that benefited society as a whole. Increasingly the means had been found to allow men to indulge those passions entirely whilst concealing them artfully, the height of ‘politeness’, the origins of which Mandeville professes to have explained in Part II. No nation, Mandeville notes, is politer than England, where men have perfected the use of language as a tool of manipulation. This stands in sharp contrast to ancient Greece and Rome, where men had openly praised themselves, and others, in a manner that would cause acute embarrassment in the social clubs frequented by Horatio and Cleomenes. (Here Mandeville directly refuted Shaftesbury’s idealization of Greece as the politest of all nations.) This represents the apotheosis of self-liking, and indicates how it has established its sovereignty over all the other passions: ‘the more dextrous, by this Means, Men grew in concealing the outward Signs, and every Symptom of Pride, the more entirely they became enslaved by it within’.​[629]​ Their success in dissembling the true motives of their actions before others was matched only by their capacity for self-delusion.
In Part II, as in the original Fable, Christianity plays no role in explaining how men had become sociable (and, apparently, moral) creatures. Mandeville’s narrative of the development of society jumps from the establishment of political authority and moral virtue in the heathen world, to the influence of commerce in perpetuating men’s self-liking and interdependency in the modern age. In part, this reflects his determination to provide a ‘System of Ethicks’ which is entirely independent of religion, one which directly challenged the theories offered by Locke and Shaftesbury. Yet Locke’s moral theology and Shaftesbury’s Stoic moral philosophy claimed to provide what Mandeville still had not. This was an account of moral obligation, which could explain why men consider themselves duty-bound to behave in certain ways not merely in front of others, but even in private. For Mandeville, the question of moral obligation was necessarily reframed in terms of self-deception: how had self-liking become so powerful that, even in private, the individual would consider himself beholden to an unalterable standard of good and ill? Here Mandeville turned to modern commerce: the social forces it unleashed had resulted in Locke’s ‘Law of Reputation’ acquiring a purchase over men’s minds which was even more tyrannous than Locke himself had recognized. The attempt to address the question of men’s sense of moral obligation in his final major work also brought Mandeville, for the first time, into a concerted dialogue with Locke and Shaftesbury on another series of questions: about the history of Christianity, its implications for the moral regulation of societies, and its relationship to the classical moral philosophies it had displaced. 
In confronting the issue of moral obligation, Mandeville turned to ‘Honour’. In the Fable, Mandeville had described this as species of moral virtue, which had nothing whatsoever to do with religion and was ‘an Invention of Moralists and Politicians’.​[630]​ In Part II honour was described as an unwritten law, the moral duties of which were, in modern societies, ‘wrote and engraved in every one’s breast’.​[631]​ There he argued that the man of honour is his own legislator, judge, and jury. His moral conduct does not depend upon an external law, or the threat of external sanctions. Mandeville had further noted in 1714 that, at the start of the previous century, ‘the Principle of Honour . . . was melted over again, and brought to a new Standard’.​[632]​ In explaining the origins of honour, Mandeville now suggested that not merely Christianity, but the bastardized species of it that both Locke and Shaftesbury so detested, had played a crucial if paradoxical role in the transformation of man in society from a brute animal to a seemingly self-legislating moral agent. The principle of honour forged an irreparable breach between the world of classical antiquity which Shaftesbury so admired, and the modern world which Mandeville considered him (with justification) to hold in such contempt.
Honour, Christianity, and Moral Obligation
An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War (1732) contains a further four dialogues between Cleomenes and Horatio, and Mandeville expected his reader to be acquainted with what had passed between the characters in Part II.​[633]​ As its title suggests, in the work Mandeville sought to address a fundamental paradox, which had long interested Augustinian polemicists. Christianity, which unequivocally prohibited violence and advocated passive obedience, had been subverted shamelessly by cunning casuists to justify bloody conquests and king-killing on a quite unprecedented scale.​[634]​ As will be seen, however, for Mandeville the long-term consequences of this illegitimate subordination of Christianity to worldly interest had been far from uniformly negative.
In the first dialogue, Mandeville identified the devastating weakness at the heart of Shaftesbury’s ethical theory which was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. As Mandeville noted, Shaftesbury had argued that a ‘mercenary’ concern for external sanctions—whether in this life or the next—exercised no influence over the virtuous man’s conduct. It was for this reason that Shaftesbury openly ‘made a Jest of all reveal’d Religion, especially the Christian’. Yet, as Horatio was made to confess, in his moral theory Shaftesbury had reverted to the claim that a future state was, after all, required for the ‘vulgar’ (the mass of mankind), who lacked reason. In their case, the fear of the gallows and God’s eternal sanctions performed what philosophy could not.​[635]​ In returning to the fear of eternal sanctions to explain the moral conduct of almost all of mankind, Mandeville argued, Shaftesbury’s attempt to offer an adequate, non-Christian system of ethics had foundered.​[636]​ Mandeville was far less equivocal when it came to the moral efficacy of a future state even than Shaftesbury. In modern, commercial society men’s conduct in the practical affairs of life revealed that ‘they are not more influenced by what they believe of a future state, than they are by the name of the street they live in’.​[637]​ An alternative explanation had to be found, as the fear of an after-reckoning would not suffice. 
Mandeville began by once again noting the opposition between ‘fear’ and ‘self-liking’. In their primitive state the majority of mankind, in whom self-liking was weak, remained in thrall to two fears: of death, and of invisible power. The fear of death was, of all those passions strongest in man in his untaught state, ‘the most violent and stubborn, and consequently the hardest to be conquer’d’. Insofar as it could be overcome, this represented a true ‘Conquest over our selves’. ‘The Fear of an invisible Cause is universal’ and, like that of death, to ‘conquer [it] is more difficult than is easily imagin’d’. Once again, Mandeville argued that only extravagant self-liking could conquer both fears: it was ‘able to stifle the loudest Calls of Nature, and with a high Hand triumphs over all the other Appetites and Inclinations’.​[638]​
The proud few in the heathen world, most notably the Stoic philosophers, had succeeded in overcoming the fear of divine power. They reduced God’s will to their own, and attributed to Him the same active virtues which, owing to their pride, they believed that they possessed themselves: reason, justice, and benevolence. In the heathen world, and to a lesser extent in the modern, this extravagant degree of pride (self-idolatry) was confined to those few, like Shaftesbury, of particular constitutions, socio-economic backgrounds, and an extensive liberal education.​[639]​ It was for this reason that ‘there are no Atheists among the Common People’: lacking such an exalted sense of their own self-worth, they were less inclined to reduce divine- to self-worship.​[640]​ The moral virtues taught by the ancient philosophers as duties enshrined in an immutable law of nature sought to attain the fundamental objective of inculcating a sufficient degree of pride or shame that men’s fear of death was allayed.​[641]​ Yet exorbitant self-liking had, in the ancient world, remained confined to the few, and politicians were compelled to continue to play upon men’s fear.
Mandeville’s main objective was to explain how this apparently intractable chasm between the proud few and the pusillanimous multitude had been closed since classical times. He showed how almost all, in commercial societies characterized by rampant consumerism, had become proud atheists like the Stoic. Seemingly paradoxically, Mandeville attributed a key causal role to Christianity in this development: in a quite ingenious way, he instrumentalized the kind of anti-Catholic narratives offered by Protestants (including Locke). Part II reveals how Mandeville drew from Locke’s epistemology and theory of property in a strikingly original manner. The Origin of Honour indicates that Mandeville read Locke’s problematic theory of moral obligation and his writings of Christian apologetic in a similarly idiosyncratic fashion, to reach very different conclusions.
In commercial societies the lives of almost all men were defined by the quest for material objects identified as desirable not by men’s concern for physical self-preservation, but rather by their craving for recognition. Neither Stoic philosophy nor Christian theology could explain how this had occurred, as both taught a contempt for ‘external things’ (including the praise of others). The Christianization of Europe and the supplanting of Stoic philosophy by Christian moral theology, Mandeville argued, nonetheless represented a crucial stage in the triumph of all men, rather than merely the few, over their untaught nature. In the first dialogue, Cleomenes noted that:
The wisest Moralists, before [Christ’s] Time, had laid the greatest Stress on the Reasonableness of their Precepts; and appeal’d to Human Understanding for the Truth of their Opinions. But the Gospels, soaring beyond the Reach of Reason, teaches us many Things, which no Moralist could ever have known, unless they had been reveal’d to him. . . . To love Virtue for the Beauty of it, and curb one’s Appetites because it is most reasonable to do so, are very good Things in Theory; but whoever understands our Nature, and consults the Practice of Human Creatures, would sooner expect from them, that they should abstain from Vice, for Fear of Punishment, and do good, in Hopes of being rewarded for it. . . . To bear with Inconveniences, Pain, and Sorrow, in Hopes of being eternally Happy, and refuse the Enjoyments of Pleasure, for Fear of being Miserable for ever, are more justifiable to Reason, and more consonant to good Sense, than it is to do it for Nothing.​[642]​
As would have been apparent to well-read contemporaries, here Mandeville drew almost verbatim from Locke’s distinctive account of the moral significance of the Christian revelation in the Reasonableness of Christianity. Locke argued that the Stoic definition of the summum bonum was for most men both unappealing and morally ineffective. It depended upon ‘the long, and sometimes intricate deductions of Reason’, which ‘the greatest part of Mankind have neither leisure to weigh; nor, for want of Education and Use, skill to judge of’. Meanwhile virtue could not incite men to virtue: pleasure and utility guided men’s sense of what was estimable and motivated their conduct. Locke concluded that ‘these incoherent apophthegms of Philosophers, and wise Men; however excellent in themselves, and well intended by them; could never make a Morality, whereof the World could be convinced, could never rise up to the force of a Law that Mankind could with certainty depend on’. The moral dictates of the Gospel, delivered by Christ in the clearest terms and disseminated by ‘ignorant, but inspired Fishermen’ (the Apostles), were suited to all men’s capacities. ‘As soon as they are heard and considered’, Locke argued, ‘they are found to be agreeable to Reason; and such as can by no means be contradicted’. Crucially, the future state also furnished sanctions which, in theory, made it in hedonic man’s interest to exercise worldly self-denial and live according to the moral law, rather than merely appealing, as had the Stoics, to human reason.​[643]​
For Mandeville, the consequences of the Christian revelation were very different to those envisaged by Locke. Mandeville emphasized that the doctrine of a future state was indeed compelling to the Christian believer, something of which Locke was considerably less confident; and he maintained that all who heard the Word could not help but believe in the fundamental tenets of Christianity. Yet in demanding that men subdue their passions in a manner of which they were completely incapable, Christianity struck ‘at the very Fundamentals of Human Nature’.​[644]​ Mandeville noted that ‘nothing can affect us forcibly but what strikes the Senses, or such Things which we are conscious of within’. As Locke had conceded, the ‘Light of Nature’ might be sufficient to explain the existence of divine power—although for Mandeville it could establish nothing regarding its attributes or commands, a question Locke had done notably little to resolve; but the doctrine of a future state was only brought to light by Christ. It followed, Mandeville argued, that men could not consider salvation to be an essential part of their happiness (hard though they might try), and their ‘Longing after it cannot be very strong’. To use Locke’s terminology, it could not stimulate sufficient ‘unease’ to move the will to action: something of which Locke himself was uncomfortably aware. It was clear that ‘how various and unreasonable soever our Wishes may be, and how enormous the Multiplicity of our Desires, they terminate in Life, and all the Objects of them are on this Side of the Grave’.​[645]​ No man possessed Locke’s ‘power’ to hold their ‘wills undetermined’; and no man’s ‘reason unbiased’ could, in practice, lead them to prefer the end of salvation to that of worldly advancement.​[646]​
Be that as it may, the unique feature of Christianity, as Locke had emphasized so forcefully, was that it united what in a heathen world had remained entirely divorced: divinity and morality. Rather than appealing to men’s reason (or pride) to enjoin self-denial, it played upon those fears of death and of invisible power in which religion originated. This was crucial, since it was axiomatic to Mandeville’s account of the art of government that ‘you can make no Multitudes believe contrary to what they feel, or what contradicts a Passion inherent in their Nature’. ‘If you humour that Passion, and allow it to be just,’ however, ‘you may regulate it as you please’.​[647]​ Christianity appealed to a passion that was stronger than all others for almost all men (fear) rather than one that remained, in the classical world, confined to the very few (pride). The Christian God was, after all, terrifying, transcendent, and capricious, as Mandeville routinely observed. Mandeville was at pains to emphasize that ‘as to Faith and Theology’, the majority of men in Christian countries were sincere in their belief, even as ‘there are very few sincere and real Christians in their Lives and Conversation’.​[648]​ These Christian believers were only too aware that they were incapable of adhering to what Mandeville claimed (in sharp contrast to Locke) was the manifestly austere and ascetic moral law laid down by Christ. They were also aware of the likely consequence of this failure (eternal damnation). Christianity, for Mandeville, induced deep psychological distress and anxiety, from which there was no respite other than blind faith in God’s mercy. Cognizant of their moral failures, it also stimulated the passion of shame in its votaries. 
As Mandeville pithily noted, ‘that the Gospel requires a literal Mortification of the Flesh, and other hard Tasks from us, is the very Basis which the Pope’s Exchequer is built upon’. The ‘wise Architects of the Church of Rome’, Mandeville declared, ‘were thoroughly skilled in Human Nature’.​[649]​ Superstition had not been invented, as Horatio suggested in good Shaftesburian fashion, by ‘designing Priests, and other Imposters’, since ‘unless Fools actually had Frailties, Knaves could not make Use of them’.​[650]​ Rather, Christ’s revelation built on man’s natural superstition. It revealed to those who would govern mankind just how productively men’s fear could be manipulated and translated into shame in such a way as to ‘render them more and more tractable’.​[651]​ The credulous multitude would go to any lengths to allay the fears they experienced on account of their inevitable incapacity to live as Christ demanded. This gave Christian ministers a remarkable power over mankind. The clergy, particularly the Jesuits (the ‘easiest Casuists’), were only too willing to provide the individual with relief from their anxiety by inventing loopholes—such as the sale of indulgences—through which the sinner might secure salvation even despite his inability to lead a Christian life.​[652]​ From the moment Christianity had been ‘made National’, Mandeville argued, it had been subverted, and given human nature the case could hardly have been otherwise.​[653]​ Priests, no less than their votaries, were motivated by the pursuit of temporal rather than eternal happiness. They secured their power and riches by claiming, as had their pagan predecessors, to mediate between men and God. By this means they acquired an authority over the superstitious multitude that was incalculably greater than that attained by the heathen politician or moralist. They engrafted moral distinctions onto the passion of shame—what was praiseworthy, and what blameable—that all too frequently advanced their corporate interest at the cost of the prosperity and cohesion of temporal societies. 
Mandeville had discussed at length the persecution, bloodshed, and inhumanity that had resulted from priestcraft in his Free Thoughts of 1720, and had drawn liberally from Shaftesbury’s Characteristics in order to do so. The Scriptures presented an image of man as he indeed was in his natural state: weak, timorous, dependent on God’s mercy, and a slave to his passions, especially fear. This vision of human nature rang true to the timorous multitude. It was, however, abhorrent to those heathen moralists and politicians in whom pride was strong, and for whom God was a being who was immanent rather than transcendent, reasonable rather than capricious. As Mandeville made clear, to an unreconstructed Stoic like Shaftesbury revealed Christianity must appear abhorrent and unnatural (‘Daemonism’). It was for this reason that Shaftesbury had subjected the Scriptures to ‘Ridicule’, something for which he was reprimanded by Mandeville in Free Thoughts as in his later works.​[654]​ The Stoic and Christian philosophies were antithetical, even though they shared the superficial similarity of endorsing theism. The foundational principle of Stoicism, pride, was unequivocally denounced by Christianity. It was impossible that these proud members of the Roman civitas from the time of Constantine’s conversion onwards—few in number, but politically and socially dominant—could have believed in revealed Christianity.
This, Mandeville argued, had presented the Church of Rome with a genuine obstacle to the attainment of its objective: temporal authority. The Church needed to win these powerful men over to its cause. Human ingenuity was never so boundless as when faced with such impediments. Rome needed to find an ‘equivalent’ that might convince those men ‘of Bravery and Virtue’, who could not be won over by playing on a fear that they had subdued, that it was in their interest to labour for the Church. The principle of honour, one ‘the Ancients knew nothing of’, provided them with this means: it ‘seems to have been an Invention to influence Men, whom Religion had no Power over’.​[655]​ ‘Honour’ had, of course, been a part of the heathen lexicon; but it had been considered, as it was by Mandeville in 1714, as merely one of the moral virtues.​[656]​ Christian Rome translated it into something far more powerful than their pagan predecessors. Recognising how, in men of extravagant pride, a concern for God was all too easily ‘jostled out by others, more nearly relating to himself’, the ‘skilful Rulers’ in Christian Rome were ‘tempted to try if Man could not be made an Object of Reverence to himself’.​[657]​ This newer notion of honour bore no relation to either civil or divine law, but rather played upon the ‘Principle of Sovereignty’ possessed by men in whom self-liking was strong, which led them to consider themselves to be superior to all others. Honour was ‘an Idol, by Human Contrivance, rais’d upon the Basis of Human Pride’. It perpetuated the tendency of the proud individual, exhibited by the providential theism of the Stoic, to self-idolatry.​[658]​
As a principle, honour was ‘diametrically opposite’ to Christianity, and ‘the regulations themselves, by which Men of Honour were to walk, were openly Anti-Christian’. Rome artfully concealed this fact by making ‘Men stupidly believe, that the Height of Pride is not inconsistent with the greatest Humility’. In the attempt to win over the proud, the Papacy flattered them by offering ‘Badges of Honour’ and glorious sounding titles that even men of sense found intoxicating. Rome encouraged men to give full vent to those appetites which had been prescribed by the ‘moral Virtue’ of the Stoics, and even more unequivocally by the Scriptures. By this means the greatest and bravest men—that is, those statesmen and noblemen whose pride was already greater than their fear of death or God—wielded their swords and spilt blood in Rome’s interest. ‘What contemptible Baubles’, Mandeville exclaimed, ‘has that Holy Toy-Shop put off in the Face of the Sun for the richest Merchandize! She has bribed the most Selfish and penetrating Statesmen with empty Sounds, and Titles without Meaning. The most resolute Warriors She has forced to desist from their Purposes, and do her dirty Work against their own Interest’.​[659]​ It was the great achievement of ‘that Master-Piece of Human Policy, the Church of Rome’, Mandeville suggested, to have managed to convince both the self-idolizing (atheistic) few and the fearful and superstitious multitude that their greatest happiness was to be found in labouring for its corporate interest. As we saw in Chapter 2, this was precisely the point made, in similarly satirical manner but to a quite different end, by Shaftesbury in Characteristics.
If the principle of honour had its origins in medieval Rome, it had subsequently become detached from these moorings. The perverted form of Christianity peddled by Rome had brought chivalry into existence, with unanticipated long-term benefits. This interest in chivalry as a key causal factor in the development of European polite, commercial society from its feudal roots was similarly evidenced by Hume in the early 1730s.​[660]​ A culture of recognition, in which status was reflected by specious titles, finery of attire, and a complaisant manner was cultivated throughout the courts of Gothic Europe. The practice of duelling grew out of the trial by combat, enshrining the man of honour’s right—notwithstanding the objections of both divine and civil law—to secure reparations for slights he perceived himself to have suffered at the hands of others.​[661]​ 
Princes quickly recognized the remarkable consequences of flattering the boundless self-esteem of their leading subjects. Rather than challenge the principle of honour, prudent princes such as Henry IV of France codified it in a manner that served the interests of the nation at large. The gallows, to say nothing of eternal damnation, were of little concern to the man of honour. Far more intolerable was the shameful punishment of begging for another’s pardon on one’s knees. Honour compelled the individual to conceal his passions with art and wit, rather than to suppress them. This made honour more attractive to, and attainable by, all men than was ‘Virtue’ in either its Stoic or Christian form, and ‘as the Principle of Honour came to be very useful, the Notions of it, by Degrees, were industriously spread among the Multitude’. Honour, Mandeville asserted, ‘is more skilfully adapted to our inward Make’, since ‘Men are better paid for their Adherence to Honour, than they are for their Adherence to Virtue: The First requires less Self-denial; and the Rewards they receive for that Little are not imaginary but real and palpable’.​[662]​
Every individual could aspire to imitate the man of honour in his manners and material possessions, and increasingly did so as their self-esteem increased and their fear diminished. The Reformation and its (continuing) aftermath, Mandeville argued, had played a crucial role in this democratization of the principle of honour—and with it, ‘Atheism’ (self-worship). Mandeville did not bother to conceal his contempt for Luther and Calvin. They may well have been pious and sincere, but they were (unlike the Roman clergy) entirely ignorant of human nature. Decrying the moral laxity of the Roman clergy, and denouncing the casuistic chicanery which saw them privilege external pomp and ritual over inner reformation, they had exposed the arts employed by Rome. They once more revealed the gulf that separated the officium from the finus, and cupidity from charity. In so doing, they ‘exposed the Frauds of their Adversaries, without considering the Hardships and Difficulties, which such a Discovery would entail upon their Successors’.​[663]​ Whereas the Roman clergy continued to emphasize the rigorous nature of Christ’s moral law, they were also insightful enough to understand that no man could live such a perfect, spiritual existence, themselves included. It was for this reason that they had continued to endorse external rituals, contrary to Christ’s explicit commands, that were identical to those of their pagan predecessors, and to suggest disingenuously that by these means individuals might atone for their inescapable sinfulness.
Luther and Calvin denied the Protestant clergy these ‘Frauds’: their successors could not lay claim to the power of the keys, and were incapable of concealing their own inability to live a truly Christian life. In many Protestant nations, Mandeville argued, this had resulted in the Christian ministry giving up its pretensions to apostolic succession and superior personal virtue. This had not occurred in England. The Anglican Church retained its Catholic pretensions even after the Civil War, but had lost the arts employed by Rome to defend them. Consequently, to legitimate their claims to be true followers of Christ they did what Rome (and even the Jesuits) had not. The ‘Philosophizing Divine, or polite Preacher’ diluted the moral content of Christianity, and largely ceased to play upon the fear and shame of the vulgar.​[664]​ Even Cromwell’s supposedly austere Puritan army, Mandeville argued, fought so valiantly on account of the pride flattered by preachers and officers in its rank and file, not due to superior piety. Dressing them in the same apparel as their officers, but at a fraction of the cost, they had inculcated the rules of honour, not those of religion, in those under their command.​[665]​
The Reformation and (continuing) schisms experienced in England had finally discredited the clergy and ushered in a ‘modern’ form of honour. This demanded ‘the Height of Politeness’ as reflected in one’s conversation, carriage, and possessions. The cunning Cromwell, presented by Mandeville as the sole example of a thoroughgoing ‘Atheist’ whose pride had utterly conquered any sentiments of religion, would have to perfect the art of dancing, rather than the affectation of austere piety, were he to win adherents in the modern day.​[666]​ The role played by the Stoic moralist in a heathen age and ‘the Holy Toy-Shop’ and Christian preacher up until the seventeenth century was now performed by the ‘Social Toyman’ (the merchant). He possessed the manners required to flatter the rich and powerful and the means to meet their material desires, whilst he stimulated self-liking in the poor by employing their labour and furnishing them with the wages which allowed them to aspire to emulate their social superiors.​[667]​ The ‘Invention of Money’, like that of honour, ‘seems to me to be a thing more skilfully adapted to the whole Bent of our Nature, than any other human Contrivance’. It encouraged aspiration amongst all ranks of men, leading them to wish, and pretend, to be what they were by nature not.​[668]​ In making this point, Mandeville once again inverted the interpretation offered by Locke in the Treatises. Far from the artifice of money finding authorisation in God’s commandment to cultivate the earth, it led men entirely to deny their concupiscence and dependence upon God. This act of deception—of others, but also of oneself—was most graphically displayed by the popularity of heraldry, which was ‘of all the Arts and Sciences . . . , the most effectual to stir up and excite in Men the Passion of Self-liking, on the smallest Foundation’.​[669]​ The Origin of Honour thus offered explanatory support for Mandeville’s observation in 1714 that ‘the Principle of Honour in the beginning of the last Century was melted over again, and brought to a new Standard’.​[670]​ There was no longer, and for the first time in human history, any distinction between the ‘two classes’ described in the ‘Origin of Moral Virtue’ in 1714 (the ‘wise’ and the ‘vulgar’). In modern, commercial societies almost all now acted upon the principle of self-liking. All men now shared the ‘superlative Wish’ and ‘golden Dream’, originally the preserve of the haughty Stoic philosopher, to have their excessive self-estimation flattered by others, and recognized the remarkable pleasure that resulted from such mutual complaisance.
This gave all individuals a genuine stake in society. The principle of honour allowed Mandeville to explain what, he claimed, neither Stoic philosophy nor Christian moral theology could. This was men’s sense of moral obligation, which developed not despite but because of the indisputable fact that ‘every Body may find, that he loves himself better than he does others’.​[671]​ This transformation of the human personality within society was man’s own, greatest achievement, the end product of his incessant quest to improve his condition and to transcend the evils of the natural and moral world. Cleomenes dismissed Horatio’s claim that he ‘ought to exempt and preserve [honour] from being ridicul’d’ on unimpeachably Shaftesburian grounds. Honour was artificial and, as Characteristics emphasized, whatever was not ‘natural’ was the just object of ridicule.​[672]​ In contrast, Shaftesbury’s ridicule of revealed Christianity was sorely misguided, but eminently comprehensible. The Scriptures presented man as he was by nature, not as he wished to be. It was for this reason that Shaftesbury, and a great many others in England’s thriving beau monde, found the Scriptures so abhorrent. As Horatio exclaimed when faced by Cleomenes’ unrelenting exposition of uninstructed human nature and the true origins of society, ‘I can’t endure to see so much of my own Nakedness’.​[673]​ Irrespective of their truth, which Cleomenes continued to assert, the Origin of Honour nonetheless indicated that the Scriptures were irrelevant to an understanding of men’s practical conduct in modern life. They were also increasingly found to be incredible by the modern, socialized individual who did not (or would not) recognize the pusillanimous and depraved vision of human nature which they presented.
Man had created a world for himself, and a sense of his ‘self’ within that world, that was entirely illusory.​[674]​ It was, however, the sole source of all the pleasure he experienced and the stimulus for all the industry he expended. This process was driven by the increasingly predominant passion of self-liking, leading to self-worship. This could not be understood, as Locke had argued, within the framework provided by a Christian divine teleology, because it represented the entire rejection of a dependence on God’s will and command as revealed to His creatures in the Scriptures. For Mandeville it was the relaxation of ascetic, Augustinian Christianity by Jesuit casuists and ‘polite’ Protestant divines—not, as for Weber, its inculcation by Calvin and his followers—that facilitated the emergence of a commercial society characterized by rampant consumerism which we might define as ‘capitalist’.​[675]​ This opened up a space for hypocrisy, upon which commercial societies rely. Inhabitants of Europe’s sprawling commercial metropolises were at liberty to invent personae for themselves; and they would extend all their labour and industry to acquire those signifiers which ensured that their claims were recognized by others. Mandeville suggested that, as self-liking became further strengthened by education, commerce, and the flattery of ‘philosophizing Divines’, this act of self-deception might become absolute. This was the remarkable consequence of the principle of honour. The individual could contract such a strong ‘Aversion to every Thing that is dishonourable’ that, even in private, he would hold himself in contempt were he to transgress the laws by which he lived, and of which he was the judge and executioner.​[676]​
Locke had argued that divine law was of such importance because it potentially governed men’s conduct at every moment, in public and in private. True Christians recognized God’s ability to ‘see Men in the Dark’.​[677]​ Locke’s rather prurient interest in men’s private conduct, and his anxiety regarding their capacity for hypocrisy, was denounced by Shaftesbury, for whom (as for his Stoic guides) the unity and autonomy of the self from one moment to the next was of utmost importance. In Sensus Communis, Shaftesbury constructed a mini-dialogue between an unmistakeably Lockean character and a Stoic man of virtue. The former raises the question of whether the virtuous man would behave identically ‘if it were in the dark’. The latter responds with disgust: ‘Honour myself I never could while I had no better a sense of what in reality I owed myself, and what became me as a human creature’.​[678]​ In Origin of Honour Mandeville agreed with Locke that, in theory, ‘a good Christian is all of a Piece; his Life is uniform’. He continued, however, by declaring that ‘it is very plain, that there are few sincere Christians’, by which he meant none. In the absence of efficacious grace, no man could live a truly Christian life, and (as Bayle had shown) his practice diverged widely from his professed speculative precepts.​[679]​ The principle of honour, which represented pride’s triumph over all the other passions, could—as Shaftesbury unwittingly showed—potentially allow for precisely such uniformity between principle and practice at all times. This, however, was the victory of pride and not of philosophy. For the man of honour, contrary to Shaftesbury’s incessant fears, ‘Self is never forgot’. It was for this reason that the principle of honour (self-idolatry) was so powerful.​[680]​
Conclusion
In his remarkable attempt to respond to Shaftesbury’s ‘Social System’ on ‘diametrically opposite’ principles, Mandeville produced the purest rendition of an unmistakeably Epicurean moral theory, one almost entirely detached from its moorings in Augustinian Christianity. Indeed, seen from one perspective there is a discernibly utopian dimension to Mandeville’s mature philosophical thought. ‘Honour’ as a principle was ‘artificial’, and diametrically opposite to Christianity. It could nonetheless achieve for unregenerate mankind what Christianity claimed for the regenerate: it saw men in the dark and allowed for a uniformity of ‘self’ at all times. In polite society, individuals recognized the benefits of reciprocity and mutual complaisance: this similarly represented the realization of the ‘Golden Rule’, even in the absence of divine grace and charity.
That ‘self’ was emphatically social: the product of a process of socialization and habituation into the moral norms which regulated any given community. As honour increasingly governed the conduct of all men in commercial society the need for civil law, instantiated as the necessary means to curb man’s natural lawlessness, progressively diminished. The individual became his own legislator. Henry IV’s codification of the rules of honour showed how this process ought to be encouraged by the prudent magistrate. With commerce and trade, men’s self-liking and acquisitive personality were perpetuated. The politician (still more, the moralist) was increasingly able to withdraw from view: ‘the whole Machine may be made to play of itself, with as little Skill, as is required to wind up a Clock’.​[681]​ The gallows, along with the threat of eternal punishment, were progressively less necessary. A social and moral ‘conscience’—that is, an obligatory moral law the sanctions of which were internal and irresistible—was created where none had existed previously. Strikingly, Mandeville offered an explanation of the development of society, and of the moral personality within it, which historicized and instrumentalized both Shaftesbury’s Stoic moral philosophy and Locke’s Christian moral theology. Neither was true or adequate, but both Stoicism’s flattery of human pride and Christianity’s appeal to shame were important stages in the history of the cultivation of the self-liking upon which depended men’s sense of moral obligation. Honour, however, had finally achieved what Stoic and Christian ‘Virtue’ could not.





4	At the Limits of Christian Humanism: Conyers Middleton
Introduction
The decades following Mandeville’s death saw the publication in England of two extraordinary works by ordained Anglican ministers, which scholars have struggled to place contextually.​[683]​ The first was Warburton’s Divine Legation of Moses (1738–1741); the second, Middleton’s Free Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers (1749). The contemporary fame (or notoriety) these iconoclastic works secured for their authors is reflected in the fact that they are the only two writers mentioned by name by Hume in his brief autobiographical sketch, ‘My Own Life’ (1776).​[684]​ The ambition, to say nothing of the heterodoxy, of these works indicates their authors’ determination to respond to the central question raised by Locke, and keenly debated in the decades following his death: this was the relationship between a natural law amenable to individual rational enquiry, and a revealed Christianity which in some sense built upon that knowledge. It also reflects how grave the challenge posed by the attempts of Shaftesbury and Mandeville to provide a non-Christian system of ethics was considered to be to the conventional foundations upon which Christianity was defended. Warburton and Middleton both took that challenge very seriously indeed. It comes as no surprize that the most stimulating attempts to reconsider the relationship between moral philosophy and moral theology came from within Christianity—as it had with Locke’s initial, deeply troubling treatment of the question. Both Middleton and Warburton entered, in the latter’s words, into ‘the very Penetralia of Antiquity’ with the aim of uncovering ‘the State and Condition of the human Mind, before Revelation’.​[685]​ In so doing, they followed in the footsteps of those philosophers who, Warburton claimed, had engaged in the ‘study of human nature’, beginning with Locke. As we have seen, these philosophers also had very particular claims to make about the relationship between natural and revealed religion, and profane and sacred (Christian) history. Unsurprisingly those within the established Church, rather than merely those outside of it, had something to say about the narratives they had offered. 
In the Divine Legation, Warburton dismissed entirely the value of heathen philosophy.​[686]​ He endorsed Shaftesbury’s interpretation of ancient philosophy as split into two exclusive traditions—the Stoic, and the Epicurean—and argued that the metaphysical assumptions of both contradicted revealed truth.​[687]​ Both led to atheism. Epicureanism, as Shaftesbury argued, reduced all to atoms and chance, and precluded the possibility of an intelligent and just creating deity who took an active interest in human life. Bayle and Mandeville, in turn, furnished Warburton with his main arguments against Shaftesbury and the Stoics’ immanent deity, whose will and justice they made identical with their own. After describing the tenets of the various dogmatic sects, Warburton reserved special attention for the unique case of Cicero: the reader would doubtless be particularly anxious to hear ‘the real Sentiments of this prodigious Man’. Warburton accepted that Cicero was no Stoic, nor a follower of Plato, as (inter alia) Stillingfleet had maintained: he was a committed member of the New Academy. Yet Warburton dismissed academic scepticism, as had Shaftesbury, as rhetorical game-playing: in reality, the Academics were ‘mere Sceptics’ who, like the Pyrrhonians, refused to assent to anything on point of principle. To be sure, they professed to seek out the probable, but ‘here lay the Joke: they continued doing this all the Time of their Existence, without ever finding the Probable in any Thing; excepting only in what was necessary to supply them with Arms for disputing against every Thing. It is true, this was a Contradiction in their Scheme: but Scepticism is unavoidably destructive of itself’. Ancients such as Cicero had turned to academic scepticism not for ‘a Rule of Life; but only as a kind of Furniture for their Rhetoric Schools’. Here Warburton agreed with Shaftesbury: academic scepticism was not a discrete philosophical tradition. Cicero was not, therefore, an exception to be salvaged from the wreckage.​[688]​ 
In contrast to both Shaftesbury and Mandeville, Warburton argued that the doctrine of a future state had been publicly taught in the heathen world on account of its observable social and moral necessity. Civil society could not cohere without the promise of eternal rewards. This was a point supposedly recognized by Shaftesbury’s ‘civil, social, theistic’ tradition: the Stoics, no less than the Pythagoreans and Plato, had endorsed the doctrine, and here Warburton directly rebutted Shaftesbury’s interpretation.​[689]​ Yet prior to Christ’s revelation no philosopher had actually believed in the doctrine, with one exception which was once again aimed directly at the author of Characteristics: Socrates alone had been a believer, and a proto-Christian.​[690]​ It was because the doctrine had not been taught in Mosaic Israel that ‘demonstrated’ that the Jews enjoyed God’s particular providence. Christ’s revelation had transformed human understanding, consigning the absurd natural, moral, and religious philosophies of the speculative heathens to the dustbin: ‘The Honour of the Discovery was reserved for true Revelation, which teaches us, in Spite of unwilling Hearers, that the real ground of Moral Obligation is the Will of God’.​[691]​ At the heart of Warburton’s paradoxical syllogism was the claim that Christianity was nonetheless eminently ‘reasonable’, even if it had not appeared so to the later heathen philosophers. This had only, and for all time, been established with Newton’s demonstration of the laws of motion and the necessity of a first (immaterial) cause of the universe.​[692]​ This had confirmed on the basis of philosophy what had previously only been established on that of revelation: the providential harmony that existed between observable worldly utility (a future state was a moral and political necessity) and objective truth (it existed). This, Warburton argued, was a relationship that had been entirely misunderstood by the heathen philosophers as by their modern acolytes, among whom Warburton included almost all Christian apologists with the notable exception of Locke.
At the time that Warburton began honing the arguments of the Divine Legation, in 1736, he initiated a friendship with Middleton, largely conducted by means of a voluminous correspondence.​[693]​ Middleton was in this period drafting his History of the Life of Cicero, which would eventually be published in the same year as the second volume of the Divine Legation (1741). Both writers recognized ‘the Life of Tully & the Divine Legation’ to confront many of the same questions, and Warburton conveyed his wish to Philip Doddridge that they ‘may be always read together’.​[694]​ Indeed, the first volume of the Divine Legation promised that ‘every Question that regards Cicero, will be [determined] with the utmost Precision, by an excellent Author, from whom we may shortly expect the Life of this illustrious Roman’. Warburton was confident that the Life would continue the Divine Legation’s assault on the scurrilous works (‘those Stink-pots of your offensive War’) of deists such as Shaftesbury and Tindal, by emphasizing the moral necessity of revelation. He warned the freethinking hordes that Middleton was ‘an excellent Person, and one of your most formidable Adversaries’.​[695]​ 
The Life of Cicero has, however, been read quite differently by modern commentators. It secured the subscriptions of the great and the good in Walpolean England, and offered an unapologetic panegyric to the heathen philosopher. The rigorous standards of source criticism so ably deployed by Middleton in his later, unstinting critical assault on the sacred sources attesting to the post-apostolic miracles in his Free Inquiry, as in his earlier contributions to theological debate, appeared to have deserted him. Leslie Stephen and Hugh Trevor-Roper, both of whom found in Middleton the pioneer of a modern, secular historical approach, were at a loss to explain why he, in the words of T.B. Macaulay, condescended to compose ‘a lying legend of St. Tully’, deifying ‘the most eloquent and accomplished trimmer’ to be found in the annals of history.​[696]​ In order to explain this obvious exception to his (questionable) rule that everything Middleton wrote was ‘provocative, scholarly—and right’, Trevor-Roper endorsed two allegations levelled at the work by far from disinterested contemporaries.​[697]​ The first, and more credible accusation was that the Life of Cicero was an opportunistic attempt by Middleton to salvage his orthodox credentials and to secure political patronage. On this reading, it was primarily a political intervention, defending the pragmatic policies of Walpole’s ministry from the attacks levelled by the political opposition.​[698]​ The second, which has since been disproved, was that the Life of Cicero was plagiarized from an obscure seventeenth-century work.​[699]​ Despite Middleton having spent more than a decade composing and then defending the work, Trevor-Roper argued that he had little intellectual investment in it.​[700]​ It followed that it could shed negligible light on Middleton’s intentions in those of his writings which interested Trevor-Roper: the Free Inquiry, and Middleton’s other contributions to theological controversy.
There is good textual evidence to support an interpretation of the Life of Cicero within the context against which Warburton evidently read it, at Middleton’s invitation and with his approval. This context has broadly been reconstructed in the previous chapters. Middleton, in contrast to the pugilistic Warburton, scarcely mentioned either Shaftesbury or Mandeville in his published writings, however.​[701]​ His explicit intention was to distinguish ‘the clear Dictates of God from the vain Conceits & Deductions of Men’, and thereby to reconcile ‘the Gospel with the Dictates of right Reason, the Revealed with the Natural Law’.​[702]​ This was a reconciliation between natural and revealed religion, moral philosophy and Reformed moral theology that Middleton, not unreasonably, considered both Shaftesbury and Mandeville to have deemed impossible. The writings of Cicero were of central importance to Middleton’s earlier works of Christian apologetic, which mined many of the same themes that would be taken further in the Free Inquiry: a point largely ignored by Trevor-Roper and Stephen.​[703]​ Middleton and Warburton’s friendship, meanwhile, did not survive the publication of their two works in 1741, which revealed just how different, indeed contradictory, were their attempts to reconsider the relationship between classical moral philosophy and Christian moral theology. Middleton, unlike Warburton, was entirely unwilling to sacrifice ancient philosophy in the cause of defending revelation, which he argued was self-defeating. Unless the moral doctrines delivered by Christ could be shown to be consistent with the insights gleaned by those who had endeavoured the hardest to understand human life, then the individual, try as he might, would be incapable of believing Christianity to be of divine origin and adopting it as a guide. 
Middleton nonetheless agreed with Warburton that the dogmatic philosophies of the Stoics and Epicureans had failed to provide a sufficient guide to life. This was not to say that philosophy could not play this role. The Life of Cicero was, in fact, not simply a panegyric to Cicero. It was a vindication of a very particular philosophy: academic scepticism. As Warburton recognized, their differences could be distilled into one fundamental point: ‘his account of the Academic Sect and Tully’s sentiments are opposed to mine’.​[704]​ As had Locke half a century before, Middleton found in Cicero’s eclecticism the means to explain the error of those who placed their faith in the sufficiency of philosophy to acquire ultimate moral truths (tending to deism), or who demanded an absolute and uncritical subscription to the literal truth of revelation (fideism). This, Middleton argued, reflected a general failure to comprehend the true importance of philosophy as an open-ended activity that defined human existence, and of religious faith as the only reasonable outcome of this continuing search for meaning and truth in human life.
Although making no claim to the title of philosopher, Middleton did profess to be a very particular type of Protestant Christian, which demanded that one philosophize. It was not to the writings of Locke that Middleton turned in order to make the troubling case that only Ciceronian academic scepticism could provide the philosophical foundations for genuine Christian belief.​[705]​ He drew instead, as several historians have recently recognized, from a distinctly eirenic tradition within Christian humanism, most notably enshrined in the writings of Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536) and William Chillingworth (1602–1644).​[706]​ The importance of this European tradition was influentially explored by Trevor-Roper, which makes it all the more curious that he was subsequently so keen, against all the evidence, to exclude Middleton from it.​[707]​ As had Erasmus, Middleton emphasized the continuity between the heathen and Christian worlds, and suggested that revelation had altered very little. Those few Christians, whether Protestant or Catholic, who were willing to examine their own faith faced essentially the same doubts experienced by Cicero. It was precisely these doubts which orthodoxies of all stripes acted to deny. Yet it was only on the grounds of doubt, and a just recognition of the limits of reason to establish truths in morality and religion, that the individual might find something of value in the teachings of the Gospels. Ciceronian academic scepticism was an eclectic philosophy practised, as Middleton emphasized, by almost no others in the late Hellenistic period and few in the modern. In his claim that this philosophy alone provided the moral insights upon which Christ’s teachings had enlarged, Middleton took the Erasmian tradition to its furthermost limits. Almost none were capable of enduring the doubts and uncertainties of true sceptical philosophy and establishing natural religion on its rightful foundations. It followed that a similarly minute number had grasped the moral significance of the Christian revelation and been true followers of Christ.
A Letter from Rome (1729)
In contrast to Warburton, Middleton’s apologetic writings were written in a self-consciously personal idiom and presented in a style that permitted an intimacy between author and reader. Middleton intended his works to act as a catalyst in ‘opening Men’s Minds, & disposing them to examine things, & to think for themselves, & to search into the Grounds of their Duty, their chief Happiness & End, for which they were formed’.​[708]​ His early decades as student, Fellow and University librarian at Trinity College, Cambridge were crucial in shaping his views on this head, just as Warburton’s lack of formal education and relative intellectual isolation in Newark informed the decidedly bookish nature of his learning.​[709]​ Thinking for oneself was emphasized by Middleton, he later reflected, because ‘I had but little acquaintance with it in early life’.​[710]​
Middleton’s youthful views in politics and ecclesiology endorse John Gascoigne’s interpretation of Cambridge as, by 1688, having been transformed under the influence of William Sancroft from a seedbed of Puritanism and political radicalism to a citadel of the Restoration church and state.​[711]​ A proctor’s report from 1710, relating a disturbance at the Rose Tavern, places Middleton in the company of the University’s Tory MPs, Dixie Windsor and Arthur Annesley (later earl of Anglesey), drinking loudly to the non-juror, Henry Sacheverell’s health.​[712]​ From the 1730s, Middleton reflected on his ‘former sins of credulity’ with regret, and on the non-juring principles he had imbibed with distaste: ‘Those principles I could never digest, from the time, when I began to think & judge for myself, & they gave me the first disgust, to what was then sanctified by the title of orthodoxy: nor has the authority of those ancient Fathers, from whom they are derived, altered my opinion of them: nor can any authority indeed ever persuade me, to receive as sacred & divine, what my sense & reason declare to be absurd & superstitious’.​[713]​
Middleton’s first published work of note can be read as distinctly autobiographical and betrays its author’s critical re-examination of the foundations of true Christian belief. Its full title gives fair warning of the central thesis it conveyed: A Letter from Rome, Shewing an Exact Conformity between Popery and Paganism: or the Religion of the Present Romans, derived from that of their Heathen Ancestors (1729).​[714]​ Middleton claimed that the work was drawn from a series of letters written from Rome to an intimate friend in England. Whilst he travelled to Italy, in 1723–1724, no such letters survive (LR 61).​[715]​ Middleton adopted the guise of the polite Protestant traveller, whose interest lay in ‘the genuine Remains and venerable Reliques of Pagan Rome; the authentick Monuments of Antiquity’, rather than in ‘the fopperies and ridiculous ceremonies of the present Religion of the place’ (LR 66–69).​[716]​ Middleton professed to realize, however, that it was the latter which provided unmediated access to the lost world of classical antiquity: ‘As oft as I was present at any religious exercise in their Churches, it was more natural, to fancy myself looking on at some solemn act of idolatry in old Rome, than assisting at a worship, instituted on the principles, and formed upon the plan of Christianity’ (LR 69).
Incense, candles, relics, and a superstitious belief in the daily intercession of myriad saints all appeared to have been incorporated wholesale into Christian practice from heathen polytheism. The absurd miracle stories concocted by opportunistic priests also built upon tropes found in the writings of the heathen philosophers, with two important differences. First, forged Christian miracles, unlike the pagan, undermined rather than encouraged the social virtues and industry. They were used to justify articles of belief that were too absurd even for the pagans, who would certainly have baulked at the concept of eating their gods (LR 94).​[717]​ Second, even the wisest in Catholic societies believed, or were compelled to claim to believe, that such stories and articles of faith were literally true, in contrast to the mockery of the superstitions of the vulgar to be found in Ovid, Cicero, and ‘many of the wisest Heathens’ (LR 83).
At first glance the Letter was a highly conventional work: an interpretation encouraged by Middleton (LR 61). It appeared to fit within a well-established tradition of Protestant apologetic originating with Martin Luther. In an English context, this had recently been exploited by Addison in his enormously popular Remarks on Several Parts of Italy (1705).​[718]​ For this reason Robert Ingram suggests that it was ‘unobjectionable stuff in an age given over to strident anti-popery’.​[719]​ This is a questionable judgement. Addison’s Remarks compared the superstition and slavery of modern Italy with the liberty and enlightened Protestantism enjoyed in Hanoverian England. The tenor of Middleton’s Letter notably lacks any such triumphalism or complacency.​[720]​ Middleton intimated that, from its inception, Christianity had become corrupted by the superstitions of polytheism. It was in this vein that he judged the account of ‘the source and origin of the Popish Ceremonies’ provided by ‘many of our Divines’ to be unsatisfactory. Here Middleton alluded to the orthodox account of corruptions as only sneaking into the purity of Christian worship during the Middle Ages, and supposedly expunged at the Reformation: an interpretation recently restated by the Whig historians Gilbert Burnet and Laurence Echard (LR 69).​[721]​ Middleton cited St. Paul in accepting that some degree of accommodation with the superstitions of a populace who considered their fortunes to be inextricably tied to the placating of numerous deities, now reconstituted as Christian saints, had been necessary as primitive Christians sought to convert the gentiles (LR 87–89). Due to a combination of the impurity of their own theism and an increasing appreciation of how superstition allowed them to gain temporal authority, however, the Church Fathers and those priests who claimed to derive their authority from them had increasingly enshrined fundamental features of polytheism within their definitions of Christian orthodoxy.
Rather than looking to Luther’s Theses or to Addison, the Letter from Rome contains distinctive ambiguities that reveal Middleton’s debt to two other sources: Erasmus’s Dialogus Ciceronianus (1528), and Chillingworth’s The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation (1638). In Middleton’s later writings, his esteem for these authors and these particular works is abundantly attested. It is no surprize that Middleton found it easy to sympathize with Chillingworth, with whose denominational manoeuvrings he evidently identified. A staunch monarchist and zealous Laudian in his youth, Chillingworth had been converted not merely to Catholicism, but to the Society of Jesus. Middleton later maintained that this was an entirely rational move should one erroneously seek to base one’s faith on the certainty seemingly offered by a continuity of tradition, and by the teachings of an authoritative church supported by the evidence of miracles.​[722]​ Chillingworth, however, returned from the Jesuit seminary at Douai a ‘confirm’d Protestant’ but an unconvinced Anglican, and with a marked scepticism regarding the reliability of the patristic sources.​[723]​ He declared that the Scriptures, rather than one true, visible church which may never have existed, provided the sole guide to salvation. Chillingworth subsequently refused to subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles (largely due to the first, which endorsed the Athanasian Creed) until sufficiently assured that they were intended merely to secure order and decorum, not to compel belief.​[724]​ Middleton’s Letter deliberately invited his reader to take a similar, metaphorical voyage to Rome, and to question the foundations upon which he built his own faith.​[725]​
Middleton’s suggestion that conniving, self-interested priests had cultivated the superstitions of the vulgar might seem to align him with the freethinking critique of ‘priestcraft’ developed not least by Shaftesbury and Mandeville. More compelling is the fact that Middleton’s sojourn in Rome coincided with the publication of Pietro Giannone’s Istoria Civile del Regno di Napoli (1723). This work saw its author mercilessly hounded by the forces of Catholic orthodoxy, eventually dying (after a long confinement) in a Savoyard prison in 1748. An English translation of this work was published in 1729, the same year as the Letter from Rome, and Middleton’s name appears on the list of subscribers.​[726]​ Giannone stressed the importance of applying the same critical standards to the sources of ecclesiastical as of civil history: an approach also countenanced by Chillingworth. This was a notable feature of Middleton’s own practice, and informed his later claim that ‘the History of the Gospel, I hope may be true, though the History of the Church be fabulous’.​[727]​ This, however, cut both ways. It was Middleton’s criticism not solely of the ‘orthodox’ who uncritically accepted the supposedly sacred sources of ecclesiastical history, but also of polite Protestants who drew in a similarly uncritical manner from the literary and philosophical remains of classical antiquity, that gives the Letter its peculiarly ambivalent quality.
In his ‘Preface’, Middleton emphasized that those Catholics whose acquaintance he had made on his travels were, to a man, civil, polite, and learned (LR 62). It was a prejudice ingrained from education and custom that led them to accept the absurd impostures of their national religion, rather than stupidity. Yet the Protestant tourist, mocking the ridiculous prejudices of the Catholic, was himself blinkered in his uncritical reverence for the literary bequest of the heathen philosophers and historians. Middleton immediately questioned whether the prejudice of the Protestant was qualitatively different from that of his antagonist. Classical histories, ‘by the early prejudice of being the first knowledge that we acquire, as well as the delight, which they give, in describing the lives and manners of the greatest men, who ever lived, gain so much upon our riper age, as to exclude too often other more useful and necessary studies’ (LR 66–67). Here Middleton struck an unmistakably Erasmian chord, to achieve a distinctly Chillingworthian end: most ‘moderate Protestants’ had scarcely considered their religious beliefs, or why they professed to follow Christ, any more than had Catholics.
In the dedicatory epistles to his enormously popular editions of Cicero’s De Officiis (1519) and Tusculan Disputations (1523), Erasmus continually emphasized how his classical scholarship was merely a means to ‘escape from my books’. It was a chance to ‘pause for two or three days in my other projects, in which I’m doing what I can to advance evangelism’, which was the true vocation and calling of a Christian.​[728]​ In the Dialogus Ciceronianus, Erasmus excoriated those Italian humanists who were ‘Christians only in name’. Though they had ‘Jesus on [their] lips . . . it’s Jupiter Optimus Maximus and Romulus that [they] have in [their] hearts’. In bitingly satirical fashion, Erasmus drew attention to the continuity that he saw as so evident between the ceremonies he witnessed in Pope Julius II’s Rome, and those reported in the pages of classical (heathen) authors.​[729]​ Erasmus’s reverence for Cicero’s writings was unbounded. It was predicated, however, upon the conviction that Cicero (unlike his modern, supposedly Christian acolytes) would have recognized clearly how Christ’s teachings affirmed and enlarged upon the limited insights he had gleaned by means of philosophy alone. Indeed, ‘if he had studied the philosophy of Christ, he would, I think, have been numbered with those who are now honoured as saints’.​[730]​
Cicero was unique, Erasmus argued, because he had seen through the errors of the dogmatic Stoics and Epicureans, who claimed to explain fully man’s true end. For Erasmus, Cicero was emphatically an academic sceptic, not a dogmatic Stoic as his scholastic Italian interlocutors suggested. This was of great consequence and explained why his moral philosophy chimed so perfectly with that revealed by Christ. Academic sceptics were ‘the least assuming of philosophers’, recognising that ‘human affairs are so complex and obscure that nothing can be known for certain’. In The Praise of Folly (Moriae Encomium: 1511), Erasmus contrasted their humility with the pride, vanity and dogmatism of the Stoics.​[731]​ Erasmus alluded to the passage in Tusculan Disputations (1.2.4) which, it was suggested in Chapter 1, was of such consequence for Locke’s consideration of the relationship between natural and revealed law from 1663–1664. Cicero, unlike the dogmatic sects by which he was surrounded, had managed to ‘put his precepts into practice in his own life’. Philosophy had for him, unlike for almost all others, provided a guide to life. Indeed, Cicero set an example of virtue which all too few Christians, despite enjoying the light provided by the Gospel, had matched. Cicero’s belief in ‘the immortality of the soul and on the different destinies or rewards that await men in the afterlife’, which Erasmus did not doubt, was (in the absence of revelation) established solely on the basis of probability, faith, and hope. It was upon such foundations, Erasmus averred, that Christ had built his church.​[732]​ Chillingworth’s later Religion of Protestants similarly spoke the language of Cicero’s Academica in emphasising that all religious ‘knowledge’ was really a species of ‘opinion’ and founded upon probable reasoning. For Chillingworth, freedom of inquiry and open discussion of even the most fundamental of religious doctrines, including the Trinity, could not be foreclosed, since nothing in religion was knowable with absolute certainty.​[733]​
Whilst there is no compelling evidence that Locke read Erasmus closely in the 1660s—albeit his presentation of Cicero in his subsequent works was very similar indeed—it is clear from Middleton’s published as well as private papers that his admiration for Cicero was mediated through Erasmus. In Middleton’s hands it again became clear how a reading of Cicero as an eclectic philosopher permitted a distinctive, determinedly heterodox answer to the question at the very heart of contemporary theological and moral philosophical debate after Locke. This regarded the relationship between reason and revelation, the useful and the true, and of how (or whether) they might be reconciled.
A Letter to Waterland and the Defences (1731–1733)
If the heterodox implications of Middleton’s Letter from Rome were largely concealed beneath its conventional veneer, the same was not true of his Letter to Waterland (1731). This work placed a black mark against Middleton’s name, precluding the possibility of further preferment within the Church. It represented a decidedly idiosyncratic intervention in a debate between freethinkers and their orthodox opponents in England, in which both Cicero and Locke were fiercely contested figures. The immediate stimulus for Middleton’s composition of the work was the intemperate reply offered by the ultra-orthodox Daniel Waterland to Matthew Tindal’s Christianity as Old as the Creation (1730).​[734]​ Tindal expertly exploited the tensions inherent within the Newtonian brand of religious apologetic that had been developed in England primarily in response to Hobbes, most notably by those who delivered the Boyle lectures.​[735]​
The Master of Middleton’s Cambridge College, Richard Bentley, had been the first such lecturer, in 1692; and he had further advanced his assault upon Hobbesian materialism in his response to Collins’ Discourse of Freethinking (1713). Collins challenged the tendency of the orthodox to draw from Cicero and Locke to defend their metaphysical arguments in support of the fundamental tenets of Christian belief, especially the immateriality of the soul and a future state. Collins presented Cicero as a thoroughgoing religious sceptic and appropriated him and Locke in support of his own distinctly Hobbesian arguments in favour of materialism. Collins’ point, echoing Bayle, was that the Christian scheme of satisfaction and redemption could not have entered ‘into the wisest Man’s imagination’ prior to revelation.​[736]​ With characteristic hauteur, Bentley replied that Collins’ ‘Atheistical Sect’ was ‘unqualified to understand one single Page of Cicero’. Bentley argued that Cicero’s professed allegiance to the New Academy was largely superficial: an interpretative strategy later adopted by Warburton. Whilst it compelled him to analyse critically the doctrines of the various sects in religious as in moral subjects, Cicero ‘dogmatizes himself’ on the most fundamental points in both. ‘He declares’, Bentley argued, ‘for the Being and Providence of God, for the Immortality of the Soul, [and] for every Point that approaches to Christianity’.​[737]​ 
If Collins turned to Cicero to question the reasonableness of the Christian revelation, then others of more neo-Stoic proclivities like Tindal did so to question its necessity. Tindal purported to accept the distinctly latitudinarian premises of apologists like Bentley and especially his successor as Boyle lecturer, Samuel Clarke.​[738]​ Clarke argued that the being and attributes of God, and the existence of a future state, were ‘strictly demonstrable to any unprejudiced Mind from the most uncontestable principles of Reason’.​[739]​ By means of the right use of their faculties, men were able to discern the ‘eternal fitnesses’ of things in the natural and moral order. They could thereby acquire demonstrable knowledge of both natural law and the foundation of their moral obligation as God’s created beings: a considerably stronger claim than Locke had been willing to endorse. In order to vindicate his thesis, Clarke drew upon the famous passage from Cicero’s De Republica (3.22) that had been preserved by Lactantius, and appropriated Cicero for his own ethical rationalism.​[740]​ Yet if, Tindal enquired, Cicero had indeed been able ‘easily’ to deduce the law of nature in its entirety, and if that law ‘can neither be wholly abrogated, nor repealed in any part of it, nor changed’, surely it followed that Christ could have done no more than reaffirm it?​[741]​ Men’s rational faculties were clearly untainted by sin, and Christ’s sacrifice lost its expiatory significance. If so, then Christianity was more or less reducible to the ‘right reason’ cultivated by the Stoics (whose ethical theory Tindal, like Toland, considered Cicero to share), and the Gospel represented nothing more than the ‘Republication of the Religion of Nature’. It could contain nothing ‘mysterious’ or inaccessible to human reason, and all claims to the contrary were the noxious consequence of centuries of priestcraft and superstition.​[742]​
All this was too much to bear for Anglicans of strongly Calvinist persuasions like Waterland, the Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge, for whom the historical evidence attesting to the divine origins of the Christian revelation required little support from the philosophical doctrines of the blinkered and ignorant heathen philosophers.​[743]​ Waterland was every bit as hostile to Clarke’s Arianism, made explicit in his Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity (1712), as he was to Tindal’s freethinking. Revelation provided what reason could not: that is, certain truths in morality as in religion, a definition of man’s true end, and the possibility of righteousness. It was Waterland’s intemperate response to Tindal, in which he defended a literal interpretation of the biblical account of the Fall, Flood, and confusion of tongues at Babel, that drew Middleton into publishing his response, as he later recognized, rather ‘too eagerly or rashly’.​[744]​ In essence, Middleton argued that Ciceronian academic scepticism undermined the premises upon which both Tindal and Waterland had constructed their arguments.
Middleton began by vindicating Tindal’s essential premise that natural law and revealed religion could be separated. It was only by doing so that religio might be divorced from superstitio.​[745]​ Natural law had evidently been sufficient for ‘many by its sole influence [to] attain to such an exalted degree of virtue as few or none have ever since arrived at’, and was still able to provide a ‘more rational rule of life and manners’ to freethinkers in modern idolatrous or Islamic countries (LW 138).​[746]​ Meanwhile, it alone provided Protestants with the criteria by which the claims of revelation were to be assessed, and the meaning of the Scriptures interpreted. The question remained, however, as to what could be established on the basis of reason alone, and what it would make of the biblical narrative of the Fall. Here Cicero’s authority was inviolable:
But since in a question of this nature, both your reason and mine may possibly be suspected, as if prejudiced by education, influenced by custom, or biased perhaps by some interest in favour of established opinions; I shall appeal to an authority, which cannot be charged either with prejudice or partiality, with favouring or detracting from the life of Moses; one of the greatest Masters of Reason that Antiquity ever produced, I mean Cicero, whose sentiments declared in some cases, nearly allied to the present, may serve to inform us what unprejudiced Reason would determine upon the literal history of man’s fall. (LW 147–148)
Middleton turned to Cicero’s mockery in De Divinatione of Alexander’s dream, in which a serpent appeared and spoke to him.​[747]​ He used this to argue that Cicero would have interpreted the story of the Fall allegorically, teaching the importance of striving to establish reason’s sovereignty over the passions (LW,149). To do otherwise was to suggest that God was vindictive and cruel in foreseeing but not preventing Adam’s transgression, and in resting content to ‘trample on [man] when he is fallen’ by imputing his sin to his descendants. In De Officiis, Middleton continued, Cicero had shown that God could not be moved by such base passions; whilst in De Divinatione Cicero had further argued that He would do nothing in vain, such as create an earthly paradise which was ‘like a Theatrical Scene changed in an instant’. To interpret the biblical account of the Fall literally, as Waterland (and Mandeville) demanded, was to portray God as ‘barbarous and unnatural’, and to contradict entirely ‘the known attributes and perfections of the Deity’ (that is, the truths of natural religion) (LW 147–149). The same was true, Middleton argued, for the story of the confusion of tongues in Genesis. Taken literally, this portrayed man as more pathetic even than brute beasts, which by means of their ‘natural Appetites’ would have been led to disperse at Babel. Tellingly, Middleton argued he had only seen men painted in such odious colours once before. This was on the frontispiece to Hobbes’ Leviathan, where they were ‘all clustered up together into one gigantic Figure, as if resolved and prepared in that collected form to combat heaven itself’ (LW 163).​[748]​
Both Cicero and ‘one of the greatest men who ever lived, Erasmus’ supported Middleton’s claim that the Scriptures ‘must be interpreted agreeably to the reason and nature of things, and the common good of society’ (LW 142).​[749]​ There were, moreover, good historical reasons to read much of the Old Testament, and especially the Pentateuch, allegorically. If the Letter from Rome emphasized the continuity between pagan and Christian Rome, now it was the historical relationship between Egypt and Mosaic Israel upon which Middleton trained his sights. Middleton drew, as had Shaftesbury, from the antiquarian scholarship of Marsham and Spencer to argue that Hebraic learning betrayed the influence of the superstitious Egyptians, a consequence of their long captivity (LW 153–155).​[750]​ All the historical evidence (including the Scriptures) attested to the flourishing of the arts and sciences in Egypt. It also pointed to their absence among the unsociable and barbaric Hebrews.​[751]​ Here Newton had been quite misled in his studies on biblical chronology, which had been published posthumously in 1728 and immediately created a furore.​[752]​ Newton’s authority in natural philosophy and mathematics gave him none in history unless, unbeknownst to Middleton, he had ‘invented a new Telescope, to pry into remote and dark Antiquity with more Accuracy than had been practicable before’.​[753]​
The miraculous stories contained in the Old Testament betrayed the ‘wholly mystical and symbolical’ learning in things ‘sacred and divine’ of the Israelites. The purpose of these stories, like the fables of ancient polytheism upon which they drew, was primarily moral and political. Indeed Josephus implied—and here Middleton strenuously professed merely to reconstruct his true sense, not to endorse it—that Moses’ claim to be divinely inspired had been designed to serve a beneficial moral and political purpose, as indeed it had for ‘Minos and the other old Lawgivers of Greece’.​[754]​ Here Middleton was cutting it very fine indeed in suggesting that this in no sense challenged the credibility of the Old Testament as the revealed word of God. It merely showed that the Scriptures had to be interpreted with care, and not in the ‘absolute and unlimited sense’ demanded by Waterland (LW 154). Middleton strongly implied that it was the moral excellence of Moses’ laws that ultimately attested to their ‘divine’ origin, but that Moses might have formulated them on the basis of his profound understanding of human nature and the natural law (i.e. without direct communication from God).​[755]​
It was for this reason that it was ridiculous to interpret the Scriptures in a manner that directly contravened natural law and offended men’s ideas of what was morally good. This was, Middleton argued, ‘destructive of that good, for which all Religion was given; turning the best thing in the world into the worst; a Revelation from heaven, into a doctrine harmful and pernicious to mankind’.​[756]​ Contradicting natural law, it also removed the sole foundation upon which a belief in revelation might be established. If a miraculous story in the Scriptures manifestly contravened the insights, especially in morality, drawn from reason and presented most perfectly by Cicero, no amount of historical testimony or other evidence would be sufficient to establish its truth and divine origins. This was where Waterland’s apologetic approach was, according to Middleton, so perverse:
You tell us, that the modest way of opposing a Revelation, pretending to be divine, is not to examine the internal merit of its doctrines, but the external evidence of the fact: but this is certainly losing time, and beginning at the wrong end; since ’tis allowed on all hands, that if any narration can be shewn to be false; any doctrine irrational or immoral; ’tis not all the external evidence in the world that can or ought to convince us, that such a doctrine comes from God (LW 164).​[757]​
This claim would later underpin Middleton’s attack, in the Free Inquiry, on the credibility of the historical testimony used to defend the post-apostolic miracles.
Waterland demanded an implicit faith established upon Tertullian’s ‘good old principle credo quia impossibile’, which banished reason and made God utterly transcendent, capricious, and terrifying (LW 146).​[758]​ On this interpretation, only faith and divine grace, and not works, might save; and as the Augustinian reading of Romans 14.23 suggested, ‘the very attempt & act of doing [good] has the nature of Sin’.​[759]​ Middleton found such extreme Augustinianism repugnant. He noted in a missive to John, Lord Hervey that ‘I am not one of those rigid Casuists, who think that our Appetites were planted in us merely to be cross’d & mortified; but am perswaded, that they may all be freely gratified; & were given us for the very purpose; as the instruments of happiness & pleasure to us’.​[760]​ Tindal was quite correct to suggest that this species of Christianity ‘is not onely useless, but mischievous’, since Waterland prioritized an external conformity on profoundly mysterious doctrinal points, such as the Trinity, over internal conviction and moral conduct (LW 166). Such principles, Middleton indicated, were to blame for the persecution and bloodshed that so marred Christian history, suggesting that men were able to believe as they chose and that error could not, as a consequence, be innocent.​[761]​
Cicero also provided Middleton with powerful arguments against Tindal’s distinctly neo-Stoic belief that ‘a wiseman has a sufficiency of all things within himself’.​[762]​ If Waterland’s deity was utterly transcendent, Tindal’s was immanent. If the former depreciated the capacity of human reason excessively, the latter raised it far too high and dissolved the divine law and will into natural law and human reason. Cicero, ‘a constant Follower of the Academy in his real Judgment’, provided the via media that Middleton suggested furnished the means to settle ‘Christianity on its true and natural foundation’ (natural law, and human nature, properly understood). This was because ‘it was the peculiar character and distinction of the Academy, Nullum Jujicium interponere; to deliver nothing dogmatically, to declare no judgment of its own; to follow onely the probable; and beat down every thing advanced as certain or self-evident’.​[763]​
Although Middleton was considerably more sympathetic to Tindal (and Shaftesbury)​[764]​, who at least attempted to search for truths in religion and morality for themselves, they were nonetheless as dogmatic and erroneous as neo-Epicureans such as Waterland. Cicero had shown, Middleton argued, how reason was insufficient as ‘a Guide to Life’ for almost all men, and it was for precisely that reason that religion had been ‘invented’. Religious belief was considered by Cicero to be ‘the voice of Nature, disclaiming [reason] as a Guide’. Tindal’s endeavour to establish a civil theology on the basis of reason alone, decrying as superstitio everything that did not ‘satisfy his supreme and perfect Reason’, would be as disastrous in practice as it was misconceived in theory (LW 167–172). All nations had religions; and as Middleton would later reflect, ‘there may be something good in all Religions’ so long as they had been permitted to develop historically according to the dictates of public utility.​[765]​ They provided what philosophy alone could not: ‘a rational and well-formed system of Morality’. As Middleton noted, almost all religions in all ages made ‘the pretence of a Divine Original, and a Revelation from Heaven’. None had been formed ‘upon the plan of Nature’, as Tindal suggested true religion ought to be (LW 167; 171).
Middleton deliberately undercut a central assumption of freethinkers of neo-Stoic proclivities: that, if not misled by priests, all men of a genuinely philosophical bent would share the same (pure) ideas of God, His attributes and their moral duties and, in fact, that all truly wise men throughout history had done so. Here Middleton echoed the passage in Tusculan Disputations (1.2.4) that had been alighted upon by both Erasmus and Locke. To be sure, in the late Hellenistic period all wise men had recognized the absurdity, philosophically speaking, of the national religion. ‘Men of philosophic & inquisitive Minds’, Middleton noted, ‘were perpetually employed in searching & pointing out a quite different Rule & Guide of Life’ to that provided by a polytheistic religion in which none believed on the basis of reason. Be that as it may, these philosophers had reached no consensus on what that alternative rule might be. The dogmatic sects had spent their time ‘fighting pro Aris & Focis’ in defence of their subjective definitions of the summum bonum. All, as a consequence, endorsed an ancestral national religion, which had developed according to its observable public utility. The cardinal error of modern freethinkers was to claim that a particular ‘System of Heathen Morality’ (the Stoics’) could serve ‘as a Rule of Life & Manners [for] the Nation’.​[766]​
Cicero had no such confidence in man’s ‘infallible Reason’. It was here that Tindal and, indeed, Clarke had fallen into error, defined by Middleton as ‘enthusiasm’: ‘if all the designs of God were as discoverable to man, as man’s are to God, he might well say, where’s the distinction?’ (LW 175).​[767]​ In denying that revelation could transcend human reason, Tindal had pushed past the ‘probable, the reasonable or the true’ with which men in religion and morality had to rest content. He thereby ignored both Cicero (a proxy for unprejudiced reason) and God (revelation), who were united on this point (LW 174–175). Cicero ridiculed the attempts of the Stoics to justify the public religion on the basis of philosophy. He defended it, instead, on account of its public utility. According to Middleton, for Cicero there was no tension between utility and truth, because Cicero did not claim to have identified the latter with dogmatic certainty. In direct contrast to Warburton’s later interpretation in the Divine Legation, Middleton’s Cicero had by no means endorsed the fallacy of ‘double doctrine’, teaching as ‘true’ to the vulgar whatever was found socially and politically useful in practice, whilst presenting the ‘wise’ with genuine moral and religious truths drawn from his speculative philosophical researches.​[768]​ Insofar as the national religion served to ‘promote publick peace and the good of society’, it was in a very real sense divine. It was one means by which God led men towards the performance of their duties to one another even as very few—indeed, perhaps only Cicero—had understood, if hazily, why they ought to do so (LW 170). 
Waterland’s acolyte, Zachary Pearce, accepted Middleton’s claim that Cicero could act as a proxy for ‘unprejudiced Reason’.​[769]​ This is unsurprising. Under Bentley’s supervision, Cambridge University Press had, from 1709, embarked upon the publication of undergraduate-friendly versions of Cicero’s works, edited by Bentley’s protégés. This included John Davies’s editions of Tusculan Disputations (1709, with additions by Bentley himself), De Natura Deorum (1718), De Divinatione et De Fato (1721), and Pearce’s edition of De Oratore (1716).​[770]​ These editions were, at least in part, similarly intended to offer a Cicero who could not easily be co-opted by freethinkers hostile to Christianity. Middleton’s interventions in ongoing discussions as to Cicero’s interpretation of the relationship between morality and religion were thus deeply compromising in a Cambridge context. In his response to Middleton, Pearce alleged that his antagonist ‘can’t distinguish [Cicero’s] Notions from the very Contrary’. It was clear that Cicero endorsed the Stoic, Balbus’ arguments in De Natura Deorum and elsewhere, not those of the academic sceptic, Cotta. The story of Alexander’s dream in De Divinatione was irrelevant. Had Cicero read of a serpent ‘actually speaking and talking’ in ‘the Gravest and most Ancient of Historians’ (Moses), he would most certainly have accepted it as true, irrespective of how improbable or miraculous it appeared.​[771]​ The same applied to the biblical account of the origins of language. In reading Cicero as a sceptic, Pearce argued that Middleton had fallen into the same error as Collins, and with much the same objective: to undermine all religion, natural and revealed. In this respect Pearce, quite legitimately, claimed the support of Bentley for his interpretation.​[772]​ 
The History of the Life of M.T. Cicero (1741)
The importance attached to interpretations of Cicero in the controversy stimulated by the Letter to Waterland provides a context within which to read Middleton’s iconoclastic Life of Cicero. When Middleton’s authorship of the Letter became common knowledge in 1732–1733, he lost the support of his Tory patron, the earl of Oxford. From this date he forged a close relationship with the strongly anti-clerical Walpolean Whig minister and courtier, John, Lord Hervey.​[773]​ Hervey energetically supported Middleton’s proposal to write what he presumed would be a political history of the decline of the late Roman republic, which would illustrate the dangers of the Clodius-style rabble-rousing of the political opposition to Walpole.​[774]​ Upon the publication of Middleton’s unrestrained panegyric to Cicero (complete with a fawning dedicatory epistle to his patron), Hervey confessed to friends that he was baffled and embarrassed in equal measure.​[775]​ Hervey repeatedly dissuaded Middleton from engaging in theological controversy, which he considered pointless. There was, in reality, ‘little Difference’ between ‘the private and Secret Opinion of all men of understanding and Knowledge, on great Theological Points’, and he quoted a classical philosopher, Tacitus, in support of this contention.​[776]​ Middleton dissented from this view in the strongest terms as, he claimed, had ‘the best and wisest of the Heathens in their writings on the Subject’.​[777]​ Hervey evidently envisaged classical history to be unrelated to theological controversy. Middleton, as he gradually came to realize, did not.
Middleton’s primary objective in the Life was to show how Cicero’s academic scepticism had, unlike Stoicism or Epicureanism, provided him with a ‘Rule for Living’ in an age in which one’s philosophical commitments carried momentous practical and political consequences. Middleton noted that the decision in Rome to change one’s philosophical sect was ‘equivalent in effect to a change of Religion with us’, with the significant difference that religious principles were of little practical consequence. This was why Cicero’s friendship with men of differing philosophical principles exposed the absurdity of Christians’ persecution of others ‘for differences of opinion, which, for the most part, are merely speculative, and without any influence on life, or the good or happiness of civil Society’.​[778]​ Middleton’s work allowed him to raise the question which had been central to his intervention in the debates between Clarke, Tindal, and Waterland. Middleton asked which of the ‘three sects, which at this time chiefly engrossed the philosophical part of Rome . . . , was the best adapted to promote the good of society’ (the Stoic, Epicurean, or academic sceptic).​[779]​ It was Middleton’s determination to make the case for an entire consistency between Cicero’s Academic precepts and practice—precisely what Erasmus, a presiding presence in the work, emphasized—that gave the Life the appearance of panegyric.
Middleton repeatedly stressed the absurdity of ‘stoical principles, and their inconsistency with common life’.​[780]​ Cato’s philosophical commitments were self-defeating, since ‘falsely measuring all duty by the absurd rigor of the Stoical rule, he was generally disappointed of the end, which he sought by it, the happiness both of his private and public life’. Cicero ‘did not pretend to be a Stoic, nor aspire to the character of a Hero’. It was for this reason that he did not labour to conceal his despondency in exile, and why he was capable of true friendship and sympathy with others. Cicero rejected Epicureanism because it similarly demanded that individuals behave in ways that were profoundly unnatural. Atticus upbraided Cicero for his affection towards his daughter, Tullia, and for his inconsolable grief at her death, in the belief that such passions precluded the quest for ataraxia and should be subdued. When his own daughter Attica was born, however, he was quite incapable of practising what he had preached. A similar concern to avoid all risk of disappointment prevented Atticus from entering public life at a time when Rome (and his closest friend, Cicero) desperately needed the assistance of her wisest citizens. Although professing opposite philosophies, both Atticus and Cato ‘by their mistaken notions of virtue, drawn from the principles of their philosophy, were made useless in a manner to their country’.​[781]​
The entire work was structured around Middleton’s discussion in Section XII of Cicero’s moral and religious philosophy—and of the relationship between the two. Middleton’s correspondence with Warburton in 1736 indicates how important he considered the interpretation he offered there to be to his overall argument; and the conclusions he intended to draw were already largely in place by this time.​[782]​ His concern to perfect this chapter, however, ensured that he was still labouring on it in 1741, something that delayed the publication of the work, much to Hervey’s chagrin.​[783]​ Significantly, and unlike all the other sections, he did not send it to his patron for critical comment (which he nonetheless steadfastly ignored) prior to publication. Drawing extensively from Erasmus, Middleton made it clear that the signal importance of Cicero’s academic scepticism, for his public as well as private conduct, lay precisely in the fact that he made no claim to have identified the summum bonum or honestum on the basis of philosophical certainty. This ensured that in all matters he was guided by his observations on what, in practice, contributed to human happiness in this life: that is, by the utile and dulce. He did not, unlike the dogmatic Stoics and Epicureans, exhort others to adhere to a set of speculative principles that forced them to suppress their natural affections. Nor did he govern Rome with a priori objectives, such as those attributed by Montesquieu to Roman statesmen in his recently-published Considérations sur les Causes de la Grandeur des Romains et de leur Décadence (1734), a work lauded by Hervey and held in contempt by Middleton.​[784]​ For Middleton it was not design that had underpinned the Roman ‘grandeur’, but necessity. Cicero had, as a consequence, adopted public utility, drawn from empirical observation, rather than speculative maxims as his guide. It was the failure of others to do likewise that had led to Rome’s ‘Décadence’.
‘CICERO’, Middleton argued, ‘chose the middle way between the obstinacy of CATO, and the indolence of ATTICUS: he preferred always the readiest road to what was right, if it lay open to him; if not, took the next, that seemed likely to bring him to the same end; and in politics, as in morality, when he could not arrive at the true, contented himself with the probable’.​[785]​ In speculative questions, the Stoics were ‘the bigots or enthusiasts in philosophy’, whose theories were drawn from ‘the refinements of the schools’. Cicero’s insights were discerned from ‘nature, and social life’, and from concerted self-examination. In religious questions the Stoics embraced augury as of divine institution, something mocked by Cicero, for whom the national religion was ‘merely political, and of human invention’, even as it served a ‘divine’ purpose. Whereas ‘ease and luxury’ attracted men to Epicureanism, it was pride that drew them to Stoicism, which claimed to establish the nature of the soul on the basis of certainty. Cicero, in contrast, deduced the probability of a future state from the remarkable powers of the mind, from men’s ‘ardent thirst for immortality’, and from ‘the will of God, manifested in his works’. The moral significance of Cicero’s belief or otherwise in a future state was, however, marginalized by Middleton. A thirst for the merited applause of posterity, secured by furthering the happiness of mankind in this world, was indistinguishable from a concern regarding the judgement of a deity whose justice could hardly be thought to disapprove of a life spent in pursuit of such a laudable objective. It was for this reason that Middleton strenuously defended the undeniable ‘Vanity’ expressed by Cicero in his writings, something routinely attacked by subsequent critics of the Life of Cicero.​[786]​ Middleton, unlike Warburton, nonetheless claimed that Cicero had identified the origins of the law of nature in the will of God. Prior to Christ, no-one had expounded the duties imposed by that law more clearly than had Cicero:
This was the law, which is mentioned by St. PAUL, to be taught by nature, and written on the hearts of the Gentiles, to guide them through that state of ignorance and darkness, of which they themselves complained, till they should be blessed with a more perfect revelation of the divine will: and this scheme of it professed by CICERO was certainly the most complete, that the Gentile world had ever been acquainted with; the utmost effort, that human nature could make, towards attaining it’s proper end; of that supreme good, for which the Creator had designed it, upon the contemplation of which sublime truths, as delivered by a Heathen, ERASMUS could not help persuading himself, that the breast, from which they flowed, must needs have been inspired by the Deity.​[787]​
In the Letter to Waterland, Middleton had dismissed the Augustinian interpretation of Romans 14.23. Here he endorsed a distinctly Pelagian reading of Romans 2.14–16, suggesting that a heathen had been able to recognize the moral law in something approaching its full extent. If Erasmus ‘could not help persuading himself’ that this was the consequence of the infusion of divine grace, Middleton was able to resist drawing any such conclusion. Cicero had explained men’s duties in De Officiis, ‘a work admired by all succeeding ages, as the most perfect system of Heathen morality, and the noblest effort and specimen, of what mere reason could do towards guiding man through life with innocence and happiness’.​[788]​ Following Socrates, Cicero ‘banished Physics out of Philosophy’. Instead of quibbling over the nature of the soul, Cicero focused on ‘questions of morality; of more immediate use and importance to the happiness of man; concerning the true notions of virtue and vice, and the natural difference of good and ill’. Yet Cicero willingly confessed that philosophy itself could not establish the honestum with certainty. In this regard academic scepticism represented ‘the first step towards preparing men for the reception of truth, or what came nearest to it, probability’.​[789]​ Cicero, Middleton suggested, was almost unique in submitting to the labour and existential doubts demanded if the individual were to acquire a just if imperfect understanding of his moral duties. Cicero’s faith in God’s goodness and justice (and perhaps even His existence), Middleton emphasized, was precisely that. It was merely a ‘hope’, not an ‘assurance’, and ‘he sometimes doubted, of what he generally believed’. This showed, Middleton concluded, that
The most exalted state of human reason is so far from superseding the use, that it demonstrates the benefits of a more exalted revelation; for though the natural law, in the perfection, to which it was carried by CICERO, might serve for a sufficient guide to the few, such as himself, of enlarged minds and happy dispositions . . . , it was not discoverable even to those few, without great pains and study; and could not produce in them at last any thing more than a hope, never a full persuasion; whilst the greatest part of mankind, even of the virtuous and inquisitive, lived without the knowledge of a God, or the expectation of a futurity.​[790]​
However Middleton’s publication of a second edition of the Letter from Rome in 1741, shortly after that of the Life, reinforced the message that Christ’s revelation itself had in many respects scarcely altered this situation. A new postscript made explicit the subversive nature of the central argument of the Letter. Middleton emphasized that if his thesis had been ‘attended to, as it ought’, Christians at Lambeth would find no more grounds to be complacent than those at Rome.​[791]​ No sooner had the Gospel message been delivered than it was subverted, and the divine origins of Christianity no longer recognized and defended on their true and sole foundation: the moral excellence of the philosophia Christi. Middleton suggested that only one particular philosophy, academic scepticism, was able to lead to those truths subsequently affirmed by Christ, but that this was a philosophy that proved too demanding for all save the very few. This, after all, was the unambiguous message of the panegyric to Cicero in the Life, in which Middleton found little to praise in any other heathen philosopher except Socrates. Cicero’s approach to philosophy was ‘of all others the most rational and modest, and the best adapted to the discovery of truth: whose particular character it was, to encourage inquiry; to sift every question to the bottom; to try the force of every argument, till it had found its real moment, or the precise quantity of its weight’.​[792]​ The true Christian, Middleton suggested, had first to be an academic sceptic. Only then might he distinguish between the word of God and that of man, and discern the harmony between the natural and revealed law.
Yet Middleton’s own highly self-conscious heterodoxy, and his sufferings at the hands of the orthodox, were presented in a manner that suggested that he was (like Cicero, Erasmus, and Chillingworth) the exception that proved the rule that most were neither true philosophers nor followers of Christ. In Middleton’s hands, Erasmian Christian humanism was pushed to its sceptical limits. Philosophy, in the absence of revelation, could provide a guide to life; it alone could assess the claims of revelation. Yet it is far from clear that, for Middleton, there was much more of value to be found in the Gospels than there was in Cicero’s philosophical writings. Man’s greatest happiness and true end, salvation, remained largely as it had been for Cicero: a question of faith. Despite Calvin’s claims in the Institutes (I.5) to the contrary, Christians no more than the wisest of the heathens could enjoy a ‘full persuasion and assurance’ of God’s mercy: all Christians were condemned to live with doubt.​[793]​ If a future state existed, in any case, the terms of salvation could hardly compel men to ignore the dictates of morality and the pursuit of temporal happiness, as Cicero had recognized. Meanwhile a desire for the merited applause of posterity, rather than a concern regarding eternal sanctions, had been sufficient to motivate Cicero to set an unrivalled example of virtuous living. In this sense there was no conflict between social morality and Christian duty, and no need to establish fundamental Christian doctrines on more concrete grounds than those of faith and hope. This was where Middleton decisively parted company from Warburton. As Middleton put it with characteristic pithiness, ‘while my academic Complexion leaves me groveling perhaps in the mire of Doubt, or pursuing the faint Track of Probability, your more sanguin Spirits, like the greater Mysteries, make you at once an Autoptes, and admit you to the joyous Regions of clear Day and Intuition’.​[794]​
A Free Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers (1749)
With the exception of Warburton and Thomas Birch (1705–1766)—the prolific editor who published the collected writings of similarly eirenic figures such as Chillingworth and Catharine Cockburn (1679–1749), and who had himself journeyed through the Christian faith from his Quaker roots to become an Anglican minister—it is clear that few of Middleton’s contemporaries grasped his underlying objectives in the Life of Cicero.​[795]​ The publication of Middleton’s Free Inquiry in 1749 made these considerably less opaque. At the heart of Middleton’s interpretation in the Free Inquiry was a theme that had run through the writings of Locke, Shaftesbury, and Mandeville, who had drawn very different conclusions from it. This was the unique nature of England’s experience of the Reformation, and its consequences for subsequent (mis)understandings of the relationship between moral philosophy and Christian moral theology.
Middleton explicitly presented the Free Inquiry as a continuation of Chillingworth’s work; his aim was to ‘fix the religion of Protestants on its proper basis’. That basis, for Middleton even more than for Locke, was emphatically moral. In the Free Inquiry, Middleton plausibly claimed that Locke’s Letters on toleration supported the interpretation he offered.​[796]​ In order to establish a standard by which to distinguish ‘the clear Dictates of God from the vain Conceits & Deductions of Men’, one had to take the Gospels themselves as the touchstone.​[797]​ The miracles worked sparingly by Christ and the Apostles, Middleton argued, had not been intended to awe spectators by dazzling their senses and perplexing their reason (unlike those of paganism). Instead, they drew attention to the moral virtues preached (and practiced) by Christ to his disciples prior to his ascension, exhorting them to convert the gentiles by the example they set of virtuous living.​[798]​ Those virtues were of manifest benefit to the temporal happiness of mankind. As a consequence miracles were to be judged solely by the internal (moral) rather than the external (historical) evidence attesting to them, a contention first advanced by Middleton in his Letter to Waterland two decades earlier. They had to serve ‘an end so great, so important, and so universally beneficial, as to be highly worthy of the interposition of the Deity’.​[799]​ Meanwhile Christ’s promise of salvation to those who followed him furnished them with a further explanation of why the natural law was obligatory, something the Stoics and Epicureans had misunderstood, and Cicero had (on Middleton’s reading, at least) not sought to provide.
For Middleton, however, the claim that the moral teachings of the Gospel provided the sole standard against which to assess the credibility of miracles was, in effect, no different to saying that God could hardly command men to contradict the duties enshrined in De Officiis. For Middleton, it was the harmony between the moral philosophy of Cicero and Christian moral theology which alone could attest to the fact that Christ was divine in mission, even if not in substance (what Cicero would have made of the doctrine of the Trinity was nowhere discussed). In the Vindication of the Free Inquiry, composed shortly before his death, Middleton made this point explicitly. Once again citing the key passage from De Republica (3.22), Middleton emphasized that it was by means of ‘sense and reason’ that Cicero had discovered the ‘universal Law or rule of conduct of man; the source of all his knowledge; the test of all truth; by which all subsequent revelations, which are supposed to have been given by God in any other manner, must be tried and cannot be received as divine, any further than as they are found to tally and coincide with this original standard’. Middleton recognized that ‘our Doctors, perhaps, will look with horror on all this, as rank Deism; but let them call it what they please, I shall ever avow and defend it, as the fundamental, essential and vital part of true religion, and what the Gospel itself must adopt, as its best foundation and support’.​[800]​ Those who, like Mandeville, presented God’s commands as crossing men’s ‘innocent Pleasures’—found in friendship, the mutual exchange of good offices, and the collective pursuit of temporal happiness—built upon the asceticism of the ‘crack-brain’d’, ‘mad’, and ‘enthusiastic’ monks of the fourth and fifth centuries, for whose piety Constantine had proclaimed his reverence. ‘I look upon the whole institution of monkery’, Middleton declared, ‘from what age or Saint soever it drew its origin, to be contrary not only to the principles of the Gospel, but to the interests of all civil society, and the chief source of all the corruptions, which have ever infested the Christian Church’.​[801]​
Middleton made the distinction between the history of the Gospel and that of the Church absolute. The miracles reported in the former advanced the universal temporal happiness of mankind and were primarily concerned with moral conduct. Those reported in the writings of the credulous Fathers, in contrast, testified to the truth of particular speculative doctrines and forwarded the corporate interest of a specific group of men. The full implications of the Letter from Rome were drawn out in the Free Inquiry. Christianity had been corrupted from the moment it became established, and the essence of true Protestantism lay in its return to the Gospels as the sole guide to salvation: as Chillingworth had famously concluded, ‘THE BIBLE, I say, The BIBLE is the only Religion of Protestants!’.​[802]​ The threat which orthodox Anglican divines considered freethinkers like Tindal to pose was, by taking issue primarily with the ‘external’ evidence advanced to support Christianity, entirely illusory. From the earliest reported post-apostolic miracles onwards, the credible was inextricably blended with the absurd. Middleton ran through the Fathers from Justin Martyr and Irenaeus onwards to expose their lack of judgement and the inconvenient fact that they reported miracles that attested to doctrines now considered by both Rome and Lambeth to be heretical (not least millenarianism).​[803]​
The Reformation, the principles of which were most clearly expounded by Chillingworth, ought to have ensured that the systemic unreliability of the Fathers and early Councils was of no meaningful consequence for the Protestant. Tindal and his friends could expose the severe limitations of the sources of ecclesiastical history, and explore the disastrous consequences of Rome’s subversion of the moral teachings of the Gospel, without challenging the true foundations of Christian belief.​[804]​ The unique character of the Reformation in England, however, made the rather superficial writings of sceptics and deists appear devastating. This was because orthodoxy in England continued, as it had in Chillingworth’s day, to encourage the individual to ‘hang, as it were, between the two religions’: Catholicism, established upon tradition and the evidence of post-apostolic miracles, and Protestantism, founded upon the moral excellence of the Gospels. With scarcely concealed relish, Middleton sought to expose the erroneous foundations upon which Chillingworth’s ‘moderate Protestants’ built and defended their faith.​[805]​
In England, the fundamentally Erastian foundations of a church established by law, the rituals and mysterious doctrines of which were intended solely to ensure order and decorum, jostled with the Popish claims of its bishops to apostolic succession. This was, ultimately, a consequence of the fact that Henry VIII had embraced the Reformation as a matter of political expediency, not personal conviction. His objective had been ‘to banish rather the power, than the religion of the Pope, out of his realm’. Whereas Elizabeth had hoped gradually to ‘moderate the prejudices of the Popish Clergy’, James I, ‘a mere School-Divine, fond of theological disputes’, had supported their cause. This return to Popish principles had reached its zenith under Charles I and Laud. It was for this reason that Chillingworth had followed those principles through to their logical conclusion and taken up his short-lived residence at the Jesuit seminary at Douai in 1630. The splits within the Church had, of course, become devastatingly apparent during the Civil War; but, after the Restoration, the status quo ante had broadly been re-established.​[806]​ Those who sought to defend the Thirty-Nine Articles did so once again on the basis of their truth rather than their utility, as the example of Waterland illustrated. Athanasius’s ‘monstrous stories’ of his battles with the Devil, and his inspired vision regarding the Trinity as reported by Gregory, were ‘too trifling to deserve any regard’. Yet for their own purposes, Christian apologists like Waterland considered a declaration of faith in these fictions to be of greater importance than an attempt to adhere to the clear moral dictates of the Gospel.​[807]​
Middleton made his position devastatingly clear. If one accepted a single miracle supposedly performed after the age of the Apostles, one had to accept them all, as well as those reported by Livy and other heathen historians. ‘We have no other part left’, Middleton declared, ‘but either to admit them all, or reject all; for otherwise, [we] can never be thought to act consistently’. The historical testimony of Justin Martyr and Iranaeus, the earliest of the Fathers, was for many reasons far less compelling than that of the Jansenists who reported miracles performed at the tomb of the Abbé de Paris in the 1720s.​[808]​ Human nature remained ever the same; and the means employed to acquire authority over men, captivating their reason and appealing to the senses, were similarly identical. This tactic had recommended itself to clerics more than any other group of men. Their shared interest was strong, and frequently contradicted that of legislators and of civil societies. ‘Tho’ this may sound harsh in the ears of many’, Middleton noted, ‘it will not appear strange to those, who have given any attention to the history of mankind; which will always suggest this sad reflection; that the greatest zealots in religion; or the leaders of sects or parties, whatever purity or principles they pretend to, have seldom scrupled to make use of a commodious lie, for the advancement, of what they call the truth’.​[809]​ This demanded that the judgement and intentions of religious writers be subjected to a more, rather than less, rigorous standard of criticism, since unlike profane historians they had an overwhelming motive to deceive.​[810]​ ‘Should we be asked’, Middleton informed his reader, ‘will ye not believe a most holy Bishop, in a fact attested by his own senses? the answer is clear and short: the fact is not credible’.​[811]​ To evaluate critically those stories of supernatural visions and occurrences that so characterized the works of religious writers was, Middleton emphasized, not to call into question the credibility of history (or of Gospel Christianity), but rather to redeem it from the abuses it had suffered. The insinuation to the contrary played on misguided fears regarding the consequences of historical scepticism, and was made by the orthodox in Rome, Lambeth and Geneva for their own purposes.​[812]​
Conclusion
The final position adopted by Middleton in the Free Inquiry seemed to many contemporaries, not least Warburton, to be indistinguishable from that of freethinkers like Tindal, who presented Christianity as merely ‘the republication of the religion of nature’. As this chapter has suggested, Middleton’s Life of Cicero rather complicates this picture. In many respects, Middleton’s attempt to reconcile moral philosophy and Christian moral theology was considerably more troubling. It was certainly more nuanced. For Middleton, gospel Christianity reinforced a moral law that Cicero had, perhaps uniquely, established on the basis of his continual observation of those qualities in individuals that, in the practical affairs of life, advanced their own happiness and that of their fellow man. True gospel Christianity, if adopted as a guide to life, would be historically invisible. It merely reinforced those natural affections which the dogmatic Stoic and Epicurean philosophies exhorted individuals to subdue, and false religion entirely inverted. Here Middleton was broadly at one with Locke; but he arrived at (and articulated) this conclusion through rather different means, with the aid of Erasmus and his own personal experience.







5	From Moral Theology to Moral Philosophy: Hume’s Academic Scepticism
Introduction: Cicero in Eighteenth-Century Scotland
The foregoing chapters have illustrated how Cicero was a highly contested figure in English debates on the relationship between morality, political authority, and religious belief from the publication of Hobbes’s Leviathan onwards. Much the same was true in Scotland in the aftermath of the legislative Union with England of 1707. The leading lights of the Scottish Enlightenment worked within the universities, law-courts, and the Kirk: unlike the French philosophes, they were emphatically ‘establishment’ figures.​[813]​ The moral philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, many scholars have argued, was characterized by the attempt to forge a synthesis between a moderate Presbyterianism and a broadly Stoic ethics.​[814]​ One, pressing objective was to reduce the influence of a more rigidly orthodox and illiberal Presbyterianism in both the Kirk and the universities, and thereby to undermine the associations between Presbyterianism and political sedition that had crystallized with the Civil Wars.​[815]​ Another was to re-establish the studia humanitatis—the study of grammar, rhetoric, poetics, history, and moral philosophy—as propaedeutic to the study of the higher subjects of medicine, law, and, especially, divinity.​[816]​ Scottish prelectors such as Francis Hutcheson (St. Andrews), Sir John Pringle (Edinburgh) and David Fordyce (Aberdeen) sought to challenge an orthodox Calvinist disavowal of pagan learning, and to offer a vision of the moral life which was consistent with polite sociability and the satisfaction of moderate worldly desires. Cicero was a presiding presence in their lectures, as attested by notes taken by their students.​[817]​ In contrast to Epictetus, Cicero was presented as softening the rigours of Stoicism and emphasising man’s nature as a social and political being; unlike Zeno, he was also interpreted as grounding morals in piety and a belief in providence.​[818]​ 
Hutcheson played a particularly important role in shaping Scottish intellectual life in this period.​[819]​ A Glasgow-educated Irish Presbyterian, his first published work of note, in 1725, was presented as an intervention in the debate between Shaftesbury and Mandeville. As its subtitle suggests, it argued that the ‘ideas of moral good and ill’ of ‘the ancient moralists’ broadly supported Shaftesbury’s defence of an objective standard of virtue: here Hutcheson took aim not merely at Mandeville, but at the modern tradition of natural law as developed by Pufendorf, Cumberland, Locke, and (in Scotland) Gershom Carmichael.​[820]​ Cicero was one, particularly important ‘ancient moralist’, as indicated by the epigraph to the work, which Hutcheson drew from Book I of De Officiis:
And so no other animal has a sense of beauty, loveliness, harmony in the visible world; and Nature and Reason, extending the analogy of this from the world of sense to the world of spirit, find that beauty, consistency, order are far more to be maintained in thought and deed. It is from these elements that is forged and fashioned that moral goodness which is the subject of this inquiry—something that, even though it be not generally ennobled, is still worthy of all honour; and by its own nature, it merits praise, even though it is praised by none. You see here the very form and as it were the face of Moral Goodness; and if it could be seen with the physical eye, it would awaken a marvellous love of wisdom.​[821]​
As in England, Cicero was a powerful ally in the effort to discredit neo-Epicurean theories of morality and justice based on self-love: a line of argument which had recently been reformulated in Scotland by Archibald Campbell in his Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue (1733).​[822]​ If Protestant natural lawyers identified Cicero’s De Officiis as ‘a direct ancestor of the Grotian and Pufendorfian tradition’, then Hutcheson turned to Cicero in order to critique central aspects of this tradition.​[823]​ Yet Hutcheson was also concerned to show that keen admirers of the Stoics, such as Samuel Clarke and his English followers, had got Cicero and ‘the Ancient Moralists’ wrong: Cicero grounded morality in sentiment, not reason; and he similarly established the existence of God and a general providence primarily upon a posteriori, rather than a priori reasoning. Clarke’s English disciples, Gilbert Burnet and John Balguy, took immediate exception to this reading of Cicero as locating the honestum in the sentiments and affections, leading to a protracted exchange of views.​[824]​ Hutcheson’s moral theory also raised the cavils of more stridently Calvinist critics in Ireland and Scotland, who argued that his reverence for heathen philosophy underplayed the extent of postlapsarian human depravity and overlooked the need for the assistance of (unmerited) divine grace.​[825]​ 
The Moderates in the Kirk and their allies in the universities were nonetheless increasingly anxious to make the point that moral philosophy, unassisted by revelation, could only go so far.​[826]​ Hutcheson’s own qualification of his admiration for Cicero, and for ancient moral philosophy more generally, was particularly marked from the early 1740s. The dedicatory address to his Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiara (1742)—‘To the Students in the Universities’—helps us to understand why. Hutcheson warned that: ‘The design of Cicero’s books de officiis, which are so very justly admired by all, has been mistaken inconsiderately by some very ingenious men, who speak of these books as intended for a complete system of morals or ethics.’​[827]​ De Officiis was ‘intended’, like Hutcheson’s own Latin works towards which his attitude was decidedly ambivalent, primarily as a textbook for the education of youths. Cicero’s ‘complete system of morals or ethics’, like Hutcheson’s own, was to be found elsewhere: in Cicero’s case, in his philosophical dialogues; and in Hutcheson’s, in his English writings.​[828]​ It is likely that Hutcheson had one ‘very ingenious’ man in mind in making this qualification regarding De Officiis: David Hume, whose Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740) he recognized deeply to compromise any attempt to construct a moral theology on Ciceronian principles.​[829]​ In defending his moral theory from Hutcheson’s criticisms in 1739–1740, as we saw in the Introduction, Hume expressly declared that he had adopted Cicero’s De Officiis as his guide. Hume further indicated that Hutcheson, despite his very public admiration for the heathen philosopher, had failed to recognize the full implications of Cicero’s philosophy for a just understanding of the relationship between morality and religious belief. 
Hume increasingly articulated his differences from his compatriots with reference to the ‘different sects or systems’ of the late Hellenistic period. He proposed reviving ‘the happy times, when Atticus and Cassius the Epicureans, Cicero the Academic, and Brutus the Stoic, could, all of them, live in unreserved friendship together’. In this scenario, Hume played the part of Cicero.​[830]​ Hume’s identification with Cicero went beyond a rather conventional yearning for a revival of the libertas philosophandi. In a remarkably similar manner to Locke five decades earlier, Hume privileged Cicero’s methodological approach, qua academic sceptic, as underpinning a ‘science of MAN’ which, like the new way of discovery in natural philosophy, was founded upon experience and empirical observation (T, ‘Introduction’, 4).​[831]​ Hume quite explicitly followed De Officiis in grounding his moral theory on utility and agreeableness alone. As on his reading had Cicero, Hume banished the question of the honestum altogether: ‘whatever is valuable in any kind’, Hume declared, ‘so naturally classes itself under the division of useful or agreeable, the utile or the dulce, that it is not easy to imagine, why we should ever seek farther’ (EPM 72). From his critics’ perspective, Hume appeared to dissolve the distinction between the praised and the objectively praiseworthy; and it was the constant preoccupation of Scottish moralists, particularly from mid-century, to re-establish it.​[832]​ Almost all endeavoured to do so with direct reference to Cicero.​[833]​
Hume’s deliberate presentation of his philosophy as, like Cicero’s, offering a ‘middle-way’ between the rival errors of (modern) Stoics and Epicureans has received insufficient attention from scholars, who have sought to categorize Hume’s thinking as either neo-Epicurean  (following Mandeville and Bayle) or neo-Stoic (albeit of a Hutchesonian/ sentimentalist, rather than Clarkean/ rationalist hue).​[834]​ This has resulted in stalemate: Hume does not fit neatly within either tradition, and was explicitly critical of both.​[835]​ To be sure, Hume’s philosophy appeared distinctly ‘Epicurean’ to his Scottish critics, because unlike them he engaged seriously with Mandeville’s insights.​[836]​ Yet when Hume’s philosophy is considered as an intervention in the debates at the heart of the ‘science of MAN’, a ‘science’ which Hume recognized to be English in provenance, his determination to mediate between Mandeville and his antagonists comes into clearer focus.​[837]​ Meanwhile the tendency to reduce all scepticism in the early modern period to the Pyrrhonian variant has led to interpretations of Hume as a close, if clumsy reader of Sextus: a claim for which, in sharp contrast to his debts to Cicero, there is negligible evidence.​[838]​ As scholars have noted, Hume offers a ‘distorted view of Pyrrhonism’ which is not to be found in Sextus or, indeed, in Bayle’s writings.​[839]​ Yet it bears marked similarities to the account offered by Cicero in Academica, and serves much the same purpose: to emphasize the superiority of academic scepticism as a means of understanding human life.​[840]​ 
The previous chapters have offered what has hitherto been lacking in the scholarly literature: an intellectual context which helps to explain Hume’s determination to distinguish academic scepticism from all other philosophical traditions, ancient and modern.​[841]​ Ciceronian philosophy was for Hume, as for Locke and Middleton, of unique importance for a just understanding of the subject to which he devoted more attention than any other: the relationship between morality and religion. Although scholars have recognized Hume’s reverence for Cicero, they have largely failed to grasp this point.​[842]​ The literature on Hume and Cicero is overwhelmingly preoccupied with two, seemingly separable issues. The first is the nature of Hume’s epistemological scepticism, as developed most comprehensively in Book I of A Treatise; and the second, the position adopted by Hume in a work, the Dialogues, which was clearly modelled on Cicero’s De Natura Deorum.​[843]​ Hume’s presentation of Cicero, however, can tell us a great deal more about his most fundamental philosophical objectives, and how he sought to advance them. 
Sections I and II of this chapter argue that Hume endorsed Locke’s and Middleton’s contention that Cicero had banished final causes, and the honestum, from moral philosophy. This, he maintained, was a necessary consequence of introducing an experimental method into the study of ethics. Yet Hume denied unequivocally that Christianity—or religious belief of any sort—could or needed to provide what philosophy alone could not: a definition of the summum bonum, and the inducements offered to moral conduct by a future state of rewards and punishments. Hume unequivocally confined morality to human life. In this crucial respect Hume departed seminally from Locke’s moral theory, which was concerned above all to relate God’s will to the content of the natural law. In his treatment of the intertwined histories of moral philosophy and theology, Hume articulated this departure with continual reference to Cicero, as illustrated in Section III. 
i.	A ‘New Medium’: Hume’s Early Intellectual Development
In Chapters 1 and 4 it was suggested that Locke and Middleton’s conception of philosophy—what it was for, what it might seek to establish, and how far it could ‘get’ in doing so—underwent a profound alteration at a formative stage in their respective intellectual developments, and that this resulted in a lifelong identification with Cicero’s academic scepticism. There is good reason to suggest that Hume experienced something similar, which informed all of his subsequent writings on the manifold subjects of which he treated, in which he expressed an esteem for Cicero (qua academic sceptic) which was greater than for any other philosopher, ancient or modern. Paradoxical though it may appear, for Hume as for Locke and Middleton before him, this increased reverence for Cicero reflected a far more critical, even negative evaluation of the more general merit of the moral philosophy of the ancients and that of their modern admirers. Cicero was the exception that proved the rule that most philosophers had been, and continued to be, led into error by their excessive optimism or unjustified despondency about philosophy’s reach and capabilities.​[844]​
Although only a few letters written by Hume survive from the crucial period leading up to, and immediately following the publication of A Treatise, they are immensely valuable to any attempt to reconstruct his early intellectual development.​[845]​ Hume’s close reading of Cicero is a constant theme of these years. His interpretation of Cicero nonetheless appears to have altered fundamentally in the aftermath of a prolonged depressive episode which began in 1729, and which Hume described in agonized strains in a letter to an unidentified physician (probably George Cheyne) in 1734.​[846]​ In the 1720s we find Hume reading Cicero more or less as a Stoic; from the early 1730s, there is every indication that Hume’s esteem for Cicero was founded upon his perceived hostility to Stoic moral and religious philosophy. 
Following university Hume’s family intended him for the law but, as he reflected in 1776, his own inclinations were to ‘the pursuits of philosophy and general learning; and while they fancied I was poring upon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors which I was secretly devouring’.​[847]​ Hume’s correspondence from these years bears out this claim. The first extant letter, dated 4 July 1727, finds Hume perusing ‘sometimes a Philosopher, sometimes a Poet’, and specifically mentions his reading of Virgil’s Eclogues and Georgics and Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations. These authors, Hume declared, ‘agree’ in teaching men how to attain the ultimate goal of ‘peace of mind’ (apatheia) in ‘a Liberty & Independancy on Fortune, & Contempt of Riches, Power & Glory’. This ‘pastoral & Saturnian happyness’ demanded contemplative withdrawal from the business of ‘low & ordinary Life’, as ‘Greatness & Elevation of Soul is to be found only in Study & contemplation’. This exercise in self-mastery and constancy was arduous, and to this end ‘I wisely practice my Rules; which prescribe to check our Appetite’.​[848]​ In this endeavour it is likely that Hume also turned for guidance, as did many of his contemporaries, to Shaftesbury’s Characteristics, a copy of the third edition (1723) of which he had procured by 1726.​[849]​
Hume’s letter to the physician offered ‘a kind of History of my Life’, the better to ‘open up to you the present Condition of my health’. This rich document needs to be read with some care.​[850]​ Hume refers once more to his youthful attraction to ‘Books of Reasoning & Philosophy, & to Poetry & the polite Authors’. His illness, Hume suggests, disabused him of this early admiration for the Stoic ideal of self-mastery. Instead, Hume ‘found a certain Boldness of Temper, growing in me’ to ‘seek out some new Medium, by which truth might be establisht’ in ‘the most fundamental Articles’ of philosophy and criticism. At the age of ‘about 18’ (c.1729), Hume continued, ‘there seemed to be open’d up to me a new Scene of Thought, which transported me beyond Measure’.​[851]​ We do not know what this ‘new Scene’ was: for Norman Kemp-Smith, it was the discovery of Hutcheson’s sentimentalist moral theory; for John Robertson and Mikko Tolonen, it reflected Hume’s reading of Bayle and Mandeville, whose Fable Part II was published in that year.​[852]​ Of the two interpretations, the latter appears the more plausible. Hume’s growing disenchantment with Stoic philosophy is consistent with insights offered by Bayle and Mandeville, but not Hutcheson. We know that, by 1732, Hume had found ‘Diversion & Improvement’ in Bayle’s writings, and recent research has established the interest in and circulation of Bayle’s collected works in Scotland in the late 1720s.​[853]​ Meanwhile Hume’s writings from the early 1730s indicate a close acquaintance with Mandeville’s works.​[854]​ A fragmentary manuscript essay on chivalry, which probably dates from these years, betrays Hume’s keen interest in the artificial codes of honour and politeness which Mandeville analysed in highly distinctive fashion in Origin of Honour (1732).​[855]​ In this period Hume also filled an ‘old Manuscript Book’, which he subsequently committed to the flames, with his sceptical thoughts on the philosophical foundations of religious belief. In this ‘perpetual struggle of a restless Imagination against Inclination, perhaps against Reason’, Bayle and Mandeville’s sceptical evaluations of natural religion might well have played a part.​[856]​  
Either way, Hume suggested that a ‘new Scene’ only ‘seemed to be open’d up’ to him in 1729. Hume rapidly recognized this to be another false start, something indicated by his comment that it ‘transported me beyond Measure’. It was, instead, from 1731 that Hume’s ‘inflam’d Imaginations’ finally cooled, allowing him to ‘consider seriously, how I shou’d proceed in my Philosophical Enquiries’.​[857]​ If the ‘new Scene’ represents Hume’s encounter with the neo-Epicurean tradition, then Hume’s initial enthusiasm for its insights did not last long.​[858]​ Neither Mandeville and Bayle, nor Shaftesbury and Hutcheson could provide the ‘new Medium’ for which Hume now sought. Hume’s aim was precisely to mediate between their antagonistic philosophical methodologies and the moral theories to which they gave rise. Here Hume’s determination to strike a new course reflected a mounting conviction that modern philosophical debate in Britain was indebted to classical moral philosophy, the value of which Hume now questioned:
I found that the moral Philosophy transmitted to us by Antiquity, labor’d under the same Inconvenience that has been found in their natural Philosophy, of being entirely Hypothetical, & depending more upon Invention than Experience. Every one consulted his Fancy in erecting Schemes of Virtue & of Happiness, without regarding human Nature, upon which every moral Conclusion must depend. This therefore I resolved to make my principal Study, & the Source from which I wou’d derive every Truth in Criticism as well as Morality.​[859]​
It was for this reason that Hume did not exclude the pioneers of the ‘science of MAN’ from his subsequent observation, in A Treatise, that ‘moral philosophy is in the same condition as natural, with regard to astronomy before the time of Copernicus’ (T 2.1.4: 30). 
The indebtedness of modern moral philosophy to the ancients was most directly discussed by Hume in the second Enquiry (1751). Hume observed that in the ancient world, the ‘cant of the STOICS and CYNICS concerning virtue’, and their ‘magnificent pretensions and slender performances, bred a disgust in mankind’. This incited antagonists such as Lucian, who was, ‘in other respects, a very moral writer’, to speak of virtue with pronounced ‘symptoms of spleen and irony’, and satirically to reduce all the springs of human action to base self-love (EPM 53).​[860]​ If Plato and Ovid depicted the ‘poetical fiction of the golden age’, in which man was naturally sociable, benevolent, and drawn to the universal good, then this was met with ‘the philosophical fiction of the state of nature’ in which man by nature was timorous, unsociable, and self-interested (EPM 17 n.11). Recent philosophical debate in Britain—and, by 1751, in France given Rousseau’s intervention—had quite clearly followed a similar course with Hobbes, Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Butler, and Hutcheson:
In this kingdom, such continued ostentation, of late years, has prevailed among men in active life with regard to public spirit, and among those in speculative with regard to benevolence; and so many false pretensions to each have been, no doubt, detected, that men of the world are apt, without any bad intention, to discover a sullen incredulity on the head of those moral endowments, and even sometimes absolutely to deny their existence and reality. (EPM 53)​[861]​
Hume’s disparagement from 1731 of the value of ancient moral philosophy, and of a modern philosophy indebted to it, laid the foundations for all of his subsequent ‘Philosophical Enquiries’. Hume proposed ‘a total Alteration in Philosophy’, which fully explored the implications of Locke’s insight that any theory of human nature had to be established ‘entirely upon experience’ and could ‘never arrive at ultimate principles’.​[862]​ Notwithstanding his low opinion of classical moral philosophy, Hume strongly indicated that one ancient philosopher offered a guide here. This was Cicero. Tusculan Disputations remained a favourite work, but Hume’s interpretation of its meaning and significance had altered in profound ways.
This is most clearly indicated by Hume’s response, in September 1739, to Hutcheson’s criticisms of a draft of Book III (‘Of Morals’) of A Treatise. This was discussed, briefly, in the Introduction, but merits closer analysis. In an earlier letter to their mutual friend Henry Home in April, Hutcheson had expressed a qualified esteem for Books I-II, and a sympathy with Hume’s epistemological scepticism in the work (most famously expressed at T 1.4.7).​[863]​ ‘I have’, Hutcheson informed Home, ‘for many years been . . . more and more . . . running into the Old Academy, despairing of Certainty in the most important subjects, but satisfied with a sort of Probable knowledge which to an honest mind will be sufficient for the Conduct of Life.’​[864]​ Unlike later critics such as William Wishart and James Beattie, it seems that Hutcheson interpreted Hume’s epistemological scepticism in the spirit in which, Hume suggested in 1745, it was intended: it was a ‘Jeux d’esprit’, meant to ‘abate the Pride of mere human Reasoners’. Hume appealed to the authority of ‘Socrates the wisest and most religious of the Greek Philosophers, as well as Cicero among the Romans’. Both philosophers had ‘carried their Philosophical Doubts to the highest Degree of Scepticism’, whilst nonetheless recognising that such extravagant scepticism, ‘by destroying every Thing, really affects nothing, and was never intended to be understood seriously’. Hume qualified this statement by conceding that one line of argument was undermined by such scepticism: ‘nothing is affected by it but the metaphysical Argument a priori’, as presented by Samuel Clarke and his followers.​[865]​ This exception, unsurprisingly, did not trouble Hutcheson.
Upon reading a draft of Book III, however, Hutcheson changed his tune. Hutcheson, following Locke, was quite content to accept that we have to remain ‘satisfied with a sort of Probable knowledge’, and in April Hutcheson had expressed a desire to meet with Hume, perhaps to discuss where such probable knowledge could (and could not) lead.​[866]​ What now concerned Hutcheson was what Hume claimed in Book III could be established with some degree of certainty in moral subjects on the basis of such probable reasoning—and the implications of these conclusions for moral theology. Hume emphasized the centrality of public utility and agreeableness in shaping the moral distinctions and ‘artificial’ rules of justice that developed as men lived together in society. The philosopher could explain how this process occurred; but he could not draw any determinate conclusions regarding man’s purpose or end, and thereby declare particular moral codes or practices to accord with or diverge from what was true or ‘natural’. Any moral system that claimed to lead men pedagogically into the path of true virtue necessarily presupposed the existence of criteria by which to establish man’s ultimate end. Hume, like Mandeville, described his approach as that of the anatomist, deeply sceptical of Shaftesbury’s and Hutcheson’s conception of philosophy and its purpose.​[867]​ Hutcheson’s criticism regarding Hume’s lack of ‘Warmth in the Cause of Virtue’ touches upon precisely this point. Hume’s response was unrepentant: Hutcheson’s ethical theory, like Shaftesbury’s, remained ‘founded on final Causes; which is a consideration, that appears to me pretty uncertain & unphilosophical. For pray, what is the End of Man? Is he created for Happiness or for Virtue? For this Life or the next? For himself or for his Maker?’ The science of man could not, and need not, be erected upon such ungrounded hypotheses regarding the summum bonum.​[868]​ 
In defending Book III from Hutcheson’s criticisms, Hume turned to Cicero. Hume noted that ‘[y]ou are a great Admirer of Cicero, as well as I am’, and he professed to have drawn his ‘Catalogue of Virtues from Cicero’s Offices’: ‘I had, indeed, the former Book in my Eye in all my Reasonings’. Hume invited Hutcheson to ‘review’ De Officiis: and, crucially, to reconsider its relationship to De Finibus, where Cicero directly discussed the question of the honestum. If he did so, Hume was confident that Hutcheson would be compelled to accept the validity of the treatment of morals and justice offered in A Treatise. In De Officiis Cicero discussed virtue and the rules of justice almost exclusively in terms of their agreeableness and utility, both to oneself and others: that is, without any reference whatsoever to man’s ultimate end. In De Finibus, meanwhile, the definition of the summum bonum furnished by the Stoic, Cato in Book III had, in Book IV, been refuted by the academic sceptic (Cicero himself).​[869]​ Cicero accused Cato of an excessively restricted, narrow view of virtue. Hume criticized Hutcheson’s moral theory in identical fashion. ‘I have always thought’, Hume confessed in a subsequent letter of 1743, that ‘you limited too much your Ideas of Virtue’ by focusing so narrowly on benevolence, on account of being ‘so much afraid to derive any thing of Virtue from Artifice or human Conventions’.​[870]​ Cicero’s critique of Cato ‘proves’, Hume declared, ‘that to every virtuous Action there must be a Motive or impelling Passion distinct from the Virtue, & that Virtue can never be the sole Motive to any Action’. Virtue could not be its own reward (cf. T 3.2.1.4).​[871]​ As an academic sceptic, Hume argued, Cicero’s works provided what Stoic moral theory could not—an account of men’s motives to morality and justice—without focusing exclusively on self-love and denying the naturalness of virtue altogether.
As the Philosophiae Moralis made clear, this was an interpretation of the relationship between De Officiis and De Finibus with which Hutcheson fundamentally disagreed. Hutcheson maintained that, in De Officiis, Cicero had provided a theory of politeness rather than anything which might legitimately be called a theory of morals. The work was intended merely ‘to shew how persons in higher stations, already well instructed in the fundamentals of moral philosophy, should so conduct themselves in life, that in perfect consistence with virtue they may obtain great interest, power, popularity, high offices and glory’. Cicero’s ‘doctrine concerning Virtue, and the supreme good, which is the principal part of ethics, is to be found elsewhere’: not least in De Finibus, where Cicero supposedly endorsed the arguments of his Stoic interlocutor, Cato. In no sense had Cicero banished the question of the summum bonum from moral philosophy. Consequently Cicero clearly distinguished, as Hutcheson’s 1725 epigraph from De Officiis indicated, between those qualities which were in practice esteemed by men in common life, and those which were genuinely (objectively) praiseworthy and truly virtuous. In his moral philosophy, in short, Cicero ‘follows the Stoics, and uses their way of treating this subject’, and ‘’tis well known that the Stoics made such a difference between virtue, which they counted the sole good, and the officia, or external duties of life, that they counted these duties among the things indifferent, neither morally good nor evil’.​[872]​
The correspondence with Hutcheson indicates that Hume drew a further, very important conclusion from insights gleaned from his reading of Cicero: one that also struck at the heart of Locke’s moral theology which, as we have been seen, was articulated with continual reference to Cicero as an academic sceptic. To invoke God as the creator, preserver, and moral legislator of the universe, and the true object of man’s gratitude and love, to vindicate an account of man’s ultimate end was entirely mistaken. Since morality, as Hutcheson himself had emphasized, ‘is determined merely by Sentiment, it regards only human Nature & human Life’, as it was dependent on an affective psychology which, in all likelihood, the deity did not share. This was a conclusion, Hume recognized, which Hutcheson and many others besides were likely to find highly objectionable. Indeed, Hume protested that he regretted having to draw it (‘I wish from my Heart, I cou[l]d avoid concluding . . . ’): the ‘Consequences’ of doing so were ‘very momentous’ for an understanding of the relationship between religion and morality.​[873]​ It was nonetheless inescapable if one applied the experimental method to moral subjects, and worked from effect to cause: a philosophical approach which Hutcheson himself claimed to endorse.​[874]​ 
Hume’s rejection of moral theology was constructed, like Locke’s earlier, influential articulation of it, upon Ciceronian foundations. Hume’s response to Hutcheson invites this interpretation. A letter to William Mure of 1743, in which he returned to the question of piety and its relationship to morality, confirms it. Here Hume notes that men are naturally attuned to experience ‘love and gratitude for whatever is benevolent and beneficial’. This echoed Cicero’s claim in De Officiis that ‘we are compelled by nature to love those in whom we believe those virtues to reside’.​[875]​ Although a deity might possess ‘these attributes in the highest perfection’, Hume continued, it was nonetheless the case that ‘he is not the natural object of any passion or affection’. Hume observed that even a ‘remote ancestor, who has left us estates and honours’ was sufficiently ‘unknown to us’ as to fail to stimulate any considerable affection or gratitude. This being so, how could such sentiments be felt towards ‘an invisible infinite spirit’ that was utterly incomprehensible to man?​[876]​ This example of the remote ancestor was lifted, without acknowledgement, from Cicero’s De Natura Deorum.​[877]​ In that work the academic sceptic, Cotta, pronounced both justice and morality to be ‘the offspring of human society and of the commonwealth of man’.​[878]​ Cotta continued that ‘the divine bestowal of reason upon man is not in itself an act of beneficence, like the bequest of an estate’. The latter act stimulated a degree of affection and gratitude towards one’s (immediate) benefactor, whereas men experienced no such sentiments with regard to any deity.​[879]​ Meanwhile, Cotta observed, ‘our virtue is a just ground for others’ praise and a right reason for our own pride, and this would not be so if the gift of virtue came to us from a god and not from ourselves’.​[880]​ 
There were two, important conclusions to be drawn from Cicero’s insight, Hume suggested. The first was that piety and religious devotion are both unnatural and potentially corrupting of men’s affective responses. ‘A man, therefore, may have his heart perfectly well disposed towards every proper and natural object of affection, friends, benefactors, country, children, etc., and yet from this circumstance of the invisibility and incomprehensibility of the deity may feel no affection towards him’. This, Hume concluded, was exactly as it should be. Only enthusiasts and fanatics would demand that men’s hearts burn with a love of God; and, to the extent that they did, it was likely that their affection for those ‘natural objects’ (‘friends, benefactors, country, children, etc.’) would diminish proportionally.​[881]​ For prudential reasons, Hume had not explicitly developed this point in the published version of A Treatise. Hume’s increased intellectual confidence and willingness to articulate his divergence from his contemporaries led him to reintegrate into his later writings those ‘noble Parts’ of A Treatise which had been ‘castrated’ for prudential reasons in 1737.​[882]​ In the Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding (1748: later presented as the first Enquiry) Hume included the discussion of miracles, which was originally intended for inclusion in Book I of A Treatise and was subsequently revised to take account of Middleton’s Free Inquiry.​[883]​ Hume’s concerted discussion of the moral consequences of belief in a future state, which had only been touched upon briefly in A Treatise (T 1.3.9: 13), similarly found a home in the Philosophical Essays. Meanwhile Hume’s most concerted interrogation of the moral arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul would only be published posthumously, and anonymously, in the Two Essays (1777): an indication of just how incendiary, and yet essential, Hume recognized this question to be.​[884]​ With the (re-)inclusion of these treatments of fundamental tenets of moral theology, Hume’s overriding objective fully to explore the implications of experience-based reasoning for an understanding of morality, and its ‘momentous’ consequences for moral theology, emerges more clearly. So, too, does Hume’s conviction that Locke and his successors had failed properly to undertake this task.​[885]​
The second conclusion invited by Cicero’s claim in De Natura Deorum, and discussed by Hume in the letter to Mure, was that conventional (Christian) ideas of virtue needed to be radically redefined. Cicero’s insight that it was precisely because virtue was confined to human life that it stimulated (justified) pride in the individual and elicited the approval of observers lay at the heart of Hume’s attempt to do so. So, too, did the contention that both justice and morality were contingent, and developed in tandem according to the continually-fluctuating dictates of public convenience. When he came to ‘cast’ the Treatise ‘anew’ in the Enquiries, Hume made much clearer his fundamental objective to offer a ‘new Medium’ between neo-Stoic and neo-Epicurean moral theories.​[886]​ He did so, in part, by placing his philosophical arguments—and those of his antagonists—in a more direct relation to the late Hellenistic philosophical traditions. By this means Hume more firmly aligned his philosophy with Cicero and laboured to define the particular variant of scepticism which he endorsed as that of the New Academy. In the Philosophical Essays, Hume took pains to distinguish between two, distinct species of sceptical philosophy: the Pyrrhonian, identified with Sextus, and the Academic, associated with Cicero. ‘PYRRHONISM’, Hume declared, could not be refuted by either the ‘STOIC or EPICUREAN’, the only two philosophies the principles of which were intended to ‘have an effect on conduct and behaviour’: that is, to provide a guide to life independent of custom. Sextus’ presentation of Pyrrhonism as the means to acquire tranquillity, however, was as misplaced and unnatural as the Stoic’s apatheia or the Epicurean’s ataraxia. No man could, in practice, ‘look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another’ and thereby suspend his judgement, as all men had to ‘act and reason and believe’ (EHU 119).​[887]​ Academic scepticism, Hume argued, was alone able to explain why men in practice formed judgements of good and ill, true and false: the academic, unlike the Pyrrhonian sceptic could live his scepticism. This classical framework also allowed Hume to put greater distance between himself and Mandeville, dropping the language of artifice which he had employed in his discussion of justice in A Treatise and which so antagonized Hutcheson.​[888]​ Yet it also resulted in Hume more clearly expressing his distaste for the broadly Stoic moral philosophy to which Hutcheson and his admirers in Scotland remained attached, and to which Hume had paid lip-service in the revised (published) version of Book III of A Treatise.​[889]​
ii.	From Moral Theology to Moral Philosophy: Virtue and Pride
In Book I of A Treatise Hume invited his reader to recognize how his theory of ideas built upon and extended insights offered in Locke’s Essay: a point widely noted in a scholarship overwhelmingly preoccupied with Hume’s epistemology.​[890]​ Yet Hume’s engagement, in Books II and III, with Locke’s moral theory has been neglected. Hume understood Locke to occupy a rather liminal position within the classically-grounded philosophical framework he adopted from the later 1740s. Unlike a number of modern commentators, Hume did not associate Locke’s moral philosophy with the ‘abstract theory of morals’ developed by Clarke and Cudworth, which ‘excludes all sentiment, and pretends to found every thing on reason’.​[891]​ Hume instead read Locke’s moral theory (as had Newton and Shaftesbury) as ‘EPICUREAN or HOBBIST’, concluding that ‘no passion is, or can be, disinterested’, and that all apparently benevolent action stems ultimately from the principle of self-love (EPM 22 n.12; 91). This explained why Locke had failed to recognize that ‘our stronger perceptions or impressions are innate, and that natural affection, love of virtue, resentment, and all the other passions, arise immediately from nature’, and were ‘a kind of natural instinct’.​[892]​ As discussed in Chapter 1, Locke’s moral theory was indeed indebted both to Hobbes and to a European, Augustinian-Epicurean tradition as represented by Nicole in his Essais; yet it was nonetheless distinctive in offering a far more constructive, naturalistic account of how men’s passions, desires, and moral ideas are moulded in society on account of their ineffaceable concern for the good opinion of others. This, for Locke, rendered the individual malleable in ways which allowed for their habituation into a shared moral language without the need for a Hobbesian ‘mortal God’. There is every reason to think that Hume recognized the largely beneficial role played by social constraint in Locke’s moral theory. As Hume’s Treatise illustrated, this potentially allowed for a more capacious, Ciceronian ‘Catalogue of the Virtues’ to that offered by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. It also enabled a critique of Mandeville, who stuck rigidly to a Christian-Stoic definition of virtue as autonomous (and rational) self-restraint.
In the explanation offered in A Treatise of how men’s estimations of their interests became harmonized within society, Hume focused upon what he called the ‘indirect’ passions natural to man—pride and humility, love and hatred—which he considered Locke to have overlooked in his concern with innate ideas.​[893]​ Hume was particularly concerned with pride, and here his close reading of Mandeville is palpable. Yet Hume, as to an extent had Locke, refused automatically to associate pride, the desire to think well of oneself, with vice. Mandeville had been quite correct to underline its importance in man’s development from rudeness to refinement; but any philosophy which then defined virtue (the honestum) in opposition to the agreeable and useful hardly had claims to be taken seriously. This was a point later made particularly forcefully by Hume in the Political Discourses (1752), a collection of essays which endeavoured to offer what Mandeville had not: a moral justification for modern, commercial society, and a more systematic analysis of the principles of political economy.​[894]​ With Mandeville in mind, Hume asked: ‘Is it not very inconsistent for an author to assert in one page, that moral distinctions are inventions of politicians for public interest; and in the next page maintain, that vice is advantageous to the public? And indeed it seems upon any system of morality, little less than a contradiction in terms, to talk of a vice, which is in general beneficial to society.’​[895]​ This was a point already touched upon by Locke, who argued that God in His goodness had forged an inseparable connection between virtue and public utility.​[896]​ 
In A Treatise Hume anticipated that men ‘accustom’d to the style of the schools and pulpit’ would no doubt be surprized by his claim that virtue could excite pride, or vice arouse humility. These pairs were all too frequently presented, as by Mandeville, as opposites (T 2.1.7: 8). On this point, Hume’s inveterate hostility, which he shared with Middleton, to ‘celibacy, fasting, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues’ peddled by ‘the gloomy, hair-brained enthusiast’ found expression. As Hume noted in the second Enquiry, this placed ‘the selfish and the social sentiments or dispositions’ in diametrical opposition (EPM 73; 81). Here Hume developed the claim first made in 1739 to Hutcheson. Cicero’s aversion to ‘narrow systems’ ensured that he offered a more generous definition of virtue: in the course of common life, men approved of those qualities, in themselves and others, which were found to be communally useful and agreeable. Since the ‘monkish virtues’ were neither useful nor agreeable to oneself or others, they naturally aroused sentiments of disapprobation and were more properly deemed vices. Hume, professing to follow Cicero, emphasized the pleasure that naturally resulted from the justified ‘merit of pride or esteem’ when well-regulated (EPM 106 n.72). Pride (or self-love), as Cicero had recognized, was itself ‘indifferent, and may be either good or bad, according as it is well or ill-founded’ (EPM 103 n.66). As Hume made a point of emphasizing, those ‘virtues’ which he set centre-stage in the Treatise and the second Enquiry—magnanimity, and a love of fame—were routinely decried by ‘many religious disclaimers’ as ‘purely pagan and natural’ (T 3.2.2: 13). Hume agreed. It was on these ‘pagan and natural’ foundations that Hume quite explicitly erected his own moral theory (EPM 108–109). By failing to do likewise, Mandeville had been unable to offer a sufficiently naturalistic, ‘anatomical’ theory of morals and justice.
In A Treatise Hume explained how our ‘love’ for others is indelibly associated with self-love (T 2.1.2; 2.2.1). ‘Benevolence’, our active desire for the happiness of another, is conjoined to love, even as it by no means always accompanies it, ‘by the original constitution of the mind’ (T 2.2.6: 6). Taste, not their inherent properties, determines the perceived worth of qualities or possessions; and this is dictated by ‘custom and ‘practice’, which have ‘settled the just value of every thing’ (T 2.1.6: 9). (This was a line of argument extended to our aesthetic responses by Hume in a later essay of 1757 entitled ‘Of the Standard of Taste’.)​[897]​ As for both Locke and Mandeville, in their different ways, man’s pride and ‘love of fame’ rendered the individual pliable: it ensures that what they find agreeable or disagreeable, pleasurable or painful alters significantly but quite naturally through their interactions with others within society. ‘The most obvious and remarkable property’ of pride and its antonym, shame, is precisely ‘the vast variety of subjects, on which they may be placed’, which was determined largely by ‘the opinions and sentiments of others’ (T 2.1.2: 5). It was this malleability of those indirect passions innate to human nature which explained how a sense of common interest might have developed among men without any need for Hobbes’s Leviathan or Mandeville’s cunning politician. Even ‘men of the greatest judgment and understanding’, Hume declared, ‘find it very difficult to follow their own reason and inclination, in opposition to that of their friends and daily companions’ (T 2.1.11: 1–2). To be esteemed was a source of pleasure which exceeded all others. Even if ‘all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and obey one man’, he would ‘still be miserable, till you give him some one person at least, with whom he may share his happiness, and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy’ (T 2.2.5: 15). Here Hume echoed Locke’s claim that ‘[o]ur reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others’.​[898]​ As we saw in Chapter 1, on this point Locke drew from a source which Hume similarly had in his eye in all his reasonings: Cicero’s De Officiis.
A further, innate property of human nature was crucial in the account Hume offered: sympathy.​[899]​ It is worth recalling that Locke had emphasized in the Second Treatise how ‘the mutual influence, sympathy, and connexion’ between individuals altered their ideas in society of what was estimable or opprobrious.​[900]​ It was for this reason, Locke had argued, that the ‘Law of Reputation’ (itself guided by public utility) allowed societies to cohere even in the absence of political authority. Locke, however, had not provided a compelling psychological and sociological account of how this process occurred. This deficiency was rectified by Hume, who introduced the principle of sympathy in a section of A Treatise (T 2.1.11) which was entitled ‘Of the Love of Fame’.​[901]​ In the second Enquiry, Hume rendered the principle of ‘sympathy’ synonymous with ‘humanity’. Humanitas is a prevalent concept in Cicero’s philosophical writings, one that encouraged a distinctly rhetorical treatment of the interplay between men’s sentiments within society (EPM 45–46).​[902]​ 
No quality of human nature, Hume declared, is more remarkable ‘both in itself and in its consequences’ than sympathy, which allows individuals ‘to receive by communication’ the ‘inclinations and sentiments’ of others, ‘however different from, or even contrary to our own’. The more closely one perceives oneself to be related to another—whether on the basis of shared ‘manners, or character, or country, or language’—the greater one’s propensity to sympathize with them, and to convert their feelings into impressions that are as vivid as our own. It is to the principle of sympathy, Hume argued, ‘that we ought to ascribe the great uniformity we may observe in the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation’, not least regarding ideas of virtue and vice.​[903]​ Crucially, sympathy enlivens the indirect passions, thereby heightening the degree of pleasure or pain they cause. Since sympathy depends upon the interpersonal commerce of sentiments, this makes man an inescapably social, if not naturally sociable animal (T 2.1.11). Sympathy, or humanity, is that ‘particle of the dove, kneaded into our frame’ which, in the second Enquiry, Hume argued could alone provide ‘the foundation of any general system and established theory of blame or approbation’ (EPM 74). Sympathy, or humanity, was crucial to Hume’s ethical naturalism. It explained why self-interest and the public good—and, in Ciceronian language, the useful and the agreeable—are brought into harmony as societies develop. The existence of sympathy had been denied by theorists of self-love and overlooked by their neo-Stoic antagonists.
As Hume emphasized in the second Enquiry, sympathy, which saw men become increasingly sociable and interdependent through iterative interactions with others, explained why the line between the natural and conventional became blurred, as men’s affective responses (and ideas of the good and just) altered insensibly within society. Cicero was a rare example of a philosopher who had appreciated the true relationship between natural and civil law. As he noted to Hutcheson, Hume’s own treatment of this subject allowed for a ‘new medium’ between the rival theories of Grotius and Pufendorf, even as this was not uppermost in Hume’s mind when writing A Treatise.​[904]​ Cicero, Hume declared, ‘supposes it certain’ that ‘there was once a time when neither natural nor civil law had yet been defined’ (EPM 54). Man in his natural state was not imbued with a sense of right and wrong, justice and injustice. As had Mandeville, Hume dismissed as unphilosophical Hutcheson’s notion of the moral sense as a discrete faculty within human nature (T 3.2.1: 11–12). He similarly ridiculed Shaftesbury’s idea that the virtuous man was ‘happily directed by right reason’ to expand his moral vision so as to identify his own interest with that of the ‘Universal good, or the interest of the world in general, [which] is a kind of remote philosophical object’.​[905]​ Such neo-Stoic accounts tended to privilege individual autonomy over social relations, which for Hume created rather than threatened the individual’s moral character, integrity, and selflessness, and alone imposed restraints on men’s socially-destructive tendencies.​[906]​ In this respect the philosophy of ‘EPICTETUS, and other STOICS’ represented ‘only a more refined system of selfishness’ to that offered by Epicurus, by means of which we ‘reason ourselves out of all virtue, as well as social enjoyment’ (EHU 35).​[907]​
As Hume observed to Hutcheson in 1739, Cicero had recognized that the Stoics had been unable to explain men’s motives to virtue and justice. Yet in the Enquiry Hume nonetheless observed that Cicero, unlike Hobbes or the Mandeville of the 1714 Fable, had not concluded from this insight that civil law (political authority) was required to bring moral norms—subsequently defined as the precepts of a law of nature—into being. Here academic scepticism revealed most clearly how ‘systems and hypotheses have perverted our natural understanding’, most disastrously when ‘explaining the origin of moral good and evil’ (EPM 34). Cicero’s ‘natural, unforced interpretation’ of the phenomena of human life had led him, like Hume, to locate the origin of morality in men’s shared humanity. He was nonetheless able—as Hume, in 1742, noted that Hutcheson was not—to accept the conventional foundations and historically-conditioned and contingent nature of both moral distinctions and the rules of justice (T 3.2.8; EPM 54, 17 n.11). Cicero, followed by Hume, offered a corrective to ‘certain writers on morals, who seem to have employ’d their utmost efforts to extirpate all sense of virtue from among mankind’ (T 3.2.2: 25). That Hume had Mandeville in mind became clear when he further criticized those who represent ‘all moral distinctions as the effect of artifice and education, when skilful politicians endeavour’d to restrain the turbulent passions of man, and make them operate to the public good, by notions of honour and shame’ (T 3.3.1: 11). 
Hume nonetheless accepted the essentially Mandevillean/Hobbesian point that ‘’tis only from the selfishness and confin’d generosity of man, along with the scanty provisions nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origins’ (T 3.2.2: 13–18).​[908]​ Men’s innate sympathy was, like that of animals, severely limited in his natural state.​[909]​ Prior to government, men might have been able to agree on unspoken general rules regarding justice and property as mutual utility dictated; yet in the absence of political authority those rules remained precarious, not least when a society was faced with the threat of external aggressors (T 3.2.8: 1). Consequently, the necessity for law and for an authority to enforce it would have been apparent to men ‘upon the least reflection’ (T 3.2.2: 13–18). What Hume termed the ‘artificial virtues’, most especially fidelity, nonetheless provided the foundation for government and for political obligation: unless, in their pre-political state, men had been able to ‘taste . . . the sweets of society and mutual assistance’, government could not have come into being (T 3.2.8: 8). Their failure to recognize the innate principle of sympathy ensured that neo-Epicureans (including Locke) were incapable of explaining how a sense of obligation to adhere to compacts (and to positive law) had become moralized. Hume accepted that ‘self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice’; yet ‘a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue’ (T 3.2.2: 24). As the communal utility of such artificial conventions and rules became ever-more apparent, so men came ‘naturally’ to take pleasure in adhering to them, and to scorn those who transgressed. This ensured, Hume concluded, that the utile and the dulce, as Cicero similarly observed, developed in some degree of harmony. This was sufficient to explain men’s sense of moral, as well as political obligation (T 2.3.5; 3.2.7: 11).
Natural and positive law developed in tandem and were inseparable. In Hume’s hands both virtue and natural law theories were rendered entirely functional and grounded in human nature as it revealed itself over historical time through iterative social interactions. The content of both was directed ultimately by what was found to be useful and agreeable in practice and could only be judged against this continually-fluctuating standard.​[910]​ It was simply an undeniable fact, and here Hume echoed Mandeville, that every man loved himself more than others. This only carried negative moral connotations if set against an idea of man’s ultimate end that philosophy was quite unable to ascertain (or revelation to provide).​[911]​ Ciceronian academic scepticism rejected the specious ‘distinction betwixt voluntary and involuntary’ action drawn by moral philosophers—of both neo-Stoic and Augustinian-Epicurean persuasions—in order to define as ‘virtuous’ only those qualities and actions which were performed disinterestedly in conscious reference to man’s ‘true’ end (T 2.3.2: 2; 3.3.4: 4).​[912]​ As Hume put it in the Enquiry, recapitulating his claims in his earlier letter to Hutcheson: ‘I suppose, if CICERO were now alive, it would be found difficult to fetter his moral sentiments by narrow systems; or to persuade him that no qualities were to be admitted as virtues, or acknowledged to be a part of personal merit, but what were recommended by The Whole Duty of Man’ (EPM, 106 n.72).​[913]​ It was for this reason that Hume dismissed contemporary debates regarding what qualities in human nature were ‘entitled to the denomination of virtue’ as a question for ‘grammarians’ (T 3.3.4: 4). The abiding concern evinced by Mandeville, no less than Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, to distinguish between the officium and finus, prudence and virtue, interested and disinterested motives for conduct was pithily dismissed by Hume as an inconsequential dispute over words. 
Locke, meanwhile, had offered a hedonic theory of motivation in which utility and agreeableness occupied a central place; but he proceeded to explain how the doctrine of a future state ensured that ‘the measures of Good and Evil, that govern [a man’s] choice [in common life], are mightily changed’.​[914]​ Hume quite explicitly confined himself to the useful and agreeable in this life. ‘There never was’, Hume declared, ‘any quality recommended by any one, as a virtue or moral excellence, but on account of its being useful, or agreeable to a man himself, or to others. For what other reason can ever be assigned for praise or approbation?’ (EPM 118). Locke’s attempt to place his hedonic psychology within the framework of a divine teleology, in which men’s affective responses were explained by God’s design and intentions for His creatures, was similarly misguided. Hume echoed Locke in noting that ‘the distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the pleasure or pain, which results from the view of any sentiment, or character’ (T 3.2.8: 8).​[915]​ Yet to ‘push your enquiries further, and desire a reason, why he hates pain’ was nonsensical and futile: pain, like pleasure, ‘is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object’ (EHU 88). Here Hume’s point is clear: there was no need, or possibility, for philosophers to ‘seek farther’ than this, in an attempt to reconcile the utile and dulce with a definition of the honestum (that which is praiseworthy in itself). Any such notion relied upon a definition of the summum bonum—for Locke, found in God’s will and the prospect of ‘endless Happiness, or exquisite Misery’ in the ‘hereafter’—which, as Hume observed to Hutcheson in 1739, would inevitably rely in turn on a groundless hypothesis of some sort or other.​[916]​ Hume banished the honestum from his experimental ‘science of MAN’, and rendered the question of man’s true end a purely ‘verbal’ controversy of no consequence for an understanding of human life.​[917]​ The ‘consequences’ of this were as ‘momentous’ for an understanding of religion as they were for moral philosophy—a point to which we now turn.
iii.	Rewriting Cicero for a Christian Age: Hume’s Writings on Religion
The two-year period spent by Hume at his family’s country estate in the Scottish borders, Ninewells, between April 1749 and July 1751 was one of quite remarkable productivity.​[918]​ Hume immersed himself in study, including a thorough reading (or, in some cases, re-reading) of Greek and Roman literature.​[919]​ This resulted in a slew of publications, which in the current climate would score highly according to the criteria imposed on British academics by the Research Excellence Framework: all were undeniably ‘world-leading in terms of originality, significance, and rigour’.​[920]​ This included not only the second Enquiry and the Political Discourses, but also a first draft of the Dialogues and, in all likelihood, the ‘Natural History of Religion’ (eventually published in the Four Dissertations of 1757).​[921]​ 
These works share a real unity of purpose. If Hume quite consciously modelled the second Enquiry on Cicero’s De Officiis, then the Dialogues was clearly intended to be recognized as a rewriting of De Natura Deorum.​[922]​ In both, Hume endeavoured to push back against what he saw to be a relatively recent development. ‘In later times’, Hume observed in the second Enquiry, ‘philosophy of all kinds, especially ethics, have been more closely united with theology than ever they were observed to be among the Heathens’ (EPM 108–109). For all its promise, the ‘science of MAN’ was implicated in this development. This is indicated by the assertion by the philosophical theist, Cleanthes, in the Dialogues that ‘Locke seems to have been the first Christian, who ventured openly to assert, that faith was nothing but a species of reason, that religion was only a branch of philosophy’ (DNR I: 14).​[923]​ It was only in these ‘later times’ that moral philosophers had concluded, with Locke, that ‘the taking away of God, even only in thought, dissolves all’.​[924]​ In the ancient world, in contrast, questions regarding the existence of a theistic god, providence, or a future state were recognized by philosophers of every stripe to be purely speculative, of no practical consequence for ‘the ties of morality’ or ‘the peace of civil society’ (EPM 101).​[925]​ As a result, with the occasional exception, the ancient philosophers had not been prosecuted (or persecuted) for their opinions on religious questions.​[926]​ Epicurus, who banished the gods from human life, ‘lived in ATHENS to an advanced age, in peace and tranquillity’, and had even been ‘admitted to the sacerdotal character, and to officiate at the altar, in the most sacred rites of the established religion’ (EPM 100–101).​[927]​ In a Christian age, however, the burden of proof had clearly shifted: the challenge was now to re-establish the conceptual separation between ethics and theology, which Locke, the pioneer of the ‘science of MAN’, had rendered inseparable. As Hume put the point in a famous passage in A Treatise: 
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. (T 3.1.1: 27)
Hume’s aim in the Dialogues was to interrogate fully the implications of the ‘science of MAN’, first pioneered by Locke, for the truth claims of natural religion by means of a concerted epistemological analysis. If the second Enquiry offered a purely secular account of moral obligation, and confined virtue to human life, then the Dialogues sharpened and developed what, in his letter to Mure, Hume presented as the necessary consequences of this insight for religion. Any religion which endowed the deity with moral attributes, and demanded ‘affection’ (piety) from its adherents, contradicted the clear insights of reason and undermined rather than reinforced men’s motives to morality and justice.​[928]​ Lacking a foundation in reason, the origins, success, and practical consequences of any such religion had to be explained in historical, psychological, and sociological terms: a question addressed by Hume in the ‘Natural History’, a work in which Cicero is once more a presiding presence. Here again the relationship between the ‘Natural History’, Dialogues, and Enquiry is an intimate one. Meanwhile the Political Discourses theorized the economic foundations of modern, commercial society—for which the Enquiry provided a moral justification.
Hume clearly expected his classically-educated reader to recognize that the Dialogues was modelled on De Natura Deorum. It is reasonable to surmise that he also anticipated that they would recognize those points at which he diverged from his classical model.​[929]​ These divergences are significant. Hume was acutely aware that, unlike Cicero, he was writing for a Christian audience, most of whom would have agreed with the opening remarks made by the impressionable youth, Pamphilus, who reports the debate. Pamphilus dutifully rehearses what he has learnt from his education under the philosophical theist, Cleanthes’ supervision: religion provides ‘the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent from our thoughts and meditations’ (DNR 5).​[930]​ No such statement can be found in De Natura Deorum, and for good reason. As Hume noted in the Enquiry:
. . . religion had, in ancient times, very little influence on common life, and . . . , after men had performed their duty in sacrifices and prayers at the temple, they thought, that the gods left the rest of their conduct to themselves, and were little pleased or offended with those virtues or vices, which only affected the peace and happiness of society. In those ages, it was the business of philosophy alone to regulate men’s ordinary behaviour and deportment. (EPM 122)
Moral theology, an explanation of the principles that determine the quality of human behaviour in the light of God’s will and intentions for created man, was only brought into being once philosophy and Christian theology had joined forces (EPM 100–101). Locke had made much the same point, if to a quite different end, in his writings of Christian apologetic: morality and divinity had only been united with Christianity.​[931]​
In one respect, Hume intimated, this made Cicero a uniquely valuable authority for the modern philosopher who sought to re-examine the relationship between morality and religious belief. In Cicero’s day, philosophy ‘was never cramped, even in its most extravagant principles, by any creeds, confessions, or penal statutes’ (EPM 100). Cicero’s value for Hume was precisely that, unlike ‘Christian’ philosophers, he had retained an open mind on the questions under review. By modelling the Dialogues on De Natura Deorum, Hume made this point eloquently. Locke may have been ‘the first Christian’ to assert that faith was (or ought to be) merely a species of reason—but he was not the first philosopher to do so. In De Natura Deorum, Cicero’s avowed objective was to make ‘the god whom we apprehend by our intelligence . . . correspond with a mental concept as a seal tallies with its impression’.​[932]​ The academic sceptic in De Natura Deorum, Cotta, challenged his Stoic and Epicurean friends (Balbus and Velleius) to convince him ‘of this fundamental tenet of the divine existence, not as an article of faith merely but as an ascertained fact’.​[933]​ In contrast to the ‘Christian’ Locke, Hume intimated that he, like Cicero, had no such investment in the debate at hand: he began from first principles to explore disinterestedly how far reason could ‘go’ in establishing truths in natural theology. Following in Cicero’s footsteps, Hume was authorized to begin with first principles.
Yet in another respect the direct relevance of De Natura Deorum for the questions explored by Hume was limited: it was for this reason that Cicero’s work required updating. Cicero had known nothing of Christianity. Hume observed that the philosophical theism of the Stoics and Platonists had rendered God immanent in the universe, thereby excluding the possibility that He was its Creator. The Epicureans, conversely, had banished God from human life altogether. Revealed Christianity, by contrast, presented a God who was transcendent, but relentlessly active in human affairs. He was the first cause of all and had at various historical junctures suspended or overturned the general physical laws of the universe (through His miracles) and the ordinary operation of human nature (through His grace) for His own particular purposes. The practical consequences of Christianity as a national religion were also very different to those of heathen polytheism. Cicero had not witnessed theistic religion’s potential to ‘weaken extremely men’s attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity’, which had only become evident in a Christian age (DNR XII: 97). The question implicitly raised and explored by Hume—most obviously in the Dialogues, but also in the ‘Natural History’—was what ‘CICERO, if alive now’ would have made of the truth-claims of Christianity (EPM 106 n.72). Here hypothesis necessarily took the place of hermeneutics. If he had lived in a Christian age in which ethics and theology were considered inseparable, how would Cicero have extended or amended his arguments? Would he have embraced Christianity? Such questions may seem odd to the twenty-first century reader of Hume; but in addressing them, as the previous chapters indicate, Hume joined a long-running debate.   
Hume first hinted at the need to update De Natura Deorum in the essay ‘Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences’ (1742). In De Finibus, Hume observed, Cicero violated his own strictures regarding the use of the dialogue form, as laid down in De Oratore.​[934]​ Cicero treated his Stoic interlocutor, Cato in ‘somewhat of a cavalier manner’; and he similarly portrayed his Epicurean interlocutor, Atticus, in a ‘pitiful light’.​[935]​ Here again Hume offered a strikingly different interpretation of De Finibus to those, like Grotius and Hutcheson, who read Cicero as endorsing Cato’s arguments. The unbalanced character of the dialogue, for Hume, illustrated Cicero’s hostility in the work to both Epicurean and (especially) Stoic moral theory. Cicero’s lapse in decorum was nonetheless understandable: in an age in which philosophy rather than religion professed to ‘regulate men’s ordinary behaviour and deportment’, such dogmatic philosophical errors were not merely speculative; they were dangerous and in need of correction (EPM 122). In marked contrast, Hume noted how in De Natura Deorum Cicero had observed the ‘true spirit of dialogue’ by maintaining ‘a tolerable equity’ among his speakers. ‘CICERO, being a great sceptic in matters of religion’ was ‘unwilling to determine any thing on that head among the different sects of philosophy’. Here, Hume might seem to suggest that Cicero had something decisive to say regarding the origins of men’s motives to morality and justice, but nothing at all when it came to the ‘inexplicable mystery’ of theology (NHR XV: 87). The operative word, however, is ‘unwilling’. Hume actually says something quite different: ‘it would have been an impropriety for so great a genius as himself, had he spoke, not to have said something decisive on the subject, and have carried every thing before him, as he always does on other occasions’.​[936]​ This is a fine-grained, but important distinction. It suggests that, on Hume’s interpretation, Ciceronian academic scepticism could settle the question of what reason could say about the nature and attributes of god decisively—but that Cicero himself had consciously refrained from doing so. 
Why? In the ‘Natural History’, Hume offers an answer. Warburton argued plausibly that the ‘contradictory’ and ‘paradoxical’ presentation of Cicero in the work provided a means of exposing the literary devices used artfully by Hume to conceal the irreligious subtext.​[937]​ The passage of the work to which Warburton drew his reader’s attention ran as follows: 
If ever there was a nation or a time in which the public religion lost all authority over mankind, we might expect, that infidelity in ROME, during the CICERONIAN age, would openly have erected its throne, and that CICERO himself, in every speech and action, would have been its most declared abettor. But, it appears, that, whatever sceptical liberties that great man might use, in his writings or in philosophical conversation; he yet avoided, in the common conduct of life, the imputation of deism and profaneness. Even in his own family, and to his wife, TERENTIA, whom he highly trusted, he was willing to appear a devout religionist. (NHR XII: 71)
Hume considered this point to be of sufficient importance to repeat it a few pages later. Even as Cicero, in Pro Cluentio, treated ‘the doctrine of a future state as a ridiculous fable, to which no body could give any attention’, he nonetheless ‘affected, in his own family, to appear a devout religionist’. The reason for Cicero’s apparent duplicity is not far to seek. One sentence further on, Hume observed that the national Roman religion ‘hung loose upon the minds of men’, contained no moral component, and was largely justified on the basis of custom, tradition, and public utility (NHR XII: 75). Heathen polytheism might have been absurd, but it was also benign: it did not interfere with the ‘natural motives of justice and humanity’ (DNR XII: 97). In De Natura Deorum Cicero considered it sufficient to expose the absurdities into which his Stoic and Epicurean friends had fallen in their respective attempts to justify their different opinions in religion with recourse to ‘the weapon of reason’.​[938]​ Yet Cicero had found it unnecessary fully to develop, and explicitly to articulate the implications of his sceptical insights for religion. Cicero’s reticence, Hume argued, illustrated the two crucial differences between ‘a traditional, mythological religion, and a systematical, scholastic one’. The former did not claim to be founded in reason, and so rested on no egregious contradictions; and, most importantly, it ‘sits so light on men’s minds, that, though it may be as universally received, it happily makes no such deep impression on the affections and understanding’ (NHR XII: 75–76).
This, for Hume, explained why Cicero had quite deliberately pulled his punches in De Natura Deorum. This reticence, Hume recognized, had since resulted in Cicero being misappropriated in a Christian age. Deists turned to Cicero in defence of their supposedly rational ethical theism; whereas on Hume’s account, Cicero had actively denied that reason could provide the foundations for a purer religion.​[939]​ It was simply an error, Hume declared, to assume that ‘because a system of religion has made no deep impression on the minds of a people, it must therefore have been positively rejected by all men of sense’, and ‘opposite principles’ established by ‘argument and reasoning’ (NHR XII: 75). This was precisely the point made by Middleton in his responses to Tindal (and, indeed, Warburton) from 1732, in which he denied that Cicero had endorsed the fallacy of ‘double doctrine’.​[940]​ Here it is worth noting that Hume read Middleton with evident interest on (or shortly before) his return to Ninewells in April 1749, since there is considerable convergence between Hume and Middleton on this point (as on many others).​[941]​ Yet it was also Cicero’s judicious refusal to say anything ‘decisive’ in De Natura Deorum that allowed Christian commentators such as Locke, Bentley, Clarke, Hutcheson, and Middleton himself to argue in their different ways that De Officiis was uniquely amenable to true (gospel) Christianity. This was a step the legitimacy of which Hume sought strenuously to deny.​[942]​ 
Here the most obvious, structural difference between De Natura Deorum and the Dialogues is particularly revealing. At the outset of his work, Cicero, speaking in propria persona, emphasized that the arguments to be advanced by the academic sceptic, Cotta, presented a dilemma. They suggested that there were no compelling grounds on which to establish the benevolence, justice, or wisdom of a first cause, in which Cotta professed to believe solely on the basis of the harmonious order he discerned in the world.​[943]​ Yet as Cicero recognized—and as Hume stressed to Hutcheson and Mure—a deity stripped of all moral attributes could not be the object of piety or reverence, and ‘religion’ as conventionally understood would be destroyed.​[944]​ In an age in which the national religion was purely ‘traditional’ and ‘mythological’, and of real social and political utility, Cicero, a statesman as well as philosopher, pulled back from drawing such disturbing conclusions. Consequently, in De Natura Deorum, it is Cicero himself who bears witness and reports the proceedings. It is Cicero who, in the final paragraph, judges against all the evidence that Balbus the Stoic’s discourse, rather than Cotta’s, ‘approximated more nearly to a semblance of the truth’.​[945]​ 
In marked contrast, in the Dialogues the debate between Cleanthes, Demea, and Philo is reported by the impressionable Pamphilus, not by Hume: the author remains invisible in his text.​[946]​ Philo, like Cotta, presents the Epicurean no less than the Stoic religious hypothesis as projecting onto the deity those qualities which they deem essential to human happiness. For the Epicurean, the ataraxia enjoyed by the deity, as by the sage, is characterized by self-interested indolence and an ‘entire exemption from all duties’, including a concern for human life.​[947]​ For the Stoic, the deity enjoys apatheia: in the divine nature, reason and the active virtues (most especially benevolence, justice, and wisdom) are realized fully.​[948]​ Both these visions of man’s true happiness, let alone god’s, were viewed as inherently subjective by Cicero, as by Hume; and they said much about philosophical pride and its tendency to embrace ungrounded hypotheses, but rather less about the divine nature. The evidence of the moral as well as physical world undermines Shaftesbury’s (and Cleanthes’) Stoic cosmic optimism that good predominates over evil, and consequently challenges the claim that this provides evidence to support a vision of God as perfectly benevolent.​[949]​ As Hume first made clear in a recently discovered manuscript fragment on evil, probably composed in the late 1730s and heavily indebted to Bayle, the Epicurean had much the better of this argument. If anything regarding God’s attributes could be deduced from the balance of good and evil in the world, then the weight of the evidence pointed to Epicurus’ denial of providence and claim that the deity took no interest at all in human life.​[950]​ Yet as Thomas Holden emphasizes, the debate regarding God’s moral attributes, and of how they might be reconciled with His power, was systematically marginalized by Hume as (once again) ‘entirely verbal’ (DNR XII: 94 n. B). To envisage the first cause as a being whose character was capable of moral evaluation of any sort—positive or negative—was a form of superstitious anthropomorphism.​[951]​ 
In the Dialogues Philo reaches a very similar conclusion to Cotta in De Natura Deorum. Even though the existence of a first cause had to be called into question, it could not seriously be denied by any right-thinking individual. Yet to move beyond this to assign moral attributes to this first cause—as the philosophical theist and, to an even greater degree, the Christian sought to do—was unwarranted. The furthest reason could go in natural theology was to establish the highly ‘ambiguous’ proposition that ‘the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence’. This, Philo emphasized, ‘affords no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance’; and ‘the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no farther than to the human intelligence; and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind’ (DNR XII: 101–102). At this point, however, the Dialogues parts company from De Natura Deorum. In the closing paragraph of the Dialogues it is the naïve Pamphilus, not Hume, who unsurprisingly endorses the arguments offered by his Christian Stoic tutor, Cleanthes. When set against the text upon which it was so clearly modelled, Hume’s Dialogues strongly invites the conclusion that, by not following Cicero in declaring openly for the philosophical theist, its author concurs with the much more forceful arguments advanced by Philo. Given the very different nature and moral consequences of heathen polytheism and Christian theism, meanwhile, we are invited to consider whether Cicero might similarly have refrained from siding with the philosophical theist had he lived in a Christian age. 
A ‘Natural History’ of Moral Theology
Hume, like Locke and Middleton, nonetheless suggested that very few—in the ancient or modern world—possessed the ‘courage’ to practice true (sceptical) philosophy: most would always ‘seek farther’, in religious as in moral questions, embracing all-encompassing hypotheses which better satisfied their psychological needs. They lacked the courage to doubt, and this had led them into all manner of errors.​[952]​ Academic scepticism, in contrast, ‘by flattering no irregular passions, it gains few partizans; By opposing so many vices and follies, it raises to itself an abundance of enemies, who stigmatize it as libertine, profane, and irreligious’ (EHU 35–36). In religious questions, few could rest content with the recognition of the bare existence of a first cause; and it followed that the history of religion as it had developed in the world owed almost nothing to the insights furnished by true philosophy. Hume’s concluding remark in the ‘Natural History’ that the ‘religious principles, which have, in fact, appeared in the world’ resembled ‘sick men’s dreams’ echoed Cicero, who dismissed popular mythologies and philosophical theologies alike as ‘more like the dreams of madmen than the considered opinions of philosophers’ (NHR XV: 86).​[953]​ In the ‘Natural History’, as in The History of England (1754–1762), Hume addressed the question which the Dialogues begged. If a religion which attributed moral attributes to a deity, and demanded piety and devotion, contradicted reason; and if it subverted men’s ‘natural’ attraction to virtue and justice on the basis of their experienced utility and agreeableness: how could such a religion have established itself so widely? For Hume, no less than for Locke, Shaftesbury, and Middleton, there was a story to tell about how the bonds which held men together in society had been undermined by Christianity.
At the outset of the ‘Natural History’, Hume distinguished between the ‘foundation’ of religion in reason and its ‘origin’ in human nature. Hume declared that, ‘happily’, the former could not be doubted: ‘The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion’ (NHR, ‘Introduction’: 33). It is important to note that, disingenuous though it may have been, there is no necessary contradiction between this statement, and Philo’s concluding remarks in the Dialogues.​[954]​ In the ‘Natural History’, Hume does not specify what the ‘primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion’ are, a question left for the Dialogues. Reason could identify the likely existence of a (possibly) intelligent first cause, and it could establish that no moral attributes could be attributed to that first cause. Yet these ‘sceptical principles’ of ‘genuine Theism’ could hardly sustain what almost all of Hume’s contemporaries would have considered as a religion worthy of the name. Such ‘principles’ had, in any case, been embraced only by the sceptical few, as indicated by Hume’s subsequent comment: ‘It is a matter of fact incontestable, that about 1700 years ago all mankind were polytheists. The doubtful and sceptical principles of a few philosophers, or the theism, and that too not entirely pure, of one or two nations, form no objection worth regarding’ (NHR I: 34).​[955]​ 
In arguing that very few philosophers had established ‘genuine’ religion on its rightful foundations by the time of Christ’s appearance, Hume raised several challenges to contemporary Christian apologists as well as deists of various stripes, as was his aim.​[956]​ First, Hume denied that the central tenets of revealed Christianity had been anticipated by the Stoic, Platonic, or Peripatetic philosophers. In referring to those ‘few’ sceptical philosophers who had embraced ‘genuine’ theism, Hume made it clear that he did not have them in mind. This undermined the apologetic strategies of those, such as Cudworth, Stillingfleet, Clarke, and Hutcheson, who in their different ways defended the reasonableness of Christianity by arguing that it enlarged upon the insights gleaned on the basis of reason by the Stoics and Platonists in particular.​[957]​ Second, Hume’s mention of the impure theism of ‘one or two nations’ struck at the heart of Warburton’s attempt to isolate sacred from profane history, by intimating (as had Middleton) that the superstitious religion of the Jews was almost identical to that of the Egyptians.​[958]​ If Christianity were ‘pure’, it must have been erected upon quite different principles to Judaism. Third, Hume denied what Shaftesbury had laboured to establish: that a pure philosophical theism, irreconcilable with Christianity, could be discovered in the writings of (especially) Epictetus and Aurelius, whom Hume mentioned by name as worshipping ‘angels and fairies’ (NHR IV: 48).​[959]​ Fourth, Hume contemptuously dismissed the claims of freethinkers such as Toland and Bolingbroke that the absurd exoteric mythological religions of ancient Egypt and Syria concealed a pure, esoteric, and theistic core (the prisca sapienta) that was subsequently corrupted by Christianity.​[960]​ Hume argued that if theism had at any time been founded upon ‘some obvious and invincible argument’, it could never subsequently have been lost. In so doing, Hume denied that polytheism represented the corruption of an initial, ‘pure’ theism: whether passed down by Adam and the Patriarchs or discerned by the earliest men in a golden age through ‘reasoning from the frame of nature’ (NHR I: 35–36). 
Hume’s account of the origins of religious belief was avowedly Epicurean, and similar to that offered by Mandeville.​[961]​ At the origin of society man was a ‘barbarous and necessitous animal’, plagued by ‘the incessant hopes and fears, which actuate the human mind’ (NHR I: 35; II: 38). It was ‘in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and astonished, that they see the first obscure traces of divinity’ (NHR II: 39). The transition from polytheism to theism that eventually took place did not represent the triumph of reason. Theism of the sort envisaged by Christians and many deists alike had never been established on the basis of an ‘invincible argument’.​[962]​ This position is once again entirely consistent with the stringent limits set to natural theology by Philo in the Dialogues. Instead, this philosophically-unjustifiable tendency to attribute human qualities (wisdom, benevolence, justice) to a theistic deity needed to be explained psychologically and sociologically. As had Mandeville, Hume broadly equated philosophical theism with Stoic self-worship, and argued that it contradicted both the fundamental tenets of revealed Christianity and the insights of true philosophy.
Polytheism, Hume suggested, was regular and subject to general principles. Ignorant of universal causes and incapable of pushing past the present appearance of things, uninstructed man attributed the immediate (and myriad) causes of happiness and, more frequently, misery to invisible powers in nature. As it was the melancholy rather than agreeable passions by which men were ‘thrown on their knees’, so these were in turn projected onto the deities they sought to placate (jealousy, anger, vengeance). As Locke had argued when discussing the Greek and Roman religions in 1663–1664, it was impossible that men could have ascribed the origin and fabric of the world to such imperfect beings (NHR III: 42).​[963]​ The Stoic ‘theologers’, meanwhile, considered god, as well as man, to be subject to fate and destiny, and to spring from a shared source. In this regard they failed to conceptualize god as the first cause of all: a true atheism. It was for this reason that Hume declared, ‘I can scarcely allow the principles even of MARCUS AURELIUS, PLUTARCH, and some other STOICS and ACADEMICS, though much more refined than the pagan superstition, to be worthy of the honourable appellation of theism’ (NHR IV: 48). The Stoic established his perfectly benevolent being on principles directly opposite to those of ‘good reasoners’. Rather than discerning the divine existence from the harmonious order of the world, he established it on the subjective basis of the good he experienced, which he attributed to a providence further evidenced by prodigies and miracles. As Cicero had emphasized in De Natura Deorum, the Stoic thereby fell into two gross errors. First, it was the argument from the balance of good or evil in the world that caused ‘the chief difficulties in admitting a supreme intelligence’, as Bayle had illustrated with such zeal. Second, God’s direct involvement in the world (particular providence) ran directly contrary to the sole argument for a possibly intelligent first cause: the regularity and order of the natural and moral worlds, attested by the constant operation of general laws in both (NHR VI: 52).
Those ‘few’ sceptical philosophers in the heathen world who had begun to look to general laws as a means of explanation, rather than attributing all unknown causes to the workings of god(s), were roundly decried as atheists by their Stoic contemporaries. Hume mentioned Anaxagoras as the first ‘genuine’ theist, and the first to be denounced as an atheist. Here Hume followed Cicero closely, who in De Natura Deorum declared that Anaxagoras was the ‘first thinker to hold that the orderly disposition of the universe is designed and perfected by a rational mind’ (NHR IV: 47 n.27).​[964]​ Yet as Hume proceeded to discuss, it was the Stoic vision of the deity—a being who demanded piety and devotion from men, and intervened directly (or through intermediate agents) in human affairs—that was most in accordance with the ‘irrational and superstitious principles’ that led the vulgar similarly to raise one god above all others (NHR VI: 53). 
Theistic religion as it had emerged in the world, Hume argued, owed nothing to reason and everything to ‘the adulation and fears of the most vulgar superstition’, as one deity came to be worshipped as a tyrannous ruler over all other lesser deities (NHR VI: 54). In a similar manner to earthly tyrants, it was assumed that such a deity might be placated only by the most servile flattery and praise. This terminated in the depiction of God as the first cause of all, thereby coinciding accidentally with the sole (and benign) principle of ‘genuine’ theism. ‘Vulgar’ theism, however, immediately pushed past this foundational proposition, as men embraced ‘the greatest absurdities and contradictions’ in their attempts to heighten their adulation. Hume intimated that this transition from polytheism to theism was identical in Mosaic Israel and pagan Rome (NHR VI: 54). Hatred and fear, not admiration, underpinned vulgar theism as it had polytheism; yet, like slavish courtiers prostrating themselves before an absolute monarch, all felt compelled to ‘endeavour, by an affected ravishment and devotion, to ingratiate themselves with [god]’. They assented to the absurd descriptions of the deity as possessing the human virtues ad infinitum presented by the theologians. Yet this assent remained ‘merely verbal’, since their ‘idea of him, notwithstanding their pompous language, is still as poor and frivolous as ever’ (NHR VII: 56). As Hume observed to Mure in 1743, by nature no man felt love and gratitude towards a purely spiritual being, and to claim otherwise was an act of self-deception or hypocrisy.
Vulgar theism’s appetite for contradiction and absurdity reached an unprecedented pitch once Christianity established itself as the national religion with Constantine. The sanctions of civil law enforced the codes of moral and devotional practice deemed worthy of a jealous and capricious deity by enthusiastic philosophers and self-interested priests.​[965]​ Philosophical enthusiasms had been indulged by individuals in all ages, as the comparison between the ‘extravagant philosophy’ of Diogenes the Cynic and Pascal indicated (EPM 122–123).​[966]​ Diogenes had, however, as with all dogmatic philosophers in antiquity, existed on the margins of civil society as the just object of contempt for all right-thinking men. The mortifying ‘monkish virtues’ practiced (and preached) by Christian enthusiasts like Pascal, by contrast, had won near-universal admiration in a Christian age. There was a toxic contradiction between ‘the representations given to us by some later religions and our natural ideas of generosity, lenity, impartiality, and justice’, as God became truly ‘barbarous’ (NHR XIII: 79). Here Hume implicitly endorsed Shaftesbury’s description of Christianity as a species of ‘daemonism’. The worship of a being that was worthy only of hatred and fear invariably corrupted men’s moral sentiments as they developed quite naturally within society.​[967]​ 
Yet only the enthusiastic few, such as Diogenes and Pascal, were able to lead such ‘artificial lives’ of the mind. Superstition was infinitely more burdensome than was ‘virtue, when men are reconciled to it by ever so little practice’ (NHR XIV: 82). Hume explained, in both the ‘Natural History’ and The History of England, how the attraction of ‘the sweets of society and mutual assistance’—which were discountenanced by ascetic Christianity—had at various times proved irresistible (T 3.2.8: 8). This was a seemingly natural process whereby the disagreeable passions stimulated by theistic religion were suppressed in society.​[968]​ This explained the tendency of vulgar theism to ‘reflux’ back towards polytheism, a phenomenon discussed by Hume in Section VIII of the ‘Natural History’. This occurred because ‘the feeble apprehensions of men cannot be satisfied with conceiving their deity as a pure spirit and perfect intelligence’, no matter how energetically priests employed the ‘chisel and hammer’ in the attempt to ‘engrave theological tenets with any lasting impression’ on men’s minds (NHR VIII: 59; XII: 72). This allowed Hume to explain what Middleton had identified in the Letter from Rome: why so many features of heathen polytheism had been incorporated into Christianity.​[969]​ The Catholic saints corresponded perfectly to the demi-gods of pagan mythology, but with a seminal difference that had been emphasized by Middleton: ‘The place of HERCULES, THESEUS, HECTOR, ROMULUS, is now supplied by DOMINIC, FRANCIS, ANTHONY, and BENEDICT. Instead of the destruction of monsters, the subduing of tyrants, the defence of our native country; whippings and fastings, cowardice and humility, abject submission and slavish obedience, are become the means of obtaining celestial honours among mankind’ (NHR X: 63).​[970]​
Precisely because the god imposed on men’s minds by the theologians failed to exercise any lasting power over their sentiments, it was necessary to resort back to images, poetical fictions, and theatrical rituals to appeal to the senses and imagination. For the vulgar, these images and saints rapidly became the sole objects of worship and the sum total of religion. This suited priests perfectly well, since it permitted them to exercise the social influence—mediating between god(s) and men—enjoyed by their heathen predecessors.​[971]​ For Hume, unlike for either Locke or Middleton, this ‘reflux’ towards the ‘easy’ superstition of a purely ‘traditional’, mythological, and ritualistic rather than a philosophical, ‘scriptural’, and moral religion was an unimpeachably good thing, so long as the priestly order were subordinated to the civil laws of the commonwealth.​[972]​ It encouraged a re-separation between what Christianity had amalgamated: religion on the one hand, and justice and morality on the other.
In several works Hume alighted upon the Renaissance as a brief period when the social, political, and philosophical benefits of a return to the Ciceronian division of labour between the moral philosopher, magistrate, and priest were fleetingly experienced. At this historical juncture, there was the promise of advances in the arts and sciences that might have far outstripped those of classical antiquity and consigned moral theology to oblivion.
In the first Enquiry, Hume noted how the ‘pertinacious bigotry’ of Christian scholastic theology had its origins in the diminution of the passion of the ‘love of truth’ in the late Hellenistic period (that is, Cicero’s age). Philosophers had gathered into dogmatic sects, claiming to have established exclusive, mutually antagonistic accounts of man’s true end: Cicero alone among the philosophers was animated solely by a disinterested concern for truth. The ‘bigotry’ evident in Christian theology, which was ‘so fatal to philosophy, is really her offspring, who, after allying with superstition, separates himself entirely from the interest of his parent, and becomes her most inveterate enemy and persecutor’ (EHU 100). It was for this reason that, in ‘Arts and Sciences’, Hume emphasized the benefits of ‘interruptions in the periods of learning’, as well as in ‘political governments and societies’: they served the purpose of ‘breaking the progress of authority, and dethroning the tyrannical usurpers over human reason’. In this case, Hume referred explicitly to the fall of the Roman Empire and the establishment of Christian superstition (underpinned by the dictatorship of Peripatetic philosophy) and barbarism throughout Europe. As men emerged from centuries of darkness with the ‘revival of learning’, the passion of the ‘love of truth’ was rekindled in those few whose constitutions led them to engage in philosophical enquiry. There had been seemingly little danger, Hume argued, that they would once again submit their reason to the authority of the bigoted sects of the Ciceronian age. As Hume noted, ‘upon the revival of learning, those sects of STOICS and EPICUREANS, PLATONISTS and PYTHAGORICIANS, could never regain any credit or authority; and, at the same time, by the example of their fall, kept men from submitting, with such blind deference, to those new sects, which have attempted to gain an ascendant over them’.​[973]​ Rather than defending philosophical systems erected on ungrounded hypotheses, they were freed to consult nature and confine themselves ‘to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians’ (EHU 121). A much greater number of philosophers might have become academic sceptics like Cicero.
The Renaissance was discussed in identical terms in The History of England. Hume observed how, at this time, a ‘few persons of a studious disposition’ experienced ‘a sceptical turn’. That is, they increasingly endorsed the ‘doubtful and sceptical principles’ of those ‘few’ philosophers who had begun to establish ‘genuine’ theism (a first cause) on its sole foundation (general laws) (HE III: 186–187).​[974]​ In the ‘Natural History’, Hume similarly observed that it was only at the Renaissance that a belief in myriad lesser deities, so central to both pagan mythology and Stoic theology, was finally recognized as a true atheism. Until this point, Europeans considered that ‘all nature was full of other invisible powers; fairies, goblins, elves, sprights’. Yet the consequences of this brief indulgence of sceptical reasoning at the Renaissance had not been explored fully, as indicated by what Hume says next. ‘Our ancestors in EUROPE,’ Hume noted, ‘before the revival of letters, believed, as we do at present, that there was one supreme God, the author of nature, whose power, though in itself incontroulable, was yet often exerted by the interposition of his angels and subordinate ministers, who executed his sacred purposes’ (NHR IV: 44, italics added). The idea of an active god and lesser deities, essential to the Christian story, could hardly have withstood the enlightening rays of true sceptical philosophy. The very core of Christianity as a scriptural religion directly contradicted the ‘primary principles of genuine Theism’: the belief in a first cause.
This ‘sceptical turn’ at the Renaissance, then, had promised to recognize the stringent limits of natural theology identified by Cicero and, in the Dialogues, by Philo. Whilst the belief in a first cause might perhaps be justified, no further inferences for human life could be drawn from this insight. Popular religion would, inevitably, push past this foundational truth, and endorse absurd rituals and poetical myths regarding the deity. Yet at the Renaissance, philosophers and statesmen appeared to be on the verge of recognising these, as had Cicero, as necessary fictions. They were intended to indulge the vulgar tendency to superstition but had to be subordinated to (and made consistent with) the demands of morality and justice. This sceptical philosophy, Hume suggested, began to be cultivated in Leo X’s court, which ‘had not been wanting a just sense of freedom’ as ‘upon the revival of letters, very generous and enlarged sentiments of religion prevailed throughout Italy’.​[975]​ Leo’s own ‘familiarity with ancient literature’, allied to ‘a sound judgment, moderation, and temper’, ensured that he was ‘fully acquainted with the ridicule and falsity of the doctrines, which, as supreme Pontiff, he was obliged by his interest to promote’ (HE III: 138; 142). In his hands, popular religion was increasingly stripped of its doctrinal content: ‘the ancient religion, by giving its votaries something to do, freed them from the trouble of thinking’, and ‘began to diffuse a general elegance of taste, by uniting it with religion’ (HE III: 354). Superstition, then, was at this time becoming ‘so innocent and inoffensive’, as it had been in Cicero’s age.​[976]​ At this historical juncture, Hume continued, ‘it might have been hoped, that learning and knowledge, stealing in gradually, would have opened the eyes of men’, and further ‘corrected such of the ecclesiastical abuses as were the grossest and most burthensome’ (HGB: 98).​[977]​
The Protestant Reformation explained why, in all of these works, Hume discussed the Renaissance primarily with recourse to the conditional tense. ‘Arts and Sciences’ celebrated the apparent vanquishing of dogmatic philosophical sectarianism at the Renaissance; but it was immediately followed by four essays entitled ‘The Epicurean’, ‘The Stoic’, ‘The Platonist’, and ‘The Sceptic’. This implied that a ‘blind deference’ to the ‘different ideas of human life and of happiness’ taught by the late Hellenistic sects had returned with a vengeance in recent centuries.​[978]​ Philosophers had once more split into sects, which professed to offer mutually-exclusive and subjective accounts of the summum bonum and accordingly ‘narrow’ definitions of virtue, maintaining that ‘the road which he pursues [is] the only one that leads to happiness’. The Sceptic is again a lonely voice in the wilderness, deflating the bloated claims of his fellow philosophers to have identified the good: the only determinate conclusion to be drawn from philosophy, he observes, is that ‘there is nothing, in itself, valuable or despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed; but that these attributes arise from the particular constitution and fabric of human sentiment and affection’.​[979]​ Given the tendency of different Christian sects and confessions to align themselves with particular philosophical schools, such sectarianism had enslaved a far greater number of men than had been the case in an ancient world in which philosophers had attracted only a few disciples. If the Renaissance had freed philosophy from the dictatorship of Aristotle, the Reformation had enslaved it to that of Epicurus, Zeno, Plato, and Sextus. This, in turn, had asphyxiated the ‘science of MAN’ at its birth, and prevented the ‘improvements . . . in natural religion’ that were ‘in some measure dependent’ upon its cultivation (T, ‘Introduction’, 4).​[980]​
The unrealized promise of the Renaissance was also a guiding theme in Hume’s History. The serene reorganization of philosophy, religion, and manners under Leo X was rapidly perverted by ‘polemical science’ and ‘the controversies of theology’ (HGB: 97). The absurd teachings of Luther and Calvin met with no sustained philosophical opposition, since ‘the period, during which letters were cultivated in Italy, was so short as scarce to allow leisure for correcting this unadulterated relish’ for sectarian squabbling (HGB: 247).​[981]​ As ‘reason played [no] considerable share’ in the unfolding of the Reformation, so it could not prevent it embracing once more the most manifest contradictions (HE III: 141). This was especially true of England under Henry VIII whom, echoing Middleton, Hume presented as remaining attached to ‘the imagined purity of his speculative principles’, which he had acquired as a youth from his favourite author, Thomas Aquinas (HE III: 222; 140).​[982]​ Protestantism was simply the consequence of the natural reflux to theism that took place when a popular religion had too clearly returned to its polytheistic roots. ‘Popular theology’ continued to draw from the false philosophy of the heathen sects to justify irregular passions that led men away from the natural inducements of morality and justice (NHR VI: 53).
The consequences of this were described at length by Hume in his History.​[983]​ Once established as a national religion, Protestantism inevitably and necessarily veered once more towards polytheism to retain votaries who required more than a purely spiritual representation of the deity. This explained the ritualistic redirection of Anglicanism under Laud, who was treated by Hume with notable sympathy (HE V: 458–460).​[984]​ This reflux, however, was met by flux, as enthusiastic Puritans once again emphasized the poverty of men’s natural moral powers and the tyrannical sovereignty of the deity over His earthly as well as spiritual kingdom. Not only the established, traditional religion but the rules of justice and morality that had developed historically on account of their experienced communal utility were denounced as superstitious and sinful by antinomian enthusiasts. As Locke had similarly observed, even those Protestant sects that claimed to be the most rational and moderate, such as the Socinians, ended up embracing ‘the most unintelligible sophisms’: ‘A system becomes more absurd in the end, merely from its being reasonable and philosophical in the beginning’ (NHR XI: 66).
For Hume, the very nature of Christianity as a species of vulgar theism made this inevitable, because the deity it presented was possessed of human attributes (whether those more conducive to the Stoic’s apatheia or to the Epicurean’s ataraxia). It could not restrain itself to the sole principle of ‘genuine’ theism: ‘The centre of unity of all men with relation to religion is, That there is a first cause. As you augment the propositions you find non-conformists, Atheists, Epicureans, idolators, those who maintain the extension, non-position, necessity of the first cause, etc.’.​[985]​ All these debates were ‘merely verbal’. Christianity simply perpetuated the tendency of philosophers to pass beyond ‘reason and common sense’ to embrace ‘absurdity and contradiction’, with consequences that were far more disastrous for human life than had been the case in the heathen world (NHR XI: 66). These consequences were discussed by Hume in his treatment of the Civil War in the History. Here the unintended but beneficial long-term consequences of religious and philosophical enthusiasm in furthering the causes of civil liberty, religious toleration, and commercial sociability were explored in a manner not dissimilar to that provided by Mandeville in Origin of Honour.​[986]​ 
Hume’s Two (Ciceronian) Definitions of ‘True Religion’
For all the damage it had caused, Hume recognized that institutional religion was here to stay. Even if, in the Dialogues, Hume refused to follow Cicero in pragmatically endorsing the philosophical theist’s arguments, the final section (XII) of the work saw an accommodation of sorts between Philo and Cleanthes. This was facilitated by the exit from the dialogue of Demea, Hume’s rather unconvincing caricature of the dogmatic orthodox Calvinist divine. It was Demea who rehearsed the argument a priori, not Cleanthes: an indication of how, post-Locke, the mainstream of religious apologetic in England and Scotland embraced a more empirically-grounded (a posteriori) strategy.​[987]​ This left the two characters who shared a commitment to the ‘science of MAN’, even as they diverged on its consequences for the relationship between morality and religion: the ‘careless’ sceptic, who hitherto had propounded many of the arguments against natural religion developed by theorists of self-love working within the Augustinian-Epicurean tradition; and the ‘philosophical theist’, who sought to erect theism upon the broadly Stoic foundations of natural human sociability and benevolence. Notwithstanding their differences, Philo and Cleanthes ‘live in unreserved intimacy’, as had Brutus, Cicero, and Atticus in ancient times: a model, perhaps, for how Hume desired intellectual debate to be conducted in contemporary Scotland.​[988]​ At this point, Philo admitted to Cleanthes, as had Hume in defending A Treatise in 1745, that his ‘careless scepticism’ was largely rhetorical; he proceeded to redefine his scepticism in ways familiar to readers of Essay XII of the Philosophical Essays (‘Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy’). Philo did so to isolate the points upon which he and Cleanthes might agree: that is, once again to cultivate a via media between the neo-Stoic and neo-Epicurean. 
Cleanthes might baulk at Philo’s claim that all debates surrounding the divine nature and attributes were nothing more than a ‘dispute of words’ (DNR XII: 96). Yet what perhaps mattered more to Philo (and to Hume) was Cleanthes’ willingness to accept that no religion ought to be considered legitimate which declaimed ‘in express terms, against morality’, and represented the individual’s adherence to this-worldly morality and justice ‘as a sure forfeiture of divine favour’ (DNR XII: 98–99). In this respect Christianity, Philo suggests, might be considered ‘reasonable’ so long as it merely reinforces those rules of morality and justice which develop historically according to their experienced utility and agreeableness in this life. This ethical Christianity, akin to Middleton’s, would refrain from advocating a ‘steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal salvation’, which ‘is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections’ by inculcating the ‘monkish virtues’ (DNR XII: 97). In effect, even as he denies the philosophical foundations upon which it is defended, Philo expresses a readiness to make terms with an ethical (rather than doctrinal) Christianity, the moral teachings of which are fully consistent with Cicero’s ‘Catalogue of the Virtues’ in De Officiis. Any such religion would, as Middleton suggested, remain historically invisible precisely because it was benign: it would not weaken ‘men’s attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity’ (DNR XII: 97). This is exactly the vision of ‘true’ religion finally offered by Cleanthes: ‘The proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience; and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of morality and justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these other motives’ (DNR XII: 95). 
Elsewhere Hume indicated his own willingness pragmatically to endorse such a doctrinally-minimal form of Christianity because of its benignity: that is, for the same reason that Cicero had endorsed the Roman religion. In a response to critics of his treatment of the Reformation in the first volume of the History, Hume echoed Cleanthes: ‘the proper office of religion is to reform men’s lives, to purify their hearts, to enforce all moral duties, and to secure obedience to the laws and the civil magistrate’. It followed that ‘the adulterate species of [religion] alone, which inflames faction, animates sedition, and prompts rebellion, distinguishes itself on the open theatre of the world’, and ‘the historian, therefore, has scarce occasion to mention any other kind of religion; and he may retain the highest regard for true piety, even while he exposes all the abuses of the false’.​[989]​ This kind of ‘true’ religion, Hume repeatedly emphasized, would of necessity be a civil religion under the strict supervision of the magistrate. As Middleton had stressed, the tendency of the Christian priesthood was to disturb rather than to promote the interests of civil society. Priests, if unrestrained by civil law, were to be despised as ‘Pretenders to Power and Dominion, and to a superior Sanctity of Character, distinct from Virtue and good Morals’.​[990]​ For this very reason Hume, like Middleton, considered a rigorously Erastian relationship between Church and State to be essential. Indeed, in advancing this definition of a ‘true’ Christianity which merely reinforced men’s motives to morality and justice, Hume invoked Middleton’s authority.​[991]​ Clergymen ‘who are set apart by the Laws’ might alone prevent the continual tendency of theistic religion to subvert morality and justice, and consequently ‘there is no Rank of Men to be more respected’.​[992]​ So long as Christianity were constrained to play broadly the same role as the Roman religion in Cicero’s day—subordinated to civil law, and not interfering with men’s moral sentiments—it might be defended on Ciceronian grounds.
Yet in his final contribution to the Dialogues, Philo offered an alternative definition of ‘true’ religion which directly contradicted what both Locke and Middleton had laboured so hard to establish: that an ethical and tolerant Christianity was entirely consistent with, and enlarged upon, Ciceronian moral philosophy. Morality was confined entirely to human life, as Hume had shown through his rewriting of De Officiis in the second Enquiry, and a future state served no necessary moral function. As Locke had recognized, it was men’s craving for others’ approval which primarily explained moral motivation, not their concern for salvation; but, contra Locke, Hume showed that the existence of a future state was similarly unnecessary to explain moral obligation. Cicero, on Hume’s presentation, would assuredly have considered Christian moral theology to be indicative of psychological disorder, and morally pernicious in its consequences. As a result, the ‘religious man’ who wanted to ‘do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition’ offered by Philo had to ‘fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity’ (DNR XII: 102). He had to embrace Pyrrhonian, not academic scepticism. His faith required the renunciation of his reason: not because this form of theism went beyond reason (as for Locke), but rather because it entirely contradicted the insights reason offered (as for Pascal and Bayle). The only tenable philosophical grounds for Christian belief, if they could seriously be considered as such, were fideistic. 
In private, Hume confessed that he would welcome ‘the pleasure of seeing the churches shut up, and the Clergy sent about their business’.​[993]​ Human life would be all the richer were churches ‘converted into Riding Schools, Manufactories, Tennis Courts or Playhouses’, which genuinely contributed to ‘an increase of humanity’ by strengthening ‘the very habit of conversing together, and contributing to each other’s pleasure and entertainment’.​[994]​ Ultimately, however, the most that one could hope for was to witness ‘the downfal of some of the prevailing systems of superstition’, leaving only a benign, amiable, and historically invisible religion which had rather more in common with ancient paganism than with anything distinctively Christian.​[995]​
Conclusion
Hume’s determination to undermine the philosophical foundations upon which Locke had erected his moral theology is most succinctly illustrated by briefly considering two, short essays which, like the Dialogues, were published posthumously (and anonymously): ‘Of the Immortality of the Soul’ and ‘Of Suicide’ (1777). These essays were composed, at the very latest, by the mid-1750s, but in all likelihood considerably earlier.​[996]​ Focused squarely on the cardinal tenet of Locke’s moral theology—the moral importance of a future state—they nonetheless reflect Hume’s thinking on a subject to which he had devoted more attention than any other since the late 1730s. William Smellie later opined that, in ‘the sophistry of the reasoning’ and the ‘poison they contain’, they threatened to exercise far more ‘injurious effects . . . on society’ than either the ‘Natural History’ or the Dialogues.​[997]​ This study has provided a context which allows us better to understand why these short pieces were considered to be quite so subversive. 
‘Of the Immortality of the Soul’ was presented in short, sharp paragraphs, and—like Locke’s own treatment of the question in the Essay, and his subsequent responses to Stillingfleet—reads like a digest of extracts drawn from Cicero’s philosophical writings.​[998]​ Hume began precisely where Locke had left off in defending his treatment of the subject from Stillingfleet’s cavils, by citing 2 Timothy 1.10 (the doctrine was ultimately ‘brought to light’ by Christ). For Locke, however, the Gospels themselves were only credible insofar as they enlarged upon primarily moral truths identified by unassisted reason. To establish this point, Locke had drawn extensively from Tusculan Disputations.​[999]​ Locke argued that the metaphysical arguments of the Stoics and Plato, endorsed by Stillingfleet, led to atheism in suggesting the pre-existence as well as the immortality of the soul. Physical arguments, meanwhile, played into the Epicurean’s hands: all the evidence of the natural world pointed to the mortality of the soul. It was solely on the basis of moral arguments, Locke claimed, that the doctrine found support, as it offered what philosophy alone could not: a definition of man’s true end, and the greatest inducement to live virtuously. This complemented Locke’s more general apologetic strategy, which suggested that Christ’s teaching enlarged upon the limited insights of true (Ciceronian) moral philosophy, thereby attesting to the former’s reasonableness and its necessity.
In his essay, Hume re-emphasized the importance of establishing religious principles on cognitive rather than affective grounds, since ‘all doctrines are to be suspected, which are favoured by our passions’.​[1000]​ Like Mandeville, Hume was in no doubt that the doctrine of a future state originated in the ‘hopes and fears’ that actuated the human mind.​[1001]​ The question remained as to whether it had a foundation in reason. As had Locke, Hume divided the evidence into three categories: metaphysical, physical, and moral. As had Locke, Hume paraphrased Tusculan Disputations almost verbatim in order to reject the metaphysical and physical arguments and show that both led to atheism. When he came to consider the moral arguments upon which Locke had laid such weight—and which, Locke claimed to Stillingfleet, Cicero would have endorsed—Hume drew from a source that Locke had studiously avoided in his discussion.​[1002]​ This was De Natura Deorum, the work in which Cotta had similarly challenged his antagonists to prove the principles they sought to defend on reason alone. Hume’s arguments to undermine the moral evidence in favour of the doctrine were identical to those employed by Cotta to refute Balbus. Moral arguments, both argued, were grounded on the fallacious assumption that God could be known to possess attributes (justice, goodness, benevolence, power) ‘beyond what he has exerted in this universe’, but which ‘according to human sentiments’ were ‘essential parts of personal merit’. This was once again to fall into the error of the Stoics and Epicureans, and ‘suppose, that human sentiments have place in the deity’, when the ‘chief source of moral ideas’, as with men’s ideas regarding justice, ‘is the reflection on the interests of human society’.​[1003]​
Human natural and positive law were guided solely by estimations of public utility—those qualities recognized as ‘essential parts of personal merit’ were useful and agreeable to men in this life—and could say nothing regarding a deity or a hereafter. The absolute nature of this separation between human moral codes and the Christian God’s declared will, which Locke had sought to render inextricable, was further indicated in ‘Of Suicide’.​[1004]​ Most men were in fact possessed of the desire of self-preservation in a very great degree. Yet to conceptualize this as an inviolable duty under natural law, to be enforced by the civil law and ‘Law of Reputation’, was as inhumane as it was chimerical. It imposed an ‘ought’ where, in the case of most men (except the suicide), there was only an ‘is’. Locke’s error reflected the disastrous confusion that had taken place in the Christian world between human (and humane) ideas of morality and justice, and theological imperatives.








Early modern philosophers told tales, and their writings possess a remarkable narrative quality. We have seen that the seemingly arcane story of how far the ancient philosophers had been able to ‘get’ in moral, religious, and political philosophy, and of how the Christian revelation had affirmed, enlarged upon, or contradicted their insights, was intimately related to other narratives which have received considerably more scholarly attention. These include, but are not confined to: the story of man’s emergence from a state of nature, through the construction of the civitas; the historical role of institutional religion, whether pagan, Christian, or idolatrous, in supporting (or undermining) civil society and the codes of morality and justice by which it is regulated; the story of the development of a modern age defined by rampant consumerism, in which almost every individual nonetheless appears to govern their speech and actions according to a consideration for others’ material and psychological needs (‘politeness’); and the broader history of the human mind, which (pace Bacon) emphasized the remarkable practical consequences of purely speculative philosophical error in impeding mankind’s quest for the kinds of useful knowledge which contribute materially to human life. This study has argued that a close identification with Cicero as an academic sceptic, hostile to the revived Stoic and Epicurean traditions, informed a series of distinctive and intellectually adventurous interventions in an ongoing debate over these issues. 
The conviction that Cicero offered unique insights into human nature and the relationship between moral philosophy and moral theology did not begin with Locke, any more than it ended with Hume; nor was it confined to Britain, and still less to the particular authors upon whom this study primarily focuses. This book might have been extended chronologically, back to a Renaissance interest in academic scepticism (glanced at in Chapter 4, with Erasmus) or even further still to the age of Augustine (a constant, if shadowy presence in these pages) and Jerome (shamefully ignored): all of whom suggested, in differing ways, that there was perhaps a unique, if potentially problematic relationship between Cicero’s moral philosophy and Christian moral theology. It might also have adopted a broader geographical perspective. To take one example: Montesquieu’s early intellectual development was marked at every stage by a close engagement with Cicero’s philosophical writings, which he evidently held to be an invaluable resource in considering the relationship between politics, ethics, and religion in the ancient and modern worlds.​[1005]​ In the early 1710s, Montesquieu composed a laudatory essay on Cicero (the Discourse sur Cicéron); and his extensive reading notes on Cicero’s works, which date from this period, survive.​[1006]​ Indeed, Montesquieu began work on a Traité de Devoirs (book of offices) in c.1720 which, modelled on De Officiis, was intended as a response, in part, to Hobbes’s theory (and perhaps to Pufendorf’s own De Officiis of 1673).​[1007]​ Even as, in his later published works, this early admiration for Cicero had abated somewhat, Montesquieu’s reading of Cicero broadly as a Stoic—an interpretation which seems to have been informed by his enthusiasm for the writings of Samuel Clarke (discussed in Chapter 4) —might allow us better to understand why both Middleton and Hume were so critical of his approach and conclusions.​[1008]​ Relatedly, this study has neglected the continued importance of the kind of reading of both Cicero and Locke offered by Clarke, which was taken further by the Rational Dissenters in England and proved influential in America.​[1009]​
All this having been said, the approach adopted in this book is informed by a conviction that there was a particularly direct and distinctive conversation between the authors upon whom I have chosen to focus: none of whom were sympathetic to Clarke’s (and subsequently Montesquieu’s) Christian Stoic reading of Cicero. The importance Locke, Middleton, and Hume accorded to their interpretations of Cicero as an academic sceptic was clearly apparent to their critics. Stillingfleet, or Shaftesbury, or Warburton, or Hutcheson recognized that to challenge this interpretation was one, powerful means of critiquing their methodologies, and the substantive conclusions drawn from them. It is no exaggeration to say that Locke, Middleton, and Hume were central provocateurs in the development of a full-blown Ciceronian controversy in eighteenth-century Britain, even as this has largely escaped the attention of scholars—a controversy which was overwhelmingly preoccupied with the relationship between moral philosophy and moral theology. 
This controversy also continued beyond the chronological confines of this study, particularly in Scotland. Hume’s later Scottish critics adopted a remarkably similar approach to that of his earliest, Hutcheson: not least in their attempts to reclaim Cicero as a Stoic moralist. If Hobbes had subordinated ethics to politics, then Hume was felt to dissolve it into sociology, and to reduce all virtue to the practical ‘bourgeois’ kind exhibited by almost all prudential individuals in modern commercial societies. In his attempt to offer what Mandeville had not—a moral defence of commercial society—Hume appeared to his contemporary critics to offer a theory of politeness or ‘propriety’, rather than a theory of ethics properly so-called. As we have seen, Hutcheson had advanced this criticism with reference to Hume’s interpretation of Cicero. Hutcheson stressed Cicero’s strictly limited objectives in De Officiis. This work had been intended for young gentlemen who were ‘already well instructed in the fundamentals of moral philosophy’: perhaps from their prior study of De Finibus and Tusculan Disputations, which distinguished (as De Officiis explicitly did not) between those qualities that were, in fact, usually praised in society, and those that were normatively praiseworthy (or honestum). By interpreting De Officiis as ‘a complete system of morals or ethics’, however, Hume in effect dissolved any such distinction: men’s moral sentiments develop through their encounters and interpersonal exchanges in society, and the norms by which they judge of the appropriateness of their own and others’ actions are to a great extent determined by the common needs and interests of the community in which they happen to live.    
As had Hutcheson, Thomas Reid drew heavily from Cicero’s rhetorical writings and, indeed, Shaftesbury’s Sensus Communis in order to respond to Locke and Hume.​[1010]​ Reid argued that, ‘though an Academic, [Cicero] was dogmatical’ in his moral theory, and had identified ‘first principles, principles of common sense, common notions, self-evident truths’ or ‘axioms’ in morality as in religion.​[1011]​ By this means Reid re-established the fundamental distinction between the officium and the finus to which they ought to be referred, which he argued Cicero as a Stoic had understood fully. ‘What is in no degree voluntary’, Reid declared, ‘can neither deserve moral approbation nor blame’.​[1012]​ In his thunderous criticism of Hume, James Beattie similarly recognized the importance of reclaiming Cicero for the moral theory of the Stoics. Cicero’s professed allegiance to the New Academy was for Beattie—as indeed for thinkers as far apart in their moral and religious viewpoints as Shaftesbury, Warburton, and Bentley—not to be taken seriously:
Cicero seems to have been an Academic rather in name than in reality. And I am apt to think, from several passages in his works, that he made a choice of this denomination, in order to have a pretence for reasoning on either side of every question, and consequently an ampler field for a display of his rhetorical talents. . . . Let it be observed also, that when the subject of his inquiry is of high importance, as in his books on moral duties, and on the nature of the gods, he follows the doctrine of the Dogmatists, particularly the Stoics; and asserts his moral and religious principles with a warmth and energy which prove him to have been in earnest.​[1013]​
Improbable though it may seem, others in Scotland were even willing to interpret Hume’s own scepticism in much the same light as Beattie had Cicero’s. Alexander Carlyle argued that Hume’s scepticism was, like Cicero’s, mere rhetorical game-playing, and not to be taken seriously. ‘I was one of those’, Carlyle claimed, ‘who never believed that David Hume’s sceptical principles laid fast hold on his mind, but thought that his books proceeded rather from affectation of superiority and pride of understanding and love of vainglory’.​[1014]​ This tendency to relegate Hume’s scepticism to the margins has in turn exercised a regrettable influence over much subsequent historical scholarship.​[1015]​ This is reflected in the methodological approach of those scholars who have sought to impose a rigid distinction between Hume’s sceptical metaphysics and his supposed moral realism.​[1016]​ Nicholas Phillipson presents Hume as a ‘practical moralist’ who shared the fundamental objective of his fellow Scots to inculcate a civic virtue that was modelled on a combination of ‘Ciceronian Stoicism and Addisonian sociability’.​[1017]​ The presentation of Hume as an instrumental figure in stimulating a ‘renewed interest in Cicero and Stoic morality in general’ in Scotland, Phillipson suggests, makes Reid and Beattie’s turn to Cicero to criticize Hume’s moral and religious philosophy rather paradoxical.​[1018]​ As this book suggests, Hume’s philosophy undoubtedly did contribute to a revival of interest in Cicero in Scotland. Yet this activity was undertaken in no small part to refute Hume’s subversive interpretation of the ancient philosopher and the concomitant rejection of moral theology to which it led. 
No contemporary philosopher engaged more closely and sympathetically with Hume’s moral philosophy than Adam Smith.​[1019]​ Like Hume, Smith was concerned above all with the problem of social coordination in large-scale communities, given the strict limits of natural human benevolence; and, like Hume, he argued that moral consensus (or ‘concord’) between self-regarding creatures results from the processes of socialization and habituation. Consequently, Smith emphasized even more strongly than Hume the extent of the embeddedness of the individual in society. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Smith indicates how men’s sense of what is morally praiseworthy or opprobrious develops through sympathetic interactions with others. Indeed, the individual’s very sense of selfhood, and self-conscious capacity for agency, first emerged only when he came to see himself through others’ eyes and experienced the pleasure of their esteem. The Foucauldian language of ‘surveillance’ and ‘discipline’, as Fonna Forman-Barzilai observes, captures essential features of Smith’s spectatorial theory of morals. The ‘self-command’ which is the basis for all the other virtues, and which encourages the individual to moderate (if not entirely to suppress) his inevitably self-regarding passions and preferences, results from the individual’s psychological need for recognition.​[1020]​ In contrast to Foucault (or, indeed, to Rousseau), however, for Smith this actualized rather than alienated the individual’s latent capacity for subjectivity and autonomy: an insight later taken further by Hegel.​[1021]​ On Smith’s account, it simply makes no sense to think that, in acting in ways which meet with public approval, we necessarily do harm to our subjective convictions regarding what is right and proper, because it is only through this process of socialization and mutual recognition that we became self-conscious moral agents in the first place. Smith’s moral theory shows how conscience itself (the ‘impartial spectator’) is a product of education in society: the internalization of those norms of decency and propriety which have been found useful and necessary to the common good of one’s community. Consequently, there need be no tension, as Hobbes supposed, between moral judgments made in private and public (in foro interno and in foro externo). Smith’s ‘socialized conscience’ responded to two, related concerns which, as this study has shown, deeply preoccupied contemporary moral philosophers.​[1022]​ First, it could explain why almost all men might act responsibly even when, to borrow from Locke, their actions took place ‘in the dark’ (that is, not under the gaze of real spectators), without necessary recourse to God as an omniscient and omnipresent judge. Second, if self-command need not depend upon a Shaftsburian, Stoic process of rational self-disciplining in isolation from society, nor need it represent an act of self-deception and hypocrisy, as was implied in various ways by Hobbes, Mandeville, and Rousseau.​[1023]​
Smith’s confidence in the mechanisms of social reproduction was nonetheless markedly more brittle than Hume’s. This is indicated by Smith’s increasing anxiety, reflected in the successive revisions made to the Theory, to show how the truly virtuous individual might identify and live according to a higher, objective standard of moral rectitude, which (if necessary) enabled a critique of the contingent norms of good and ill which were generated endogenously within their society. We have seen that this problem vexed Locke, given the embeddedness of individuals in societies which could all too easily develop in corrupted and depraved ways; and indeed Smith’s thoughts on education bear marked similarities to Locke’s in suggesting that, even if a concern for reputation is initially essential in encouraging propriety and social conformity, true virtue inheres in the recognition of one’s accountability before a higher tribunal.​[1024]​ As Hume had shown, however, and as the moral psychology developed in Smith’s Theory further illustrated, a sentimentalist theory of morals was able powerfully to explain moral consensus and social conformity on a local level. But it seemed to preclude the possibility that the socialized individual has the epistemological and affective resources to liberate himself from the parochial conventions regarding good and ill, just and unjust which regulate his particular society, in order to subject them to critique from a truly objective (or transcendental) standpoint.​[1025]​ 
In his final revisions to the Theory in 1789–1790, Smith strove to distinguish categorically between those ‘imperfect virtues’ and qualities that did, in fact, attract other men’s admiration (which, in commercial societies, were all too often tied up with the pursuit of material wealth and fame), and those that ought to secure the esteem of a genuinely ‘impartial spectator’ (notably wisdom and disinterestedness). For Smith, too, the distinction had to be made between the ‘praised’ and the objectively ‘praiseworthy’, and between the craving for recognition and the ‘real love of virtue’.​[1026]​ Here Smith again drew attention to the limitations of De Officiis, noting that Cicero had concerned himself in that work solely with prudence and the ‘imperfect’ (social) virtues, which were primarily enforced by men’s concern to secure the good opinion of others. The moral duties outlined by Cicero in that work were ‘laws of police, not of justice’: these were indeed conventional, and guided by temporal utility. Those of ‘justice’, however, were immutable, and its precepts were seemingly disclosed to the individual on account of his very design, as Smith intended to explain in a later work which was never completed.​[1027]​ Men naturally feel a hatred and repugnance towards those who act unjustly towards others, an instinctive response which (like Rousseau’s pitié) owes nothing to education and socialization and therefore enables any potential contradictions between objective natural law and the contingent precepts of positive law to be grasped. Smith’s striving for a higher, transcendental conception of virtue, and his rejection of a theory of justice grounded in utility and convention, was clearly intended to distance his theory from fundamental aspects of Hume’s philosophy.​[1028]​ In so doing, Smith now grounded his insights on a broadly deist metaphysic: human nature was to be understood within the framework of a divine teleology that owed rather more to Stoic providential theism than it did to Christian orthodoxy.​[1029]​ Indeed, in 1790 Smith grounded the origins and sanctions of the ‘perfect’ duties ultimately in the ‘laws’ and concomitant rewards and punishments imposed by the ‘the all-seeing Judge of the world’. Smith also refined his theory of self-command in ways which attributed considerably more agency to the autonomous individual, rather than to the forces governing society, and here he drew heavily on Aurelius, Epictetus, and a Stoicized Cicero.​[1030]​ This distinctly Scottish anxiety regarding the possibility of moral autonomy in commercial societies defined by a high degree of social conformity and interdependence shaped German Idealist thought in important ways.​[1031]​ It also animated nineteenth-century liberal thinking, as attested by the profound concern with the tyranny of conformity in democratic societies exhibited by Tocqueville and J.S. Mill.​[1032]​ 
As this brief discussion of Smith and the much fuller treatment of Hume in Chapter 5 suggest, eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers were keenly interested in a question which had preoccupied Locke: that is, how men are shaped by their mutual interactions in ways that insensibly, but permanently alter their perceptions of right and wrong, good and ill. The attempt better to understand Locke’s reading of, and admiration for Cicero alerts us to the importance of the ‘Law of Reputation or Opinion’ in his decidedly naturalistic explanation of how, in practice, men acquire their moral ideas and a sense of obligation to adhere to ethical norms. The distinctiveness of Locke’s interpretation of man’s desire for the good opinion of others is brought into relief through a comparison with Hobbes and Nicole, and resides in his conviction that this desire could serve beneficial ends: it might encourage naturally solipsistic individuals to conform to shared norms, and induce them to perform the social duties which enrich civil society and give rise to mutual trust and affection. As we saw, this aspect of human nature could, like all others, nonetheless be corrupted and militate against those bonds of affection: here, Locke drew concerted attention to the catastrophic consequences of dogmatic and intolerant variants of Christianity, which tended to legitimate heinous and immoral acts in the name of piety. Hume remained deeply preoccupied by the capacity of religion to disturb the bonds which men naturally form in the course of their social (and sympathetic) interactions—precisely because of how they are indelibly shaped, psychologically and morally, through those interactions. For Smith, however, the primary danger lay elsewhere: his final revisions to the Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1790 indicate a concern that in modern commercial societies it is economic, rather than religious forces which most powerfully subvert men’s capacity properly to judge of the merits of one another (and, indeed, of their own self-worth).​[1033]​ As this suggests, even if Hume and Locke’s ethical naturalism stands in marked contrast to—and, in Hume’s case at least, was developed in part as a response to—Locke’s moral theology, we ought to consider seriously Hannah Dawson’s recent insight that, upon closer investigation, ‘we might find that the naturalising figures of the Enlightenment, such as Hume, learned as much as they rejected from their forbears’ such as Locke.​[1034]​ The chasm between seventeenth-century voluntarist natural law and eighteenth-century Scottish social analysis may not be as great as John Dunn and, more recently, Colin Heydt imply.​[1035]​ 
In addition to its other aims, this book has sought to show how the pervasive interest in the relationship between classical moral philosophy and Christian moral theology gave rise to contrasting historical narratives of the significance and consequences of Europe’s transition from paganism to Christianity. Here it is perhaps unsurprising to find that the intellectual biography of Edward Gibbon was profoundly marked by an engagement not merely with the writings of Locke, Hume, and Cicero, but also with those of Middleton, who probed the boundaries between sacred and civil history.​[1036]​ Like Middleton, Gibbon was raised ‘a high Tory in Church and State’: his father’s Jacobite leanings were shared by the members of the Senior Common Room at Magdalene College, Oxford, where the youthful Gibbon was introduced to ‘the dangerous mazes of controversy’.​[1037]​ With the assistance of Middleton’s Free Inquiry, Gibbon recognized where such High Church, non-juring principles necessarily led, and converted to Roman Catholicism in 1753.​[1038]​ As had Chillingworth, Gibbon rapidly came to recognize his error, and ‘emerged from superstition to scepticism’; from the moment of his reconversion in late 1754, Gibbon ever after ‘suspended my Religious enquiries’. In his Memoirs, he declared that ‘[s]uch as I am in Genius or learning or in manners, I owe my creation to Lausanne’, where he spent five intellectually fertile years following his return to the Protestant fold. Not the least significant of his voluminous reading in this period were ‘all the Epistles, all the Orations, and the most important treatises of Rhetoric and Philosophy’ by Cicero, along with a careful study of Locke’s Essay and Giannone’s Civil History. It was, Gibbon later claimed, ‘Dr Middleton’s history [the Life of Cicero], which I then appreciated above its true value, [that] naturally directed me to the writings of Cicero’ in 1755.​[1039]​  This enthusiasm for Cicero continued into the 1760s, when his tiresome militia duties permitted only intermittent opportunities to read: ‘the hungry appetite with which I opened a volume of Tully’s philosophical works is still present to my memory’.​[1040]​
Gibbon’s first publication, the Essai sur l’Étude de la Littérature (1761), betrays a very similar reading of Cicero to that offered by both Middleton and Hume. This work indicates, as its modern editors note, a ‘philosophical rather than predominantly or exclusively historical’ approach to religion, which suggests that Gibbon remained in thrall to their interest in the philosophical foundations and moral consequences of both polytheistic and theistic belief.​[1041]​ Gibbon’s first publication in English similarly testifies to his deep interest in the question which preoccupied all of the authors upon whom this study has focused: that is, whether the ancient philosophers had taught, or believed in, the doctrine of a future state. His Critical Observations on the Sixth Book of the Aeneid (1770) took aim at ‘the Dictator and tyrant of the World of Litterature’, Warburton, by ridiculing his contention in the Divine Legation that the Aeneid ought to be read allegorically as a work of political philosophy, inculcating a belief in immortality without which no civil society could subsist.​[1042]​
Meanwhile, Gibbon’s treatment of Christianity in the first volume of his magnum opus, the Decline and Fall (1776–1789), similarly betrays an investment in these questions, and was recognized by many contemporaries to be deeply indebted to Middleton and Hume. In responding to his critics in the Vindication (1779), Gibbon protested that the nature of his work meant that ‘I had been obliged to connect the progress of Christianity with the civil state and revolutions of the Roman Empire’.​[1043]​ Hugh Blair begged to disagree: Gibbon’s historical project, he argued, did not require him to engage so closely with the philosophical issues mined with such relish by Middleton and Hume.​[1044]​ Chapters 15 and 16 brought Gibbon firmly into dialogue with those authors discussed in this study on the vexed question of how Christian moral theology had reinforced, enlarged upon, or contradicted heathen moral and political philosophy. In his discussion of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul—the second ‘human cause’ of ‘the progress and establishment of Christianity’—we should not be surprised to find that Gibbon turned to a familiar source to establish the ancient philosophers’ views on this subject. ‘The writings of Cicero’, Gibbon declared, ‘represent in the most lively colours the ignorance, the errors, and the uncertainty of the ancient philosophers with regard to the immortality of the soul’. In a footnote to this passage, Gibbon cited ‘the first book of the Tusculan Disputations’, which had guided Locke’s treatment of the subject, along with other of Cicero’s works.​[1045]​ 
In pagan Rome, Gibbon continued, men’s ‘actions, their characters, and their motives, [were] never regulated by any serious conviction of the rewards or punishments of a future state’. Instead, ‘superstition always wore the appearance of pleasure, and often of virtue’: a verdict which closely echoed Hume’s in the ‘Natural History’ and History of England.​[1046]​ As Middleton, Hume, and indeed Locke had argued, ‘the cheerful devotion of the Pagans’ was void of ethical or doctrinal content; as a consequence, it was morally benign, and allowed for ideas of morality and justice to develop according to what was found to be in the interests of Roman society. In stark contrast, the millenarian teachings and ‘rigid sentiments’ of the fanatical early Christians, who condemned even the most virtuous of the heathen philosophers to the eternal fires of hell for their inescapable ignorance of Gospel truth, ‘seems to offend the reason and the humanity of the present age’. Far from providing the essential foundation for civil society, as Warburton argued, the doctrine of a future state had undermined the ties which held it together. Gibbon’s excuse for dwelling on the vindictiveness and intolerance of the primitive Christians, who rejected the social virtues advocated in De Officiis as damnable vices, was identical to that offered by Middleton and Hume: 
The theologian may indulge the pleasing task of describing Religion as she descended from Heaven, arrayed in her native purity. A more melancholy duty is imposed on the historian. He must discover the inevitable mixture of error and corruption, which she contracted in a long residence upon earth, among a weak and degenerate race of beings.​[1047]​  
As Hume immediately foresaw, Chapters 15 and 16 brought upon Gibbon the wrath of the resurgent forces of Anglican orthodoxy.​[1048]​ 
Yet Gibbon was already distancing himself from the broadly Middletonian/Humean approach he had adopted in those chapters, for intellectual rather than merely prudential reasons. The treatment of Christianity in Chapters 15-16 is made to seem anachronistic and wilfully ahistorical by both what precedes and follows it.​[1049]​ Even as these chapters draw together concerns which, this book has argued, animated British philosophers in a period of remarkable intellectual vigour and innovation, Gibbon’s subsequent volumes appeared to strip them of their vitality, urgency, and interest. The overwhelming preoccupation of British thinkers with the question of how far the ancient philosophers had been able to ‘get’ in their moral and political philosophy, and of how Christianity had either enlarged upon or contradicted their insights, increasingly appears to be a curious episode in British intellectual history (and, indeed, in Gibbon’s own intellectual biography). So, too, does the suggestion that Cicero, as a philosopher, might have something uniquely valuable to say to an eighteenth-century audience: this explains why, in his Memoirs, Gibbon qualified his earlier esteem for Middleton’s Life of Cicero. As Gibbon came to recognize, his primary interest did not lie in explaining—or, indeed, in evaluating the ethical and religious implications of—the birth of commercial, modern Europe. Instead, Gibbon turned away from western Europe, to the East; his narrative ended in 1453; and he wrote what was in large part an ecclesiastical history, concerned primarily not with Catholic authority and Papal Rome but with orthodox theology and the controversies which shaped its formation. As he did so, it was the ‘good sense’ of the Jansenist priest Le Nain de Tillemont and the learning of Mosheim, rather than the ‘calm philosophy’ of Hume or sceptical wit of Middleton, which appealed to Gibbon. Once he had taken this step, Middleton’s canonization of Cicero as an exemplary model of disinterested impartiality and epistemic open-mindedness in the Life of Cicero, and as an authority whose insights were held to speak directly to an audience almost two millennia later, could not but appear as polemical as it was unhistorical. 
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^733	 	Remer, ‘Humanism, Liberalism’, p. 33. In a letter of the 1630s, composed whilst he remained denominationally uncommitted, Chillingworth concluded that whoever examined the sacred sources of the primitive Church ‘shall not choose but confesse, or at least be very inclinable to beleeve, that the Doctrine of Arius is eyther a Truth, or at least no damnable Heresy’: Birch, ‘Life of Chillingworth’ [1741], p. v. It is likely that Locke’s esteem for Chillingworth owed something to their shared stance on the question of the Trinity.
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^783	 	Middleton to Hervey, 24 Sept. 1740, in SRO 941/47/7. For Hervey’s frustration, see Halsband, Lord Hervey, p. 266.
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